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The significance of EU level corporate governance regulation has been increasing in the years
following the financial crisis. At the same time EU regulatory initiatives in this field have
been subject to much criticism. The corporate governance systems in the EU vary
significantly and it has been argued that EU initiatives have not been adapted to corporate
environments prevalent in member states. This has been argued to have decreased the
competitiveness of listed companies and the financial markets in the EU. Several EU
corporate governance initiatives have also failed or been subject to considerable political
compromise emphasizing the challenging political nature of the EU regulatory system.
EU integration represents a model for coordinating interaction between different economies
and political systems. Understanding how supranational systems work and developing
regulation at this level remains an important venture. More attention is needed to adapt the
design of EU regulation to the varied institutional environment across the EU. To be able to
develop EU legal strategies and regulatory design in the field of corporate governance, a
better understanding of the dynamics of EU policymaking remains important.
The goal of the study is to provide a basis for developing legal strategies used in EU corporate
governance regulation in light of the challenges of the (i) varied regulatory requirements of
different corporate environments in the EU and (ii) the supranational political dynamics of
corporate governance regulation. This requires a better awareness of the factors that affect (i)
the impact and effectiveness of different legal strategies and regulatory mechanisms in
different corporate environments and (ii) the political dynamics of EU policy-making with
respect to corporate governance regulation.
The study analyses corporate governance regulation in the context of specific environments of
corporate governance and corporate ownership. With an emphasis on institutional and
political aspects of corporate governance, the study analyses and compares the effects of
different legal strategies in these environments; i.e. what the effects of different regulatory
mechanisms have been on the relationships between corporate constituencies. The study
focuses on corporate governance regulation in the context of concentrated ownership in a
Nordic institutional environment. The study also analyses the political dynamics of EU
policymaking based on economic theories of regulation and an institutional analysis of EU
policy-making. The results of study include a framework for a corporate governance index
that incorporates the prevalent institutional dynamic, as well as a qualitative model for
developing regulatory policy at the EU level.
The study relates to comparative corporate governance research and to political economy




This study has originated from observations made in my legal practice in relation to corporate
transactions, including IPO’s and takeovers, involving Nordic companies with concentrated
ownership. Having then worked with legislative and regulatory projects on takeover
regulation, it has appeared that EU and international corporate governance regulation has not
been adapted to the Nordic corporate environment resulting in unintended and unwarranted
outcomes. At the same time the EU has provided a promising source for regulation that could
circumvent entrenched or inefficient structures at national levels. Also, having worked with
EU regulators at ESMA as an adviser on regulatory initiatives, it seems to me that initiatives
and debate on how to develop EU regulation to meet the challenges posed by the varied
corporate environment in the EU are welcomed. Developing EU regulation thus continues to
be an important venture and I hope the study can make a contribution in this regard. In this
context, I wish to recognize recent efforts in Finland in relation to legislative research. This
line of scholarship is clearly important – especially with respect to EU law.
I have worked on this research project over a few years in a variety of different environments
from university surroundings in Cambridge, Massachusetts to military camps in Northern
Afghanistan. Differences in the political dynamic in these regions were so extreme as to force
a researcher to acknowledge the existence of strong links between politics, economics and
law. My experiences have convinced me that the political environment must be introduced
into qualitative economic and legal models related to defining and understanding the
dynamics of business enterprise.
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STUDYING THE DYNAMICS OF EU CORPORATE GOVERNANCE REGULATION: LAW, POLITICS
ANDMARKET STRUCTURE
I. CONTROVERSIES OVER EUCORPORATE GOVERNANCE INITIATIVES
There has been considerable criticism of some of the key EU corporate governance initiatives1,
such as the debates surrounding the introduction of the Takeover Directive2, the one-share-
one-vote initiative3 and the more recent EU corporate governance initiatives following the
financial crisis4. It has been argued5 that the EU is no more attuned than national regulators to
properly identifying market failures for the purposes of regulatory intervention, that EU
regulatory processes are vulnerable to interest group influence and that the regulatory
outcomes at the EU level may not increase social welfare6. It has even been argued that the
EU has failed altogether in its efforts to develop corporate law and that regulation in this field
should be restricted to the national level7.
It has proved challenging to introduce EU level regulation and regulatory outcomes have
often been deemed unsatisfactory. First, introducing regulatory models at the EU level that
take into account national differences in corporate governance systems has been difficult. This
dissertation originates from the observation that EU corporate regulations have often been
criticized for not having been adapted to different corporate environments. The application of
1 See John Armour, Who Should Make Corporate Law? EC Legislation versus Regulatory Competition (ECGI -
Law Working Paper No. 54/2005), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=860444 or
http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.860444; John Armour & Wolf-Georg Ringe, European Company Law 1999-2010:
Renaissance and Crisis (ECGI – LawWorking Paper No. 175, 2011, Oxford Legal Studies Research Paper No.
63/2010), available at ttp://ssrn.com/abstract=1691688 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1691688; Luca
Enriques, Company Law Harmonization Reconsidered: What Role for the EC (ECGI Law Working Paper No 53,
2005), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=850005; Luca Enriques & Matteo Gatti, The Uneasy Case for Top-
down Company Law Harmonization in the European Union, 27:4 U. PA. J. INT’L ECON. L., 939-998 (2006),
Gerard Hertig & Joseph A. McCahery, Company and Takeover Law Reforms in Europe: Misguided
Harmonization Efforts or Regulatory Competition? (ECGI Law Working Paper No 12, 2003), available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=438431.
2 Directive 25/2004/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 21 April 2004 on Takeover Bids, 2004
O.J. (L142) [hereinafter Takeover Directive].
3 See Charlie McCreevy, Commissioner, Speech at the European Parliament's Legal Affairs Committee, October
3, 2007, available at http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=SPEECH/07/592.
4 See European Commission, Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the
European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions, Action Plan: European Company
Law and Corporate Governance – a Modern Legal Framework for More Engaged Shareholders and Sustainable
Companies, COM(2012) 740/2 [hereinafter the Company Law Action Plan]; European Commission, Proposal
for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council amending Directive 2007/36/EC as regards the
encouragement of long-term shareholder engagement and Directive 2013/34/EU as regards certain elements of
the corporate governance statement, Brussels COM(2014) 213 final.
5 Enriques (2005), supra note 1.
6 Id.
7 Enriques & Gatti, supra note 1.
3
the same regulatory mechanism can have different results across a varied institutional
landscape such as the EU8. Specific regulatory mechanisms may not be adapted to prevailing
systems of corporate governance which may lead to unintended results. The structure of
corporate ownership will affect the relevance of different regulatory mechanisms, as will the
quality of enforcement, for example. This can disenfranchise specific governance models and
prevent the development of a level playing field. There has been some concern in this regard
that EU regulation has been ill adapted to an environment with concentrated ownership and to
governance systems that have developed in this type of environment – such as in the Nordic
region 9 . Key EU corporate governance regulation seems to have been adopted from
jurisdictions with dispersed ownership and then applied across the EU without consideration
for its effects in a different institutional environment10. As a result, it has been argued that the
emphasis on developing corporate governance regulation should be at the level of national
regulation; this criticism has also been vocal in the debate in the Nordic region11.
Second, a number of EU initiatives in the field of corporate governance have failed before any
new regulation has been introduced. For example, the EU efforts to introduce a mandatory
break-through rule in the Takeover Directive and the one-share-one-vote initiative, that would
have challenged the position of controlling shareholders, were not successful. It seems that
time and again initiatives have been introduced that have not been politically feasible. It has
been argued that even if the EU has issued a broad range of company law regulation the real
impact of EU company law has been limited due to political compromises necessary on many
occasions to enable regulation to be introduced at all. This has at times resulted in regulatory
outcomes that have been argued to have been misguided and ineffective12. The impact of EU
level corporate legal rules has been limited, for example, by the optionality sometimes
provided in how the rules can be implemented. This was the case in connection with the
Takeover Directive, where some of the mechanisms introduced by the EU Commission were
strongly opposed – also in the Nordic region 13 . Yet the regulatory or policy concerns
underlying those initiatives have not been wholly unwarranted. It has appeared that the form
or design of the regulation, rather than the underlying policy, necessarily, may have caused
considerable concern among incumbent dominant corporate constituencies who have then
mobilized all available lobbying efforts to (successfully) counter the initiatives.
8 Marc Goergen, Marina Martynova & Luc Renneboog, Corporate Governance Convergence: Evidence from
Takeover Regulation 29 (ECGI working paper No. 33, 2005), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=709023.
9 See Jesper Lau Hansen, The Nordic Corporate Governance Model – a European Model?, in PERSPECTIVES IN
COMPANY LAW AND FINANCIAL REGULATION 145 (Michel Tison, Hans de Wulf, Christoph van der Elst &
Reinhard Steennot, eds. 2009); see also THE NORDIC CORPORATE GOVERNANCE MODEL 9 (Per Lekvall, ed.,
2014).
10 See supra note 9, see also ANDREW JOHNSTON, EC REGULATION OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 266, 280-287
(2009), Ulf Bernitz, Mechanisms of Ownership Control and the Issue of Disproportionate Distribution of Power,
in COMPANY LAW AND ECONOMIC PROTECTIONISM 191 (Ulf Bernitz & Wolf-Georg Ringe, eds., 2010).
11 See Bernitz, supra note 10, Rolf Skog, The European Union’s Proposed Takeover Directive, the
“Breakthrough” Rule and the Swedish System of Dual Class Common Stock, 45 SCANDINAVIAN STUDIES IN LAW
293 (2004), Rolf Skog, Does Sweden Need a Mandatory Bid Rule?, A Critical Analysis (SUERF Report, 1997),
available at http://wvw.suerf.org/download/studies/study2.pdf.
12 See Luca Enriques, EC Company Law Directives and Regulations: How Trivial Are They?, 27 U.PA.J.
INT’L.ECON.L. 1 (2006).
13 See Thomas Papadopoulos, The Mandatory Provisions of the EU Takeover Bid Directive and Their
Deficiencies, 1 LFMR 525 (2007), Rolf Skog, The Takeover Directive – an Endless Saga?, 13 EUROPEAN
BUSINESS L REV. 301 (2002).
4
At the same time, the importance of EU regulation has been increasing. As economies have
become more integrated with increased globalization, there has been a need to find solutions
for coordinating economic interaction among different economic and regulatory systems.
Supranational political systems such as the EU provide one such solution – albeit with many
challenges14. Overall, the EU has provided an alternative avenue to pursue an over-arching
regulatory framework that can combine international standards with national differences15.
The characteristics of the institutional structures at the EU level have facilitated policy
making in select areas of policy, and circumvented national political processes and structural
rigidities16. The role of the EU as a source for regulation – especially in relation to corporate
governance - has further increased in the years following the financial crisis17. Even more
recently, the Commission announced its goal to develop a closer capital markets union to
enhance financing for European corporate enterprises18. Considering the close relationship
between capital markets regulation and corporate governance, developing regulatory
responses with respect to corporate governance at the EU level clearly remains an important
pursuit.
Moreover, despite the criticism, it does not seem justified to renounce EU level regulatory
initiatives as such. The EU can provide an avenue to circumvent entrenched regulatory
models, and the possibility of EU intervention can prompt national regulatory reform. EU
initiatives have increased the transparency and the comparability of regulatory solutions
across the EU19. Also, some of the criticism of EU regulation may have been self-serving and
intended to promote the interests of regionally prominent interest groups 20 . Different
corporate governance systems have their own challenges related to the potential for abuse and
supranational regulatory intervention may well have been justified from time to time. Even if
EU regulation has been far from perfect, national regulation does not necessarily fare much
better as domestic regulatory structures may be geared to promote the entrenched interests of
politically dominant constituencies21.
14 SeeMasahiko Aoki, The Japanese Firm as a System of Attributes: A Survey and Research Agenda, in THE
JAPANESE FIRM: THE SOURCES OF COMPETITIVE STRENGTH 11, 34-36 (Masahiko Aoki & Ronald Dore, eds.,
1994); MASAHIKO AOKI, TOWARD A COMPARATIVE INSTITUTIONAL ANALYSIS 391 (2001); see also Ronald J.
Gilson, Globalizing Corporate Governance: Convergence of Form or Function, in CONVERGENCE AND
PERSISTENCE IN CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 128 (Jeffrey N. Gordon & Mark Roe, eds., 2004).
15 Helen Wallace & William Wallace, Overview: The European Union, Politics and Policy-Making, in
HANDBOOK OF EUROPEAN UNION POLITICS 339, 344 (Knud Erik Jorgensen, Mark A. Pollack & Ben Rosamond,
eds., 2007).
16 Id.
17 Armour & Ringe (2011), supra note 1, at 40; see also Klaus Hopt, Corporate Governance in Europe – A
Critical Review of the European Commission’s Initiatives on Corporate Law and Corporate Governance, 12
N.Y.U. J.L. & BUS. 139 (2015).
18 See European Commission, Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council,
the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions, Action Plan on Building a
Capital Markets Union, COM(2015) 468 final, (Sept. 30.2015).
19 See Jean-Michel Josselin & Alain Marciano, Introduction: The Economics of the Constitutional Moment in
Europe, in THE ECONOMICS OF HARMONIZING EUROPEAN LAW 1, 9 (Alain Marciano & Jean-Michel Josselin,
eds., 2002).
20 Guido Ferrarini & Geoffrey P. Miller, A Simple Theory of Takeover Regulation in the United States and
Europe 15 (New York University Law and Economics Working Paper 197, 2009), available at
http://lsr.nellco.org/nyu_lewp/197.
21 See Lucian A. Bebchuk & Mark J. Roe, A Theory of Path Dependence in Corporate Governance and
Ownership, 52 STAN.L.REV. 127 (1999).
5
The legal strategies for regulatory intervention at the EU level and the design of EU
regulation clearly remain challenging issues, as discussed above. There are a number of
approaches to coordinate diverging regulatory systems, including harmonization and
regulatory competition. The EU program of positive harmonization has been subject to much
criticism in this regard. Commentators have questioned the extent to which it is appropriate to
introduce uniform EU level corporate governance regulation, for example, considering the
variation in corporate environments through the EU member states22. Instead of pursuing
market integration through harmonization, some scholars argue that regulatory competition
would be a superior way to develop EU corporate governance regulation23. The prerequisites
for effective real-world regulatory competition have been debated, however. Regulation is
only one factor affecting companies, and benefits from regulatory arbitrage in the field of
corporate law or corporate governance may not be significant enough to cover costs of
relocation, for example. Taxation has typically been a more dominant feature in this regard. It
is also not clear whether EU member states would, in fact, have sufficient incentives to
develop policies with the specific aim of attracting companies to re-establish in their
jurisdictions. EU member states may lack the incentives to supply regulation tailored to attract
incorporations24. Benefits may be limited, risky and long-term, while the investments required
would be immediate and costly25 . In the EU, considerable national lock-ins remain for
corporations subject to a plethora of regulation varying from labor regulation to taxation,
which hinder efficient cross-border establishment. Also, the differences in the institutional
environments (including complementary institutional structures) do not necessarily facilitate
an expedited process of regulatory competition. Altogether, there is some concern that the
premises for regulatory competition in the EU are still incomplete, and cannot necessarily be
relied on to provide a mechanism for EU wide regulatory development. Also, negative
harmonization based on court rulings and interpretations of the EC Treaties may be too slow
to support efficient market integration.
In this environment it remains important to identify problems related to EU harmonization
and to better understand the dynamics of regulation and regulatory processes. This can
contribute to the development of both the design of EU regulatory mechanisms and the
regulatory processes for EU regulation. This dissertation seeks to contribute to this
development by combining legal and political approaches to comparative corporate
governance research.
II. GOALS AND SCOPE OF THE STUDY
A. THEME OF RESEARCH
The goal of the study is to provide a basis for developing legal strategies for EU corporate
governance regulation in light of the challenges of the (i) varied regulatory requirements of
different corporate environments in the EU and (ii) the political dynamics of supranational
corporate governance regulation. This requires a better awareness of the factors that affect (i)
the impact and effectiveness of different legal strategies and regulatory mechanisms in
different corporate environments and (ii) the political dynamics of EU policy-making with
22 See Johnston (2009), supra note 10.
23 See Enriques (2005), supra note 1, Enriques & Gatti (2006), supra note 1.
24 See Johnston (2009), supra note 10, at 182-184.
25 Id.
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respect to corporate governance regulation. The study seeks to understand the environment for
EU corporate governance regulation by studying select EU regulatory initiatives and the
debates related to these initiatives. The study then focuses on how legal strategies can be
developed at the EU level to better respond to the characteristics and the challenges of this
environment.
The study is primarily concerned with the observation that EU regulation may have different
and even contradictory effects across jurisdictions depending on the relevant institutional
environment26. The question that arises is what institutional factors are relevant with respect
to the effects of corporate governance regulation and how these can be taken into account in
legal strategies. In this regard the study is largely based on a Nordic perspective and
observations of Nordic corporate governance systems. The Nordic perspective is used as a
tool to demonstrate the challenges of applying the same EU level regulation in a variety of
institutional environments. A key argument of the study is that different legal strategies may
be required to ensure that legal intervention has the desired effects in different institutional
environments. This should be reflected in the choice of legal strategies and regulatory design
at the EU level. Indeed, much of the criticism of EU regulatory initiatives has been targeted at
how specific regulatory mechanisms have not been adapted to different models of corporate
governance – including governance systems in the Nordic countries27.
The other principal theme of the study relates to the corporate governance policies pursued at
the EU level - as well as the underlying legislative dynamics. In this context the relevant
research questions include, first, what the dynamics of legislative processes underlying EU
level corporate governance regulation are, and second, what the prerequisites are to develop
legal strategies at the EU level to better take into consideration the differing institutional
landscape and the relevant political framework in the EU. The study seeks to understand the
dynamics affecting the legislative processes underlying EU level corporate governance
regulation. The study seeks to promote an increased understanding of how the characteristics
and political dynamics of EU regulation can be taken into account in developing supranational
legal strategies28.
The study argues that the institutional and political dimensions of corporate governance are
not sufficiently taken into account in the choice of legal strategies and in the design of
regulatory mechanisms at the EU level. Moreover, the theoretical basis for developing EU
corporate governance regulation has been insufficient – based in part on the lack of
combining different approaches to corporate governance (including combining legal and
political approaches). This has resulted in (i) an incomplete understanding of the basis for
corporate governance regulation, (ii) increased political resistance to regulatory initiatives due
to poor choice of legal strategies, and (iii) unintended consequences of EU regulatory
intervention. The study argues that formal qualitative models should be developed to
incorporate the institutional and political dimensions of corporate governance in the process
of developing corporate governance regulation.
26 Goergen, Martynova & Renneboog (2005), supra note 8; John C. Coates IV, Ownership, Takeovers and EU
Law: How Contestable Should EU Corporations Be? 12 (ECGI Law Working Paper 11, 2003), available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=424720.
27 Per Lekvall, Foreword, in THE NORDIC CORPORATE GOVERNANCE MODEL, supra note 9, at 9.
28 See John Armour, Henry Hansmann & Reinier Kraakman, Agency Problems and Legal Strategies, in
KRAAKMAN ET.AL., THE ANATOMY OF CORPORATE LAW 35 (2nd. ed., 2009).
7
The study is of topical interest as the EU Commission is taking new steps to develop
corporate governance in the EU making it particularly relevant to consider corporate law
issues in the prevailing institutional environment in Europe 29 . There has also been an
emerging interest in whether concentrated ownership can provide a competitive monitoring
structure and a basis for long term growth - at the same time there has been concern over
decreasing engagement of shareholders in models with dispersed ownership30. The study is
particularly interesting at a time when new regulatory initiatives are seen to result from the
financial crisis, and when national interests31 may be emerging that balance the drive for
further opening the internal market with regard to the market for corporate control in the EU.
Regulatory initiatives related to “better regulation” have also emerged at national and EU
levels over the past years. The EU has a stated aim of developing “better regulation for better
results” so that policies are clearly set and communicated and pursued through effective and
target regulatory initiatives32. The relevance of these types of programs can be questioned and
can, in part, be seen as political rhetoric to address legitimacy concerns of the EU.
Nevertheless, this study argues that there is room to increase the transparency of regulatory
processes in the EU and to better understand the relationship between regulation and the
institutional environment where it is applied. This can provide tools to develop the design of
regulation to better meet stated policy goals in a varied institutional environment such as the
EU.
B. DEVELOPING LEGAL STRATEGIES
Legal strategies for corporate governance have often been analysed with a focus on different
national systems of corporate governance33. Legal intervention based on prescriptive rules and
standards, often combined with disclosure obligations, is generally associated with efficient
enforcement institutions, such as independent agencies and effective court systems. This type
of intervention based on regulatory strategies may be called for when the affected
constituencies are precluded from efficiently coordinating monitoring themselves – as is the
case with dispersed shareholders, for example. Other strategies based on the ability of
“principals” to exercise monitoring functions independently may be associated with less
formal enforcement institutions. However, developing legal strategies in a supranational
framework, such as the EU, provides for special challenges as the institutional environment
29 See the Company Law Action Plan, supra note 4.
30 See European Commission, The EU Corporate Governance Framework, Green Paper, Brussels,COM(2011)
164 final (Apr. 5, 2011) [hereinafter the “Corporate Governance Green Paper”]; see also Lynn Dallas, Short-
Termism, the Financial Crisis and Corporate Governance (San Diego Legal Studies Paper No. 11-052, 2011).
31 Italy, for example, having initially adopted no-frustration and break-through rules based on the Takeover
Directive, has amended its takeover regulation after implementation to allow certain pre- and post-bid defences
to be adopted by boards. See discussion in Paul Davies & Klaus Hopt, Control Transactions, in THE ANATOMY
OF CORPORATE LAW, supra note 28, at 272. Germany, on the other hand, has introduced regulation requiring
government consent for certain corporate acquisitions by foreign acquirers. See Sec. 7 (2) no. 5
Aussenwirtschaftsgesetz (AWG) - Foreign Trade and Payments Act and Aussenwirtschaftsverordnung (AWV)
(Regulation Implementing the Foreign Trade and Payments Act). See also Jeffrey N. Gordon, An American
Perspective on Anti-takeover Laws in the EU, in REFORMING COMPANY AND TAKEOVER LAW IN EUROPE 545-
547 (Guido Ferrarini, Klaus Hopt, Jaap Winter, & Eddy Wymeersch, eds., 2004).
32 See Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic
and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions, Better Regulation for Better Results - An EU agenda,
COM (2015) 215 final.
33 Armour, Hansmann & Kraakman (2009), supra note 28, at 39.
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varies across affected jurisdictions. Where one strategy may be appropriate in some EU
member states due to the structure of corporate ownership, for example, another strategy may
be called for in other jurisdictions with a different corporate environment. The effects of EU
level regulation differ across the affected jurisdictions depending on the relevant applicable
market structures and the broader institutional environment. In some cases the effects have
been contradictory to the stated goals of EU regulation34. The design of EU regulation and the
choice of regulatory mechanisms are relevant in this regard, and may need to be tailored to
different institutional environments.
Moreover, the EU political institutions and the political processes for EU regulation pose their
own challenges for pursuing regulatory change at the EU level. Regulatory responses are the
result of political processes and the efforts of affected constituencies pursuing their interest
through the markets for regulation. The study recognizes that corporate law can be expected
to reflect the institutional power of dominant corporate constituencies35. However, the EU
framework has added considerable complexity to the political dynamic of regulatory
development. The EU process has its own characteristics with respect to interest group input
and political dynamics of the legislative process36. The EU political institutions provide an
alternative and additional framework to national institutions with respect to interest group
input and the regulatory markets. The agendas and alliances of affected constituencies and
interest groups may differ across the EU creating a challenging political dynamic to be taken
into account when considering feasible strategies for regulatory intervention at the EU level.
In summary, at the EU level it is not sufficient to address specific policy concerns within a
given institutional setting. In fact, developing EU level legal strategies poses at least two
different kinds of challenges that differ from regulatory intervention at the national level. First,
the effects of EU level regulation vary depending on the institutional environment in different
member states and, second, the political processes related to the enactment of EU regulation
create a multilevel governance framework that affects how interest groups promote their
agendas through regulatory intervention37. These factors must be taken into account also when
considering the development of EU corporate governance regulation and different
mechanisms for regulating control transactions.
The main focus of the study is to identify and assess key issues to be taken into account in
developing legal strategies for EU level corporate governance and takeover regulation for an
environment of concentrated ownership. For practical implications, the study looks to identify
concrete problems in EU regulatory design with regard to corporate governance regulation. In
this regard the study can form a basis for better design of EU corporate governance regulation.
In a broader context, the study contributes towards a better understanding of developing
regulatory strategies for supranational political systems and for complex and varied
environments.
34 See Coates (2003), supra note 26.
35 John Armour, Henry Hansmann & Reinier Kraakman, What is Corporate Law?, in THE ANATOMY OF
CORPORATE LAW, supra note 28, at 32.
36 See SIMON HIX AND BJÖRN HÖYLAND, THE POLITICAL SYSTEM OF THE EUROPEAN UNION 12-16 (2011).
37 See LIESBET HOOGHE &GARYMARKS, MULTI-LEVEL GOVERNANCE AND EUROPEAN INTEGRATION (2000).
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C. EUCORPORATE GOVERNANCE AND TAKEOVER REGULATION
EU corporate governance regulation provides an interesting field for research with respect to
the interaction between regulation and market structure. There have traditionally been
significant differences in the structure of corporate ownership in the EU member states said to
reflect basic differences in the structure of national economies referred to in the political
economy literature as varieties of capitalism38. These differences can also be explained in
terms of industrial history and path dependence39. The differences can be seen in corporate
governance solutions that have evolved in different regions in Europe and the EU member
states. Shareholder primacy, for example, has been much emphasized in the United Kingdom,
whereas corporate governance solutions in Continental Europe are said to reflect a
stakeholder model with an emphasis on balancing shareholder interests against those of other
stakeholders, including employees. Corporate governance regulation, then, makes an
interesting research topic for understanding the challenges of EU level regulatory initiatives.
One of the more controversial corporate governance initiatives at the EU level was the
adoption of the Takeover Directive. The directive was adopted in 2004 after a long legislative
process subject to intense political pressure and compromise40. While the Takeover Directive
has contributed somewhat towards harmonizing the processes related to takeover bids across
the EU, it has been criticized for not delivering the level playing field in corporate control set
as its goal41, and for not contributing to the development of a European market for corporate
control42. It has been argued that instead of facilitating takeovers the mechanisms introduced
in the directive in fact support further shareholder entrenchment specifically in the context of
concentrated ownership43. Commentators frustrated at the level of political compromise in
connection with the adoption of the directive have even argued the directive not to be worth
the paper it was written on44. This study will look more closely at the Takeover Directive.
Takeovers provide a corporate governance function as a management monitoring system and
a framework for the transfer of corporate control. The potential for conflicts of interest in
takeover situations is accentuated, while the corporate governance relationships include new
elements with the introduction of external bidders45. Takeover regulation provides therefore
an important subject (and an interesting proxy) for researching corporate governance models.
More recently, the EU Commission has introduced new regulatory initiatives in the field of
corporate governance that have also been controversial. In 2011, the Commission published
38 See DEBATING VARIETIES OF CAPITALISM (Bob Hancké, ed., 2009); and VARIETIES OF CAPITALISM: THE
INSTITUTIONAL FOUNDATIONS OF COMPARATIVE ADVANTAGE 1 (Peter A. Hall & David Soskice eds., 2001).
39 See Bebchuk & Roe (1999), supra note 21, MARK ROE, STRONGMANAGERS, WEAKOWNERS – THE POLITICAL
ROOTS OF AMERICAN CORPORATE FINANCE (1994), MARK ROE, THE POLITICAL DETERMINANTS OF CORPORATE
GOVERNANCE: POLITICAL CONTEXT, CORPORATE IMPACT (2003).
40 See Report of the High Level Group of Company Law Experts on Issues Related to Takeover Bids, Brussels,
January 10, 2002, available at http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/company/docs/takeoverbids/2002-01-hlg-
report_en.pdf [hereinafter High Level Group Report]; see also Johnston (2009), supra note 10, at 268-280.
41 See Paul Davies, Edmund-Philippe Schuster & Emilie Van de Walle de Ghelcke, The Takeover Directive as a
Protectionist Tool? (ECGI Law Working Paper 141, 2010), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1554616.
42 See Thomas Papadopoulos, The Mandatory Provisions of the EU Takeover Bid Directive and Their
Deficiencies, 1 LFMR 525-533 (2007), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1088894 .
43 See Coates (2003), supra note 26.
44 See Vanessa Edwards, The Directive on Takeover Bids – Not Worth the Paper It’s Written On?, 1 ECRF 416,
439 (2004).
45 Paul Davies & Klaus Hopt (2009), supra note 31, at 225 - 229.
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the Corporate Governance Green Paper and based on responses to the related consultation,
published an action plan on company law and corporate governance in late 201246. Many of
the original initiatives, as well as the notion of an increase in EU level regulatory intervention
in the field of corporate governance, have caused alarm among key corporate constituents in
the EU member states47. The initiatives have been argued, among other, to decrease the
competitiveness of publicly listed companies in the EU and consequently of the EU financial
markets48. In responding to the initiatives market participants have emphasized that corporate
governance issues should be regulated primarily at the national level and that the EU should
limit its involvement in this field 49 . The regulatory process related to the Corporate
Governance Green Paper and the Company Law Action Plan provide further information on
the regulatory dynamics of EU corporate governance regulation, and will be discussed in this
study, as will the key elements of the proposal to amend the Shareholder’s Rights Directive
that derive from the action plan.
Developing EU corporate governance regulation has been poignant especially as it relates to
listed companies. Stock markets have of course provided an effective avenue for cross-border
investments, and as the volumes of these investments have increased, the differences in the
corporate governance systems of EU member states have become a topic of greater interest.
Increasing the liquidity of the European capital markets has been closely related to the efforts
to develop an internal market, and the recent EU level initiative to promote a capital markets
union, the “CMU”50, is a further indication of EU interests in this field. The corporate
governance regulation of listed companies is of course closely related to these efforts51, and
has thus become an increasingly important topic for EU level regulatory initiatives52. In this
study, therefore, corporate governance will be discussed specifically in the context of public
corporations, i.e. companies with shares traded on a regulated market in the EU. Indeed, some
EU corporate governance initiatives have specifically addressed listed companies only53 .
However, it can be noted that corporate governance often relates to matters of corporate law,
and in many cases there is little difference between a listed and non-listed company for the
purposes of corporate law. Consequently the importance of EU level regulation will
necessarily increase also with respect to non-listed companies as well.
The study focuses on certain key EU level regulatory initiatives that address corporate
governance relationships. The Takeover Directive and the Company Law Action Plan,
including the proposed amendments to the Shareholder’s Rights Directive in particular, will
be used as examples to describe the dynamics of EU regulation. The study will focus on
specific provisions that are of particular interest vis-à-vis the relative position of different
corporate constituencies – these include break-through rules and provisions on mandatory
tender offers, and regulation of related party transactions, for example. This approach serves
46 See the Corporate Governance Green Paper, supra note 30.
47 Miles Johnson, Europe: EU Paper Raises Doubts over Shareholder Model, Financial Times, October 6, 2010.
48 See Swedish Corporate Governance Board, Views on the EU Green Paper on the Corporate Governance
Framework, 19.7.2011, available at
http://www.bolagsstyrning.se/media/53853/views%20on%20eu%20cg%20framework%20from%20the%20swed
ish%20cg%20board%202011-07-19.pdf.
49 Enriques (2005), supra note 1.
50 Supra note 18.
51 Id. at 24.
52 See, for example, the directive 2006/46/EC on corporate governance statements and directive 2007/36/EC on
the rights of shareholders. See also the Corporate Governance Green Paper.
53 Most evidently the Takeover Directive.
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the purpose of the study – i.e. to understand the dynamics of EU corporate governance
regulation that affects key corporate constituencies.
D. CONCENTRATED OWNERSHIP AND THE NORDIC CORPORATE GOVERNANCE
ENVIRONMENT
The study deals with how EU regulation is adapted to the varied institutional environments in
the EU. One of the key differences between different types of economies in the EU is the
structure of corporate ownership. The interaction between corporate ownership structure and
corporate governance regulation is therefore of some interest for the study. On a general level,
certain key distinctions in ownership models in the EU exist between the UK and Continental
Europe, for example. Ownership in listed companies in the UK is typically widely dispersed
with a strong institutional shareholder base54. In Continental Europe and the Nordic region, on
the other hand, listed companies may have a single large shareholder or shareholder block
with a controlling stake. Companies can also have a blocking minority shareholder who may
not have an absolute majority, but at least controls a significant block of the shares and votes
in the company55. The level of ownership concentration in EU member states has decreased
somewhat over the past decade but still remains high in many regions in the EU56. In the
Nordic region, it is reported that 62 percent of listed companies have at least one shareholder
with over 20 percent of the votes and 21 percent of the companies have a shareholder with
over 50 percent of the votes57.
Both concentrated ownership and control enhancing mechanisms remain important features
among publicly traded corporations in the EU58. These features raise specific regulatory
concerns in relation to the relationship between controlling and minority shareholders as well
as to the efficiency of corporate monitoring mechanisms59. At the EU level there has also
been concern that the structures as such are an impediment to the development of active
capital markets in the EU60 and consequently even to economic growth61. However, even
though concentrated ownership and control enhancing mechanisms remain common after
54 See Mara Faccio & Larry H.P. Lang, The Ultimate Ownership of Western European Corporations, 65 JFE 365,
(2002).
55 SeeMarco Becht, Reciprocity in Takeovers (ECGI – LawWorking Paper No. 14/2003), available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=463003.
56 See Christoph van der Elst, Shareholder Mobility in Five European Countries (ECGI - LawWorking Paper
104/2008), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1123108 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1123108
57 THE NORDIC CORPORATE GOVERNANCE MODEL, supra note 9, at 50, 280-284.
58 See Faccio & Lang (2002), supra note 54; see also Shearman & Sterling, Proportionality Between Ownership
and Control in EU Listed Companies (External Study Commissioned by the European Commission, May 18,
2007, Open Call for Tender No MARKT/2006/15/F), available at
ec.europa.eu/internal_market/company/docs/shareholders/study/final_report_en.pdf [hereinafter EU
Proportionality Report].
59 See Lucian A. Bebchuk, Reinier Kraakman & George Triantis, Stock Pyramids, Cross-Ownership and Dual
Class Equity: The Creation and Agency Costs of Separating Control from Cash Flow Rights 12 (Harvard Law
School John M. Olin Center for Law, Economics and Business Discussion Paper Series 249, 1999), available at
http://lsr.nellco.org/harvard_olin/249: “The CMS [“controlling minority structure”] lacks the principal
mechanisms that limit agency costs in other ownership structures. Unlike the DO [“dispersed ownership”]
structures, where controlling management may have little equity but can be displaced, the controllers of CMS
companies face neither proxy contents nor hostile takeovers”.
60 See High Level Group Report, supra note 40.
61 Rafael La Porta, Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes, Andrei Schleifer & Robert Vishny, Investor Protection and
Corporate Governance, 58 JSE, 3-27 (2000) [hereinafter La Porta et al. (2000)].
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years of market integration it is not clear that these characteristics have been sufficiently taken
into account in EU corporate governance regulation62. In fact, the nature of the EU initiatives
introduced to address these features suggests that concentrated ownership and control
enhancing mechanisms have to some extent been deemed problematic per se, and that these
structures should be discouraged through regulatory intervention 63 . However, empirical
studies suggest that it is unclear that concentrated ownership is an inefficient form of
corporate ownership or that control enhancing structures necessarily provide an impediment
for the development of a market for corporate control64. In fact, empirical studies in the EU
report a relationship between high levels of corporate performance and ownership
concentration 65 - and there are jurisdictions in the EU that report both high levels of
concentrated ownership and active takeover markets 66 . Nor is it clear that regulatory
intervention by itself would lead to the increase of dispersed ownership67 or indeed that other
forms of corporate ownership would be superior in the EU markets. Given the prevalence of
concentrated ownership and the entrenchment of control structures it seems fruitful to focus
on developing regulation that recognizes these features while addressing related regulatory
concerns.
The study will consider, in particular, the dynamic of takeovers and EU takeover regulation in
an environment of concentrated ownership. For practical purposes, observations will be based
on experiences in the Nordic region. The governance models adopted in the Nordic countries
have gained increasing interest internationally68. Following the financial crisis there have
been concerns related to the perceived “short-termism” of institutional shareholders and the
status of shareholders more generally in corporate governance. It has been argued that
corporate governance models are failing due to inadequate monitoring by dispersed
shareholders 69 . As a result there has been an emerging interest in the role of large
shareholders in developing better corporate governance solutions for publicly traded
corporations70. The corporate governance models in the Nordic countries, where corporate
ownership remains somewhat concentrated but where private benefits of control are
reportedly relatively low, have therefore been of interest in the international corporate
62 See Gerard Hertig & Joseph McCahery, Joseph A., Company and Takeover Law Reforms in Europe:
Misguided Harmonization Efforts or Regulatory Competition? (ECGI LawWorking Paper No. 12/2003),
available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=438431.
63 See Erik Berglöf, & Mark Burkart, European Takeover Regulation, 18 ECON. POL. 171 (2003), available at
http://www.jstor.org/stable/1344656.
64 See Harold Demsetz & Kenneth Lehn, The Structure of Corporate Ownership: Causes and Consequences, 93
J. OF POL. EC. 1155 (1985); Torben Pedersen & Steen Thomsen, Ownership Structure and Value of the Largest
European Firms: The Importance of Owner Identity, 7 J. OFMANAGEMENT AND GOVERNANCE 27 (2003); Ann-
Kristin Achleitner, André Betzer, Marc Goergen & Bastian Hinterramskogler, Private Equity Acquisition of
Continental European Firms - The Impact of Ownership and Control on the Likelihood on Being Taken Private
(Working paper, June 2010) available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1319836.
65 See Pedersen & Thomsen (2003), supra note 64.
66 Most notably this is the case in Sweden. See Jonas Agnblad, Erik Berglöf, Peter Högfeldt & Helena Svancar,
Ownership and Control in Sweden: Strong Owners, Weak Minorities and Social Control, in THE CONTROL OF
CORPORATE EUROPE (Fabrizio Barca & Marco Becht, eds., 2001).
67 SeeMagnus Henrekson & Ulf Jakobsson, The Swedish Corporate Governance Model: Convergence,
Persistence or Decline? 20 CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: AN INTERNATIONAL REVIEW 212 (2012).
68 Richard Milne, Model Management, Financial Times, March 21, 2013, at 5; see also THE NORDIC CORPORATE
GOVERNANCE MODEL, supra note 9, at 9 and 13-14.
69 See Dallas (2011), supra note 30.
70 Report of the Reflection Group on the Future of EU Company Law (April 5, 2011), available at
http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/company/docs/modern/reflectiongroup_report_en.pdf [hereinafter Reflection
Group Report (2012)], and The Corporate Governance Green Paper, supra note 30.
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governance debate. Nordic corporate governance has at times even been seen as an “ideal
model”71 . However, rather than accepting such statements at face value, this study will
consider the development of corporate governance in the Nordic region from a historical and
political perspective to highlight the political aspects of corporate governance on a national
and regional level. This perspective provides additional insight into the complexity of
developing legal strategies for corporate governance regulation.
Concentrated ownership and corporate governance in a Nordic environment will be used as a
case study and provides a perspective from which EU regulation is observed for the purposes
of the study. It has been observed that EU takeover regulation has different effects in the
member states depending on the applicable prevalent structure of corporate ownership that
may be in contradiction to the stated goals of the Takeover Directive72. It has been argued, for
example, that the regulatory mechanisms chosen by the EU Commission to address issues
arising in the context of concentrated ownership and control enhancing structures have been
flawed as such73. This criticism was vocal also in the Nordic region74. In many respects the
Takeover Directive transplanted regulatory solutions from the United Kingdom - with largely
a dispersed ownership structure and active takeover markets - to apply throughout the EU
member states largely dominated by an environment of concentrated corporate ownership. In
this respect regulation has not been tailored to the broader national institutional environment
in most member states, and the effects of regulatory intervention can be expected to vary75.
The critique of the EU Takeover Directive in this regard is based on the recognition that a
uniform regulatory framework may not be appropriate throughout the varied structures of
corporate ownership in the EU member states. It has been argued, for example, that “similar
regulatory changes may have very different effects within different corporate governance
systems. For example, while in some countries the adoption of a specific takeover rule may
lead toward more dispersed ownership, in others it may further reinforce the blockholder-
based system.”76 These factors are important to take into consideration when choosing legal
strategies for corporate governance regulation at the EU level.
III. CORPORATE GOVERNANCE IN THE EUCONTEXT
The theme of the study is focused on corporate governance and the regulation thereof in the
EU context. Given that the corporate environments may vary among the EU member states it
is particularly relevant to discuss the concept and definition of corporate governance, and to
set out the theoretical framework for how this study understands and approaches corporate
governance and corporate governance regulation.
A. DEFINING CORPORATE GOVERNANCE
The definition of corporate governance has been subject to much debate, and numerous
alternatives have been offered by scholars with different approaches to corporate governance
71 See Richard Milne (2013), supra note 68; JESPER LAU HANSEN, NORDIC COMPANY LAW – THE REGULATION
OF PUBLIC COMPANIES IN DENMARK, FINLAND, NORWAY AND SWEDEN 1 (2003).
72 See Coates (2003), supra note 26.
73 See Davies, Schuster & van der Walle de Ghelcke (2010), supra note 41.
74 See Rolf Skog (1997), supra note 11.
75 See Goergen, Martynova and Renneboog (2005), supra note 8.
76 Id. at 29.
14
research77. For the purposes of this study it is important to understand corporate governance
in terms that recognize the legal, economic and political aspects of corporate governance.
Some definitions anchored in agency-theory may neglect the external aspects of corporate
governance, while purely political approaches sometimes fail to recognize the requirements of
competitiveness and economic performance.
In its simplest form corporate governance can be understood in an organizational context as
“the system by which companies are directed and controlled”78 with the aim of reducing
transaction costs. Similarly, corporate law could be viewed as a default framework for the
legal organization of business enterprise79. The function of corporate governance would be to
address the collective action problems of various corporate claimholders and to reduce “the
scope for value-reducing forms of opportunism among different constituencies”80.
However, corporate governance is not only related to the organizational aspects of enterprise.
The distributional and re-distributional aspects of corporate governance are a significant
factor in this regard. The basis for how the revenue from the enterprise is distributed will have
an effect on the willingness of corporate constituencies to make investments in the corporate
enterprise. In this respect the definition by Shleifer & Vishny provides that “corporate
governance deals with the ways in which suppliers of finance to corporations assure
themselves of getting a return on their investment”81. Shleifer and Vishny emphasize that
production capital is actually specified so that it is committed to the enterprise (resulting in
sunk costs). As different constituents consider firm-specific investments of capital or labor
resulting in such costs, there must be sufficient assurance that they will be repaid. Corporate
governance mechanisms are intended to provide that assurance82. Pursuant to the definition
above, the goal of the corporate governance mechanisms is to provide a basis for an optimal
balance in the terms and conditions of different types of contributions of production capital
(equity, debt, labor etc.) from time to time. The Shleifer & Vishny definition suggests that
corporate governance arrangements are much like contractual arrangements or covenants that
are negotiated among the parties and affected by the risks and returns involved. This approach
is also linked to the principal-agent theory of the firm.
It is well established, however, that corporate governance is a more complex phenomenon not
easily defined based on a purely contractual approach. This is particularly difficult where
entrepreneurial aspects are involved and there is disagreement on the potential levels of future
cash-flows. At best, the theories related to costs of contracting suggest that the implicit
contracts underlying the relationships between corporate constituents are incomplete 83 .
77 See OLIVERWILLIAMSON, THE ECONOMIC INSTITUTIONS OF CAPITALISM (1985), Andrei Schleifer & Robert W.
Vishny, A Survey of Corporate Governance, 52 J. OF FIN. 737 (1997), Margaret M. Blair & Lynn A. Stout, A
Team Production Theory of Corporate Law, 85 VIRGINIA L.R. 247 (1999), Mary O’Sullivan, Corporate
Governance and Globalization, 570 ANNALS OF THE AMERICAN ACADEMY OF POLITICAL AND SOCIAL SCIENCE
153 (2000), and Ruth V. Aguilera & Gregory Jackson, The Cross-National Diversity of Corporate Governance:
Dimensions and Determinants, 28 ACADEMY OFMANAGEMENT REVIEW 447 (2003).
78 Report of the Committee on the Financial Aspects of Corporate Governance, 1992, at 2.5, available at
http://www.ecgi.org/codes/documents/cadbury.pdf.
79 Armour, Hansmann & Kraakman (2009), supra note 35, at 2.
80 Id.
81 Shleifer & Vishny (1997), supra note 77, at 737.
82 Id. at 738.
83 See Philippe Aghion & Patrick Bolton, An Incomplete Contracts Approach to Financial Contracting, 59 R.
ECON. STUDIES 473 (1992).
15
Corporate governance provides the means and mechanisms by which potential conflicts of
interest among different corporate constituencies are resolved. It is important to recognize,
however, that the dynamics of corporate governance can change. Corporate constituents can
seek to renegotiate these contracts if their bargaining power increases over time with each
party seeking to increase its stake from the income of the enterprise84.
A broader version of the definition of corporate governance has been provided by Zingales,
whereby corporate governance is the “set of conditions that shapes the ex post bargaining
over the quasi rents generated by a firm”85 . Zingales emphasizes the incompleteness of
contracts and recognizes the interests of all parties that are mutually specialized and have
made firm-specific investments, i.e. shareholders, employees, suppliers and customers86. As
assets are specialized their value outside of that context decreases. This has important
implications for the efficient allocation of control rights. Zingales argues that, as a result,
residual rights of control should be allocated to a “group of agents who need to protect their
investment against ex post expropriation, but who have little control over how much the asset
is specialized” 87 . This approach has important implications for corporate governance
mechanisms. Zingales sees that governance mechanisms, including allocation of ownership,
financial structure, organizational structure, product market competition and takeovers, can be
seen as institutions affecting the process of how quasi rents are distributed. This suggests that
the firm is a complex structure88 and expands corporate governance to cover a broader range
of norms and circumstances. The relationships between corporate constituencies are also not
defined in hierarchical terms, but rather in terms of their relative dependency on each other. A
further aspect is that these relationships are not in an equilibrium 89 but evolve with
technological, political and institutional developments. Thus the group of agents in need of
protection for firm-specific investments will change over time.
Other Approaches
Other approaches to corporate governance have also been advocated90. Stakeholder theory, for
example, emphasizes that also other constituencies than shareholders make firm-specific
investments and should have residual claims and appropriate control rights 91 . Corporate
governance is seen as a broader framework as “the whole set of legal, cultural and
institutional arrangements that determine what publicly traded corporations can do, who
controls them, how control is exercised, and how the risk and returns from the activities they
undertake are allocated”92. In this regard stakeholder theory is based on a more open system
84 Manuel A. Utset, Towards a Bargaining Theory of the Firm, 80 CORNELL L.REV. 540, 609 (1995).
85 See Luigi Zingales, Corporate Governance 16 (NBER Working Paper 6309, 1997), available at
http://www.nber.org/papers/w6309 .
86 Id. at 5.
87 Id. at 13.
88 See Bruno Deffains & Dominique M. Demougin, Governance: Who Controls Matters (SFB 649 Discussion
Paper No 53, 2006), available at http://hdl.handle.net/10419/25136.
89 MASAHIKO AOKI, CORPORATIONS IN EMERGING DIVERSITY: COGNITION, GOVERNANCE AND INSTITUTIONS 13-
14 (2010).
90 See Johnston, supra note 10.
91 SeeMargaret M. Blair & Lynn A. Stout, A Team Production Theory of Corporate Law, 85 VIRGINIA L.R. 247
(1999).
92 MARGARETM. BLAIR, OWNERSHIP AND CONTROL: RETHINKING CORPORATE GOVERNANCE FOR THE TWENTY-
FIRST CENTURY 3 (1995).
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perspective than definitions anchored in agency-theory alone93. Stakeholder theory is based
on a different premise of cooperation among the participants in the business effort
emphasizing the role of corporate organs, such as the board, as mediators between the
differing interests of these participants94. Stakeholder theory also broadens the notion of
efficiency in recognizing the possibly differing views of corporate constituencies in this
regard. It also recognizes the role of corporations in society and the legitimacy of external
corporate governance. The corporation is not only seen as a theoretical structure, but as a
legally defined independent entity. As such, a corporation can legitimately be expected to
promote broader interests than merely those of shareholders. However, it has been argued that
stakeholder theory does not necessarily provide help in guiding managerial practice95, or in
how to mediate among conflicting priorities. The theory has also been said not to recognize
the cleavages within different constituencies whereby it is increasingly difficult to identify the
interests of those constituencies96.
Corporate Governance as a Framework for Bargaining
To define and understand corporate governance it is important to revisit the definition of the
firm, and the characteristics of the corporation. Agency theory provides a basis for
understanding the relationships between different actors involved in economic activity97. The
idealized “firm” has been viewed as a ”nexus of contracts” for corporate constituencies when
regulating agency relationships in relation to a business enterprise98. In their approach Jensen
& Meckling view the “firm” as a legal fiction that provides the axis for contractually
arranging the conflicting objectives of these actors for the purposes of economic activity99.
While agency theory has provided major contributions towards the theory of the firm, it has
been supplemented by other approaches, including transaction cost economics and the theory
of property-rights. Scholars have argued that while agency theory provides a framework for
understanding the problems related to the relationships between corporate constituencies, it
does not fully explain the financial structure of the corporation. Hart points out, for example,
that in applying agency theory in the corporate context the main focus seems to be on
monitoring and aligning the interests of the agents with those of principals while there seems
to be less focus on explaining the financial structure of the corporation100. Williamson has
emphasized the relationship between the structure of corporate finance and governance so that
the type of financial instrument and resulting governance system should be based on the
characteristics of the specific project or transaction101.
93 See Ruth V. Aguilera, Igor Filatotchev, Howard Gospel & Gregory Jackson, An Organizational Approach to
Comparative Corporate Governance: Costs, Contingencies, and Complementarities, 19 ORGANIZATION SCIENCE
475 (2008).
94 Blair & Stout, supra note 91, at 253-254.
95 See Steve Letza, Xiuping Sun & James Kirkbide, Shareholding Versus Stakeholding: a Critical Review of
Corporate Governance, 12 CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: AN INTERNATIONAL REVIEW, 242, 255 (2004)
96 Id.
97 SeeMichael Jensen & William Meckling, Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs and
Ownershup Structure, 3 JFE 305 (1976).
98 Id.
99 Id. at 314.
100 Oliver Hart, Financial Contracting 7 and 9 (NBER Working Paper 8285, 2001) available at
http://www.nber.org/papers/w8285.
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Importantly, it is also possible to approach the corporation and corporate governance as a
framework for recurring bargaining among self-interested actors with varied interests who can
obtain benefits from mutual cooperation102. This approach has its origins in game theory - but
applied in a less-stylized environment with multiple parties and an unstable environment103.
Bargaining occurs in, and is affected by, the broader institutional environment, involving
market institutions and processes, the industrial and political environment and formal and
social norms104. It has been argued that “(i)n comparison with the principal-agent theory, a
model that puts the bargaining power in the centre is able to give a more comprehensive
picture of the reality of the firm”105 . This approach recognizes that governance of the
corporation does not occur in a vacuum, and is affected by the relevant institutional
environment that participants interact with, and based on which participants can also form
coalitions for increased bargaining power106. According to Aoki, corporations and corporate
constituencies, investors, management and employees, “are all important players in the
political-exchange game, individually and collectively, contributing to the shaping of the
political state”107. Bargaining can take the form of explicit or implicit contracts that parties
may seek to renegotiate from time to time as their relative bargaining power evolves. The
relative bargaining power among the corporate constituencies can change as a result of
technological or industrial changes, for example, or through political developments and the
introduction of new regulation. Bargaining, however, does not need to be direct and corporate
constituencies can affect the internal relationships through the political system, for example.
Importantly, this approach recognizes the legal and economic aspects of corporate governance,
but incorporates the political aspects of corporate governance to the definition as well.
A relevant prerequisite for bargaining is the fact that contracts are necessarily incomplete, as
discussed above, and it is generally not possible to fully regulate the relationships among
corporate constituencies ex ante. When an investor has made a significant firm-specific
investment (be it a shareholder, debt holder, manager or employee) it is difficult to withdraw
the investment and it becomes less liquid. Once an equity investment is made, for example, it
may not be possible to withdraw it and the investor is dependent on the continued
performance of other constituencies. Similarly, an employee will be more dependent on the
specific corporation once the employee has invested in firm-specific skills that may be
difficult to take elsewhere. Other constituencies may look to take advantage of this and
attempt to renegotiate the terms of their respective investments as their relative bargaining
power changes. Investors will be aware of this risk, of course, and require ex ante guarantees
to protect their initial investment108. However, as contracts are necessarily incomplete (and as
102 See Aoki (2001), supra note 14, John C. Coffee, Unstable Coalitions: Corporate Governance as a Multi-
Player Game, 78 GEO.L.J. 1495 1989-1990 and Utset, supra note 84.
103 Coffee (1989-1990), supra note 102, at 1497.
104 Masahiko Aoki & Gregory Jackson, Understanding an Emergent Diversity of Corporate Governance and
Organizational Architecture: An Essentiality-Based Analysis 3 (SIEPR Discussion Paper 07-19, 2007), available
at http://www-siepr.stanford.edu/repec/sip/07-019.pdf.
105 Peter Nobel, Stakeholders and the legal Theory of the Corporation, in PERSPECTIVES IN COMPANY LAW AND
FINANCIAL REGULATION, supra note 9, at 165, 176 - 179.
106 See Aoki (2001), supra note 14, at 287-291; Coffee, supra note 102; see also PETER GOUREVITCH & JAMES
SHINN, POLITICAL POWER AND CORPORATE CONTROL (2005).
107 Aoki (2010), supra note 89, at 80.
108 See Zingales (1997), supra note 85.
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the alternatives available to the investors will likely have the same characteristics in an
environment of incomplete contracts) there will be room for such renegotiations109.
The structure of corporate finance and the corporate governance framework provide for the
building blocks for bargaining. In this context, the corporation and corporate finance can be
approached from the perspective of financial contracting 110 . In simple terms financial
contracting in the corporate context can be seen as the understanding between the
entrepreneur with an idea but no funds and the investor with funds but no idea111. The
structure of corporate finance and the corporate governance of the corporation are the result of
bargaining between these actors. In financial contracting theory the entrepreneur negotiates
cash flow and governance rights with the providers of financing 112 . Entrepreneurs and
investors can agree on the allocation of control rights and cash-flow rights with the aim of
finding the best outcome to meet the specific requirements and priorities of each party. The
different priorities of the actors and their relative valuation of control and cash-flow rights
provide a basis for the bargaining over how cash-flow and governance rights are allocated
between them. As discussed, different types of financial instruments, i.e. equity, debt and
convertibles, are the basic the building blocks of corporate finance and corporate
governance113. The structure of corporate finance sets the framework for ex-post bargaining
over control. Debt-financing generally allows the entrepreneur to maintain control, for
example. However, higher levels of debt increase the risk of default with the result, typically,
that control will be passed on to the investors. Equity-financing, on the other hand, generally
provides control to the investors. Financial instruments with contingent control rights, such as
convertible debt, provide a further model of allocating governance rights in that control is
transferred upon a triggering event typically linked to the performance of the enterprise.
Corporate governance can thus be approached as a broad framework for on-going
bargaining114 among corporate constituencies over the terms of corporate finance. Corporate
governance regulation, then, covers a broader scope of regulation than provisions in corporate
law that directly apply to the corporate rights and obligations of stakeholders and include, for
example, tax laws, employee regulation and contract law. The regulation of legal institutions,
such as commercial courts and agencies, are also relevant, as enforcement mechanisms are a
key factor in legal strategies related to corporate governance. Finally, corporate governance
cannot be understood without reference to the economic and political systems that create the
framework for bargaining for the relevant constituencies. In fact, a political perspective to
corporate governance can be seen to be aligned with defining corporate governance in terms
of bargaining by independent constituencies who have different means to coordinate amongst
themselves and to promote their interests in relation to other corporate constituencies. The
approach outlined here therefore provides for a meaningful basis for this study overall.
109 Id. at 3.
110 See OLIVER HART, FIRMS, CONTRACTS AND FINANCIAL STRUCTURE (1995).
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B. THE POLITICAL CONTEXT OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE
Regulation cannot be studied in isolation from economics and political systems. It is
important to recognize that the corporation and the key corporate constituencies (shareholders,
managers, and employees) do not operate in a vacuum. The nexus of contracts approach, for
example, emphasizes the relationships among key constituents but may neglect how the
institutional and political environment affects and interacts with the corporation and these
constituencies – with redistributive effects. Politics can influence the loyalties and the
relationships among corporate constituencies115. The regulation of corporations, including
corporate governance, can be expected to reflect the interests of politically dominant
constituencies 116 . This study recognizes that a broader range of stakeholders may have
considerable interests and influence on the corporation and on the distribution of corporate
revenues, and that the political aspects of corporate governance should not be underestimated.
At the same time, political approaches to corporate governance have not always provided
normative guidance. Merely pointing out the political background of regulatory outcomes
does not necessarily provide normative guidance for developing regulation. The economic
and legal aspects of corporate governance are of paramount importance, and regulation can
have a significant effect on competitiveness and economic performance, and not only on the
distribution of revenue from economic enterprise (i.e. corporate governance is not a zero-sum
game). In developing regulatory policy it is important to understand the political aspects of
regulation, while recognizing the importance of economic performance117.
A number of political explanations have been provided for the relationship between corporate
ownership and corporate governance models on the one hand and political structures on the
other hand118 . The studies emphasize that both industrial history119 and the structure of
political processes120 are important factors in understanding the development of corporate
governance models. The political economy of corporate governance systems sets a framework
for the development of corporate governance regulation. It helps to explain the current status
of regulation and provides a background against which to consider feasible developments.
Political Systems and Corporate Governance
The development of industrial and market structures has been understood to have a significant
effect on the development of corporate ownership and corporate governance. Corporate
115 Ruth V. Aguilera & Gregory Jackson, Comparative and International Corporate Governance, 4 THE
ACADEMY OFMANAGEMENT ANNALS 485, 513 (2010).
116 ROGERM. BARKER, CORPORATE GOVERNANCE, COMPETITION AND POLITICAL PARTIES, EXPLAINING
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE CHANGES IN EUROPE 77 (2010).
117 It has also been argued that the basis of economic systems are political as such; yet such choices can have
very grave consequences, as discussed by Douglass C. North; see DOUGLASS C. NORTH, INSTITUTIONS,
INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE AND ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE (1990).
118 See Gourevitch & Shinn (2005), supra note 106, Marco Pagano & Paolo F. Volpin, The Political Economy of
Corporate Governance, 95 AMERICAN ECON. REV., 1005 (2005), Enrico C. Perotti & Ernst-Ludwig von
Thadden, The Political Economy of Corporate Control and Labor Rents, 114 J. OF POL. ECON. 145 (2006), Roe
(2003), supra note 39.
119 See Roe (2003), supra note 39, and Peter Högfeldt, The History and Politics of Corporate Ownership in
Sweden, in AHISTORY OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AROUND THEWORLD: FAMILY BUSINESS
GROUPS TO PROFESSIONALMANAGERS 517, 518-522 (Randall K. Morck, ed., 2005).
120 See Perotti & von Thadden (2006), supra note 118.
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governance systems will be developed so that they are adapted to their industrial and market
environments. Markets with a prevalence of heavy industry will likely have different
structures of corporate ownership, finance and corporate governance than markets dominated
by trade or knowledge-based technologies, for example. The financing needs and the
dynamics of the relationships among key corporate constituencies are likely to be quite
different in the respective environments resulting in the emergence of different corporate
finance and corporate governance models. Different solutions for addressing the same
corporate governance concerns may evolve in different institutional environments.
Complementary institutions adapted to a specific institutional environment will then develop
to support the existing corporate governance framework121. The example often provided in
this context is how the monitoring of management can be organized by different means, such
as by controlling shareholders, financial institutions or market based solutions (the markets
for corporate control or incentive programs) 122 . The monitoring system with rules and
regulations then develops based on these different mechanisms.
In this context concentrated ownership has been seen to reflect the effects of the broader
institutional environment. Roe mentions Germany, Italy and Sweden as examples of EU
member states with a political and institutional environment that supports concentrated
ownership123. Roe argues, for example, that in countries with strong labor institutions there is
likely to be pressure for more corporate governance institutions that favor employees and less
for institutions that support the interests of shareholders 124 . Companies are likely to be
encouraged to expand to secure employment even at the cost of profitability, for example, and
to avoid down-sizing as well as not to take disruptive risks125 . In this environment the
institutions needed for dispersed ownership to flourish are not present, whereas a controlling
shareholder, on the other hand, would be in a better position, in relative terms, to bargain over
surplus and to resist political pressures126.
Other political economy explanations point out that in states with concentrated ownership a
political majority with fewer financial incentives (and more labor-oriented financial interests)
may oppose a market based system related to higher risk taking127. The outcome of the
political system in this environment can be expected to favor large shareholders and labor at
the cost of smaller investors and will support complementary governance structures - much of
which can be observed in EU member states with concentrated ownership. The effect of
incumbent industrial and financial interest groups on the development of financial systems
based on their interest to restrain competition has also been emphasized 128 . Rajan and
Zingales argue that it is in the incumbents’ interest to restrict financial development and the
openness of the economy to disallow competitors to emerge. With globalization their impact
121 See Aoki (2001), supra note 14, at 300-305.
122 Marco Becht, Patrick Bolton & Ailsa Röell, Corporate Governance and Control 1 (ECGI Finance Working
Paper No 02, 2002, updated as of August 2005) available at http://ssrn.com/abstract_id=343461
123 SeeMark Roe, The Institutions of Corporate Governance 18 (Harvard Law School, John M. Olin Center’s
Program on Corporate Governance Discussion Paper 488, 2004), available at
http:/www.law.harvard.edu/programs/olin_center/papers/pdf/Roe_488.pdf.
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126 Id. at 19.
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on financial markets has decreased resulting in an increase in financial development and
market based corporate governance institutions129.
Path Dependence
It has been emphasized that the development of corporate governance is path dependent as the
development of new institutions is based on the existing institutional environment. Once a
given structure has been established, it is likely to be reinforced as complementary institutions
develop130. However, the development may not always lead to the most optimal outcome in
the prevailing environment131. Sunk costs, externalities and complementarities caused by
initial choices of governance structure increase the cost of choosing alternative structures132.
Existing structures may also persist due to rent-seeking by parties empowered by the initial
structure. The regulatory framework can be seen as a complementary institution that
recognizes and reinforces certain ownership structures both due to efficiency and rent-seeking.
In the “varieties of capitalism” debate in political science133 it is argued that economies can
enhance their competitiveness by specialization; i.e. by taking advantage of the relative
benefits of the type of economy it has. This argument suggests that the characteristics of an
economy may strengthen as institutions develop that complement the system in question. This
argument assumes that the basis and competitiveness of a particular “variety” is stable and
sustainable. With globalization and technological innovations the basis for an economic
model may change, so that different models of governance are required for retaining
competitiveness. The question is whether the “varieties of capitalism” debate can in fact be
defined more accurately in terms of path dependence where a given “variety” reflects a
particular point in the specific development path of an economy. As economies and political
systems develop complimentary institutions emerge and a corporate governance system will
develop with appropriate political coalitions and regulatory and governance mechanisms that
reflect the interests of the politically dominant groups – i.e. different “varieties of capitalism”.
Path dependence suggests that the system is likely to be entrenched, and deviation from the
path that has developed becomes increasingly costly and difficult.
Political Coalitions and Governance Outcomes
The shareholders, management and employees of a corporation are typically identified as the
main corporate constituencies. Different corporate constituencies will seek to renegotiate the
contracts as their bargaining power increases. Bargaining is likely to occur when
constituencies have made firm-specific investments and are committed with significant sunk
costs. In this situation it is tempting for other constituencies to take advantage of any
129 Id.
130 See North (1990), supra note 117.
131 See Bebchuk & Roe (1999), supra note 21, and Jeremy Grant & Thomas Kirchmaier: Who Governs?
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http://ssrn.com/abstract=555877.
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bargaining power they may have. Ultimately, then, corporate governance is a system of
bargaining134.
Changes in bargaining power will reflect overall changes in the political economy. Corporate
constituencies are also interest groups that can use political means to further their own
interests. Regulation can be seen as the outcome of the interaction between political and
market structures, reflecting the impact of interested market participants and the political
environment135. Changes in regulation can be seen to reflect changes in the relative bargaining
power of these constituencies. In other words, the terms of the relationship between
shareholders and managers will be renegotiated, in part, through political and regulatory
intervention depending on how the relative political bargaining power of these constituencies
evolves. In this respect corporate law and corporate governance regulation can be expected to
reflect the institutional power of dominant corporate constituencies136.
Corporations and the way they are governed are of considerable economic importance.
Corporate governance has a significant effect on the preconditions for the creation of wealth
and economic growth, as well as on the distribution of the cash flows and profits from
corporate enterprise. It is natural that corporate governance should have considerable political
implications as key corporate constituencies agree and renegotiate their relationships through
the political framework. For example, in markets with a prevalence of concentrated ownership,
corporate governance regulation can be expected to favour blockholders. In markets with
dispersed ownership, where shareholders face coordination problems, corporate governance
can be expected to favour management. Labor is also a significant corporate constituency
often with considerable political clout. In basic agency analysis labor is sometimes
understood as an external constituency as the contracts between the company and labor are
assumed to be complete137. However, these contracts are often renegotiated depending on the
relative bargaining power of unions. It cannot be assumed, for example, that if the role of
labor increases significantly in the production chain, this would not affect corporate
governance solutions.
In the EU it has been argued that the strong position of labor has had a strong influence on
corporate governance. In Germany, for example, the impact of labor in direct governance
issues has been significant. Moreover, management and shareholders will also want to
renegotiate the terms of employment to ensure a well-functioning workforce138 as the business
environment evolves. Creditors are another external constituency, along with employees that
also has significant interests in corporate governance that can be pursued through policy and
regulation. In particular, in economies with a financial system dominated by financial
intermediaries, such as banks, the role of external creditors in corporate governance has been
significant.
Political economies are sufficiently complex so that they are rarely dominated by single
political interests. In other words, a single constituency is rarely in the position to dictate
policy. Gourevitch & Shinn have assessed the potential for political coalitions between
134 Nobel (2009), supra note 105, at 176 - 179.
135 SeeMark Roe: Political Preconditions to Separating Ownership from Corporate Control, 53 STAN. L. REV.
539 (2000); and Roe (2003), supra note 39.
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different key corporate constituencies139. Different constituencies can seek to bargain with
each other, or if interests are not sufficiently uniform within a group, their political influence
can be divided. Gourevitch & Shinn have identified the key interests of each constituency and
assess to what extent and in which circumstances two constituencies might form a political
coalition in terms of corporate governance regulation140. They have identified three different
basis for political conflicts and coalition preferences that are represented in different types of
economies. First, a class conflict model posits shareholders (“owners of capital”) in conflict
with employees (“workers”). In this model management would be in coalition with
shareholders141. If investors are politically dominant this model would lead to strong minority
protection and dispersed ownership. However, in economies where employees are dominant
there will be pressure on companies to provide higher salaries and job security at the cost of
maximizing profits. As proposed by Roe, strong labor calls for a controlling shareholder to be
able to negotiate with labor giving concentrated ownership structure an overall relative
advantage in that economy.
Second, in a sectoral cleavage model, constituents with asset specific investments form
political coalitions to protect their investment. In this model employees and managers would
cooperate to protect their interests in the company and in the industry in general. An example
of this model is the “Corporatist Compromise”142 where managers and employees cooperate
to promote stability, size of the corporation and insiders’ claims on corporate income143. The
regulatory framework would promote stability with rules favourable to blockholders and
strong employee protection. Minority shareholder protection would not be strong.
The third model sees coalitions forming between shareholders and employees combining their
interests to constrain managerial agency costs. Employees support shareholders with regard to
corporate power but are compensated in job security. Alternatively, employees can have
interests aligned with those of shareholders in the form of pension fund investments. The
preferences of labor will be affected by how the pension system is structured. For example,
the more social security and pensions are funded on a pay-as-you-go basis the less of a
connection is perceived between corporate governance and future benefit streams. The more
pensions are based on fully funded models, and the more benefits are linked to investment
returns, the greater the connection to corporate governance outcomes144.
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140 Id. at 57-68.
141 See Michael Hiscox, Class versus Industry Cleavages: Inter-Industry Factor Mobility and the Politics of
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The priorities of the different constituencies may change over time, as may the coalitions
formed between different corporate constituencies. The interests of labor in Europe, for
example, have been argued to have shifted towards supporting transparency and
accountability in corporate governance – from a corporatist model to a transparency coalition
favoring minority shareholders145. To some extent the structure of corporate ownership has
also changed towards increased diffusion 146 . However, in many cases complementary
institutions needed to support dispersed ownership have been lacking, preventing this
development147. Scholars have analyzed the political developments in EU member states
underlying this development, and some have noted a “party paradox” where pro-shareholder
policies traditionally pursued by centre-right coalitions have been supported by centre-left
governments148. The paradox has been explained by the evolving political economy, where
labour interests have been adapted to a new industrial setting with an emphasis on increased
transparency and accountability in corporate governance – that also supports minority
interests149.
The work of Gourevitch & Shinn suggests that regulatory models and the structure of
corporate ownership are interdependent, and that the industrial dynamic affects outcomes in
this regard. This suggests that regulatory models are likely to vary depending on the prevalent
industrial structures and the relationships among the key corporate constituencies. As these
environments vary across the EU it clearly can be challenging to develop and design
regulatory models at the EU level.
145 See Barker (2010), supra note 116.
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C. EU LEGISLATIVE PROCESSES AND CORPORATE GOVERNANCE REGULATION
Supranational political systems such as the EU provide a solution to the need for coordinating
economic interaction among varied economic and regulatory systems. Understanding the
dynamics and challenges of developing regulation in this environment is important. The
effects of regulation will depend on the applicable institutional environment while regulatory
outcomes are the result of historical development, the influence of interested constituencies
and the political environment 150 . Moreover, the special characteristics of supranational
regulation must also be taken into account in considering the effects of regulatory intervention;
these include the differences in institutional environments, the absence of uniform
enforcement mechanisms and the dynamics of the multilevel regulatory environment created
by the evolution of the EU regulatory framework151. These factors create unique challenges
for the development of legal strategies.
The study will consider the political effects of the EU framework with respect to the dynamics
of corporate governance regulation. The EU and its institutions form a political system akin
other national or regional systems. The EU cannot merely be seen as an intergovernmental
forum for the member states, of course, but rather as an independent political system
facilitating the development of a multilevel governance system152. Moreover, EU integration
as such, together with its institutional forms, reflects a polity in itself whereby certain political
and economic agendas may be promoted153. In addition, the EU political institutions and the
political processes for EU regulation pose their own challenges for pursuing regulatory
change at the EU level154. The agendas and alliances of affected constituencies and interest
groups may differ at the national and the EU levels155 creating a challenging political dynamic
to be taken into account when considering feasible strategies for regulatory intervention at the
EU level. These characteristics of the EU must be understood when considering how EU
regulation is formed.
It has been argued that “corporate governance evolves through a dynamic process of
competing interests and competing interpretations of institutionalized norms, processes
shaped by, but not fully determined by, political institutions” 156 . A central aspect in
developing EU corporate governance regulation is related to the political dynamics of
regulatory initiatives. Regulatory responses are the result of political processes and the efforts
of affected constituencies pursuing their interest through the markets for regulation 157 .
Regulatory outcomes will depend on the evolving preferences of interested constituencies, as
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well as on the structure of political institutions 158 . In light of the political controversy
surrounding the legislative process preceding the adoption of the Takeover Directive, and the
current debate related to new EU corporate governance initiative, for example, the political
aspects of EU regulation should not be underestimated. The political process underlying the
adoption of the Takeover Directive was particularly convoluted and provides insights into
how interested constituencies pursue their preferences through the EU political
framework 159 .The controversies reflected the significant differences in ownership and
governance systems of listed companies in the EU member states160. The debate related to the
more recent EU initiatives in the field of corporate governance may also add to our
understanding of the political aspects of EU corporate governance regulation.
Some scholars believe that with the development of EU level regulation traditional industry
groups will be able to coordinate their actions on an international level and focus their efforts
to lobby favourable EU level regulation161. However, others argue that the EU framework
creates a multilevel framework of regulation that affects how interested constituencies can
pursue their interests through the political systems 162 . Key industry groups may have
considerable political leverage at the national level, but may not be able to affect EU level
regulation in the same way. For example, Ferrarini and Miller argue that at the national level
takeover regulation may be more likely to favour target companies and their management,
while the relative position of institutional investors may be better at the EU level, for
example163. Callaghan points out that the EU contributes to the development of a multilevel
governance framework – also with respect to corporate governance regulation. Callaghan
argues that this creates new strategic opportunities for interest groups164 and that the EU
institutional set-up allows for competing political coalitions to simultaneously advance
different reforms thus limiting the possibility for interest groups to monopolize policy.
Supranational political systems, such as the EU, provide an increasingly important platform
for regulatory initiatives and affect the dynamics of regulatory processes as such165. A better
understanding of these systems is an important precondition for understanding the dynamics
of supranational regulation. In this respect procedural and political strategies are equally
important when trying to understand or develop EU level regulation. The study will discuss
the characteristics of the EU regulatory processes related to the development of corporate
governance regulation. The study considers how the political framework of EU corporate
governance regulation affects the choice of legal strategies, and how legal strategies can be
developed to reflect the characteristics of this framework. The study seeks to provide a basis
158 See Gourevitch & Shinn (2005), supra note 106.
159 See Skog (2002), supra note 13.
160 Ownership in listed companies in the UK is typically widely dispersed with a strong institutional shareholder
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world, 54 J. FIN. 471, 491-93 (1999).
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for the further development of political as well as legal strategies for EU level regulatory
initiatives.
IV. COMPARATIVE CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AND THE DYNAMICS OF EUREGULATION
From a scholarly perspective this study is related to comparative corporate governance
research166. The study is concerned with the apparently varying effects of EU corporate
governance regulation in different corporate environments. The study applies comparative
institutional analysis and findings from comparative corporate governance research with
regard to the interaction of corporate governance regulation and different corporate
environments.
The study is also concerned with the dynamics of legislative processes in supranational
regulatory systems - more specifically, the EU. The study seeks to understand the dynamics
underlying EU corporate governance regulation. This helps to explain the background of
regulatory initiatives (and opposition to the same), and provides a framework for
understanding regulatory outcomes. In approaching EU legislative dynamics the study builds
on theories of EU integration and general political theories. With respect to the dynamics
underlying corporate governance regulation specifically the study also applies economic
theories of regulation.
The research methods applied in the study are described in more detail below.
A. COMPARATIVE CORPORATE GOVERNANCE RESEARCH
The study is related to comparative corporate governance research. This field of study has
been of much interest over the past decades as globalization and market integration have
increased the salience of the differences in corporate governance systems and the effects
thereof167.
As interaction increases between different kinds of national economic systems, the need for
coordination among these systems increases also. Different scenarios for the outcomes of
interaction between national systems include convergence, destabilization resulting from the
implementation of elements foreign to the system, the disappearance of less-successful
systems and the emergence of hybrid systems with an independent institutional architecture
(such as EU integration)168. The identification of these types of scenarios emphasizes that a
focus on national level solutions is insufficient for understanding the development of
corporate governance regulation. The study of the emergence of different outcomes is
important and the study of emerging political systems with their own institutional architecture
is of particular interest in this regard.
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and Klaus Hopt, Comparative Corporate Governance: The State of the Art and International Regulation (ECGI
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There has been considerable interest in understanding the relationship between corporate
governance and economic performance. Comparative corporate governance has provided a
framework for studying the relationship between corporate performance and different
corporate governance systems and whether certain systems are superior to others 169 .
Comparative research has, for example, focused on corporate governance mechanisms
adopted in different types of legal systems and argued for the superiority of certain systems in
this regard170. The work of La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer and Vishny171 has been
important in this field of research, and has triggered a large body of international
comparisons172. Very often the model of dispersed ownership and shareholder supremacy, that
is perceived prevalent in the United States, for example, has been used as a benchmark for
measuring different corporate governance systems173. It has been argued that as markets
become more integrated and product markets more competitive corporate governance systems
must converge to the standards that are the most efficient174. Initially the observed persistence
of different corporate governance systems was consequently of some concern. However, it
has been recognized that corporate governance outcomes can reflect the requirements and
dynamics of the given institutional environment, and that different corporate ownership and
corporate governance models can form a competitive basis for firm performance 175 .
Importantly, the “legal origins” explanations related to corporate governance systems have
been called into question and it has been understood that the development of corporate
governance is much more complex 176 . This is also relevant with respect to comparing
corporate governance systems.
For the purposes of comparative analysis, comparative corporate governance scholarship has
recognized the close relationship between corporate governance and the institutional
environment, including industrial structures and history, capital markets, as well as the
political system and the legal system177. Comparative methods should include holistic analysis
of corporate governance systems. The business enterprise, the corporation and the dynamics
among interested constituencies and society at large cannot be compared without reference to
the relevant institutional environments. Comparative approaches must address the diversity of
169 See Dennis C. Mueller & B. Burcin Yurtoglu, Country Legal Environments and Corporate Investment
Performance, 1 GERMAN ECON. REV. 187 (2000), and Rafael La Porta, Andrei Schleifer & Robert Vishny, Law
and Finance, 106 J. OF POL. EC. 1113 (1998).
170 See Rafael La Porta, Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes & Andrei Schleifer, Corporate Ownership Around the
World, 54 J. FIN. 471, 491-93 (1999), Rafael La Porta, Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes, Andrei Schleifer & Robert
Vishny, Investor Protection and Corporate Governance, 58 J. FIN.ECON. 3 (2000).
171 Id.
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institutions across jurisdictions, markets and time 178 . Indeed, comparative corporate
governance has also focused on the diversity of the corporate landscape, and how corporate
governance solutions evolve in different institutional environments179. Different mechanisms
or institutions can have similar functions that are effective in their respective environments.
The market for corporate control has been identified as a monitoring mechanism in dispersed
ownership systems, but controlling shareholders may provide similar functions in systems
based on concentrated ownership, while bank financing can provide such functions in other
environments 180 . It may thus be impractical to compare different corporate systems
independently of their institutional surroundings. In fact, it is argued, different modes of
corporate architecture and governance “cannot be superior independently of the social and
political milieu, history, technology, available individual cognitive assets, and so on. Rather,
varieties of organizational forms may better serve society” 181 . Indeed, it has also been
observed that different corporate governance systems are persistent in ways that may not have
been expected. Institutional development may well be path dependent so that changes are
affected by pre-existing conditions. In this respect many aspects of comparative corporate
governance are aligned with the positions developed in new institutional economics182. Indeed,
comparisons of corporate governance systems rely on the recognition that governance must be
analyzed in the context of the relevant institutional environment.
Research has demonstrated the complex nature of corporate governance and its connectivity
to broader themes of economic, cultural and political interaction. Comparative corporate
governance research has been approached from different scholarly perspectives, including
economics and management, culture and sociology, as well as legal and political paradigms183.
Economic approaches have allowed for comparing different corporate governance systems
based on the same economic premises. Macro-level studies have been concerned with whether
corporate governance systems have contributed to the success of national or regional
economies – and have thus been of significance from an economic perspective. In this respect
corporate governance rules have been seen as a part of the overall financial system184. Legal
approaches have considered the relationship between legal systems and corporate governance
solutions. Finally, political approaches seek to provide political explanations for corporate
governance outcomes with the understanding that political interests drive regulation – also
with respect to corporate governance.
There has been an emerging awareness that research should increasingly seek to integrate
these different paradigms185, and this study seeks to make a contribution in this regard. Legal
and economic approaches to comparative corporate governance are relied on to understand
the effects of legal strategies in different institutional environments. While approaches based
on law and economics research provide a basis for studying the corporation and the
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relationships among corporate constituencies, it is important to study corporate governance
regulation in the context of the broader institutional environment, including industrial
structure, legal systems and politics. This study recognizes that regulatory solutions reflect the
outcomes of political processes, and that the political dimensions of both corporate
governance and the political institutional structure (of the EU) must be recognized for a better
understanding of the dynamics of regulatory intervention. The study emphasizes that
regulation must be understood and studied in its economic and political context. Regulatory
action (or inaction) is the result of political processes with their own dynamics, including the
effects of interest groups, political constituencies and the institutional political structure.
Based on such an analysis the study seeks to identify the premises for developing EU legal
strategies for corporate governance regulation.
B. SUPRANATIONAL REGULATION
The study is concerned with the dynamics of legislative processes at the EU level, and thus
related to the study of EU integration. The study is based on the understanding that law and
politics cannot be studied independently if the goal is to properly understand the dynamics of
legislation and legislative processes186. The dynamics of supranational regulation, and the
effects of the institutional structure of the EU, must also be taken into account when
considering the development of EU corporate governance regulation and appropriate legal
strategies. Research in EU law has emphasised the need to study EU law in the context of its
evolving economic and political environment187. In some cases the special nature of the EU
has been much emphasised and EU integration has been studied as a unique case188. However,
it has also been argued that the EU must be understood as a political system that can be
studied pursuant to terms of general political theory189. This study outlines the sphere of
political bargaining with respect to corporate governance regulation at the EU level with the
help of political theories of integration. The study then analyses EU corporate governance
regulation with tools related to economic theories of regulation – i.e. how the “market for
regulation” functions at the EU level with respect to corporate governance regulation.
Interest Groups and Regulation
Regulation can be seen as the outcome of the interaction between political and market
structures, reflecting the impact of interested market participants and the political
environment190. Changes in regulation can be seen to reflect changes in the relative bargaining
power of these constituencies191. The political economy sets out the broader parameters for
feasible regulatory outcomes. Within these parameters, the public choice literature identifies a
“market for regulation” where political actors trade regulatory benefits for resources and
where regulation can be captured by dominant interest groups 192 . In this model the
redistributive effects of regulation are emphasized. Indeed, it is important to recognize that
186 ANNAHYVÄRINEN, SUOMENMAHDOLLISUUDET VAIKUTTAA EUROOPAN UNIONIN
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economic regulation will of course affect the distribution of wealth in the form of the
reallocation of risks or opportunities, for example. It is rarely the case (if ever) that regulation
would address “market failures” in a pareto-optimal manner193. Dominant, well organized
constituencies will be able benefit from regulatory intervention. However, it has been pointed
out that political utility maximization by political entrepreneurs is still likely to result in
regulation that also takes into account the concerns of other political coalitions194. Regulatory
initiatives will cause opposition that increases as the initiatives cause losses for other
constituencies195. The laws of diminishing returns suggest that the political process will thus
be drawn to more effective regulatory outcomes196.
Different political constituencies have different requisites for pursuing their interests197. Small
interest groups with similar interests can be expected to overcome coordination problems and
look after their interests in a satisfactory way. Large interests groups with similar interests can
be expected to pursue their interest through the political system. In the corporate environment
unionized labor, for example, can be expected to use the political system to protect their
interests. Even if labor would not be a direct participant or co-decision maker in corporate
governance their political power is likely to guarantee that their interests are taken into
account – within the parameters of the political economy. Large interest groups with
heterogeneous interests may have difficulties in overcoming coordination problems or in
having access to the political system. Minority shareholders have typically been categorized
as a group with some difficulty in overcoming coordination problems. Minority shareholders
have often been deemed to have sufficiently diverging agendas, and may not have sufficient
financial interests involved, to allow for the coordination costs required to organize political
cooperation. Thus minority shareholder interests can easily be trumped by the interests of
politically more dominant groups. In some economies, where the political economy has
developed so that labor favours equity interests, the situation is different. The ability of
different interest groups to coordinate political action to pursue their interests can also be
taken into account in developing regulation. Based on this, minority shareholders would not
be the groups in the best position to coordinate activities at the political level with respect to
corporate governance or takeover regulation, for example. The interests of these
constituencies, then, may require specific attention from regulators if market based regulation
and investor protection are desired.
The Regulatory Dynamics of Supranational Political Systems
It is important to recognize the effects of structure of supranational political systems, such as
the EU, on the political dynamics of corporate governance regulation. The introduction of the
EU framework has established a parallel regulatory framework to national regulation.
Constituencies can pursue regulatory agendas through both the national and the EU regulatory
frameworks198. An important element in the ability of interests groups to pursue their interests
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is that the dynamics of the market for regulation may be different at the national and
international levels. Certain interest groups may have significant influence on regulation at the
national level, while their ability to influence EU level regulation can be limited, for example.
Ferrarini & Miller argue that the interests of corporate insiders remain strong at the national
level199. With respect to takeovers, for example, target company interests may have more
influence at the level of national regulation than the interests of bidders. At the domestic level,
interest groups representing management, labour and community groups are likely to
advocate for rules that increase the threshold for takeovers200. At the international (or federal)
level, however, the influence of these interest groups may be more balanced201. Corporate
insiders may not have the same relative advantage over the interests of bidders (and minority
shareholders) who may better be able to organize themselves on an international basis.
The preference for regulatory competition (national regulation) or harmonization (EU
regulation) may also be driven by how the relevant constituency can best promote its interest
– in relative terms. Constituencies with considerable sunk costs and a high threshold for
corporate mobility may not be able to take advantage of the freedom of establishment. To
prevent competitors from taking advantage of more competitive regimes they would opt for
EU level harmonization setting similar rules throughout the EU that would cater to existing
industrial structures. Constituencies with lower costs for relocating, on the other hand, will
lobby for national regulation and regulatory competition, as they can move their operations to
jurisdictions with more favourable regulation, for example202.
At the EU level it may be more difficult for individual interest group to promote their interests
by affecting EU policies and regulations. Overall, the EU has resulted in a system of
multilevel governance that may be less prone to be dominated by specific policies. The EU
institutional set-up allows for competing political coalitions to simultaneously advance
different reforms thus limiting the possibility for interest groups to monopolize policy203.
Callaghan, for example, argues that the multilevel system established with the introduction of
the EU framework increases strategic opportunities for using regulation to pursue policies
across the EU – regardless of the national system of corporate governance204. Also, the
institutional set-up of the EU allows different types of policies to be pursued simultaneously.
In other words, it is not as easy for a single interest group (or coalition) to dominate the
political agendas regarding a particular field of regulation. This can result in reforms
reflecting, at the same time, different policies.
The different regulatory approaches to developing corporate governance regulation in the EU
– harmonization and regulatory competition – also have significant political implications. The
different approaches are linked to expected regulatory outcomes and reflect underlying
political preferences. The dynamics of positive and negative integration differ. Negative
integration and regulatory competition are often associated with a market oriented or laissez-
faire approach to corporate regulation205. Generally negative integration limited to enforcing
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treaty freedoms would result in deregulation at the national level, for example, as
incompatible national rules would be trumped by treaty freedoms. Also, this approach relies
less on political decision making and more on an increased role of the European Court of
Justice. Positive integration through harmonization initiatives, on the other hand, always
requires sufficient political support, whereas the effects of such harmonization initiative can
vary depending on the policies pursued at the supranational level206.
The institutional structure of the EU will also have a significant effect on policy. The
dynamics of agenda-setting and decision-making in the key institutions, including the Council,
the Commission and the EU Parliament, have their own dynamics that affect regulatory
processes and outcomes. Also, the EU institutions do not only reflect the interests of national
constituencies, but drive their own agendas as well. For example, the EU institutions may
have an interest in increasing their overall influence as such. The different EU bureaucracies
may be able to identify potential political alliances when promoting new regulatory
initiatives207 to ensure that the initiatives are acceptable to key political and industry actors. It
is possible that the interests of industry representatives and governments vary among
jurisdictions depending on the applicable economic structures, and that different alliances
would be formed from time to time with regard to political and lobbying efforts. These efforts
may overshadow the analytical advancement of the structure and design of regulation.
C. PREMISES FOR DEVELOPING EUCORPORATE GOVERNANCE REGULATION
This study approaches EU corporate governance regulation by first assessing the effects and
efficacy of corporate governance mechanisms introduced in EU and national regulation in
different types of corporate environments – with an emphasis on environments with a
prevalence of concentrated ownership. The form and design of legal intervention are key
factors for the efficient enforcement of policy. Different legal strategies may be required to
ensure that legal intervention has the desired effects in different institutional environments.
Strategies can vary from specific rules or standards to regulatory frameworks based on
contractual arrangements. Enforcement of legal strategies can be based on private actions
(court systems) or on public authorities, such as regulatory agencies. The efficient
enforcement of certain legal strategies may depend on the quality of available court systems,
for example. Legal strategies are also likely to vary depending on the applicable institutional
environment so that they address the concerns and interests of dominant constituencies208. The
study will consider the effects of certain regulatory instruments and compare these with the
policy goals underlying the relevant regulatory initiatives. The study then considers how legal
strategies can be selected so that they are better adapted to the relevant corporate environment
and produce expected policy results. In this analysis the study will emphasize the political
aspects of corporate governance to better understand the dynamics underlying existing
corporate governance models and corporate governance systems.
This study incorporates political perspectives to the study of corporate governance and
corporate governance regulation and establishes the resulting implications for legal strategies
and regulatory design for EU corporate governance regulation. The analysis of regulatory
processes is an important element of the study. It is not sufficient that legal strategies are
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chosen to accommodate for the structure of corporate ownership, but they also have to be
politically feasible. The political environment and the broader political economy effectively
define the framework within which legal strategies can be introduced. In developing EU
regulation, the Commission may, for example, analyze the preferences of different political
coalitions in assessing how regulation should be structured in order to be successfully
introduced. It is also important to understand the relative bargaining power of interest groups
at the national and EU levels in designing EU level regulation. The study seeks to understand
the underlying political dynamic and its impact on EU level corporate governance and
takeover regulation. The study recognizes that corporate law can be expected to reflect the
institutional power of dominant corporate constituencies209 and seeks to establish how EU
regulation reflects this assumption; how these aspects are reflected in the characteristics of EU
regulation and regulatory processes; and how EU legal strategies might be developed in this
regard. Thus, having outlined the varied environment of corporate governance in the EU and
the factors that affect the application and effects of EU level regulation, the study will look at
the premises for developing legal strategies for EU corporate governance regulation to better
take into account the characteristics of that environment. An important factor is the political
dynamic underlying the introduction of EU level corporate governance regulation. The study
applies theories of EU integration and political theory to outline the multilevel governance
system where corporate governance regulation is pursued. The study then applies economic
theories of regulation to study the introduction of specific corporate governance initiatives.
V. THE STRUCTURE OF THE STUDY
Following this introductory chapter, the study consists of six independent chapters with
different approaches to the research questions presented earlier in the introductory chapter.
The chapters build on and elaborate the themes raised in the introduction and discuss them in
the context of the topics of each chapter. The chapters address corporate ownership and
corporate governance issues that are relevant for the purposes of developing legal strategies in
a varied institutional environment such as the European Union. Concentrated ownership, for
example, is a recurring theme throughout the study, as are the Takeover Directive and more
recent key EU corporate governance initiatives. The Nordic perspective is introduced in the
different chapters as a tool for providing context for the research. The study concludes with a
brief summary of findings and proposals for further research.
The chosen structure of the study allows an assessment of the themes of research from
different perspectives and using different tools. The themes of research are general in nature
and relate to the dynamics and processes of developing legal strategies and regulatory design
in relation to EU corporate governance regulation generally. These themes become more
concrete when discussed in a given context – such as the Nordic corporate environment or
specific EU regulatory instruments. By approaching the research themes from different angles
and in different contexts, the different factors that affect the dynamics of EU corporate
governance regulation also become more transparent. Approaching the selected themes of
research from different perspectives in largely independent chapters necessarily results in
some repetition of descriptions of factual circumstances and research arguments. For example,
the dynamics of corporate governance in an environment of concentrated ownership is
discussed in the study in different contexts, and is further elaborated in the latter chapters.
209 Armour, Hansmann & Kraakman (2009), supra note 35, at 32.
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However, the structure of the study has allowed a detailed assessment of specific aspects of
the themes of research in each chapter, providing for a more thorough understanding of the
relevant dynamics of corporate governance regulation.
Below, the key theses of each of the chapters are briefly summarized.
Chapter 2: Bargaining Over Corporate Control – Regulating Concentrated Ownership in
the EU
The chapter considers alternative definitions of corporate governance in the context of
concentrated ownership. In this study concentrated ownership serves as a case study and
provides a perspective for discussing the relationships among corporate constituencies. The
chapter first introduces corporate governance concerns related to concentrated ownership, and
questions the traditional premises of the relationship between concentrated ownership and
private benefits of control or weak minority protection. In this regard, the chapter considers
the relationships between the prevalent structure of corporate ownership, historical and
industrial developments and the political environment.
The purpose of the chapter is to understand and define corporate governance in terms that
recognize the legal, economic and political aspects of corporate governance. Some definitions
anchored in agency-theory may neglect the external aspects of corporate governance, while
purely political approaches sometimes fail to recognize the requirements of competitiveness
and economic performance in how the governance of economic enterprise should be
organized. The chapter builds the framework for how this study approaches corporate
governance in the EU.
The modern corporation and much of corporate governance theory have been based on the
premise of the separation of ownership and control and the agency problems that arise
therewith. The resulting assumption is that shareholders are best served by diversifying their
holdings, and corporate governance is focused on the alignment of agents’ interests with those
of principals and on the efficient monitoring of agents’ performance. In these circumstances
control rights are best allocated with the holders of residual cash flows, i.e. the shareholders.
In this approach, corporate governance relates to efficient monitoring and incentivising of
agents. This perspective does not seem wholly satisfactory, however, and does not fully
reflect prevalent forms of corporate governance. While agency theory may accurately
describe the nature of the conflict of interests between economic actors in business, it does not
necessarily give an accurate picture of the dynamics of the relationship between these parties.
For example, the emphasis on shareholder primacy may be related to the importance of equity
capital characteristic to prevalent industrial structures, and reflect corporate governance
outcomes in a specific industrial environment. Also, in an environment of incomplete
contracts it is not always clear who is the principal and who is the agent.
The chapter considers corporate finance and corporate governance outcomes as the results of
on-going bargaining among corporate constituencies, where concentrated ownership
represents one result of such bargaining. In this approach the structure of corporate finance is
closely related to corporate governance as different combinations of corporate finance
instruments provide different rights for investors and entrepreneurs, and reflect the bargaining
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outcomes between these parties. This approach recognizes that bargaining does not occur in a
vacuum, and that politics and changes in regulation are different means for constituencies to
conduct bargaining. Different constituencies have different means to affect regulation that can
change over time and vary at the national and supranational levels. This leads to a complex
regulatory environment that must be better understood. The chapter concludes by considering
the regulatory implications of bargaining theory in the context of EU corporate governance
regulation.
Chapter 3: A Political Narrative of Nordic Corporate Governance: Shareholders,
Stakeholders and Change of Control210
The following chapter provides a political narrative of Nordic corporate governance. The
chapter discusses the relationship between industrial and political developments and different
structures of corporate governance and corporate ownership. The chapter focuses on the
Nordic region in the EU where concentrated ownership remains prevalent - but with
reportedly low levels of private benefits of control. The chapter discusses and analyses the
development of corporate governance in Sweden and Finland. The purpose of the chapter is to
emphasize the political aspects of corporate ownership and corporate governance.
Corporate governance models in the Nordic countries have been subject to increasing interest
in the international corporate governance debate. Concentrated ownership combined with
reportedly low private benefits of control has been seen as a competitive model of governance.
The low levels of private benefits in the Nordics have been explained as the result of the non-
pecuniary nature of control benefits or the social norms characteristic to the Nordic
environment. However, the effects of the political environment on the corporate governance
framework should not be underestimated in this regard.
The chapter argues that private benefits of control in the Nordics have been limited mainly
due to an export-driven industrial structure open to product market competition while
economic crisis and the development of pension systems have decreased resistance to better
investor protection. These developments reflect expectations based on models presented by
Gourevitch & Shinn211. However, the Nordic governance models are in fact not without
challenges as the institutional framework continues to support block-holding and change of
control remains subject to the consent of controlling shareholders, for example.
The chapter seeks to make a contribution to the debate on the relative merits of national and
supranational regulation in the field of corporate governance in the EU. The chapter argues
that the evolution of the EU as a parallel political framework has, in fact, provided a welcome
avenue for regulatory change that can circumvent entrenchment in national level corporate
regulation. Corporate constituencies have deeply entrenched interests in corporate governance
and takeover regulation at the national level. There is no guarantee that regulatory initiatives
at this level would necessarily do anything but further entrench these interests. Corporate
structures still remain locked-in at the national level and regulatory competition has not yet
210 An abbreviated version of the chapter has been published in the European Company and Financial Law
Review (4/2015), and as a working paper on the Social Science Research Network; see Klaus Ilmonen, A
Political Narrative of Nordic Corporate Governance: Shareholders, Stakeholders and Change of Control, 12
ECFR 489 (2015), and Klaus Ilmonen, Explaining Nordic Corporate Governance: A Political Narrative
(working paper, 2014) available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2748741.
211 Gourevitch & Shinn (2005), supra note 106.
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developed to provide a viable alternative to harmonization. The paper concludes with
considering appropriate EU level regulatory strategies for corporate governance regulation in
this environment.
Chapter 4: Towards a Nordic Corporate Governance Index: Metrics for Concentrated
Ownership
In the next chapter the study considers the relationship between corporate governance
mechanisms and the structure of corporate ownership. The chapter focuses on the relevance of
different corporate governance mechanisms in relation to concentrated ownership. The
chapter builds on papers critical of universal corporate governance indices.
The relevance of corporate governance mechanisms varies considerably. Some mechanisms
are less critical than others and, in particular, many mechanisms that may be effective in a
specific institutional environment are not nearly as relevant in other circumstances. The
structure of corporate ownership is a key factor in this regard. Mechanisms that provide
oversight for shareholders in the context of dispersed ownership may not be relevant in the
context of concentrated ownership. The dynamic of a general meeting of shareholders is
completely different if the vote is largely dominated by a controlling shareholder than in the
case of dispersed ownership. Given how complementary institutions develop to support
existing structures of corporate ownership these differences will also be reflected in the type
of matters considered by general meetings, and how decision making is regulated.
The chapter considers corporate governance indices used to assess corporate governance in
the Nordic countries (Sweden and Finland, specifically). The chapter then looks at the extent
to which the mechanisms used in those indices are relevant in a Nordic context. The chapter
then seeks to contribute towards developing a corporate governance index better adapted to
circumstances prevalent in the Nordic environment.
The chapter contributes to the topic of the study by assessing the impact of corporate
governance mechanisms in a specific institutional environment, including the structure of
corporate ownership and the political environment. This assessment provides the basis for
considering legal strategies appropriate for concentrated ownership. The chapter also looks to
expand the scope of factors used in assessing the relationship among corporate constituencies.
Corporate governance in different jurisdictions cannot be compared based on the availability
of individual corporate governance instruments; a more holistic analysis is needed to
understand the dynamics among different corporate constituencies. Factors that are relevant
for the purposes of corporate governance are not limited to company law regulation, but
include employment regulation and tax rules as well, among other. Moreover, the
enforcement of regulation must also be taken into consideration, including the quality of the
court system, for example.
Chapter 5: The Law and Politics of the Company Law Action Plan – Towards a Federal
System of Corporate Governance Regulation in the EU
The chapter contributes to the study by providing a case study on the political aspects of
corporate governance at the EU level in light of recent regulatory initiatives. The chapter
considers the political dynamic of EU level corporate governance regulation with a focus on
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initiatives that address corporate governance systems based on concentrated ownership. The
chapter specifically considers recent corporate governance initiatives of the EU as a case
study in assessing the political economy implications of EU regulatory initiatives.
The European Commission’s corporate governance initiatives have raised concern among
corporate constituents in the EU member states. The initiatives have been seen to decrease the
competitiveness of the publicly listed companies in the EU and the EU financial markets. It
has been argued that the EU has failed with respect to corporate regulation and that corporate
governance should be regulated at the national level.
The Company Law Action Plan is an important element in the on-going conflict between
harmonization and regulatory competition in the EU. Regulatory initiatives are being
increasingly introduced on international forums outside traditional legislative and political
processes and it may be important for the EU to find a role in such forums to avoid being
marginalized. Also, regulatory competition in the EU has not yet provided a fully viable
alternative to harmonization. Delegating regulation to the national level in this environment -
with national lock-ins remaining - would enable nationally entrenched interests to persist even
if they were sub-optimal. Thus it still remains important to provide EU level regulatory
initiatives.
Overall, the chapter finds that the Company Law Action Plan does not significantly alter the
positions among corporate constituencies or reflect significant changes in the political
economy – despite having its origins in political reactions to the financial crisis. Overall, the
plan reflects dominant market liberal trends but introduces, as can be expected, regulatory
elements based on the increased political salience of corporate regulation in the period after
the financial crisis. The Commission initiatives mainly reflect the trend of how political
decision making is concentrating to larger blocks at the cost of national governments. In this
respect the EU level may remain an important source of corporate law going forward. This
emphasizes the importance of understanding the political dynamics of EU corporate
governance regulation.
While some of the proposals in the action plan are novel and well-advised, other potential
solutions presented by the Commission would challenge the functioning of prevalent
corporate governance systems in light of current research and may not contribute to a more
competitive European market place for corporations. While corporate governance regulation
has many political implications, the adopted solutions have significant economic effects. In
this respect the EU Commission should reconsider some of the initiatives, while it may well
choose to pursue a more robust role in corporate governance regulation overall. The paper
calls for adopting legal strategies at the EU level that support diverse corporate governance
systems and different structures of corporate ownership and control.
Chapter 6: Law and Politics of Supranational Regulation: Developing Legal Strategies for
EU Corporate Governance Regulation
This chapter builds on the research in the previous chapters and summarizes the political
dynamic of EU corporate governance regulation. The chapter builds on understanding the EU
as a supranational political system and a solution for coordinating interaction among different
economic and regulatory models. These types of systems pose their own challenges for policy
and regulation, as the same regulation is applied throughout a varied institutional landscape,
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while the political dynamics are affected by the supranational political institutions. As the
importance of the EU increases with further economic integration it is more important than
ever to analyze and develop the types of legal strategies used for supranational regulatory
intervention.
The chapter identifies challenges for introducing EU corporate governance regulation with
respect to enforcing policy and with respect to introducing regulation for varied structures of
corporate ownership. The chapter then identifies available legal strategies and outlines a
typology of strategies appropriate for different types of situations. The chapter then provides a
brief outline for developing policy for EU corporate governance regulation.
Chapter 7: The EU Takeover Directive: Developing Legal Strategies for Concentrated
Ownership
The chapter looks at the Takeover Directive and its provisions that were deemed controversial
in the context of concentrated ownership. The chapter looks at how the mechanisms of the
directive were adapted (or not adapted) to corporate governance systems based on
concentrated ownership and whether the mechanisms might have been better designed to
address the concerns underlying the directive while not raising such opposition among key
interest groups.
The chapter serves as a case study on the application of EU level regulation in an environment
of concentrated ownership – and an example for the application of the qualitative model for
developing legal strategies at the EU level outlined in chapter 6. The chapter describes and
analyses the implications of concentrated ownership in the EU and identifies the key
regulatory concerns related to concentrated ownership in a path dependent institutional
environment. The paper suggests that the factors affecting ownership structure are complex
and that regulatory intervention may not lead to dispersed ownership in the absence of a
broader institutional environment supporting such structure. Indeed, it is not clear that
dispersed ownership would provide for a superior model of corporate ownership in many EU
member states.
The chapter considers EU level legal strategies for takeover regulation in light of the
differences in the institutional environment among EU member states and the special
characteristics of supranational regulation. The chapter considers how the effects of EU level
regulation differ among member states depending on the institutional environment. The
chapter also considers whether the legal strategies and regulatory tools chosen by the EU
Commission were appropriate for the goals set out for regulatory intervention.
The chapter is mainly concerned with developing legal strategies and the design of regulatory
tools at the EU level. The chapter will consider the types of legal strategies used in EU
takeover regulation. The study looks at how legal strategies address different agency
relationships (shareholders-managers, majority shareholder – minority shareholders), as well
as which legal strategies are appropriate for different institutional environments (dispersed
ownership, concentrated ownership, availability of enforcement mechanisms). The paper also
considers how legal strategies can be developed taking into consideration the applicable
political environment. The findings in the chapter will be used to develop a broader typology
of legal strategies used in EU level corporate governance regulation.
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The chapter suggests that EU initiatives for regulating concentrated ownership have been
flawed - in particular with regard to the EU Takeover Directive. The chapter argues that,
instead, it is important to develop regulatory responses that address both the agency problems
related to concentrated ownership and the challenges of entrenchment. The conclusion of the
paper with regard to EU corporate regulation is that instead of seeking to discourage
concentrated ownership as such, EU rules should limit operational private benefits of control
and encourage change of control where current structures have become inefficient. Regulatory
proposals with regard to EU takeover regulation are provided in the conclusions of the chapter.
Chapter 8: Conclusions: Nordic Perspectives on EU Corporate Governance Regulation
The final chapter provides brief responses to the research questions posed in the introductory
chapter. It also provides insights on the Nordic perspective on EU regulatory policies on
corporate governance. The chapter also discusses further research opportunities based on the
findings of the study. In this regard, the study recognizes that much research is still needed on
the development of EU corporate governance regulation, and identifies comparative
institutional analysis and the analysis of regulatory policy as areas where more empirical and










BARGAININGOVER CORPORATE CONTROL: REGULATING CONCENTRATED OWNERSHIP IN
THE EU
The position of controlling shareholders has at times been difficult to reconcile with effective
corporate governance regulation in prevalent models of corporate governance regulation.
Mechanisms that are available for monitoring controlling shareholders in the context of
concentrated ownership have been deemed inadequate and ineffective, for example. These
concerns have been reflected in corporate governance regulation, including a number of EU
corporate governance initiatives. However, concentrated ownership remains prevalent in
many EU jurisdictions and has demonstrably provided a competitive basis for economic
enterprise and corporate governance. There is a need for defining corporate governance in
terms that reflect the differences in the broader corporate environment.
This chapter approaches corporate governance as the outcome of bargaining over the terms
of corporate financing, and argues that the structure of ownership and corporate governance
outcomes reflect the characteristics and requirements of the broader institutional landscape.
The chapter then considers the resulting implications for EU corporate governance
regulation. The theme of the study is of topical relevance, as the EU Commission is pursuing
new initiatives in the field of corporate governance regulation.
I. INTRODUCTION: CONCENTRATED OWNERSHIP AND CORPORATE GOVERNANCE
A. CORPORATE GOVERNANCE CONCERNS
The position of controlling shareholders has often been deemed problematic in corporate
governance regulation.1 For example, there has been concern that corporate governance
systems based on concentrated ownership have been inadequate for the effective monitoring
of controlling shareholders.2 Corporate governance systems based on concentrated ownership
have been associated with low levels of investor protection, where controlling shareholders
are assumed to enjoy private benefits of control.3 These concerns have been reflected in
corporate governance regulation, including a number of EU corporate governance initiatives.4
There has been considerable focus on assessing the quality of corporate governance regulation
based on the availability and efficiency of monitoring mechanisms and regulations restricting
the use of control rights by large shareholders.5 However, it is unclear whether regulatory
1 See Rafael La Porta, Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes, Andrei Schleifer & Robert Vishny, Investor Protection and
Corporate Governance, 58 JSE, 3-27 (2000).
2 SeeMarco Becht, Patrick Bolton & Ailsa Roell, Corporate Governance and Control 17-21 (ECGI Finance
Working Paper 02/2002) available at http://ssrn.com/abstract_id=343461.
3 See La Porta et al. (2000), supra note 1.
4 See Commission of the European Communities, Impact Assessment of the Proportionality Between Capital and
Control in Listed Companies, Commission Staff Working Document SEC(2007) 1705 (2007), available at
http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/company/docs/shareholders/impact_assessment_122007.pdf.
5 See La Porta et al. (2000), supra note 1.
45
intervention based on these factors is adequate in all cases. The assumptions on which
corporate governance regulation have been premised may not always reflect the dynamics of
the institutional environment.
Concentrated ownership remains prevalent in many EU jurisdictions and has demonstrably
provided a competitive basis for economic enterprise and corporate governance.6 This is not
necessarily reflected in EU corporate governance regulation, which has not been tailored to an
environment of concentrated ownership.7 It has been argued that models for corporate
governance regulation adopted from jurisdictions with dispersed ownership may not be suited
to corporate governance systems based on concentrated ownership,8 the failed break-through
rule in the EU Takeover Directive9 and the one-share-one-vote initiative being two relevant
examples.10 The proposed break-through rule would have limited the effects of control
enhancing mechanisms in connection with takeovers, while the one-share-one-vote initiative
would have limited the introduction of certain control enhancing mechanisms altogether. Both
initiatives were deemed controversial and met with sufficient resistance to prevent the
introduction of new mandatory regulation. In light of the outcome, consideration should be
given to the adoption of other regulatory approaches better suited to addressing regulatory
concerns related to the position of controlling shareholders.
This study looks for alternative approaches to regulating the position of controlling
shareholders that would be better adapted to concentrated ownership and considers the
resulting implications for EU corporate governance regulation. The study argues that a focus
on regulatory mechanisms allowing for effective monitoring may be an inadequate basis for
regulatory intervention in an environment of concentrated ownership. Instead, the study looks
for alternative approaches that reflect the characteristics and dynamics of the relationships
between corporate constituencies in such an environment. For example, it has been suggested
that different forms of corporate ownership and control can also be seen to reflect the results
of bargaining among corporate constituents in a particular institutional environment, with
concentrated ownership seen to represent one outcome of such bargaining.11 Accordingly,
corporate governance has also been defined as the broader framework for bargaining among
these constituents.12 Moreover, corporate governance reflects the industrial developments and
6 See Harold Demsetz & Kenneth Lehn, The Structure of Corporate Ownership: Causes and Consequences, 93 J.
OF POL. EC., 1155-1177 (1985); Torben Pedersen & Steen Thomsen, Ownership Structure and Value of the
Largest European Firms: The Importance of Owner Identity, 7 J. OFMANAGEMENT AND GOVERNANCE, 27-55
(2003); see also Harold Demsetz & Belen Villalonga, Ownership Structure and Corporate Performance, 7 J. OF
CORP. FIN. 209, 210 (2001).
7 See Paul Davies, Edmund-Philipp Schuster & Emilie van der Walle de Ghelcke, The Takeover Directive as a
Protectionist Tool? (ECGI Law Working Paper No. 141/2010), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1554616.
8 Marc Goergen, Marina Martynova & Luc Renneboog, Corporate Governance Convergence: Evidence from
Takeover Regulation 29 (ECGI Working Paper No. 33/2005), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=709023.
9 Directive 25/2004/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 21 April 2004 on Takeover Bids, 2004
O.J. (L142) [hereinafter Takeover Directive].
10 See Rolf Skog, The Takeover Directive – an Endless Saga?, 13 EUR. BUS. L REV. 301-312 (2002); and
Charlie McCreevy, Commissioner, Speech at the European Parliament's Legal Affairs Committee, October 3,
2007, available at http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=SPEECH/07/592.
11 Zohar Goshen & Assaf Hamdani, Corporate Control and Idiosyncratic Vision, 125 YALE L.J. 560, 586-587
(2013).
12 SeeMASAHIKO AOKI, TOWARD A COMPARATIVE INSTITUTIONAL ANALYSIS (2001), John C. Coffee, Unstable
Coalitions: Corporate Governance as a Multi-Player Game, 78 GEO.L.J. 1495 1989-1990 and Manuel A. Utset,
Towards a Bargaining Theory of the Firm, 80 CORNELL L.REV. 540 (1995).
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political environment that affect the bargaining framework.13 This approach to corporate
finance and corporate governance reflects the dynamic nature of the relationships between
corporate constituencies in an evolving corporate environment. This study considers the
resulting regulatory implications for corporate governance, control and concentrated
ownership, focusing, in particular, on regulation in the EU, where concentrated ownership
remains characteristic to the corporate environment. The theme of the study is timely, as the
EU Commission is considering the need for new initiatives in the field of corporate
governance regulation.
B. BARGAINING OVER CORPORATE GOVERNANCE
It has been argued that the nature of the firm has been changing.14 Industrial structures have
evolved with the expansion of new technologies; vertical integration of manufacturing has
decreased and the boundaries of the firm have become less firm; so that the adoption of
different financing and governance models can easily affect them15 In general, the importance
of human capital in the corporate enterprise has increased.16 Current corporate theories largely
originate from an era where the relative importance or bargaining power of corporate
constituencies was different, and this may be reflected in how the roles of corporate
constituencies have been defined in corporate governance regulation. For instance, the
emphasis on shareholder primacy may be related to the importance of equity capital
characteristic of formerly prevalent industrial structures. As these structures are now
changing, it is appropriate to reconsider the basis for corporate governance regulation. For
example, in the prevailing environment the balance between investor interests and the control
rights of agents (or entrepreneurs) may well warrant re-examination.17
Agency theory emphasizes the need for principals to monitor and control the activities of
agents in the corporate environment. This is often reflected in corporate governance
regulation emphasizing the importance of different types of monitoring mechanisms.
However, it may be useful to view corporate constituencies as independent actors who may
have complementary interests allowing for efficient bargaining outcomes. Different forms of
corporate ownership and control can be seen to reflect the results of bargaining over the terms
of corporate finance and corporate governance, where the institutional environment and the
life-cycle of the corporation may affect the choice of ownership structure and where
concentrated ownership is one outcome of such bargaining.18 This study argues that while the
concentration of control rights can be a key prerequisite for firm-specific investments, it does
not necessarily result in the extraction of private benefits of control. Concentrated ownership
and control enhancing mechanisms may often be associated with poor investor protection and
private benefits.19 Nevertheless, both have also been observed in environments with low
levels of private benefits of control, where they have provided a competitive basis for
13 See Aoki (2001), supra note 12; see alsoMark J. Roe, Political Preconditions to Separating Ownership from
Corporate Control, 53 STAN. L. REV. 539 (2000).
14 See Luigi Zingales, In Search of New Foundations (NBER Working Paper Series 7706, 2000), available at
http://www.nber.org/papers/w7706.
15 Id. at 3.
16 Id.
17 See Goshen & Hamdani (2013), supra note 11.
18 Id. at 26-29.
19 See Rafael La Porta, Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes & Andrei Schleifer, Corporate Ownership Around the World,
54 J. FIN. 471, 491-93 (1999) [hereinafter La Porta et al. (1999)].
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corporate governance.20 This suggests that a better understanding of the underlying causes of
different forms of corporate ownership may still be needed. This can also have implications
for the regulation of the relationships between corporate constituencies.
Corporate governance provides the framework for exercising control over the use of corporate
assets and for allocating revenues among corporate constituents. The financial structure of the
corporation, including the terms of debt and equity financing, are important factors in this
regard. In fact, corporate governance and corporate finance outcomes can be defined in terms
of financial contracting, where entrepreneurs and providers of finance bargain over the terms
of corporate finance and the related cash-flows and governance rights in a given institutional
environment.21 Financial instruments, such as equity, debt and their different combinations,
with attached cash-flow and governance rights, can be seen as the building blocks of both
corporate finance and corporate governance.22 Different combinations of financial instruments
and corporate governance solutions thus reflect the outcome of bargaining among corporate
constituencies. In the context of concentrated ownership, the bargaining-perspective may be
particularly useful, as controlling shareholders can be seen as entrepreneurs and concentrated
ownership as one corporate governance outcome of bargaining.23 This approach to corporate
finance and corporate governance reflects the more dynamic nature of the relationships
between corporate constituencies in an evolving corporate environment.
This study recognizes the problems related to the entrenchment of corporate control and that
the transfer of corporate control may require to be facilitated through appropriate regulatory
strategies. However, the study finds that the concentration of corporate control may be a
general characteristic of corporate governance and that corporate governance mechanisms
based on outside monitoring have been less effective than assumed, regardless of ownership
structure.24 Consequently, other types of mechanisms should be introduced for regulating the
relationship between entrepreneurs and investors and for facilitating the transfer of control.
C. CONCENTRATED OWNERSHIP IN THE EU
This study is concerned with corporate governance in the context of concentrated ownership
and provides a review of research on different aspects of concentrated ownership and
corporate control. As discussed, concentrated ownership, especially combined with control
enhancing mechanisms, is often deemed problematic for the purposes of corporate
governance. Nonetheless, this form of ownership dominates much of the European corporate
landscape with respect to both privately and publicly held (i.e., listed) companies.25
20 See Pedersen & Thomsen (2003), supra note 6 and Christian Weiss, The Ownership Concentration of Firms:
Three Essays on the Determinants and Effects 133 (Dissertation, European Business School, International
University Schloss Reichanthausen, 2010), available at http://hdl.handlenet/10419/30247.
21 See Oliver Hart, Financial Contracting (NBER Working Paper 8285, 2001) available at
http://www.nber.org/papers/w8285.
22 See Goshen & Hamdani (2013), supra note 11.
23 Id. at 6; see also Oliver Hart & John Moore, Property Rights and the Nature of the Firm, 98 J. OF POL. EC.
1119 (1990).
24 See Joseph E. Stiglitz & Aaron S. Edlin, Discouraging Rivals 1-3 (NBER Working Paper 4145, 1992),
available at http://www.nber.org/papers/w4145 and Martin Hellwig, On the Economics and Politics of
Corporate Finance and Corporate Control in CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: THEORETICAL AND EMPIRICAL
PERSPECTIVES 95 (Xavier Vives, ed., 2000).
25 See THE CONTROLOF CORPORATE EUROPE (Fabrizio Barca & Marco Becht, eds., 2001);
Mara Faccio & Larry H.P. Lang, The Ultimate Ownership of Western European Corporations, 65 JFE 365,
(2002), and La Porta et al. (1999), supra note 19.
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Consequently, it remains important to consider the corporate governance implications of
concentrated ownership from a European perspective. Considering the controversies related to
EU corporate governance initiatives targeting control structures related to concentrated
ownership, it is important to assess whether other, less controversial, approaches to regulating
the position of controlling shareholders could be adopted.
The potential for conflicts of interest among corporate constituencies is emphasized in
connection with change of control transactions. These situations may provide an opportunity
for re-bargaining or, indeed, for extracting private benefits at the cost of other constituencies.
For these reasons, the study will also briefly examine the application of the bargaining
approach outlined above to EU-level takeover regulation. The theme of the study is timely, as
the EU Commission is considering the need for new initiatives in the field of corporate
governance regulation, including proposals for new regulation on related-party transactions.
This chapter proceeds as follows. After an introduction to the theme of the study (Section I),
the chapter reviews research on different aspects of concentrated ownership and corporate
control (Section II). Next the study discusses corporate governance arrangements and the
allocation of control and cash-flow rights from the perspective of financial contracting,
highlighting the perspective of the entrepreneur in negotiating with the providers of corporate
finance (Section III). The study then turns to factors affecting the bargaining outcome,
including the core legal elements of the corporation and other external factors (Section IV).
The chapter then discusses concentrated ownership and control as a specific outcome of
bargaining over corporate finance and the regulatory implications thereof (Section V). This
section also discusses the application of these observations to EU-level corporate governance
and change of control regulation. Section VI presents the conclusions of the study.
II. EXPLAINING CONCENTRATED OWNERSHIP
There has been much research into the underlying causes of different forms of corporate
ownership.26 In particular, concern has been expressed that governance models based on
concentrated ownership are less competitive than those based on dispersed ownership.27
However, in recent years there has been some concern related to the perceived lack of
shareholder involvement in dispersed ownership28. There have been concerns that corporate
governance models are failing due to inadequate monitoring by dispersed shareholders29. As a
result there has been an emerging interest in the role of large shareholders and in corporate
governance solutions based on concentrated ownership30.
Below, this study briefly examines the debate on concentrated ownership, and the theories
that underlie the debate, in order to demonstrate the need to better understand the underlying
causes for variations in corporate ownership and corporate governance.
A. SEPARATION OF OWNERSHIP AND CONTROL VS. CONCENTRATED OWNERSHIP
26 See La Porta et al (1999), supra note 19, Stijn Claessens et al, The Separation of Ownership and Control in
East Asian Corporations, 58 JFE 81 (2000), and Faccio & Lang (2002), supra note 25.
27 See La Porta et al (1999), supra note 19.
28 See Lynn Dallas, Short-Termism, the Financial Crisis and Corporate Governance, 37 J. CORP. L. 264 (2011).
29 Id.
30 Report of the Reflection Group on the Future of EU Company Law (April 5, 2011), available at
http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/company/docs/modern/reflectiongroup_report_en.pdf [hereinafter Reflection
Group Report (2012)], and EU Commission Green Paper, The EU Corporate Governance Framework
COM(2011) 164 final (April 5, 2011).
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The modern corporation and much of corporate governance theory have been based on the
premise of the separation of ownership and control and the agency problems that arise
therewith.31 The resulting assumption is that shareholders are best served by diversifying their
holdings, and corporate governance is consequently focused on the alignment of agents’
interests with those of principals and on the efficient monitoring of agents’ performance. In
these circumstances control rights are best allocated to the holders of residual cash flows, i.e.,
the shareholders.
In this paradigm, the ability to control corporate strategy and the use of corporate assets in the
absence of effective monitoring mechanisms is generally deemed problematic and often
associated with the extraction of private benefits of control.32 Similarly, the costs associated
with maintaining large, undiversified holdings are assumed to be covered by these private
benefits. For example, controlling shareholders are assumed to extract benefits through
tunneling33 or by leveraging their control positions through control enhancing mechanisms
and taking more risk than is beneficial to the minority shareholders.34 In some cases it is
argued that private benefits are non-pecuniary, i.e., that controlling shareholders may have
non-monetary interests, such as political influence or the social status sometimes associated
with corporate control.35 Nevertheless, typically these aspects of corporate control have still
been defined in terms of private benefits. Concentrated ownership and control enhancing
mechanisms have often been associated with unsatisfactory investor protection and the
extraction of private benefits of control – with some justification.36 The principle of
separation of ownership and control and the agency problems related therewith also support
the notion that for the purposes of efficient risk allocation and management incentives,
concentrated ownership may not be an optimal structure of ownership. In corporate
governance regulation, these assumptions have often been reflected, for example, in a focus
on limiting private benefits of control and the control rights of large shareholders.
Assumptions regarding the role of controlling shareholders have nevertheless been called into
question, and have been deemed to overly simplify the underlying causes of different
structures of corporate ownership and control.37 Both concentrated ownership and different
types of control enhancing mechanisms have also been observed in environments with
reportedly low levels of private benefits of control.38 In Sweden, for example, concentrated
31 SeeMichael Jensen & William Meckling, Theory of the Firm – Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs and
Ownership Structure, 3 JFE 305 (1976).
32 See John Armour, Henry Hansmann & Reinier Kraakman, Agency Problems and Legal Strategies, in THE
ANATOMY OF CORPORATE LAW 35 (Reinier Kraakman et al., 2004).
33 See Luca Enriques & Paolo Volpin, Corporate Governance Reforms in Continental Europe, 21 J. ECON.
PERSP. 117 (2007) and Simon Johnson, Rafael La Porta, Florencio Lopez de Silanes & Andrei Shleifer,
Tunnelling (Harvard Institute of Economic Research Paper No. 1887, 2000), available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=204868 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.204868.
34 See Lucian A. Bebchuk, Reinier Kraakman & George Triantis, Stock Pyramids, Cross-Ownership and Dual
Class Equity: The Creation and Agency Costs of Separating Control from Cash Flow Rights 12 (Harvard Law
School John M. Olin Center for Law, Economics and Business Discussion Paper Series 249, 1999), available at
http://lsr.nellco.org/harvard_olin/249 .
35 See Ronald J. Gilson, Controlling Shareholders and Corporate Governance: Complicating the Comparative
Taxonomy, 119 HARV. L. REV. 1641, 1663-1665 (2006).
36 See La Porta et al (1999), supra note 19.
37 See Gilson (2006), supra note 35, at 1649-1650.
38 SeeMartin Holmén & Peter Högfeldt, A Law and Finance Analysis of Initial Public Offerings, 13 J. OF FIN.
INTERMEDIATION 324 (2004), Martin Holmén & Peter Högfeldt, Pyramidal Discounts, Tunneling or
Overinvestment?, 2 INT. REV. OF FIN. 133 (2009), Alexander Dyck & Luigi Zingales, Private benefits of control:
An international comparison, 59 J. OF FIN. 537 (2004) and Jonas Agnblad, Erik Berglöf, Peter Högfeldt &
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ownership remains an important feature of the corporate environment and has often been
supported by the use of control enhancing mechanisms, such as dual class share structures.39
Nevertheless, empirical studies report relatively low levels of private benefits of control in
Sweden – at levels similar to the United States and the United Kingdom, countries generally
associated with high levels of dispersed ownership.40
In fact, it has also been noted that ownership in the United States may be less dispersed than
commonly assumed. Empirical research suggests that a significant portion of publicly listed
companies have block holders, or even a single controlling shareholder.41 Moreover, there are
important examples from leading growth companies in the U.S. technology sector of founders
retaining control with control enhancing mechanisms at the point of listing.42 This reflects the
notion that governance models based on concentrated ownership remain highly relevant. The
life-cycle theory of corporate governance suggests that concentrated ownership may well be
characteristic of new innovative companies, as in the cases referred to above, but will give
way to other forms of governance as the company matures.43 Nevertheless, if we accept that
only low levels of private benefits of control are permitted in the U.S. institutional
environment, then there would seem to be other reasons for maintaining control of a company
than the ability of the founders to enrich themselves at the cost of the other shareholders.
Consequently, other explanations for differences between corporate governance systems may
be warranted.
Block holding has been identified as a corporate governance mechanism for mitigating the
collective action problem of shareholders.44 It has been recognized that there may be a trade-
off between the agency problems related to the separation of ownership and control in a
diversified shareholder structure and the issues that arise in connection with concentrated
ownership.45 Controlling shareholders can provide an efficient management monitoring
function, as they may carry undiversified risk in holding a large position in a single
company.46 The inability of the minority shareholders to challenge the position of the
controlling shareholder is compensated for by an alignment of interests based on the illiquid
investment of the controlling shareholder. If sufficient restrictions are in place to limit the
ability of controlling shareholders to extract private benefits of control through related-party
transactions, for example, the structure may well offer a competitive form of ownership.47
This should also be reflected in corporate governance regulation.
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Empirical studies support the view that concentrated ownership in itself does not necessarily
imply inferior corporate performance. In certain regions concentrated ownership has indeed
been found to correlate with weaker firm performance,48 but a number of studies have also
found a positive relationship between firm performance and concentrated ownership.49 In fact,
a division between jurisdictions that support a variety of shareholder systems and those that
only support concentrated ownership has been suggested.50 In the former jurisdictions,
concentrated ownership is seen as one of many possible efficient governance outcomes
supported by the overall legal framework. One important aspect of such jurisdictions is that
the legal framework does not allow for high levels of private benefits of control.
B. THE INSTITUTIONAL ENVIRONMENT
Industrial development and political institutions51 have a significant impact on the
development of the structure of corporate ownership and corporate law.52 In this context
concentrated ownership has been seen to reflect the effects of the broader institutional
environment. Roe mentions Germany, Italy and Sweden as examples of EU member states
with a political and institutional environment that supports concentrated ownership.53 Roe
argues, for example, that in countries with strong labor institutions there is likely to be more
pressure for corporate governance institutions that favor employees and less for institutions
that support the interests of shareholders. 54For example, companies are likely to be
encouraged to expand to secure employment, even at the cost of profitability, and to avoid
down-sizing and taking disruptive risks.55 In this environment the institutions needed for
dispersed ownership to flourish are absent, whereas a controlling shareholder would be in a
relatively good position to bargain over surplus and to resist political pressures.56 Other
political economy explanations point out that in states with concentrated ownership a political
majority with fewer financial incentives (and more labor-oriented financial interests) may
oppose a market-based system related to higher risk taking.57 The political system in this
environment can be expected to favor large shareholders and labor at the cost of smaller
investors and will support complementary governance structures – much of which can be
observed in EU member states with concentrated ownership. Finally, incumbent industrial
and financial interest groups may also seek to affect the development of financial systems
based on their interest to restrain competition58. Rajan and Zingales argue that it is in
incumbents’ interest to restrict financial development and the openness of the economy in
order to prevent the emergence of competitors. However, globalization has reduced their
48 See Claessens et al. (2002), supra note 26.
49 See Pedersen & Thomsen (2003), supra note 6 and Weiss (2010) supra note 20.
50 See Gilson (2006), supra note 35, at 1660-1661.
51 See Roe (2000), supra note 13 and MARK J. ROE, POLITICAL DETERMINANTS OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE
(2003).
52 See Lucian A. Bebchuk and Mark J. Roe, A Theory of Path Dependence in Corporate Governance and
Ownership, 52 STAN. L. REV. 127 (1999).
53 SeeMark J. Roe, The Institutions of Corporate Governance (Harvard Law School, John M. Olin Center’s
Program for Corporate Governance Discussion Paper 488, 2004), available at
http://law.harvard.edu/programs/olin_center/papers/pdf/Roe_488.pdf.
54 Id. at 18.
55 Id. at 18-19.
56 Id. at 19.
57 See Enrico C. Perotti & Ernst-Ludwig von Thadden, The Political Economy of Dominant Investors (Tinbergen
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impact on financial markets, resulting in an increase in the development of corporate finance
and market-based corporate governance institutions.59
C. CONCENTRATED OWNERSHIP AND CORPORATE CONTROL
There has been concern that corporate governance systems based on concentrated ownership
have provided inadequate means for the effective monitoring of controlling shareholders.
There seems to be a lack of effective mechanisms both to restrict the ability of controlling
shareholders to disenfranchise minority shareholders and to challenge the control of
incumbent controlling shareholders when they no longer contribute to the enterprise.60 It has
traditionally been argued that monitoring agent behavior can be more effective in an
environment of dispersed ownership, where management is accountable to shareholders and
monitored by market-based mechanisms, such as hostile takeovers.61 However, in reality it
appears that control is often concentrated and hard to challenge, regardless of the governance
and ownership structure.62 Control is commonly concentrated in the hands of given corporate
constituencies, usually management or an owner-entrepreneur, for example; but it rarely rests
with outside shareholders.63 Complementary institutions usually evolve to support the
prevalent governance system, further strengthening the influence of the dominant
constituencies.64 For example, it has been argued that legal systems support management
control in jurisdictions with a prevalence of dispersed ownership, while shareholder power
may be stronger in jurisdictions with a preponderance of concentrated ownership.65
As legal systems evolve, the position of the controlling constituents is strengthened in relative
terms and even entrenched. It is important to emphasize that the possibility of entrenchment
of corporate control is not limited to concentrated ownership. Pacces suggests that the
entrenchment of corporate control may be not just a distortion of separation of ownership and
control, but rather one of its distinctive features.66 In other words, entrenchment is not limited
to governance systems based on concentrated ownership; it is also a feature of dispersed
ownership systems.
The arguments discussed above suggest that concentration of control may be a key
characteristic of corporate governance. However, rather than being a means to extract private
benefits, control may be a crucial pre-requisite for certain firm-specific investments in an
environment of incomplete contracts. In fact, corporate control has also been associated, for
example, with the ability to pursue value-maximizing strategies that markets are not fully able
to price and where investors might disagree with the entrepreneur on the use of the corporate
59 Id.
60 Becht, Bolton & Roell (2002), supra note 44, at 17-21, see also Lucian A. Bebchuk, Efficient and Inefficient
Sales of Corporate Control, 109 Q´LY J. ECON. 957 (1994).
61 Becht, Bolton & Roell, supra note 44, at 12-17.
62 See Alessio M. Pacces, Control Matters: Law and Economics of Private Benefits of Control 30 (Rotterdam
Institute of Law and Economics, Working Paper 2009/04, 2009), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1448164.
63 See Hellwig (2000), supra note 24, Sofie Cools, The Real Difference in Corporate Law between the United
States and Continental Europe: Distribution of Powers 64 (Harvard Law School John M. Olin Center for Law,
Economics and Business Discussion Paper Series, Paper 490, 2004) available at
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assets.67 As a result, it is possible that the controlling constituent prioritizes control rights over
cash-flow rights, whereas investors take the opposite view, allowing for the parties to seek an
optimal balance in the form of the financial structure of the corporation through bargaining.
This suggests that approaching corporate governance from the perspective of bargaining may
provide additional insights into the relationship between corporate constituencies. It also
suggests that for the purposes of corporate governance regulation it may be just as important
to recognize the rights of the controlling constituents (or agents) as it is to acknowledge the
need to protect minority shareholders.68
The underlying causes of the structure of ownership are complex. Nevertheless, it seems that
concentrated ownership may well be an efficient form of ownership and can provide a
competitive basis for corporate governance. It also seems clear that there may be other
reasons for maintaining control than the ability to extract private benefits. In this regard,
agency theory and the notion of the separation of ownership and control may fail to fully
describe the dynamics of the relationship between corporate constituents in the modern
corporation in the context of an evolving corporate environment. It is possible that a better
understanding of the underlying causes of different forms of corporate ownership may still be
needed.
III. BARGAINING AND CORPORATE GOVERNANCE
The nature of the corporation cannot be separated from the nature of the underlying business
enterprise. It has been argued that the nature of the corporation is changing together with the
evolution of the prevalent forms of enterprise. If the dominant features of business change,
this may have an effect both on the relationships between corporate constituencies and on
corporate governance. For example, it has been argued that the importance of innovative
enterprise and human capital as a basis for enterprise has increased relative to the importance
of capital and ownership of physical assets. Moreover, decision making may no longer be
concentrated at the top of the organization.69 These factors are bound to affect corporate
governance choices. Zingales argues that the boundaries of the firm are less stable and can
easily be affected by financing and governance choices.70 These developments should also be
taken into account in corporate governance regulation when considering the basis for
regulating the relationships between corporate constituencies.
Agency theory has focused on principal-agent relationships among corporate constituencies
and on the monitoring of agent performance. A key concern has been how to overcome
agency problems, incentivize agents and align their interests with those of the principals.
However, an important element that agency theory fails to address directly is the relationship
between financial structure and corporate governance.71 The financial contracting literature
and theories related to the incompleteness of contracts introduce new elements that connect
the structure of corporate finance with corporate governance and the allocation of control
rights.72 However, these factors may be insufficiently reflected in corporate governance
regulation. This section outlines the financial contracting approach to corporate governance
and how it reflects the dynamic nature of the relationship between entrepreneurs and
67 See Goshen & Hamdani (2013), supra note 11.
68 Id. at 1.
69 Zingales (2000), supra note 14, at 37.
70 Id. at 3.
71 See Oliver E. Williamson, Corporate Finance and Corporate Governance, 43 J. OF FIN. 567 (1988).
72 See Hart (2001), supra note 21.
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investors. The purpose of this section is to identify possible alternative approaches to the role
of controlling shareholders to be used as a basis in corporate governance regulation.
A. FROMAGENCY THEORY TO FINANCIAL CONTRACTING AND BEYOND
Agency theory provides a basis for understanding the relationships between different actors
involved in economic activity.73 The idealized “firm” has been viewed as a “nexus of
contracts” for corporate constituencies when regulating agency relationships in relation to a
business enterprise.74 In their approach, Jensen & Meckling view the “firm” as a legal fiction
that provides the axis for contractually arranging the conflicting objectives of these actors for
the purposes of economic activity.75 As outside equity investment is introduced, agency costs
will be generated as the interests of managers and outside investors begin to diverge. This line
of argument results in support for the separation of ownership and control and a focus on
management monitoring as the main function of corporate governance.
In an environment where the relative importance of capital is emphasized, the position of
investors (including shareholders) as principals is underlined at the cost of the entrepreneurs
deemed to be acting as agents. Much of the focus in corporate governance reregulation has
been on effective monitoring and incentives to ensure that agents promote the interests of
principals. In the corporate context, it sometimes seems that agents have been likened to
employees that can be dismissed at will, which, of course, is not what agency theory
necessarily suggests. A definition of the relationship between corporate constituencies based
on agency theory alone may reflect just one of many bargaining outcomes, and may fail to
reflect the dynamic nature of these relationships characteristic to the modern corporation and
an evolving corporate environment.
While agency theory has provided major contributions to the theory of the firm, it has been
supplemented by other approaches, including transaction cost economics and the theory of
property-rights. Scholars have argued that while agency theory provides a framework for
understanding problems related to the relationships between corporate constituencies, it does
not fully explain the financial structure of the corporation. Hart observes, for example, that
when applying agency theory to the corporate context, the main focus seems to be on
monitoring and aligning the interests of agents with those of principals, while there seems to
be less focus on explaining the financial structure of the corporation.76 Williamson
emphasizes the relationship between the structure of corporate finance and corporate
governance, claiming that the type of financial instrument and resulting governance system
should be based on the characteristics of the specific project or transaction.77
In property rights theory, a firm is defined according to the assets it possesses, with ownership
conferring residual rights of control over these assets. 78 The specificity of assets in a
corporation and the further realization that ex ante contracting among corporate constituencies
is necessarily incomplete puts an emphasis on the allocation of decision rights with regard to
73 SeeMichael Jensen & William Meckling, Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs and
Ownershup Structure, 3 JFE 305 (1976).
74 Id.
75 Id. at 314.
76 Hart (2001) supra note 21, at 7 and 9.
77 SeeWilliamson (1988), supra note 71.
78 See Hart & Moore (1990), supra note 23.
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how corporate assets are used and, importantly, separates “access” from “ownership.”79 There
has been much research on how decision-making rights should be optimally allocated
between managers (or entrepreneurs), on the one hand, and investors (or providers of
financing), on the other.80
It is also possible to approach the corporation and corporate governance as a framework for
continuous or at least recurring bargaining among self-interested actors with varied interests
who can obtain benefits from mutual cooperation.81 This approach has its origins in game
theory – but here it is applied to a less-stylized, unstable environment with multiple parties.82
Bargaining occurs in, and is affected by, the broader institutional environment, involving
market institutions and processes, the industrial and political environment and formal and
social norms.83 With respect to corporate ownership and control, bargaining within these
parameters can result in multiple equilibria, including governance models with concentrated
ownership.84
Generally, multiple parties are deemed to be involved in bargaining over corporate
governance, including investors, management and employees.85 With respect to investors, the
role of shareholders has often been emphasized, but debt investors also have a considerable
interest in the corporation, of course.86 Bargaining can take the form of explicit or implicit
contracts that parties may seek to renegotiate from time to time as their relative bargaining
power evolves. The relative bargaining power among corporate constituencies can change as a
result of technological or industrial changes, for example, or through political developments
and the introduction of new regulation. Bargaining, then, does not need to be direct; instead,
corporate constituencies can, for example, affect internal relationships through the political
system.
A relevant prerequisite for bargaining is the fact that contracts are necessarily incomplete, as
discussed above, and it is generally impossible to fully regulate the relationships among
corporate constituencies ex ante. When an investor has made a significant firm-specific
investment (be it a shareholder, debt holder, manager or employee) it is difficult to withdraw,
and thus it becomes less liquid. Once an equity investment is made, for example, it may not
be possible to withdraw it, and the investor is dependent on the continued performance of
other constituencies. Similarly, employees will be more dependent on a specific corporation
once they have invested in firm-specific skills that may be difficult to take elsewhere. Other
constituencies may look to take advantage of this and attempt to renegotiate the terms of their
respective investments as their relative bargaining power changes. Investors will be aware of
this, of course, and require ex ante guarantees to protect their initial investment.87 However,
as contracts are necessarily incomplete (and as the alternatives available to investors are likely
79 Id. at 1121.
80 Id. at 1121-1122 and 1149-1151.
81 See Aoki (2001), Coffee (1989-1990) and Utset (1995), supra note 12.
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to have the same characteristics in an environment of incomplete contracts) there will be room
for such renegotiations.88
The structure of corporate finance and the framework of corporate governance provide the
building blocks for bargaining. In this context, the corporation and corporate finance can be
approached from the perspective of financial contracting.89 In simple terms, financial
contracting in the corporate context can be seen as an understanding between an entrepreneur
with an idea but no funds and an investor with funds but no idea.90 The structure of corporate
finance and the corporate governance of a given corporation are the result of bargaining
between these actors. From the perspective of financial contracting, much of corporate
governance relates to how entrepreneurs and investors agree on the terms of corporate
financing. Different forms of capital structure, i.e., different corporate finance and corporate
governance solutions, reflect the different outcomes of bargaining between these
constituencies. The relationship between those in need of financing for their business
enterprise and the providers of that financing is a core element of corporate governance.91 It is
in this respect that this approach may be useful for analyzing concentrated ownership, as
controlling shareholders can be seen as entrepreneurs and concentrated ownership as one
outcome of bargaining. 92Control enhancing mechanisms can be similarly understood as the
result of negotiations between the entrepreneur and investors, for example.
In financial contracting theory, the entrepreneur negotiates cash flow and governance rights
with the providers of financing.93 As discussed, different types of financial instruments, i.e.,
equity, debt and convertibles, are the basic building blocks of corporate finance and corporate
governance. 94The structure of corporate finance sets the framework for ex-post bargaining
over control. For example, debt-financing generally allows the entrepreneur to maintain
control. However, higher levels of debt increase the risk of default, with the result, typically,
that control will be passed to the investors. Equity-financing, on the other hand, generally
provides control rights to the investors. Financial instruments with contingent control rights,
such as convertible debt, provide a further model of allocating governance rights, in that
control is transferred upon a triggering event typically linked to the performance of the
enterprise.
Different bundles of governance rights and cash-flow rights attach to different bundles of
financial instruments. Governance rights can be divided in many different ways, including on
the basis of the party entitled to take governance decisions, the types of decisions or specific
contingencies.95 Cash-flow rights, on the other hand, can be divided on the basis of duration
(debt with different maturity or equity with indefinite maturity) or whether they are fixed
(debt), residual (equity) or a combination of the two. By agreeing on the use and allocation of
different combinations of financial instruments, entrepreneurs and investors can create unique
bundles of cash-flow and governance rights.
88 Id. at 3.
89 See Hart (1995), supra note 86.
90 Hart (2001), supra note 21, at 1.
91 See Andrei Shleifer & Robert W. Vishny, A Survey of Corporate Governance, 52 J. OF FIN. 737, 737 (1997).
92 See Hart (2001), supra note 21.
93 Id. at 1-2, 10-12 and Goshen & Hamdani (2013), supra note 11.
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In this context, it is important to further recognize that bargaining is on-going and involves
multiple participants. Moreover, bargaining does not occur in a vacuum and is affected by the
relevant institutional environment with which participants interact, and also by which
participants can form coalitions for increased bargaining power.96 The participation of
employees, for example, can occur through the political system, as will be discussed in more
detail below.
B. BARGAINING OVER CORPORATE CONTROL
1. Approaches to Corporate Governance
The well-known definition of corporate governance provided by Shleifer & Vishny states that
“corporate governance deals with the ways in which suppliers of finance to corporations
assure themselves of getting a return on their investment.”97 Shleifer and Vishny emphasize
that production capital is specified; i.e., it is committed to the enterprise (resulting in sunk
costs). When different constituents consider firm-specific investments of capital or labor, thus
resulting in sunk costs, there must be sufficient assurance that they will be reimbursed.
Corporate governance mechanisms are intended to provide that assurance.98
Pursuant to the definition above, the goal of corporate governance mechanisms is to provide
the basis for an optimal balance in the terms and conditions of different types of contributions
of production capital (equity, debt, labor etc.) at any given time. Shleifer & Vishny’s
definition suggests that corporate governance arrangements are much like contractual
arrangements or covenants that are negotiated among the parties and affected by the risks and
returns involved. However, it is commonly acknowledged that corporate governance is a more
complex phenomenon that cannot easily be defined on the basis of a purely contractual
approach. Such a definition is particularly difficult where entrepreneurial aspects are involved
and there is disagreement on the potential levels of future cash-flows. At best, theories related
to the costs of contracting simply suggest that the implicit contracts underlying the
relationships between corporate constituents are incomplete.99 Corporate governance provides
the means and mechanisms by which potential conflicts of interest among different corporate
constituencies are resolved. It is important to recognize, however, that the dynamics of
corporate governance can change. Corporate constituents can seek to renegotiate these
contracts if their bargaining power increases over time, with each party seeking to increase its
stake from the income of the enterprise.100
Shleifer & Vishny’s definition has often been used as the basis for working with the allocative
aspects of governance. A broader version of the definition has been provided by Zingales,
whereby corporate governance is the “set of conditions that shapes the ex post bargaining
over the quasi rents generated by a firm.”101 Zingales emphasizes the incompleteness of
contracts and recognizes the interests of all parties who are mutually specialized and have
made firm-specific investments, i.e., shareholders, employees, suppliers and customers.102 As
96 See Aoki (2001), supra note 12, at 287-291; Coffee, supra note 12; see also PETER GOUREVITCH & JAMES
SHINN, POLITICAL POWER AND CORPORATE CONTROL (2005).
97 Shleifer & Vishny (1997), supra note 91, at 737.
98 Id. at 738.
99 See Philippe Aghion & Patrick Bolton, An Incomplete Contracts Approach to Financial Contracting, 59 R.
ECON. STUDIES 473 (1992).
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101 See Zingales (1997), supra note 87.
102 Id. at 5.
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assets become specialized their value outside that context decreases. This has important
implications for the efficient allocation of control rights. Zingales argues that, as a result,
residual rights of control should be allocated to a “group of agents who need to protect their
investment against ex post expropriation, but who have little control over how much the asset
is specialized.”103 This approach has important implications for corporate governance
mechanisms. Zingales claims that governance mechanisms, including allocation of ownership,
financial structure, organizational structure, product market competition and takeovers, can be
seen as institutions affecting the process of how quasi rents are distributed. This perspective
suggests that the firm is a complex structure104 and expands corporate governance to cover a
broader range of norms and circumstances. Moreover, the relationships between corporate
constituencies are defined not in hierarchical terms but rather in terms of their relative
dependency. A further aspect of Zingales’ analysis is that these relationships are not in an
equilibrium105 but evolve with technological, political and institutional developments. Thus,
the group of agents whose firm-specific investments require protection will also change over
time.
I shall first consider the basis for bargaining over corporate governance from the perspective
of financial contracting and will then, in the next section, turn to some factors affecting the
dynamics of that bargaining.
2. Bargaining over Corporate Governance
As discussed above, corporate governance can be approached as a broad framework for
bargaining over the terms of corporate finance in which entrepreneurs and investors agree on
the allocation of control rights and cash-flow rights with the aim of finding the best outcome
to meet the specific requirements and priorities of each party. It is important to note, however,
that control rights and cash-flow rights may not be symmetrically valued by these parties.106
This allows for increased value to be obtained through bargaining. The different priorities of
the actors and their relative valuation of control and cash-flow rights provide the basis for
bargaining over how cash-flow and governance rights are allocated between them.
From the entrepreneur’s perspective, the corporation can be seen as a financing vehicle for a
business opportunity with a broad range of financial instruments with varying terms and
conditions and other qualities. The entrepreneur commits his management skill and his
personal assets to the enterprise and, if supported by the institutional environment, uses a
controlling stake in a publicly held corporation as the organizational form for such enterprise
to obtain a desirable financial structure. The entrepreneur bargains the terms of financing with
relevant providers – including other shareholders, and the structure of corporate finance
represents the outcome of this bargaining.
Corporate governance rules set the framework for the amount and type of discretion an
entrepreneur has over the use of corporate assets. The corporate governance framework sets
the limits on control in relation to the ability to manage day-to-day operations, obtaining and
agreeing terms of financing, and the ability to take corporate decisions affecting the rights of
corporate constituencies. These controls limit management control rights and, to an extent,
103 Id. at 13.
104 See Bruno Deffains & Dominique M. Demougin, Governance: Who Controls Matters (SFB 649 Discussion
Paper No 53, 2006), available at http://hdl.handle.net/10419/25136.
105 Aoki (2010), supra note 84, at 13-14.
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minimize self-serving behavior by the agent.107 However, they may also restrict business
decisions aimed at superior performance. Control rights and autonomy are valued by the
entrepreneur, as they facilitate decision making for maximizing value. Investors, however,
will require increased returns to compensate for the possibility that actions are taken that they
oppose. The entrepreneur will seek to agree on the terms of corporate governance to balance
autonomy with the cost of capital.
For the entrepreneur it is important to maintain control of the business enterprise – i.e., to be
able to decide upon the strategy of the corporation and how the corporation’s assets are
ultimately used in order to maximize profits. As the parties involved have asymmetric
information, there is the possibility of disagreement between investors and the entrepreneur
over the value of the corporation or the steps required to maximize that value. Consequently,
the primary motivation of the entrepreneur for maintaining control of the corporation may not
be the extraction of private benefits of control, and the entrepreneur may not rely on self-
dealing to capture returns. Rather, the entrepreneur may anticipate that disagreements can
arise as to the best use of the corporation’s resources to maximize profits.108 For investors the
protection of cash-flow rights may be the primary interest. Investors may allow the
entrepreneur to take operative decisions but want to protect their cash-flow rights by having a
veto with regard to corporate decisions that could have a significant impact on those rights (or
an exit right in corresponding circumstances). In bargaining over corporate finance, the
entrepreneur can be expected to require a level of control allowing for the pursuit of the
business enterprise but should be able to commit to sharing control in other matters and give
guarantees to other shareholders with regard to the return of their investment. The different
priorities in this regard reduce the conflict between the interests of entrepreneurs and
investors and can allow for efficient bargaining results.
3. The Political Environment
Politics and corporate governance systems are interlinked.109 Corporations and the way they
are governed are of considerable economic importance. Corporate governance has a
significant effect on the preconditions for the creation of wealth and economic growth, as well
as on the distribution of the cash flows and profits from corporate enterprise. It is but natural
that corporate governance should have considerable political implications, as key corporate
constituencies agree and renegotiate their relationships through the political framework.110
Corporate constituencies are also interest groups that can use political means to further their
own interests. In fact, a two-way causation has been identified between politics and corporate
governance, so that they can be said to co-evolve.111 Different political conditions impact the
structure of corporate governance systems, while different corporate governance systems can
similarly cause various political reactions.112 It has been argued that political approaches to
corporate governance have demonstrated that corporate governance evolves “through a
107 Arnoud W. A. Boot, Radhakrishnan Gopalan & Anjan V. Thakor, The Entrepreneur’s Choice between
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dynamic process of competing interests and competing interpretations of institutionalized
norms, processes shaped by, but not fully determined by, political institutions.”113
The political economy sets the broader parameters for feasible regulatory outcomes. Within
these parameters, the public choice literature identifies a “market for regulation,” where
regulatory changes are the result of bargaining among relevant constituencies, including
market participants, regulatory agencies and politicians.114 The political economy of corporate
governance is generally analyzed in relation to how the respective interests of different
corporate constituencies are balanced in relative terms. Shareholders, management and
employees are often identified as the main corporate constituencies in this regard. Creditors
and, with the increasing political interest in corporations, increasingly tax payers at large are
other groups with interests in corporate governance that they enforce through policy decisions
and regulation. Depending on the structure of the economy and the political system, different
constituencies may have different bargaining power, resulting in a variety of corporate
governance models – some reflecting the pre-eminence of shareholder interest and others a
more continental structure reflecting labor and creditor interests, for example.
This study considers the implications of the above for corporate governance in connection
with concentrated ownership. The study argues that entrepreneurs, such as controlling
shareholders, should be prepared to share control in matters that do not challenge their right to
control corporate strategy or their property rights. This approach may allow a distinction to be
made between corporate governance mechanisms that support control rights to protect firm-
specific investments from an entrepreneurial stand point and those which reflect the extraction
of private benefits and the entrenchment of control. This should be beneficial for the
development of corporate governance regulation for environments with concentrated
ownership. The findings of the study have implications for regulatory strategies in corporate
governance and for assessing the quality of corporate governance mechanisms in an
environment of concentrated ownership.
IV. THE DYNAMICS OF BARGAINING
It is important to recognize that a broad range of norms and circumstances affects the use of
different financial instruments and defines the terms of corporate governance and corporate
control. Bargaining over the structure of corporate finance and corporate governance forms
the basis for the relationship between the different constituencies, but that relationship is
affected by the broader institutional environment, and changes in that environment necessarily
affect the terms of corporate governance and control as well. The study now turns to how the
institutional environment affects the dynamics of bargaining and how this might be reflected
in regulatory approaches related to corporate governance.
A. INTRODUCTION
The allocation of income or profits is generally based on the result of ex-ante bargaining
between the entrepreneur and other providers of financing or means of production. It might be
assumed that in each case the structure of ownership and control is optimal as a result of
113 Ruth V. Aquilera & Gregory Jackson, Comparative and International Corporate Governance, THE ACADEMY
OFMANAGEMENT ANNALS, 4:1, 485, 517 (2010).
114 See Sam Peltzman, Towards a More General Theory of Regulation, 19 J. OF LAW AND ECON. 211 (1976), and
George J. Stigler, The Theory of Economic Regulation, 2 BELL J. OF ECON. ANDMANAGEMENT SCIENCE 137
(1971).
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market-based contracting. Indeed, some scholars have argued that the structure of corporate
ownership can be expected to vary based on value maximization.115 For instance, Demsetz
and Villalonga argue that the “ownership structure that emerges, whether concentrated or
diffuse, ought to be influenced by the profit-maximizing interests of shareholders, so that, as a
result, there should be no systematic relation between variations in ownership structure and
variations in firm performance.”116 These scholars believe there is sufficient empirical support
for the view that “the market succeeds in bringing forth ownership structures…that are of
approximate appropriateness for the firms they serve.”117
Property rights theory is also concerned with the optimal allocation of control rights and how
they can be reallocated between the entrepreneur and investors. According to Aghion &
Bolton, for example, the entrepreneur should have control rights when the firm has high
earnings and its product is selling, whereas investors should be given increased control rights
in the opposite case.118 The optimal allocation of control rights should also be reflected in the
cost of financing, with higher levels of control maintained by the entrepreneur raising that
cost. However, lower levels of control will decrease the willingness of the entrepreneur to
make firm-specific investments in the enterprise. Often maintaining some level of contingent
control rights allows investors to make monetary commitments at a reasonable cost to the
entrepreneur. If the investment is unsuccessful, a change in control rights can be triggered by
an event that can be agreed ex ante (i.e., by poor performance), and investors can decide again
how their investments should best be used. Markets should be able to set the terms of the
triggering event, as it should be driven by the cost of financing.
However, bargaining over corporate control does not occur in a vacuum. Industrial and
historical developments and the political aspects of corporate governance have a considerable
impact on corporate governance outcomes.119 This affects the types of financial instruments
that are used and the preferred financial and governance structure of the corporation. The
institutional environment may favor a certain structure of corporate ownership or a certain
corporate governance outcome, for example. As was earlier mentioned, it is possible that
concentrated ownership is an effective governance model in certain environments. Moreover,
the corporate form in itself also affects the terms of bargaining. The firm may be a “nexus of
contracts,” but the actual legally regulated corporate form introduces externalities to the
bargain, resulting in a compromise between freedom of contract and the liquidity of the
investment. As a result, corporate governance outcomes may not always be optimal from the
perspective of value maximization – at least in the long term as the political economy evolves.
In this section I briefly discuss the externalities that affect bargaining over corporate control
and the implications they may have for the need for regulatory intervention.
B. THE INSTITUTIONAL AND POLITICAL ENVIRONMENT
Goshen & Hamdani emphasize that the variation in corporate governance arrangements, as
well as in forms of corporate ownership, can be seen to represent the different outcomes of
negotiations over the terms of corporate finance.120 Dispersed ownership, concentrated
115 See Demsetz & Lehn (1985), supra note 6.
116 Demsetz & Villalonga (2001), supra note 6, at 210.
117 Id. at 231.
118 Aghion & Bolton (1992), supra note 99, at 490-492.
119 See Roe (2004), supra note 53.
120 Goshen & Hamdani (2013), supra note 11, 586-593.
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ownership and different capital structures with different debt or equity positions are examples
of such outcomes. These outcomes are affected by the relative value given to control rights
and cash-flow rights by each party, by the supply and demand of different forms of financing
for the enterprise and the resulting relative bargaining power of the constituencies, as well as
by the industrial and institutional environment, which may favor specific corporate
governance or financing structures. The type of industry in which the enterprise is active may
also affect the type of ownership and governance that is best adapted to this environment. The
institutional environment can be further shaped by externalities, such as the industrial or
historical development of business, and it is also affected by path dependence.
The prevalence of different structures of corporate ownership and control can be seen as the
outcome of historical and industrial developments.121 For example, in countries where labor
interests are strong, the institutions needed for dispersed ownership to develop may be absent;
in contrast, controlling shareholders are often in a good position to bargain with labor and to
resist political pressures.122 Thus, in relative terms, this environment favors a choice of
corporate governance systems based on concentrated ownership. It has also been argued that
in markets with concentrated ownership a political majority with fewer financial incentives
(and more labor-oriented financial interests) may oppose a market-based system related to
higher risk taking.123 In this environment the outcome of the political system can be expected
to favor large shareholders and labor, which have undiversified risk positions, at the cost of
smaller investors. Complementary governance structures can then be expected to emerge.
To promote their interests, corporate constituencies may form coalitions with other
constituencies. Several different outcomes can result from such coalitions, depending on the
political economy. A conflict is often seen to emerge between shareholders and labor, for
example, with management collaborating with shareholders. When investors are politically
dominant, the model leads to strong minority protection and dispersed ownership. On the
other hand, when employees are politically dominant, there will be pressure for higher
salaries and job security at the cost of profits. This latter model will typically result in a
concentrated ownership structure.124 Coalitions can also be formed between shareholders and
employees to constrain managerial agency costs, with, for example, employees supporting
shareholders with regard to corporate power in return for security. The loyalties of corporate
constituencies are not necessarily stable and can change for opportunistic reasons,125 or as the
political economy evolves. For example, the preferences of labor can be affected by changes
in the funding of pension systems.126
Nevertheless, the institutional environment may favor a specific structure of corporate
ownership and control in relative terms. Thus, the choices with regard to corporate ownership
are in reality limited as corporations are established and develop. Once a given structure of
corporate governance has been established, it is likely to be reinforced.127 Bebchuk and Roe
suggest that the sunk costs, externalities and complementarities caused by initial choices
121 See Roe (2000), supra note 13, Roe (2003), supra note 51 and Bebchuk & Roe (1999), supra note 52.
122 See Roe (2004), supra note 53, at 18.
123 See Enrico C. Perotti & Ernst-Ludwig von Thadden, The Political Economy of Dominant Investors
(Tinbergen Institute Discussion Paper 2004-091/2), available at http://dare.uva.nl/document/5462.
124 Roe (2004), supra note 53, at 18-19.
125 See Coffee (1989-1990), supra note 12, at 1531-1538.
126 Gourevitch & Shinn (2005), supra note 96, at 215.
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increase the cost of alternative structures. 128 Existing structures may also persist due to rent-
seeking by controlling constituencies. It is important to recognize the self-reinforcing nature
of the structure of corporate ownership and its relationship to the applicable regulatory
framework in initiatives to develop corporate governance regulation. This underlines the
importance of addressing corporate governance issues in the context of existing structures of
ownership and control. It is important, then, that corporate governance regulation be adapted
to the characteristics of the relevant institutional environment.
C. THE CORPORATE FORM
The corporate form in itself affects bargaining between the entrepreneur and external
investors. However, the corporation does not necessarily always provide the ideal framework
for balancing the interests of entrepreneurs and investors with respect to a specific enterprise.
Bespoke contracts could well provide a more accurate reflection of the interests of these
constituencies. The listed corporation, for example, is subject to endogenous and often
standardized corporate governance requirements, which may or may not provide an optimal
balance between these interests. Company law in general can also be too generic and
untailored to the specific requirements of each enterprise.
Corporate law and corporate governance regulation provide different (and in a sense arbitrary)
thresholds where financial instruments are linked to special governance rights. For example, it
is often the case that the board can be nominated by a simple majority of votes at a general
meeting of shareholders, while certain corporate transactions (such as statutory mergers,
where available) may require the support of different qualified majorities. Deviating from
these rules is often costly and sometimes even impossible in the context of public
corporations. Moreover, governance rights are not directly allocated on a pro rata basis, but
include option value where an investor holding bundles of financial instruments with a
specific set of governance rights is able to take certain corporate decisions or veto them.
These thresholds may be standardized and thus fail to reflect the optimal solution in each
case.
The liquidity provided by the standardized terms offered by company law may, however,
compensate for possible sup-optimal governance solutions. Ultimately, the market should be
able to price the potential risks and returns of investments made on the terms provided by the
applicable corporate governance framework. Contracting is also costly, and the corporate
form may nevertheless provide a cost-efficient default platform for arranging economic
relationships among corporate constituencies with respect to the enterprise. The entrepreneur
may balance the need for bespoke contracting against the liquidity provided by solutions
prevalent in the market. Nevertheless, the corporate form does affect bargaining, as will be
discussed in more detail below.
1. Lock-in of Assets in the Corporation
Much effort has been directed to defining and explaining the existence and development of
the corporation. As an entity, the corporation may be a legal fiction, but it has proved an
excellent structure for organizing economic activity, for overcoming coordination problems
and conflicts of interest among economic actors and for contributing to economic growth.
Compared to the contractual fiction of the conceptual “firm,” the “corporation” can be defined
128 See Bebchuk & Roe (1999), supra note 52.
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as a legally regulated platform for economic activity. The corporation can be seen as a legal
shell that has defined claims on the underlying economic activity.129 While corporations are
subject to national regulation that may vary among different jurisdictions, the corporations
generally discussed in the context of international corporate governance research have certain
common features that are relevant for the purposes of a more general evaluation.130
Corporations are generally independent legal entities that hold distinct assets and liabilities.
Corporations are also generally characterized by a shareholder structure, where equity
investment is made in the form of shares and where ownership is formally separated from the
control and management of the corporation. Ultimately, the rights and obligations of
providers of financing rest on contractual terms and conditions based on mandatory default
rules (in company law) or actual investment agreements (articles of association, terms of
specific investment instruments).
One of the key characteristics of the corporation is its independent legal personality and the
fact that its assets and liabilities are separated from those of investors. This separation results
in the lock-in of capital injected into the corporation, which, is deemed an important factor in
its institutional success.131 While shareholders enjoy limited liability, it is equally important
that the assets of the corporation are protected from the creditors of the shareholders and that
shareholders are prevented from withdrawing their share of the corporate assets at will. The
lock-in serves to provide comfort for creditors and other parties dealing with the corporation.
However, it also allows for a re-bargaining of the terms of investment, as investors have made
illiquid, firm-specific investments resulting in heavy sunk costs. In other words, in reality the
shareholder cannot easily withdraw his or her investment at will.
The transferability and fungibility of shares are also important features of a corporation. For
example, governance and cash-flow rights are related to shares and are not linked to the party
holding the shares. Shareholders hold shares that give them certain cash-flow and governance
rights based on company law and the articles of association of the company. These rights are
balanced, based in part on the legal framework, with the interests of other constituencies. The
framework by which this balance is regulated is the central focus area of corporate
governance. While the other characteristics of corporations are fairly similar around the
world, the allocation of corporate control and authority can be organized in a variety of
ways.132
Shareholders are sometimes defined as the “owners” of the corporation. For the purposes of
this study, and more generally, it seems important to challenge this notion. As discussed,
shareholders merely have certain specific governance rights based on the shares they hold, as
well as certain residual cash-flow rights; but they cannot be said to “own” the company. In
this regard, the lock-in of the capital injected by shareholders and the fungibility of shares are
important features that allow for the re-bargaining of the terms of corporate finance as the
relative bargaining power of different corporate constituencies evolves over time. This
bargaining power is reflected, among others, in corporate governance regulation and in how
129 See Deffains & Demougin (2006), supra note 104.
130 John Armour, Henry Hansmann & Reinier Kraakman, What is Corporate Law? 1 in Kraakman et al. (2004),
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such regulation changes over time. It is for this reason that it is important to understand the
dynamics of corporate governance.
2. Public and Private Ownership
The listed corporation often provides the best available liquidity for external investments,
resulting in cost-efficient financing. However, this corporate form often also entails
standardized corporate governance solutions that can be affected by externalities. Boot,
Gopalan & Thakor argue that entrepreneurs may avoid public ownership with externally fixed
corporate governance regimes, choosing instead private ownership structure, where they are
able to tailor the corporate governance framework to their needs together with investors.133
The corporate governance structures applied to publicly listed corporations are, to some
extent, externally given and based, for instance, on statutes or stock exchange rules. Corporate
governance structures in public corporations can also be subject to regulatory intervention
based on political agendas. Moreover, these structures may be fixed and untailored to the kind
of precise trade-off desired by the entrepreneur.134 On the other hand, a public ownership
structure provides increased liquidity, generally resulting in lower costs of capital.
Boot, Gopalan & Thakor argue that the choice of ownership structure depends on the
stringency of corporate governance regimes. If corporate governance is particularly lax and
investor protection is low, investors may require extremely high returns. Under such
circumstances, entrepreneurs tend to prefer private ownership with a small number investors
where corporate governance is largely contractual. When corporate governance for publicly
traded corporations is overly stringent, the entrepreneur’s autonomy will be excessively
limited, and private ownership will again be preferred. Other factors affecting choices of
ownership structure include the increased cost of capital for private ownership structures and
the likelihood of disagreement between the entrepreneur and the investors.
For the purposes of this study, the above emphasizes that the relationships between corporate
constituencies are affected by a variety of external factors and that the outcomes of bargaining
are incomplete. This has important implications for corporate governance regulation. It cannot
be assumed that the bases of the relationships between corporate constituencies are static; thus
it remains important to address how these relationships develop.
D. THE CONCENTRATION OF CORPORATE CONTROL
Many of the corporate governance mechanisms used to avoid the concentration and
entrenchment of control may be less effective than assumed – regardless of the structure of
ownership. For example, researchers and regulators have voiced concern that shareholders are
relatively powerless in the United States.135 For some time, this concern has focused on the
central role of the board of directors, and it has been argued that instead of displaying
shareholder primacy, U.S. companies with dispersed ownership are in fact controlled by the
board – albeit in the interest of shareholders.136 For example, boards of directors are deemed
to have a considerable level of independence with regard to corporate decision making,
133 See Boot, Gopalan & Thakor (2006), supra note 107.
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without having to refer matters to shareholders.137 Furthermore, in matters where shareholders
are allowed a voice, directors have often been given a veto-right.138 It has been assumed,
however, that there are effective market-based mechanisms in place whereby the performance
of directors and management is monitored.
More recently it has nevertheless been argued that the monitoring mechanisms assumed to
police the board and management are not functioning as intended.139 For example, the hostile
takeover is no longer thought to provide the management monitoring function it was once
believed to perform. Poor performance reflected in a lower share price is assumed to result in
a proposal to change management through a public takeover. In reality, however, the
mechanism seldom performs this function, due to institutional entrenchment by
management.140 In contrast, it seems that management has means of maintaining control,
while shareholders have clear disincentives to challenge incumbent management.141
It has been noted that the allocation of legal powers reflects dominant ownership structures,
which provides a further reason why external monitoring mechanisms may be less efficient
than assumed. For example, the structure of corporate law may provide an advantage to
constituents representing the prevalent structure of ownership, and a relative disadvantage to
other constituents in the pursuit of their interests through the regulatory framework. In other
words, corporate law has evolved to favor the interests of dominant constituencies. Company
law may provide monitoring mechanisms that, for example, insufficiently take into account
the collective action problems associated with a diversified and dispersed shareholder base.
Moreover, the balance between the interests of the principal and the agent may not provide
sufficient incentives for efficient monitoring.
Differences between the allocation of corporate legal authority in the United States and in
certain EU member states with concentrated ownership may provide an example in this
regard.142 Cools has observed that under Delaware corporate law the allocation of legal
powers favors directors and provides only limited avenues for shareholders to affect corporate
matters. When founders in Delaware companies raise further equity financing, they do not
need to retain high equity stakes to maintain control as long as they have ensured their
representation on the board. This balance of legal authority also functions to discourage
outside investors from buying larger stakes in the company, considering the limited legal
power that can be obtained.143 It has also been argued that regulation fails to facilitate the
ability of shareholders to effectively coordinate decision making, giving management a
relative advantage with respect to entrenching its control over corporate strategy.144
By way of comparison, boards in a number of EU member states require, for example, the
consent of shareholders to issue new shares (sometimes a simple majority for pre-emptive
offerings and a qualified majority for directed offerings) or pay dividends. In a number of EU
137 See Cools (2004), supra note 63, at 46-47.
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member states, shareholders have further powers that can be effectively enforced at
shareholders’ meetings,145 where a controlling shareholder can wield considerable influence
based on his or her holdings. Where the allocation of legal powers favors shareholders, the
founders must ensure they maintain sufficient voting rights in order to maintain control.146 In
some cases, however, legal institutions have developed that further strengthen the position of
controlling shareholders. Control enhancing mechanisms can be seen as a complementary
institution that can be used to leverage the monitoring function of controlling shareholders. In
this way, controlling shareholders can obtain economies of scale and decrease firm specific
risk.147 In this environment, the control rights of minority shareholders may often be limited.
Even if corporate law provides legal avenues for minorities to pursue their rights, the legal
system may disfavor such initiatives. For example, the lack of the legal concept of class
action may result in the risks of shareholder litigation being too high for minority
shareholders.
Control over the use of corporate assets is a key element in bargaining and usually prioritized
by the entrepreneur (the presumed “agent”). In governance models reflecting dispersed
ownership, control over the use of corporate assets is mainly in the hands of the board of
directors, whereas in the context of concentrated ownership, the controlling shareholders
often have de facto control over the corporation and its business.148 However, it is not
necessarily the case that control is used to extract private benefits of control. Instead, it is
possible that control over the use of corporate assets is a key element of bargaining for an
entrepreneur pursuing a business enterprise.
It seems, then, that the expectation that monitoring by principals is a key factor for corporate
governance may not accurately reflect the dynamic of the relationship between entrepreneurs
and investors in relation to bargaining over the terms of corporate finance and corporate
governance. In the context of concentrated ownership, corporate governance mechanisms
providing “voice” to the minority may be illusionary, at best. Whatever the case may be, it is
also suggested that the monitoring underlying the principal-agent relationship in corporate
governance is generally less effective than assumed. This suggests that in addition to agency
theory other elements are needed for a better understanding of the dynamics of corporate
governance.
E. CHANGING THE INITIAL BARGAIN
This section has highlighted the fact that many factors affect bargaining, not least the
industrial and historical development of the corporate environment, which sets the broader
framework for contracting.149 Institutional development is path dependent, and as
complementary institutions evolve, the cost of deviating from standardized solutions
increases.150 It has been recognized that the corporate governance outcomes prevalent in a
particular environment are not necessarily optimal, even if they are the result of bargaining on
145 See Cools (2004), supra note 63 (Belgium and France) and JESPER LAU HANSEN, NORDIC COMPANY LAW –
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market terms. Incumbent governance structures do not necessarily exist because they are
efficient; rather they can also be the resultof strategic behavior and maneuvering by parties
seeking to maximize their own interests.151 Empirical research also supports the position that
the structure of ownership tends to persist over time.152 Nevertheless, as the relevant parties’
investments are specialized and mutually dependent, there will be interest in renegotiating the
terms of bargaining on an on-going basis.
As contractual arrangements are necessarily incomplete, there is a need to organize
mechanisms for bargaining on an ex-post basis. The participants in an enterprise are aware of
the possibility of ex-post bargaining and are therefore unwilling to make initial investments
unless they are satisfied that the initial agreement will be respected and that they will not be
disenfranchised. Sufficient guarantees against ex-post changes will therefore be a central
element of the bargain. This, in turn, emphasizes the importance of corporate governance. In
the bargaining approach to corporate governance, the structure of corporate finance can be
seen as the main tool for changing the terms of corporate control. As discussed, the balance
between the use of equity and debt instruments in corporate finance, and how they are
bundled, will determine how control is allocated on the basis of corporate performance. A
case in point is including convertible instruments in the bargain, whereby the parties can set
triggering events for changing control.153
However, there may well be pressure to change the original terms of the bargain. For
example, when initial investments are made in specialized assets, resulting in sunk costs, the
relative bargaining position of the constituencies may change. Even if the various corporate
constituents have committed to certain corporate governance rules, they may well seek to
renegotiate these rules as their relative bargaining power increases. In this respect contracts
can merely be seen as “frozen” bargaining power.154 Investors may hesitate to make initial
investments if they face a risk of ex-post changes, and may require guarantees to protect their
investment. However, they will also compare these risks with other investment alternatives
(including making no investment at all), which are all likely to include similar risks in an
environment of incomplete contracts.
New legal regulation can also be seen as a mechanism for changing the original corporate
governance framework. Corporate constituencies are also interest groups that can use political
avenues to pursue corporate interests, and changes in regulation can be seen to reflect changes
in the relative bargaining power of these constituencies. The relationship between
entrepreneurs and investors will be renegotiated, in part, through political and regulatory
intervention as the political bargaining power of these constituencies evolves. Corporate
governance regulation can be expected to reflect the interests of politically dominant
constituencies. However, different constituencies have different requisites for pursuing their
interests in this regard.155 Theories on political coordination suggest that small interest groups
with similar interests overcome coordination problems to sufficiently promote their interests.
Small groups of large shareholders in an environment of concentrated ownership have often
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been identified as such a constituency. On the other hand, the interests of large interest groups
with similar interests are generally reflected through the political system. It has been argued,
for example, that labor interests are pursued through political avenues. However, large
interest groups with dissimilar interests may be more vulnerable than others, as they may face
disproportionate coordination costs. Minority shareholders, for example, may have
insufficiently similar agendas and overly small financial interests to allow for efficient
coordination. The interests of these constituencies, then, may require special attention.
Changes in bargaining power may reflect changes in the overall political economy. As
industrial structures develop and the political economy evolves, the initial outcome of
bargaining may become sub-optimal. In other words, the original allocation of control is no
longer value maximizing from a property rights perspective. At the same time, the relative
bargaining power of the corporate constituents may change, leading, a consequence, to
changes in the framework for feasible corporate governance outcomes. Technological change
can affect the relative importance of different types of firm-specific investments in this
regard. For instance, much attention has been paid to the increase in the relative importance of
human capital. Here, the outcome of a dispute between the new owners and the manager and
former owner of the advertising agency Saatchi & Saatchi has often been cited as a case in
point.156 When the new owners rejected the salary demands of the former chairman, he and
several others left the company to set up a competing enterprise – taking with them a
significant portion of the company’s assets in the form of the human capital.
It has been argued that change is the central characteristic of interaction between economic,
political and corporate environments.157 Technological change affects the business and
organizational environments of corporations, and it is vital that the organizational structures
of businesses can be adapted to such changing circumstances. Corporate acquisitions and the
transfer of control are important elements in this respect. The transfer of control can be seen
as a process whereby access to corporate assets is transferred to a party that, due to
technological or other changes, can use them more efficiently and give them a higher value.158
It is therefore important that the transfer of control is appropriately facilitated. However, as
discussed earlier, the entrenchment of control is a central characteristic of corporate
governance. Creating incentives for changing the structure of corporate ownership may
consequently be as important as trying to regulate concerns related to currently dominant
structures of corporate ownership.159 Moreover, many of the governance mechanisms based
on monitoring by external parties are less effective than assumed. Consequently, the
continued development of different approaches to corporate governance regulation remains
important.
F. IMPLICATIONS FOR REGULATION
On a general level, parties should enjoy freedom of contract with respect to different
corporate governance solutions, and the promotion of specific structures of governance or
ownership through regulation is generally unwarranted. However, it is also the case that the
outcomes of bargaining are not necessarily optimal or efficient – especially in the longer term
156 See Raghuram G. Rajan & Luigi Zingales, The Governance of the New Enterprise in CORPORATE
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as the political economy evolves. Moreover, in many cases bargaining is carried out in “an
institutional, legal, standardized framework”160 that shapes the outcomes of that bargaining,
and resulting in structures that may or may not be optimal for the enterprise in question.
Political factors also have a considerable impact in this respect. The ex-post bargaining
process is therefore very important. Moreover, it has been emphasized that as the corporate
environment evolves, organizations must have the ability to adapt, in which context the
transfer of control is a key element. However, due to the characteristics of corporate
governance and the deficiencies in many corporate governance mechanisms, corporate control
may be entrenched so that control is not necessarily transferred when it would be expedient to
do so. Consequently, new regulatory concepts and mechanisms warrant continued
consideration. The next section will turn to a consideration of the regulatory implications of
an environment of concentrated ownership.
V. REGULATORY IMPLICATIONS FOR CONCENTRATED OWNERSHIP
A. INTRODUCTION
This study approaches corporate governance from the perspective of financial contracting in
order to provide a better understanding of the assumptions upon which corporate governance
regulation is based. This approach may capture the dynamic of corporate governance,
especially in the context of concentrated ownership, where a controlling shareholder can be
seen as an entrepreneur negotiating the terms of corporate finance with other constituencies,
including other shareholders. The study argues that a corporation’s corporate finance and
corporate governance structures are the outcome of bargaining, and that parties should be
allowed freedom of contract in this regard. For example, it could be argued that introducing
the concept of one-share-one-vote would be an inappropriate limitation of the potential
outcomes of bargaining and freedom of contract.161 However, adopting this approach does not
mean that regulatory intervention is unwarranted as such. It is clear that different corporate
governance structures are vulnerable to abuse, and there is no guarantee that different
corporate constituencies are not primarily driven by self-interested action at the cost of others.
The study also recognizes that control is often entrenched and that regulatory intervention
may be justified to prevent abuse and to facilitate transfer of control where incumbent control
has become suboptimal. However, the question remains as to how these issues could be
approached through regulation.
The bargaining theory of corporate governance suggests that for an entrepreneur the value of
control is based on the ability to direct corporate strategy and the use of corporate assets to
maximize value to the benefit of all shareholders. The value of control is in the possibility it
offers an entrepreneur to pursue a chosen strategy even in case of disagreement with external
investors. This is something that external investors have agreed to when deciding to make the
investment, and the entrepreneur may have had to pay for this option through the terms of
financing acceptable to them. However, the (potential) superior performance achieved
through the entrepreneur’s control of the corporation is expected to benefit all shareholders
alike.
This premise has certain implications for corporate governance regulation. It means that there
should be no need (or justification) for controlling shareholders to divert corporate
160 See Deffains & Demougin (2006) supra note 104.
161 Nobel (2009), supra note 154, at 177.
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opportunities (i.e., “steal”) from the corporation. Consequently, the controlling shareholder
should be able to agree to corporate governance regulation that protects the cash-flow rights
of investors, as long as the ability of the entrepreneur to decide on strategy and day-to-day
management remains unchallenged. The possibility granted to the entrepreneur of affecting
corporate strategy is also based on the promise of superior performance over time. The
controlling shareholder should thus be encouraged to agree to change the balance of
governance rights if such performance is not ultimately delivered. In connection with
bargaining over the terms of financing, controlling shareholders should be encouraged to
transfer governance rights if performance has been unsatisfactory. A controlling shareholder
can be incentivized to transfer control independently if the shareholder can no longer provide
superior performance.
This section will discuss the basis for regulatory intervention in the context of concentrated
ownership based on the bargaining perspective of corporate governance.
B. REGULATORY CHALLENGES OF CONCENTRATED OWNERSHIP
Concentrated ownership has been associated with low levels of investor protection and the
risk of private benefits of control being extracted in the absence of sufficiently effective
monitoring mechanisms.162 Nevertheless, concentrated ownership has also been seen as an
effective mechanism for monitoring management. Large shareholders may be better disposed
to monitor management than the market-based mechanisms available in a dispersed
ownership environment.163 However, at the same time the risk of the expropriation of
corporate assets by the controlling shareholder at the cost of other shareholders emerges.
Nevertheless, concentrated ownership can be a competitive outcome of bargaining over the
terms of corporate finance. It has been suggested that investments in a company with
concentrated ownership are based on a trade-off between the costs associated with the
possible extraction of private benefits of control by the controlling shareholder and the benefit
derived from the monitoring function performed by an undiversified and consequently
incentivized shareholder. Controlling shareholders are generally not afflicted by the free-rider
problem affecting diversified shareholders; i.e. that it would not be in the interests of a
specific shareholder to perform monitoring and incurring the full costs of this while all
shareholders would share the benefit. Based on the trade-off between the possible extraction
of private benefits and the more effective monitoring function of a controlling shareholder,
there may well be situations where concentrated ownership, as such, is an efficient ownership
structure from the outset.164 Indeed, even allowing some private benefits of control to be
extracted by a controlling shareholder as compensation for an undiversified position and for
performing the monitoring function may well be in the interests of other shareholders.165
In many cases it is argued that even if diversionary private benefits (i.e., “stealing”) could be
restricted by appropriate regulation, it would be far more difficult to address distortionary
private benefits (i.e., “shirking”) in an environment of concentrated ownership. In effect, a
large controlling shareholder may, rationally, use corporate control to steer the use of
corporate assets for purposes other than maximizing shareholder value. It is argued that in the
162 See La Porta et al. (1999) supra note 19.
163 Gilson & Gordon (2003), supra note 45, at 786.
164 See Gilson (2006), supra note 35.
165 Lucian A. Bebchuk, A Rent-Protection Theory of Corporate Ownership and Control (National Bureau of
Economic Research, Working Paper 7203, 1999); and Gilson & Gordon (2003) supra note 45, at 786.
72
presence of control enhancing mechanisms this risk is accentuated, as the relative economic
risk of the controlling shareholder decreases in relation to his or her level of control.
Another problem with concentrated ownership (and with control enhancing mechanisms in
particular) is that changing the structure of ownership, even where such change could be
value-increasing, may be difficult.166 Ownership structures should vary and evolve according
to market requirements in order to allow the adoption of the most efficient structure for the
prevailing circumstances at a given time.167 It should be possible to reorganize corporate
assets (either inside or outside the firm) as flexibly as possible to respond to market changes.
Due to controlling shareholders’ ability to extract private benefits of control, it may against
their interest to relinquish control unless future potential private benefits are compensated for,
which creates a disincentive for controlling shareholders to agree to some value-increasing
takeovers.168 These problems are further accentuated when control enhancing mechanisms are
used to separate cash flow and voting rights. Typically, these mechanisms allow controlling
shareholders to exert disproportionate control in relation to their capital input. In such
situations, controlling shareholders may in fact be incentivized to pursue courses of action
that are detrimental to other shareholders.169
C. DEVELOPING REGULATORY STRATEGIES FOR CONCENTRATED OWNERSHIP
Legal strategies should be adapted to the broader institutional environment, including, for
example, the prevalent structure of corporate ownership and the quality of enforcement
mechanisms. For instance, certain legal strategies that are successfully used in dispersed
ownership systems can be ineffective in an environment of concentrated ownership.
Disclosure-based corporate governance mechanisms, such as comply-or-explain based
regulation, may be of little effect in corporations with a controlling shareholder, for example.
In connection with bargaining over corporate governance, these issues should be taken into
account in the choice of corporate governance mechanisms.
It is also important to recognize that corporate governance regulation is not an externality
imposed to objectively regulate the relationships between corporate constituencies; rather, it
should be viewed in the context of bargaining, as a part of the institutional landscape that
parties may well seek to use to their advantage. Parties to the bargain should also recognize
possible differences in their priorities to allow, where possible, more latitude for the
entrepreneur with respect to control over the use of corporate assets, while applying other
mechanisms with respect to protecting cash-flow rights, for example.
With respect to corporate governance regulation, legal strategies have been divided into
regulatory strategies and governance strategies, where regulatory strategies provide the
prescriptive terms for regulating the relationship between corporate constituencies, and
governance strategies provide mechanisms for principals to monitor and control the behavior
of agents.170 Regulatory strategies include rules and standards, as well as setting the terms of
entry and exit for principals,171 such as disclosure obligations and appraisal rights,
respectively. Governance strategies include appointment rights, decision rights and agent
166 See Bebchuk (1994), supra note 60.
167 Gilson (2006), supra note 35 at 1645.
168 See Bebchuk (1994), supra note 60.
169 See Bebchuk, Kraakman & Triantis (1999), supra note 34.
170 Armour, Hansmann & Kraakman in Kraakman et al. (2009), supra note 32, at 39.
171 Id., referred to as “Affiliation Terms.”
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incentives. It has been noted that governance strategies typically require principals to be
active and coordinate their actions; thus, for example, such strategies may be inadequate for
minority shareholders faced with free-rider problems. Regulatory strategies imposing rules
and standards may be more effective for setting limits on the activities of controlling
shareholders, provided appropriate enforcement institutions are available.
It is also important to consider the type of minority protection mechanisms that should be
available. As earlier discussed, it may be difficult for the minority to challenge the control of
a large shareholder. Minority shareholders can be prevented from acting by collective action
problems, for example, and as a result governance strategies requiring active monitoring by
shareholders may be ineffective in this environment. Controlling shareholders are likely to be
opposed to regulation that challenges their ability to decide on corporate strategy or
significantly changes governance rights. Considerable efforts may be made to ensure that this
control cannot be challenged. Governance strategies, consequently, are likely to be
unsuccessful in this environment.
On the other hand, a system where minority shareholders are able to challenge the controlling
shareholder and veto day-to-day management decisions is vulnerable to opportunistic
behavior by the minority.172 Potential regulatory strategies for protecting minority
shareholders should not seek to challenge the ability of the controlling shareholder to decide
on corporate strategy; rather, they should focus on protecting the minority’s cash-flow rights.
In these circumstances, it may be appropriate to base the relevant mechanisms, for example,
on certain rules and standards, as well as on exit rights at fair value, rather than on governance
rights.
With respect to standards, for instance, stricter rules on related-party transactions should be
acceptable to the controlling shareholder. An “entire fairness” standard could also be
introduced with respect to related-party transactions. Fiduciary duties towards other
shareholders could well be introduced for situations where a controlling shareholder chooses
to enter into transactions with the controlled company, for example.
Some governance strategies might also be suitable for regulating the relationship between
controlling shareholders and minority shareholders. For instance, it should be possible to
agree on the minority shareholders’ right to nominate independent directors , as long as they
constitute a minority of the board, for this would not challenge the control of the controlling
shareholder. What it might do, however, is introduce an increased degree of legitimacy and
protection for independent board members.
Governance rights also include different incentive structures. Regulation might seek to
incentivize controlling shareholders to transfer control when a change of ownership structure
is called for. For example, it may be possible to induce controlling shareholders to
independently transfer control when the controlling shareholder can no longer contribute to
the corporate enterprise and the structure of ownership has become sub-optimal. It has been
noted that in jurisdictions with a prevalence of concentrated ownership, it may be reasonably
cost-efficient to maintain a controlling position based on a favorable institutional
environment. For example, a relatively low level of ownership may provide high levels of
governance rights (through control enhancing mechanisms or the impotence of governance
rights afforded to minority shareholders). It has also been noted that tax regulation may favor
172 Goshen & Hamdani (2013), supra note 11, at 610.
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pyramid structures or the maintenance of control positions. Changing this environment could
increase the costs of maintaining controlling positions and induce control transfers. Tax rules
that are less favorable for maintaining control structures can also provide incentives to
incumbent owners to transfer control when they can no longer provide entrepreneurial input.
This type of regulation is likely to be more effective and even more politically feasible than
initiatives that seek to challenge control against the will of the entrepreneur.
In this context, incentive structures should be understood in broader terms. Merely seeking to
align the interests of controlling shareholders (the “agent”) with those of the minority (the
“principals”) seems to ignore certain key aspects of the relationship between these
constituencies. However, in bargaining over the terms of corporate finance, penalties or
disincentives might also be introduced if control is maintained under certain circumstances.
As earlier discussed, tax rules may be considered in this regard. Furthermore, convertible
financial instruments could also be used to facilitate change of control where there has been a
failure of performance.
D. REGULATING CONTROLLING SHAREHOLDERS AND CHANGE OF CONTROL IN THE EU
The potential for conflicts of interest among corporate constituencies is underlined in
connection with change of control transactions. Regulation on takeovers, for example, has
been the subject of much controversy in the EU. The directive on takeovers (the “Takeover
Directive”)173 was adopted in 2004, after a politically divisive legislative process lasting
almost two decades.174 The directive introduced certain mechanisms aimed at challenging
controlling shareholders. The so called break-through rule was intended to provide a
framework applied in connection with takeover situations for bypassing mechanisms
preventing the execution of a bid (such as super-voting shares or transfer restrictions).175
Ultimately, the implementation of the break-through rule was optional, and as a result very
few countries introduced the rule on a mandatory basis. Nevertheless, the rule and the related
debate provide a rich context for better understanding how the interests of key corporate
constituencies are reflected in corporate governance regulation. The Takeover Directive can
therefore serve as a useful framework for studying the dynamics of bargaining over corporate
control.
It has been observed that had the break-through rule been imposed, shareholders would hardly
have been remained passive; instead, they would certainly have taken steps to protect their
control positions.176 New companies listing on the stock market could also have adopted
control structures not covered by the rules. A regulatory solution that could have similar
effects as a break-through rule in the context of concentrated ownership and controlling
shareholders would consist of more intrusive rules on self-dealing, rules that raised the cost of
maintaining controlling stakes in unprofitable enterprises and rules that decreased the
threshold for transferring control. It has been noted that in many EU member states
maintaining control is relatively cheap due to the use of control enhancing mechanisms and
173 Directive 25/2004/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 21 April 2004 on Takeover Bids,
2004 O.J. (L142) [hereinafter the Takeover Directive].
174 See Report of the High Level Working Group of Company Law Experts on Issues Related to Takeover Bids,
Brussels, January 10, 2002, available at http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/company/docs/takeoverbids/2002-
01-hlg-repprt_en.pdf.
175 Takeover Directive, art. 11, para. 4.
176 John C. Coates IV, Ownership, Takeovers and EU Law: How Contestable Should EU Corporations Be? 12
(ECGI Law Working Paper 11/2003), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=424720.
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favorable tax regimes.177 Minimum dividend rules can also protect the cash-flow rights of
minority shareholders. These types of provisions would have been better adapted to
governance systems based on concentrated ownership and may have also been less politically
controversial.
The Takeover Directive also introduced a mandatory bid rule providing shareholders with an
exit right at a fair value in cases of transfer or accumulation of control. According to the
directive, a shareholder must launch a tender offer for all equity instruments upon acquiring
“control” of the company. The relevant thresholds are subject to national laws and are
generally set at the level of a thirty percent holding in the target company. The mandatory bid
rule has been seen to prevent transactions that would extract value at the cost of other
shareholders rather than from increased efficiency or synergies. Through the fair or equitable
price requirement, the rule also limits control premiums payable to controlling shareholders.
However, the mandatory bid rule can have negative effects in a context of concentrated
ownership, as it increases the price of takeovers and thus reduces trade in control positions.
Based on the arguments put forward in this study, the EU should focus on limiting the private
benefits of control available from operating a corporation rather than on introducing
regulation that can entrench concentrated ownership and increase the threshold for changing
control.
VI. CONCLUSIONS
This study has focused on corporate governance in the context of concentrated ownership,
arguing that concentrated ownership does not necessarily correlate with inferior economic
performance or with the extraction of private benefits of control; rather, it can provide the
basis for a competitive model of corporate governance. In light of the above, certain theories
regarding corporate governance may be inadequate for explaining and defining the
relationships between corporate constituencies in different situations. In particular, this study
argues that corporate governance regulation may sometimes be based on assumptions that are
flawed in certain corporate environments.
In the context of concentrated ownership, in particular, corporate governance and corporate
finance outcomes can be defined in terms of financial contracting, where the relationship
between the controlling shareholder (entrepreneur) and external financiers, including minority
shareholders, (investors) is characterized by on-going bargaining over corporate control. The
potential conflicts of interest arising in this relationship can be acknowledged, and it is
unnecessary to focus solely on aligning the interests of the controlling shareholder (the
“agent”) with those of the minority shareholders (“principals”). The approach recognizes that
the relative value given by the parties to cash-flow and control rights may differ, allowing for
an efficient outcome to be reached as a result of bargaining. For the purposes of corporate
governance regulation, this approach also suggests that it is appropriate to limit the ability
controlling shareholders to extract private benefits (diversionary private benefits) but that
intervening in control rights established on the basis of bargaining may not be equally
justified.178
177 See Randall Morck, How to Eliminate Pyramidal Business Groups: The Double taxation of Intercorporate
Dividends and Other Incisive Uses of Tax Policy, in TAX POLICY AND THE ECONOMY, Volume 19 136 (James M.
Poterba, ed., 2005).
178 See Goshen & Hamdani (2013), supra note 11.
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While transfer of control is an important adaptation mechanism for corporations in an
evolving business environment, the study recognizes that the characteristics of corporate
control and the mechanisms related therewith may actually facilitate entrenchment of control.
As discussed earlier, many current corporate governance mechanisms are less effective than
assumed – regardless of ownership structure. The conclusion of the study is that regulation
may be called for to facilitate transfer of control and that combining incentives and penalties
(in the form of different combinations of financial instruments, for example) that do not
directly challenge control – but allow the controlling shareholder to take the decision to
transfer control independently – may be the approach that best reflects the dynamics of
entrepreneurship and corporate control.
For the purposes of EU corporate governance regulation, the above would entail that the use
of a variety of financial instruments should be facilitated, and, in particular, that the use of
convertible instruments should not be discouraged. In contrast, the entrenchment of control
should be discouraged, and the facilitation of the concentration and maintenance of corporate
control based on favorable tax treatment should be avoided.179 With respect to EU takeover
regulation, it seems clear that the decision not to make the implementation the so-called
break-through rule mandatory was a successful outcome, as it would have provided a direct
challenge to incumbent control. Mechanisms that allow the entrepreneur to independently
assess the premises for maintaining control would better reflect the interests of the affected
constituencies.
More stringent regulation could also be introduced with respect to related-party transactions.
It should be noted that the EU Commission is contemplating such regulation and originally
proposed a mechanism that would make material related-party transactions subject to
approval by shareholders (excluding any shareholder who is party to the transaction).180
Nevertheless, while the need to monitor related-party transactions is a valid concern, such
mechanism would be ill-suited to concentrated ownership, as it challenges the control rights
of controlling shareholders and would allow opportunistic behavior by the minority. An
alternative mechanism would involve increasing disclosure requirements (as has also been
proposed by the Commission) and, for example, the introduction of fiduciary obligations for
controlling shareholders in connection with related-party transactions, thus further regulating
the terms on which the transactions are entered into.
179 SeeMorck (2005), supra note 177.
180 Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council amending Directive 2007/36/EC As
Regards the Encouragement of Long-term Shareholder Engagement and Directive 2013/34/EU as regards
Certain Elements of the Corporate Governance Statement, COM(2014) 213 final, 2014.
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CHAPTER 3
A POLITICAL NARRATIVE OF NORDIC CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: SHAREHOLDERS,
STAKEHOLDERS AND CHANGEOF CONTROL
Corporate governance in the Nordic countries has been the subject of increasing interest in the
international corporate governance debate. Concentrated ownership combined with reportedly
low private benefits of control have been seen as a competitive model of governance. The low
levels of private benefits of control in the Nordics are claimed to result from the non-pecuniary
nature of control benefits and the social norms characteristic to the Nordic environment.
However, the effects of the political environment on the corporate governance framework should
not be underestimated. This study argues that the limitation of private benefits of control in the
Nordics has mainly been due to an export-driven industrial structure open to product market
competition, while economic crises and the development of pension systems have decreased
resistance to better investor protection. This chapter sets out a political narrative of Nordic
corporate governance and considers the resulting regulatory implications. The study argues that
Nordic governance models are not without their own challenges and that the evolution of the EU
as a parallel political framework has provided a welcome avenue for regulatory change that can
circumvent entrenchment in national corporate regulation. The chapter concludes with an
assessment of appropriate EU level regulatory strategies for the regulation of corporate
governance.
I BACKGROUND TO THE NORDICMODEL
The governance models adopted in the Nordic countries have attracted increasing international
interest.1 Following the financial crisis there have been concerns related to the perceived “short-
termism” of institutional shareholders and the status of shareholders more generally in corporate
governance. It has been argued that models of corporate governance are failing due to inadequate
monitoring by dispersed shareholders.2 As a result, there has been an emerging interest in the role
of large shareholders in developing better corporate governance solutions for publicly traded
corporations.3 Corporate governance models in the Nordic countries, where corporate ownership
remains somewhat concentrated but where private benefits of control are reported to be relatively
low, have therefore been of some interest in the international corporate governance debate.
1 Richard Milne, Model Management, Financial Times, March 21, 2013, at 5.
2 Lynn Dallas, Short-Termism, the Financial Crisis and Corporate Governance, 37 J. CORP. L. 264 (2011).
3 Report of the Reflection Group on the Future of EU Company Law (April 5, 2011), available at
http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/company/docs/modern/reflectiongroup_report_en.pdf [hereinafter Reflection
Group Report (2012)], and EU Commission Green Paper, The EU Corporate Governance Framework COM(2011)
164 final (April 5, 2011) [hereinafter Corporate Governance Green Paper].
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The Nordic corporate environment has generally been characterized by the prevalence of
concentrated ownership and by the use of control-enhancing mechanisms for leveraging the
position of controlling shareholders. While corporate governance models, to a large extent,
support the control rights of large shareholders, 4 other stakeholders, such as creditors and
employees, have relatively strong protection based on creditor rights and employment
legislation. 5 This environment would generally be conducive to low levels of minority
shareholder protection; nonetheless empirical research has reported the private benefits of control
enjoyed by controlling shareholders to be relatively low. In fact, Nordic corporate governance has
at times been seen as an ideal model.6
Explanations for the low levels of private benefits reported in the Nordics have been based,
among others, on the effect of social norms characteristic to the Nordic environment and the non-
pecuniary nature of control benefits (such as the social status associated with corporate
ownership).7 It has also been suggested that strong tax compliance and lower levels of crime in
the Nordic countries8 help explain the behavior of controlling shareholders. Even the role of the
press has been mentioned as a factor contributing to better monitoring of controlling
shareholders.9 However, the effects of the political environment on the framework of Nordic
corporate governance should not be underestimated.
This study argues that the outcomes of corporate ownership and corporate governance are
affected by industrial and political developments. Nordic models of corporate governance remain
subject to path dependence and the development of the overall political economy. The chapter
will consider the resulting regulatory implications. The study argues, inter alia, that the evolution
of the EU as a parallel political framework has in fact provided a welcome avenue for regulatory
change that can circumvent entrenchment in national level corporate regulation. The chapter
concludes with an assessment of appropriate EU-level regulatory strategies for the regulation of
corporate governance.
A. POLITICAL ASPECTS OF THE NORDIC CORPORATE ENVIRONMENT
Corporate governance is of considerable political interest due to its economic impact and its
potential effects on the distribution of wealth among corporate constituencies. Regulation can
generally be seen as the outcome of the interaction between political and market structures,
reflecting the impact of interested market participants and the political environment.10 In this
4 JESPER LAU HANSEN, NORDIC COMPANY LAW – THE REGULATION OF PUBLIC COMPANIES IN DENMARK, FINLAND,
NORWAY AND SWEDEN 75 (2003).
5 Id. at 75-80.
6 See Richard Milne (2013), supra note 1; Hansen (2003), supra note 4, at 1.
7 See Ronald Gilson, Controlling Shareholders and Corporate Governance: Complicating the Comparative
Taxonomy, 119 HARVARD L.R. 1642 (2006).
8 See John C. Coffee Jr., Do Norms Matter?: A Cross-Country Examination of the Private Benefits of Control
(Columbia Law School Center for Law and Economic Studies Working Paper No. 183, 2001), available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/Paper.taf?abstract_id=257613.
9 See Alexander Dyck & Luigi Zingales, The Corporate Governance Role of the Media, in THE RIGHT TO TELL: THE
ROLE OFMEDIA IN DEVELOPMENT 107 (Roumeen Islam, ed., 2002).
10 See George J. Stigler, The Theory of Economic Regulation, 2 BELL J. OF ECON. &MAN. SCI. 3 (1971); Sam
Peltzman, Toward a More General Theory of Regulation, 19 J. OF LAW AND ECON. 211, 212-214 (1976); Roger M.
Barker, Corporate Governance, Competition and Political Parties, 19-24 (2010), Mark J. Roe, Political Preconditions
79
respect corporate law and corporate governance regulation can be expected to reflect the interests
of dominant corporate constituencies.11 Changes in regulation can be seen to reflect changes in
the relative bargaining power of these constituencies. At the same time, corporate governance is
significant for the competitiveness of corporations as vehicles for business enterprise. Regulatory
outcomes are the result of political processes and are not necessarily optimal for the purposes of
efficiency or economic growth and even have significant negative welfare effects. Even the
overall institutional structure itself can be inefficient.12 Moreover, entrenchment by powerful
incumbent constituencies, for example, can easily lead to suboptimal regulatory solutions, even
in the face of increasing product market competition. It is therefore important to understand the
political aspects of corporate governance and how corporate governance regulation may be
affected by changes in the political economy.
Different political coalitions between corporate constituencies result in different ownership
structures and corporate governance models. In the Nordic countries, coalitions have traditionally
been formed between large shareholders on the one hand and management and labor on the
other.13 For the purposes of political economy this environment can been seen to represent a
coalition among constituencies with undiversified risk, i.e. labor interests and the interests of
lenders or large shareholders, who may prefer lower risk strategies, as opposed to strategies
preferred by dispersed shareholders.14 In this model, employees can be expected to support large
shareholders and leave their corporate decision-making rights unchallenged in return for
improvements in job security.15
However, over the past decades the political economy has evolved in such a way that labor
interests have increasingly shifted towards supporting enhanced minority protection. The
development of pension systems towards larger portions of funded pension regimes has been one
of the underlying causes of this development.16 Through the pension system, labor interests are
more aligned with better investor protection, and there is, if not direct support, at least less
political resistance to the introduction of minority protection mechanisms. 17 The political
economy in the Nordic region has also been affected by globalization as an external factor. The
globalization of markets and increased international product market competition has particularly
affected small export-reliant states, such as the Nordic countries, and restricted the rents available
from corporate enterprise.18 As the importance of equity as an investment form has increased,
to Separating Ownership from Corporate Control, 53 STAN. L. REV. 539 (2000); see alsoMARK J. ROE, POLITICAL
DETERMINANTS OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE (2003).
11 See John Armour, Henry Hansmann & Reinier Kraakman, Agency Problems and Legal Strategies, in RENIER
KRAAKMAN ET. AL, THE ANATOMY OF CORPORATE LAW, A COMPARATIVE AND FUNCTIONAL APPROACH 35 (2009).
12 DOUGLASS C. NORTH, INSTITUTIONS, INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE AND ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE 107-117 (1990).
13 PETERA. GOUREVITCH & JAMES SHINN, POLITICAL POWER& CORPORATE CONTROL – THE NEWGLOBAL POLITICS
OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 140-148 (2005).
14 Enrico Perotti & Ernst-Ludwig von Thadden, The Political Economy of Dominant Investors 1 (Tinbergen Institute
Discussion Paper TI 2004-091/2, 2004), available at http://www.haas.berkeley.edu/groups/finance/June041.pdf.
15 Gourevitch & Shinn (2005), supra note 13, at 65-67.
16 Id. at 145-146.
17 See Timo Korkeamäki, Yrjö Koskinen & Tuomas Takalo, Phoenix rising: Legal reforms and changes in
valuations in Finland during the economic crisis (Bank of Finland Research Discussion Papers, 2007) available at
http://www.suomenpankki.fi/en/julkaisut/tutkimukset/keskustelualoitteet/Documents/0701netti.pdf.
18 See Karl-Oskar Lindgren, The Variety of Capitalism in Sweden and Finland in THE CHANGING POLITICAL
ECONOMIES OF SMALLWEST EUROPEAN COUNTRIEs 45 (Uwe Becker, ed., 2011).
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controlling shareholders and labor have been forced to accept better minority protection. A
marked increase in foreign investment, in particular, has resulted in close scrutiny of Nordic
corporate governance models as well as in the introduction of corporate governance models from
different types of economies.
The political economy in much of Europe has evolved as a result of the globalization of markets
and changes to the industrial environment. In the EU, there has been a general trend over the last
two decades towards the introduction of more market-based models of corporate governance,
with an emphasis on shareholder primacy coupled with increased investor protection.19 The EU
has also introduced a political dynamic that has provided new avenues for the pursuit of political
agendas. EU regulation provides a whole new framework in addition to national regulation with
respect to interest group input and the regulatory markets which can circumvent potentially
entrenched national regimes.20 This affects regulatory development at the national level in the
Nordic countries.
B. CHANGE OF CONTROL AND TAKEOVER REGULATION IN THE NORDIC CONTEXT
The regulation of takeovers is an interesting proxy for corporate governance regulation.
Perceived conflicts of interest among corporate constituencies are accentuated in takeover
situations, which may provide opportunities for renegotiating the existing status quo. Premiums
and other compensation paid in connection with a change of control can come to benefit
corporate constituencies unevenly. Management and employees may resist takeovers to protect
their existing benefits, or a controlling shareholder may seek significant premiums for the sale of
a controlling stake. Takeovers also go to the heart of corporate governance in being so
immediately related to control and change of control in corporations. The issues and concerns
raised in the prevailing debate on takeover regulation may say much about the structure of
governance and the relative interests and political power of the respective corporate
constituencies. Therefore, this chapter will also focus on changes in Nordic takeover regulation.
The dynamics of takeovers are considerably different in an environment of concentrated
ownership than in companies with dispersed ownership. In companies with dispersed ownership,
takeovers or the possibility thereof provide, in effect, a management monitoring function. In the
“market for corporate control,” takeovers provide the mechanism by which underperforming
management can be changed.21 In companies with concentrated ownership, takeovers do not have
the same governance function, as the incumbent controlling shareholder, in effect, can usually
veto any change of control proposals. Instead, an undiversified large shareholder can be expected
to monitor management in order to maximize the value of his or her holdings. In this regard
concentrated ownership has been seen as an alternative monitoring mechanism to takeovers.22
19 See Laura Horn, Corporate Governance in Crisis? The Politics of EU Corporate Governance Regulation, 18
EUR.L.J. 83 (2012).
20 See Helen Callaghan, How Multilevel Governance Affects the Clash of Capitalisms (MPIfG Discussion Paper
08/5), available at http://www.mpifg.de/pu/mpifg_dp/dp08-5.pdf.
21 Paul Davies & Klaus Hopt, Control Transactions, in Kraakman et al., supra note 11, at 227-228.
22 SeeMarco Becht, Patrick Bolton & Ailsa Röell, Corporate Governance and Control (ECGI Finance Working
Paper No 02/2002, updated August 2005), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=343461.
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In companies with concentrated ownership, takeovers would generally be subject to negotiations
between the bidder and the controlling shareholder. Takeover regulation may be of significant
importance, however, in protecting minority shareholders from the possible self-interested
behavior of the controlling shareholder. Regulation would address the possibility of controlling
shareholders extracting private benefits of control in the form of unwarranted control premiums,
or seeking to redeem minority shareholders on unfair terms. Regulation would also need to
address the possibility of a controlling shareholder deciding not to transfer control even when no
longer performing an effective monitoring function.
At the EU level, takeover regulation has been harmonized to some extent, pursuant to the EU
directive on takeovers (the “Takeover Directive”23) adopted in 2004 after a legislative process
that lasted almost two decades and was the subject of much controversy and political compromise.
Subsequently, takeover regulation in the Nordic countries has been largely based on the directive.
However, the Takeover Directive allows for further national discretion with respect to many
aspects of takeover regulation. For example, member states were allowed an opt-out from the
directive requirements on “board neutrality” and the “break-through” of certain perceived
obstacles to change of control. As control enhancing mechanisms are a prevalent feature in
Nordic corporate governance, no “break-through” rules have been adopted, of course. Moreover,
exemptions to mandatory bid obligations are a fairly common feature in the most active Nordic
takeover market, Sweden, reflecting the need to accommodate the requirements of concentrated
ownership. In addition, the Nordic countries have many other regulations that affect the interests
of different corporate constituencies in takeovers, including self-regulation and policies and
practices related to exemptions from certain requirements in national takeover rules.
Takeover regulation has been the subject of recent debate in the Nordic countries,24 and in the EU
more generally. It has been argued that in the prevailing institutional environment takeovers may
have been based less on synergies or economic efficiency than on creating short term benefits for
shareholders at the cost of other constituencies, such as employees or creditors.25 Moreover, there
has been some increase in protectionist tendencies in different EU member states more generally.
Cross-border takeovers, in particular, have become more suspect in the eyes of legislators.26
Regulatory changes in the EU have also been criticized for adopting concepts and regulation that
do not take into account differences in economic and institutional structures within the union. For
example, it has been argued that corporate governance models adopted from the United States or
the United Kingdom may be incompatible with, and hence inefficient in, a Continental European
or Nordic context.27 However, it is interesting to consider how these developments reflect a
political approach to corporate governance. In terms of political economy, some developments
could be deemed to represent a shift back towards a more corporatist political and economic
model.28 Furthermore, some of the abovementioned concerns may well have been self-serving, a
23 Directive 25/2004/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 21 April 2004 on Takeover Bids, 2004 O.J.
(L142) [hereinafter Takeover Directive].
24 See BEATE SJÅFJELL, TOWARDS A SUSTAINABLE EUROPEAN COMPANY LAW (2009).
25 See SOPHIE NACHEMSON-EKWALL, AN INSTITUTIONAL ANALYSIS OF CROSS-BORDER HOSTILE TAKEOVERS (2012).
26 See Damien M. B. Gerard, Protectionist Threats Against Cross-Border Mergers: Unexplored Avenues to
Strengthen the Effectiveness of Article 21 ECMR, 45 COMMONMARKET L.R. 987 (2008).
27 ANDREW JOHNSTON, EC REGULATION OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 268 (2009).
28 Gourevitch & Shinn (2005), note 13, at 60.
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result of politically dominant constituencies seeking to prevent changes to existing regulatory
regimes.
D. OBJECTIVES OF THE STUDY
This chapter is concerned with the regulatory implications of a political economy approach to
Nordic corporate governance and takeover regulation. Different corporate constituencies have
different interests with respect to takeovers which is reflected in the political dynamic of takeover
and corporate governance regulation. The chapter will investigate whether recent changes in
takeover regulation reflect changes in the relevant political economy, and whether possible
differences between national regulations in the Nordic region can be explained by differences in
their political economy. Findings in this regard can confirm or disprove the hypothesis of the
study, i.e., that corporate governance models in the Nordics reflect industrial and political
developments and the evolution of the overall political economy. Building on these findings, the
chapter then considers how corporate governance and takeover regulation can be developed and
what regulatory strategies might be available in this environment. The study seeks to contribute
to a better understanding of the relationship between corporate governance and takeover
regulation and the political economy from a Nordic perspective.
The chapter is structured as follows. In section two, the study describes the corporate
environment in the Nordic countries in broad terms. The study focuses on the structure of
corporate ownership and, in particular, the political environment as it relates to corporate
ownership. In section three, the study turns to the discussion of the political approach to
corporate governance, examining theories related to the political economy of corporate
governance and explanations on the relationship between different corporate governance
solutions and political coalitions between different corporate constituencies. The section
discusses formal corporate governance arrangements in the Nordic countries and then looks at
how corporate governance solutions in the Nordic countries reflect political explanations of
corporate governance. In section four, the study turns to change of control transactions in the
Nordic region. The section discusses the dynamic of takeovers and takeover regulation in the
context of concentrated ownership with an emphasis on how the function of takeovers in this
environment differs from that in dispersed ownership situations. The study then considers
takeovers and takeover regulation in the Nordic countries from the perspective of the political
approach to corporate governance. The section concludes by comparing regulatory development
in Finland and Sweden in the light of differences in their respective political economies. Section
five considers the relationship between corporate governance and takeover regulation on the one
hand and the changing political economy on the other from the perspective of how regulatory
changes come about. Based on theories of the political coordination of interest groups,29 the study
seeks to identify how the interests of different corporate constituencies are likely to develop and
which constituencies may, in fact, be in need of any further regulatory intervention. Section six
considers the recent corporate governance debate in the Nordics in light of the arguments made in
the study, and concludes by considering appropriate regulatory strategies for this environment.
Sweden, in particular, has received much attention as the largest market of Nordic region, with
established corporate governance practices and an active takeover market. Sweden has therefore
29 SeeMANCUR OLSON, THE LOGIC OF COLLECTIVE ACTION (2nd ed., 1971).
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often been seen as representative of the whole Nordic region in studies related to corporate
governance. This chapter will also focus mainly on Sweden, but Finland too will be discussed, as
the two countries have similar industrial structures. Norwegian and Danish corporate governance
matters will also be considered to a limited extent.
II. CORPORATEOWNERSHIP AND CONTROL IN NORDIC COUNTRIES
Corporate governance and the structure of corporate ownership are closely related and rest on the
development of economic, political, legal and historical conditions. 30 The importance of
historical development and path dependence has been emphasized in the legal literature on
corporate governance.31 Taken as a whole, the political aspects of corporate governance should
not be underestimated. Corporate constituencies make use of regulation and the political
framework to further their corporate interests in relation to corporate governance. As these
constituencies may have significant political influence, corporate governance can easily become
the target of considerable political interest.
Below, this section briefly describes the key characteristics of corporate ownership and control in
the Nordic countries, as well as some of the explanations regarding the historical and political
background for the prevalent structures of corporate ownership.
A. STRUCTURE OF CORPORATEOWNERSHIP AND CONTROL
Nordic corporate governance has traditionally been characterized by relatively high levels of
concentrated ownership and the application of different types of control mechanisms. 32
Nevertheless, empirical studies report low levels of private benefits of control in these
countries.33 As concentrated ownership and control mechanisms, in particular, have often been
linked to the extraction of private benefits, the Nordic model of corporate ownership and
corporate governance has been the focus of quite some interest as a model for an efficient
structure of corporate control. Some scholars have argued that controlling shareholders extract
non-pecuniary private benefits in the form of the political influence and status that go with
considerable corporate power. 34 Such benefits are claimed to be specific to the controlling
shareholder and not extracted at the cost of other shareholders. Other scholars, however, have
found satisfactory explanations in the path dependent nature of corporate governance and the
corporate legal environment that may have resulted over time in relative advantages for
concentrated ownership over a dispersed ownership model.35
30 Peter Högfeldt, The History and Politics of Corporate Ownership in Sweden, in A HISTORY OF CORPORATE
GOVERNANCE AROUND THEWORLD: FAMILY BUSINESS GROUPS TO PROFESSIONALMANAGERS 517, 518-522
(Randall K. Morck ed., 2005).
31 See Lucian A. Bebchuk and Mark J. Roe, A Theory of Path Dependence in Corporate Governance and Ownership,
52 STAN. L. REV. 127 (1999).
32 See Johan E. Eklund, Corporate Governance and Investments in Scandinavia – Ownership Concentration and
Dual-class Equity Structure (CESIS Electronic Working paper Series, 2007), available at
http://www.infra.kth.se/cesis/documents/WP98.pdf.
33 Martin Holmén & Peter Högfeldt, Pyramidal Discounts: Tunneling or Agency Costs? (ECGI Working Paper 73,
2005), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=667743.
34 See Gilson (2006), supra note 7, at 163-165.
35 See Roe (2000), supra note 10; Roe (2003), supra note 10.
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1. Concentrated Ownership
Ownership concentration in the Nordic countries remains relatively high, with the reported
average (mean of a data set of the largest listed companies) ownership share of the largest
shareholder at 23.5 percent and for the top five shareholders together 44.8 percent.36 In Sweden
and Finland, single large shareholders are common even in larger listed companies. In Norway it
seems that the level of holding of the single largest shareholder is somewhat lower, but it is
common for companies with concentrated ownership to be controlled by a few large
shareholders..37
During the past decades traditional ownership structures have weakened in the Nordic countries –
especially in Sweden.38 The ownership of key families has decreased, as have their spheres of
influence; nevertheless, over 60 percent of companies in the Nordics have at least one
shareholder with over 20 percent of the votes and over 20 percent have a shareholder with more
than 50 percent of the votes.39 Foreign ownership has increased considerably since the 1980s, and
new industries have emerged to challenge the traditional dominance of the raw material and
machinery based industries that dominated the economies of Finland and Sweden during the
larger part of the 20th century. Nonetheless, Henrekson & Jakobson find that while the position of
traditionally dominant shareholder groups in Sweden has decreased over the past decades, this
has not resulted in a significant increase in dispersed ownership. The institutional framework is
still based on concentrated ownership, if not in a listed context then through the increase of
foreign ownership (subsidiaries) or private equity.40 Moreover, they observe that monitoring by
controlling shareholders is still a vital element of corporate governance. The authors argue that to
the extent that this ownership structure cannot be maintained in publicly traded companies, these
structures will be maintained outside the listed context (i.e., as foreign subsidiaries or companies
held by private equity).
There has been some concern that concentrated ownership could negatively impact corporate
performance and share value.41 However, empirical research findings give little support to the
assumption that as such concentrated ownership necessarily implies inferior performance. Instead,
studies have found a positive correlation between concentrated ownership and firm
performance,42 as undiversified large shareholders or entrepreneurs are able to efficiently monitor
36 Eklund (2007), supra note 32, at 9.
37 See Oyvind Bohren & Bernt Arne Odegaard, Corporate Governance and Economic Performance in Norwegian
Listed Companies (Norwegian School of Management Working Paper, 2001), available at http://finance-
old.bi.no/~bernt/governance/Report_Performance.pdf.
38 SeeMagnus Henrekson & Ulf Jakobsson, The Swedish Corporate Control Model: Convergence, Persistence or
Decline? (IFN Working Paper No. 857, 2011), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1734149.
39 Högfeldt (2005), supra note 30, at 518-522, and Ronald Gilson, The Nordic Model in an International Perspective
– the Role of Ownership, 99-199, in THE NORDIC CORPORATE GOVERNANCEMODEL, 94, 99-100, (Per Lekvall, ed.,
2014).
40 See Henrekson & Jakobsson (2011), supra note 38.
41 See See Stijn Claessens, Simeon Djankov, Joseph P.H. Fan, & Larry H.P. Lang, The Benefits and Costs of Group
Affiliation: The Evidence from East Asia (CEPR Discussion paper 3364, 2002) available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=307426.
42 See Torben Pedersen & Steen Thomsen, Ownership Structure and Value of the Largest European Firms: The
Importance of Owner Identity, 7 J. OFMANAGEMENT ANDGOVERNANCE, 27-55 (2003), and Christian Weiss, The
Ownership Concentration of Firms: Three Essays on the Determinants and Effects 133 (Dissertation, European
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management. In fact, the type of shareholders a company has can be a more important factor with
respect to corporate performance.43 In particular, it has been argued that rather than the structure
of corporate ownership, it may be the type of controlling shareholder that affects corporate
decision making and performance.44 Having corporations or financial institutions as controlling
shareholders is reported to correspond to a higher company value. Family shareholders, on the
other hand, may pursue low-risk strategies due to constrained financial resources and an
undiversified risk profile, resulting in a lower firm value. La Porta et.al. have identified different
types of large shareholders in the Nordic countries, as shown in the table below:
Owner Identity Allocation at 10% cut-off in Nordic Countries45





Denmark 10% 35% 20% 5% 0% 30%
Finland 15% 10% 35% 25% 0% 15%
Norway 5% 25% 40% 10% 0% 20%
Sweden 0% 55% 10% 30% 0% 5%
2. Control Enhancing Mechanisms
Control mechanisms supporting the control of incumbent shareholders are common in
environments with concentrated ownership. Control mechanisms generally function to separate
voting rights from cash-flow rights by different means, in order to allow incumbent shareholders
to maintain a higher degree of control than their relative share of equity holdings would entitle
them to. The control mechanisms used in the Nordic countries include multiple share classes,
voting caps and pyramid ownership structures.46
According to Eklund, in the Nordic countries the largest shareholder holds an average of more
than 20 percent of the capital and close to 30 percent of the voting rights.47 In Norway, some 14
Business School, International University Schloss Reichanthausen, 2010), available at
http://hdl.handlenet/10419/30247.
43 See Pedersen & Thomsen (2003), supra note 42.
44 Id.
45 See Rafael La Porta, Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes & Andrei Schleifer, Corporate Ownership Around the World, 54
J. FIN. 471, 491-93 (1999).
46 See Shearman & Sterling, Proportionality Between Ownership and Control in EU Listed Companies (External
Study Commissioned by the European Commission, May 18, 2007, Open Call for Tender No MARKT/2006/15/F),
available at ec.europa.eu/internal_market/company/docs/shareholders/study/final_report_en.pdf [hereinafter EU
Proportionality Report].
47 Eklund (2007), supra note 32, at 28.
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percent of listed companies are reported to employ a dual-class share structure;48 in Denmark and
Finland the figure is more than 30 percent and in Sweden some 55 percent.49 In Faccio & Lang
(2002), the usage of dual-class share structures was reported for 29 percent of listed companies in
Denmark, 44 percent in Finland, 11 percent in Norway and 62 percent in Sweden.50 The low
percentage in Norway has been explained by the fact that government authorization has been
required for the introduction of dual-class share structures. As a compensating factor, Faccio &
Lang report that 33 percent of listed companies in Norway had pyramid structures, while the
corresponding share in the other Nordic countries was significantly lower, as is shown in the
table below.51
Corporate Control Mechanisms in the Nordics and other European Countries52
Dual-class shares Pyramid Cross-holdings
Denmark 0.29 0.17 0.00
Finland 0.44 0.07 0.00
Norway 0.11 0.33 0.02
Sweden 0.62 0.27 0.01
Nordic Average 0.37 0.21 0.01
European Average** 0.24 0.20 0.01
**Nordic countries and Switzerland, Italy, United Kingdom, Ireland, Austria, Germany, France,
Belgium, Portugal
To the extent that new companies are introduced on the stock exchange in the Nordic countries,
they must generally adhere to the requirements of the markets with regard to corporate
governance. It worth noting that the use of dual class share structures has more recently been
resisted by investors and it is unusual in new listed companies. However, it is still common for
founding owners to maintain controlling stakes in IPOs. It is also possible that other control
enhancing mechanisms which are less negatively viewed by external investors are used.
48 Bohren & Odegaard (2001), supra note 37, at 21.
49 See Hans Tson Söderström, Erik Berglöf, Bengt Holmström, Peter Högfeldt & Eva M. Meyersson Milgrom,
Corporate Governance and Structural Change, European Challenges (SNS Economic Policy Group Report, 2003)
available at http://meyersson.com/ekoradet1-CorpGovEuropean.pdf.
50 SeeMara Faccio & Larry H.P. Lang, The Ultimate Ownership of Western European Corporations, 65 JFE 365,
(2002).
51 Id. at 380-381.
52 Morten Bennedsen & Kasper Nielsen, The Principle of Proportionality: Separating the Impact of Dual Class
Shares, Pyramids and Cross-Ownership on Firm Value Across Legal Regimes in Western Europe (Center for
Industrial Economics Discussion Papers, University of Copenhagen, 2005), available at https://www.wiwi.uni-
muenster.de/iw/downloads/Im%20Seminar/ss06/Litss06/T15/16_pp_june.pdf.
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There are many concerns related to the use of control enhancing mechanisms. Bebchuk,
Kraakman & Triantis have demonstrated how disproportionate voting rights in these types of
systems distort the interests of the controlling shareholder.53 As the relationship between control
and capital grows more disproportionate, the economic risks of the controlling shareholder and
those of minority shareholders are increasingly unaligned. For example, the controlling
shareholder can engage all the company’s assets in a venture, while carrying only very limited
risk. Empirical research also reports significant private benefits of control in many jurisdictions
where control enhancing mechanisms are used.54
The structure of corporate ownership bears a relationship to how corporations are controlled.
Corporate control is a key factor in any model of corporate governance. In the context of
dispersed ownership, control over corporate assets lies mainly in the hands of management and
the board of directors, while in companies with concentrated ownership the controlling
shareholder is generally able to control the corporation and its business.55 Legal institutions have
developed to complement each of these systems. In this respect, control enhancing mechanisms
can be understood as mechanisms for leveraging the monitoring function of controlling
shareholders, allowing incumbent shareholders to obtain economies of scale and decrease firm
specific risk.56 Concentrated ownership can provide benefits in the form of effective monitoring
of management by largely undiversified shareholders. In an environment that relies on controlling
shareholders to perform this function, different means have evolved by which this system of
governance can be leveraged. Control enhancing mechanisms allow the entrepreneur or founding
shareholder to retain control while raising further equity financing. In this way the control
function can be taken advantage of with less capital being tied up. 57 This can provide a
competitive form of corporate governance, provided that private benefits of control are
sufficiently limited and the controlling shareholder is appropriately incentivized.
B. THE POLITICAL ENVIRONMENT FOR CORPORATEOWNERSHIP AND CONTROL
The way in which corporations are owned and managed can have a considerable impact on
economic development and the interests of different corporate constituencies. The structure of
corporate ownership cannot be studied separately from the political environment, as corporate
constituencies can pursue their interests through regulatory and political avenues.
The structure of corporate ownership is a result both of specific historical and industrial
development and the broader institutional environment. For example, a model of ownership and
governance that has developed in an economy with heavy industry which requires considerable
capital outlays and untrained labor, could be expected to differ from the model in an economy
53 Lucian A. Bebchuk, Reinier Kraakman & George Triantis, Stock Pyramids, Cross-Ownership and Dual Class
Equity: The Creation and Agency Costs of Separating Control from Cash Flow Rights 12 (Harvard Law School John
M. Olin Center for Law, Economics and Business Discussion Paper Series 249, 1999), available at
http://lsr.nellco.org/harvard_olin/249.
54 See Tatyana Nenova, The Value of Corporate Voting Rights and Control: A Cross-country Analysis, 68 J. FIN.
ECON. 325 (2003) and La Porta et. al. (1999), supra note 45.
55 Becht, Bolton & Röell (2002), supra note 22, at 46.
56 Ronald J. Gilson & Alan Schwartz, Constraints on Private Benefits of Control: Ex Ante Control Mechanisms
versus Ex Post Transaction Review 4 (ECGI Law Working Paper 194, 2012), available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=2129502.
57 See Gilson (2006), supra note 7.
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based on services or products, which require firm-specific investments of skilled labor. Analysis
of the political preconditions for corporate ownership suggests, in fact, that there is a relationship
between concentrated ownership and politically strong labor institutions. It is argued that in
economies with strong labor there is more pressure for corporate governance institutions that
favor employees and less for institutions that support shareholder interests. 58 For example,
companies are likely to be encouraged to prefer securing employment by expanding at the cost of
profitability.59 In this environment a controlling shareholder would have a better bargaining
position over surplus, in relative terms, and would be better equipped to resist the related political
pressures.60
Other political economy explanations point out that in states with concentrated ownership a
political majority with fewer financial incentives (and more labor-oriented financial interests)
may oppose a market-based system related to higher risk taking.61 The outcome of the political
system in this environment can be expected to favor large shareholders and labor at the cost of
smaller investors and will support complementary governance structures – much of which can be
observed in EU member states with concentrated ownership, including the governance structures
traditionally associated with the Nordic countries.
1. The Politics of Corporate Ownership and Control
The “Nordic model” of corporate ownership and control has evolved over the 20th century and is
largely based on industrial structures that developed during the first decades of the century. The
industrial structure in Sweden, for example, was predominantly characterized by large
corporations involved in machinery and the refinement of raw materials.62 Industrial dynasties
had a significant role in this development, as a number of families had the means available to
develop these types of industries. Ownership was originally concentrated, and controlling
shareholders were able to leverage their control positions with different types of control-
enhancing mechanisms, including different share classes and cross-ownership. Even if the
structure of the economy has changed over the past decades, the basis of the structure of
corporate ownership and control originates from the era of industrial corporations, large labor
unions and social democratic governments.
In Sweden, Högfeldt has described how labor unions have cooperated with controlling
shareholders and supported their corporate power in return for job security.63 The prevalence of
concentrated ownership is based on a political bargain between capital and labor, resulting in a
corporatist society with, on the one hand, heavily entrenched, concentrated private ownership and,
on the other hand, strong labor unions and strong employee protection. Högfeldt emphasizes the
political aspects of these relationships. He argues that a corporate structure with a small number
58 Mark J. Roe, The Institutions of Corporate Governance 18 (Harvard Law School, John M. Olin Center’s Program
on Corporate Governance Discussion Paper 488, 2004), available at
http:/www.law.harvard.edu/programs/olin_center/papers/pdf/Roe_488.pdf.
59 Id. at 18-19.
60 Id. at 19.
61 See Perotti & von Thadden, supra note 14.
62 Hans Sjögren, Welfare Capitalism: The Swedish Economy, 1850-2005, in CREATING NORDIC CAPITALISM 22, 22-
30 (Susanna Fellman, Martin Jes Iversen, Hans Sjögren & Lars Thue eds., 2008).
63 Högfeldt (2005), supra note 30, at 538-549.
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of large industrial corporations corresponded with the interests and agendas of the Social
Democrats, the dominant party for the majority of the 20th century. Policies supporting the
reinvestment of retained earnings to expand industrial companies (thus increasing the political
clout of labor) were preferred over policies that would have favored shareholder value. The
position of controlling shareholders could be supported (by allowing control enhancing
mechanisms, for example) in exchange for strong protection of the established workforce, i.e. the
inside-labor, and corporate policies aimed at investment in Sweden.64
In terms of concrete measures, Högfeldt argues that the Social Democrats have pursued policies
that reinforce entrenchment of incumbent shareholders by “(i) allowing bank ownership of equity;
(ii) strong support for control structures that rigidly separate votes from capital, for a long time
also combined with rigorous restrictions on foreign ownership of equity, and (iii) persistently
giving retained earnings and borrowing a tax advantage over equity.” Högfeldt concludes that
these policies have hampered the development of companies in growth industries that would have
needed outside equity financing and have supported overinvestment in traditional entrenched,
capital-heavy, low-growth industries.65
The Swedish corporate tax regime has traditionally favored organic growth through favorable
treatment of retained earnings and debt financing.66 Allowing for expedited depreciations of long-
term assets also supported this type of activity. Equity investments were disfavored by
unattractive dividend taxation.67 Share buy-backs, another mechanism for returning funds to
shareholders, were not possible until the introduction of new company law in 2005.68 Large
shareholders, however, have typically been able to arrange their holdings so as to avoid extensive
dividend taxation. For instance, shares could be held through foundations or holding-company
structures, to avoid the highest levels of dividend taxation applied to direct dividend payouts.
The pecking order theory of financing suggests that companies and their owners prefer to finance
new investments first from retained earnings and second by external debt, with raising new
equity being seen as a last resort due, among others, to its dilutive effects. These features seem
particularly pronounced in the Nordic model. A characteristic of the Nordic economies is that
financing through retained earnings or relationship banking is favored over equity financing,
which is typically deemed conducive to structural change.69 Banks have traditionally enjoyed a
strong position in the corporate environment and in corporate governance. The banking sector in
Sweden was traditionally an extension of its large industrial families with respect to corporate
finance and corporate ownership.
Concentrated ownership and control enhancing mechanisms have been characteristic of Finland
as well. However, Finland has differed from Sweden in respect to certain elements of its
historical and political development, which has been reflected in the politics of corporate
governance. First, per capita GDP in Finland was lower than in the other Nordic countries until
64 Id. at 548.
65 Id. at 560.
66 See Pierre Habbard, Corporate Governance in Sweden – An International Trade Union Perspective (TUAC
Report, 2008) available at http://www.tuac.org/e-docs/00/00/01/CF/telecharger.phtml?cle_doc_attach=463.
67 Id. at 10.
68 Id. at 11.
69 Högfeldt (2005), supra note 30, at 518.
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the late 20th century, and the country has previously experienced more political instability than its
Nordic peers.70 Private ownership has also developed in a somewhat different manner than in
Sweden. While Finland has also had important industrial dynasties, their role in the economy has
been less significant than in Sweden. In short, private wealth has been limited and there have
been fewer private sources of financing available. Until the 1980s large shareholders in Finnish
listed companies were typically financial institutions and the government. Pension funds have
later seized a larger portion of equity holdings, albeit on a more dispersed basis. This explains, in
part, the difference between Sweden and Finland in the levels of concentrated ownership found in
empirical studies.
Another factor characterizing corporate governance in Finland is the development of
relationships between large shareholders and labor. These relationships have differed from those
in Sweden to some extent.71 The position of labor is said to have been less institutionalized than
in Sweden, as labor interests and unions were weakened first by the effects of the Finnish civil
war of 1918 and later by internal conflicts within the labor movement.72 Thus, it is claimed that
Finnish labor relations have been dominated, in relative terms, by employer representatives.73
Nevertheless, maintaining employment was an important factor in Finnish industry, a factor that
supported political stability but also led to an increase in organizational rigidity and a lack of
readiness for industrial change.74
In Finland retained earnings and bank financing have traditionally been preferred to equity or
other capital-markets-based financing. Companies were previously incentivized to invest using
bank-based debt financing, for example. 75 It was national policy to pursue growth through
investment and favor export-oriented industries through low interest rates and currency
devaluations. 76 As in Sweden, this has contributed to overinvestment and decreasing returns on
investment. In Finland the leading national banks also had established spheres of interest with
large shareholdings and a strong voice in corporate governance in large Finnish companies.77
These positions were largely disposed of in the early 1990s in the aftermath of a deep recession.
Moreover, the business environment in Finland was closely regulated, and exports were driven
by political factors, such as international trade agreements, that were not necessarily reflective of
the interests of the market. Consequently, Finnish corporate strategies may not have been market
driven, resulting in some level of inefficiency.
70 Susanna Fellman, Growth and Investment: Finnish Capitalism, 1850-2005, 139, 140 in Fellman et al. (2008) supra
note 62.
71 Id. at 162-164.
72 Id. at 159.
73 Id. at 163-164.
74 Mika Skippari & Jari Ojala, Success and Failure of a Conglomerate Firm: The Strategic Paths of Nokia and
Tampella in the Liberalizing Finnish Economy after the Second World War, 238, at 253, in Fellman et al. (2008),
supra note 64.6
75 See Timo Korkeamäki, Elina Rainio & Tuomas Takalo, Reforming Corporate Law in an Emerging Market: The
Case of Finland in the 1970’s, 21 ECONOMICS OF TRANSITION 509 (2013), and Skippari & Ojala (2008), supra note
76, at 254.
76 Fellman (2008), supra note 70, at 208.
77 See Ari Hyytinen, Ilkka Kuosa & Tuomas Takalo, Investor Protection and Financial Development in Finland in
FINANCIAL SYSTEMS AND FIRM PERFORMANCE, THEORETICAL AND EMPIRICAL PERSPECTIVES 86 (Ari Hyytinen &
Mika Pajarinen, eds., 2003).
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In the course of the 20th century, developments in Denmark and Norway included similar
phenomena to those seen in Sweden and Finland, even if many specific national features were
also added to the corporate environment.78 In Denmark, the considerable significance of the
agricultural industry and related political agendas have affected corporate structures to some
degree. In Norway, geographical factors have influenced both the development of a locally-
driven, self-reliant economic structure and, in the latter decades of the 20th century and beyond, a
heavy reliance on raw-materials-based industries and related government involvement.79
2. Low Private Benefits of Control
In an environment with a prevalence of concentrated ownership and control enhancing
mechanisms, the expectation is that significant levels of private benefits of control will be
extracted from minority shareholders. Nevertheless, in the Nordic countries this generally is not
the case. Empirical studies report levels of private benefit of control which are equal to those in
the United Kingdom and the United States and thus diverge from other regions with concentrated
ownership. For example, in their empirical studies, Nenova and Dyck & Zingales find varying
but nonetheless extremely low values for control-block votes in the Nordic countries.80 Nenova
reports the value of control-block votes in Scandinavian countries at below 10 percent, in line
with premiums in Anglo-Saxon countries. In their study, Dyck & Zingales observe block
premiums in control block transactions in the Nordic countries with means varying from 1 to 8
percent.
Various types of investor protection indices also award Nordic countries relatively high values.
For example, the La Porta et. al. (LLSV) index81 lists the Nordic countries as having relatively
good shareholder protection regulation (anti-director rights) and creditor rights that are, on the
whole, slightly below the world average.
Denmark Finland Norway Sweden World
average
Anti-director rights 2.00 3.00 4.00 3.00 3.00
Creditor rights 3.00 1.00 2.00 2.00 2.30
Ownership concentration 0.45 0.37 0.36 0.28 0.46
Source: La Porta et. al
(1998)
Several reasons have been suggested for the reportedly low levels of private benefits of control in
the Nordic countries. Dyck & Zingales studied the impact of legal origins as well as extra-legal
institutions, including product market competition, pressure from public opinion, moral norms,
78 SeeMartin Jes Iversen & Steen Andersen, Co-operative Liberalism: Denmark from 1857 to 2007, 265, in Fellman
et al. (2008), supra note 62; Lars Thue, Norway: A Resource-based and Democratic Capitalism, 394, in Fellman et
al. (2008), supra note 62.
79 See Thue (2008), supra note 78.
80 Nenova (2003), supra note 54, at 348; see also Alexander Dyck & Luigi Zingales, Private Benefits of Control: An
International Comparison, 59 J. OF FINANCE 537 (2004).
81 See La Porta et al. (1999), supra note 45.
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labor monitoring and government control.82 They conclude that specific institutions, in isolation,
are associated with lower levels of private benefits of control.83 Coffee suggests that social norms,
including general compliance with laws, also explain lower private benefits of control.84 Other
authors emphasize the different nature of private benefits of control where controlling
shareholders enjoy social or political prestige from corporate ownership. Gilson argues that these
non-pecuniary private benefits of control can explain why Sweden, for example, enjoys low
levels of economic private benefits of control. 85 Holmén & Knopf also find that extralegal
institutions can help explain the low level of control benefits. They argue that “the very prestige
(private benefits of control) that is associated with control would be lost if the owners were
perceived to be abusing that power.”86
Another reason given for the traditionally relatively low levels of private benefits of control is the
fact that, as smaller export-reliant economies, the Nordic countries have generally been subject to
international product market competition. Generally, incumbent industrial and financial interest
groups have been found to hold back the development of financial systems in closed economies
in an effort to restrain competition. Rajan & Zingales argue that it is in the incumbents’ interest to
restrict financial development and economic openness to prevent competitors from emerging.87
Large incumbent industrial groups, for example, will have a competitive advantage in financing
their operations from retained earnings, thus blocking new entries to the industry. Moreover,
incumbents will actively seek to restrict opening up the economy to new domestic or foreign
entrants. Open economies reliant on international trade are, in contrast, likely to face more
product market competition and cannot produce the same levels of rent for incumbent
constituencies.88 The economies in Sweden and Finland have traditionally been dependent on
export industries and hence subject to international competition. As a result of globalization,
increased international product market competition has further affected small, export-reliant
states, such as the Nordic countries, restricted available rents and forced controlling shareholders
and labor alike to accept better minority protection. The economic crisis of the 1990s also
severely affected the previous, predominantly bank-based, financial system and decreased the
influence of the banking lobby simultaneous to the emergence of minority shareholder interests
resulting from an increase in foreign ownership.89
3. The Institutional Environment
Low levels of private benefits of control have also been linked to the broader political
environment for corporate ownership. For example, Holmén & Högfeldt have studied pyramid
82 Dyck & Zingales (2004), supra note 80, at 575-590.
83 Id. at 590.
84 See John C. Coffee, Jr., Do Norms Matter?: A Cross-Country Examination of the Private Benefits of Control
(Columbia Law School Center for Law and Economic Studies Working Paper 183, 2001) available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/paper.taf?abstract_id=257613.
85 Gilson (2006), supra note 7, at 1665-1666.
86 Martin Holmén & John D. Knopf, Minority Shareholder Protection and the Private Benefits of Control for
Swedish Mergers, 39 J. OF FIN. AND QUANT. ANALYSIS 167, 169 (2004).
87 See Raghuram G. Rajan & Luigi Zingales, The Great Reversals: The Politics of Financial Development in the
Twentieth Century, 69 J. OF FIN. ECON. 5 (2003).
88 Id.
89 See Korkeamäki et al. (2007), supra note 17.
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structures in Sweden and found increased agency costs in these types of structures. 90
Nevertheless, they failed to find indications of tunneling or the direct extraction of private
benefits. They believe that controlling owners in financially developed countries, such as Sweden,
are subject to closer scrutiny, based on well-developed accounting and judicial standards, and that
there is less room for direct “stealing” in this type of environment. The authors suggest that the
agency costs and discounts related to pyramid structures can be explained by investment behavior
(over-investment) based on relatively inexpensive capital obtained from retained earnings as
compared to external financing.91 The cost of financing is driven, among others, by the favorable
tax treatment of dividends in pyramid structures.92. In Sweden and Finland, dividends paid to
legal entities are generally tax-exempt. Large shareholders can structure their holdings so that
little tax is paid on dividend payments. In some other jurisdictions, pyramid ownership is
efficiently restricted through dividend taxation.93 The authors conclude that “[t]ax rules that
regulate cash flows within the pyramid substitute for weak minority protection and limit
incentives for outright stealing.”94
In other words, controlling shareholders do obtain benefits from holding control blocks rather
than diversified positions, but these benefits are based on the institutional environment and the
tax system rather than on the direct transfer of wealth through “stealing” from minority
shareholders. The explanation for the low levels of private benefits of control is thus, at least in
part, political. Through political influence and bargaining, controlling shareholders have secured
favorable treatment for concentrated ownership. The Nordic system of corporate governance may
well restrict private benefits of control while still supporting control by large shareholders.
Nonetheless, the background of the governance system is linked to a political approach to
corporate governance.
C. THE ENVIRONMENT FOR TAKEOVERS IN THE NORDIC COUNTRIES
Tender offers have proven controversial in many regions around the world, as they seem to
provide a mechanism that effectively circumvents the central governing organs of a corporation,
including the board and the operational management. Takeovers as a means to transfer control
may provide the potential for emphasizing conflicts of interest among key corporate
constituencies. Management and employees may have an interest in retaining the existing
corporate status and resisting takeovers, while controlling shareholders may look to extract
unwarranted control premiums, for example. Different constituencies are likely to seek to
influence regulation in their own interests. In an environment with strong labor interests and
concentrated ownership this dynamic can lead to interesting end results. What this study will
examine in more detail is the nature of the political environment of takeovers and takeover
regulation in the Nordic countries and how it has evolved over the years.
90 Martin Holmén & Peter Högfeldt, Pyramidal Discounts: Tunneling or Overinvestment?, 9 Int’l R. of Finance 133,
135-136 (2009).
91 Id. at 170.
92 Id. at 136-137.
93 See Randall Morck, How to Eliminate Pyramidal Business Groups: The Double Taxation of Inter-corporate
Dividends and other Incisive Uses of Tax Policy, 19 TAX POLICY AND THE ECONOMY 135 (2005).
94 Holmén & Högfeldt (2009), supra note 90, at 172.
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Despite the prevalence of concentrated ownership, there have been a reasonably large number of
takeovers in the Nordic countries,95 with Sweden being a particularly active market for corporate
control. It is interesting that takeovers have occurred with relative frequency in an environment
with concentrated ownership and low levels of private benefits of control. Generally speaking,
controlling shareholders may indeed be inclined to transfer control if they are only able to extract
limited private benefits of control and a new owner (the bidder) can offer a more efficient
monitoring function. However, in an environment favoring block-holders, there may be negative
consequences for a controlling shareholder selling out.96 If the institutional environment supports
block-holding, the relative benefits of this position may be lost when it is unwound. Moreover,
where private benefits have been non-pecuniary, compensation might be hard to realize.97 The
perceived social or political prestige will probably be lost without compensation. In such an
environment, creating incentives for changing control may, in fact, be as important as trying to
regulate private benefits in the first place.98
There has in fact been some concern that the ownership and control structures prevailing in the
Nordic countries fail to facilitate change of control when incumbent owners no longer benefit the
enterprise.99 While there is nothing necessarily wrong with concentrated ownership, there is a
need to allow new potential owners to challenge the power of the existing controlling
shareholders. At the same time, there has been concern that the interests of different stakeholders
are not adequately recognized in connection with the takeovers that do occur and that the model
of shareholder supremacy that supports blockholder control also allows extraction of private
benefits and the transfer of wealth from other constituencies (mainly employees) in connection
with control transfers.100
D. OWNERSHIP, CONTROL AND THE CHANGING POLITICAL ECONOMY
The structure of corporate ownership and control is heavily entrenched in the institutional
environment. Even as industrial structures change and the political economy evolves, many
factors that support concentrated ownership and facilitate the concentration of control remain in
place.
Some of the elements underlying this environment have been evolving, however. First, with the
development of pension systems, for example, the interests of inside-labor have further shifted
towards supporting an increase in minority protection. Partially funded pension systems have
aligned labor interests with those of shareholders on a general level. For example, in Sweden a
comprehensive pension reform was initiated at the beginning of 2000 which increased the
holdings of pension funds in Swedish listed companies. This increase has led to a corresponding
growth of interest in corporate governance solutions that reflect the interests of minority
shareholders. Similar developments have occurred in Finland as well. Finland (like Sweden)
95 SeeMarina Martynova & Luc Renneboog, Mergers and Acquisitions in Europe (ECGI Finance Working Paper
114, 2006), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=880379.
96 See Jeremy Grant & Thomas Kirchmaier: Who Governs? Corporate Ownership and Control Structures in Europe
(SSRN Working Paper, June 7, 2004), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=555877.
97 Id. at 19.
98 Id. at 20.
99 Söderström et al. (2003), supra note 49 at 24.
100 Nachemson-Ekwall (2012), supra note 25, at 12 and 245-251.
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experienced a severe economic crisis in the early 1990s. Due to the recession and the high level
of unemployment, there were no rents available and labor had less entrenched interests in the
existing systems – hence there was less resistance to change precipitated by the emergence of
minority shareholder interests.101
Increases in foreign ownership have also been an important factor in introducing change to the
Nordic model of governance.102 With the increase of foreign ownership, the Nordic model of
corporate governance has been subjected to closer scrutiny and comparison with standards in
other types of economies. Foreign shareholders have voiced their own expectations with regard to
corporate governance based on the institutional environments they know best. A significant part
of foreign investment originates from the United States and the United Kingdom,103 and the
corporate governance models in those countries have become benchmarks against which the
Nordic model has been compared. However, in many cases incumbent owners have not
relinquished control of the corporations where they are shareholders, so foreign ownership may
not have affected control-related corporate governance as much as it has affected transparency or
the procedural aspects of corporate governance.
A further important development is the evolution of the EU as a parallel political framework.
Regulation is the outcome of political processes and can be heavily influenced by politically
dominant constituencies. However, the political bargaining power of key corporate constituencies
can differ at the national and EU levels. Ferrarini & Miller argue, for example, that national
takeover regulation can be expected to be more favorable to management and large shareholders
than EU-level regulation. In this respect the EU framework has added complexity to the political
dynamic of regulatory development.104 Moreover, interest groups in smaller member states, such
as the Nordic countries, may not always have been able to promote their interests at the level of
EU regulation. In fact, EU regulation has been a significant factor driving the development of
corporate governance and takeover regulation in the Nordic countries. However, the introduction
of EU-level takeover regulation has also raised concerns in the Nordic countries with respect to
the interests of large shareholders in particular. Interestingly, in the case of the Takeover
Directive, shareholder interest groups in the Nordic countries were successful in preventing the
introduction of mechanisms that would have diluted their control positions (while not addressing
control enhancing mechanisms used in larger member states, such as France).105
As these factors change, there may be increasing tension between traditional structures of
ownership and control and the evolving interests of corporate constituencies. Moreover, as a
result of changes in the political economy, the relative bargaining power of corporate
constituencies may also be shifting, facilitating regulatory change. In the next section, this study
101 Korkeamäki et al. (2007), supra note 17, at 9.
102 Lindgren (2011), supra note 18, at 56-57.
103 Pekka Ylä-Anttila, Jyrki Ali-Yrkkö & Martti Nyberg, Foreign Ownership in Finland: Boosting Firm
Performance and Changing Corporate Governance in THE INTERNATIONALIZATION OF ASSET OWNERSHIP IN
EUROPE 247, 247-251 (Harry Huizinga & Lars Jonung eds., 2005).
104 See Helen Callaghan, How Multilevel Governance Affects the Clash of Capitalisms (MPIfG Discussion Paper
08/5, 2008), available at http://www.mpifg.de/pu/mpifg_dp/dp08-5.pdf.
105 Ulf Bernitz, Mechanisms of Ownership Control and the Issue of Disproportionate Distribution of Power in
COMPANY LAWAND ECONOMIC PROTECTIONISM: NEW CHALLENGES FOR EUROPEAN INTEGRATION 191, 194-195
(Ulf Bernitz & Wolf-Georg Ringe eds., 2010).
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considers the relationship between ownership, control and corporate governance regulation and
examines how developments in the political economy can be expected to affect regulation.
III. CORPORATE GOVERNANCE IN THE NORDIC ENVIRONMENT
There is increasing tension between traditional structures of ownership and control and the
evolving interests of corporate constituencies as the corporate and broader institutional
environments develop. As a result of developments in the political economy, the relative
bargaining power of corporate constituencies is also affected, which in turn facilitates regulatory
change. In this section, this study considers the relationship between ownership, control and
corporate governance regulation in the Nordic context, and how developments in the political
economy can affect regulation. I first briefly outline theories on the political aspects of corporate
governance106 and then determine how Nordic corporate governance regulation reflects these
theories. One of the key aspects in this regard is the interaction between political and industrial
structures and the structure of corporate ownership.
A. CORPORATEGOVERNANCE IN THE POLITICAL ECONOMY
The shareholders, management and employees of a corporation are often identified as the key
constituencies in corporate governance. The relationship between shareholders and managers has
formed the basis for corporate theories based on agency problems related to the separation of
ownership and control. Based, as it is, solely on an analysis of the agency relationship, the focus
of corporate governance has been different ways of decreasing agency costs and better aligning
the interests of the agents and their principals. These relationships, it has been suggested, are
contractual in nature. Nevertheless, it is often recognized that the implicit contracts in the “nexus
of contracts” theory are incomplete at best and will need renegotiating from time to time.
Different corporate constituencies will seek to renegotiate contracts as their bargaining power
increases. Bargaining is likely to occur when constituencies have made firm-specific investments
and are committed with significant sunk costs. In this situation it is tempting for other
constituencies to take advantage of any bargaining power they may have. Ultimately, then,
corporate governance can be seen as a system of bargaining.107
Changes in bargaining power will reflect overall changes in the political economy. Corporate
constituencies are also interest groups that can use political means to further their own interests.
Regulation can be seen as the outcome of the interaction between political and market structures,
reflecting the impact of interested market participants and the political environment.108 Changes
in regulation can be seen to reflect changes in the relative bargaining power of these
constituencies. In other words, the relationship between shareholders and managers will be
renegotiated, in part, through political and regulatory intervention, depending on how the relative
political bargaining power of these constituencies evolves. In this respect, corporate law and
106 See Perotti & von Thadden (2004), supra note 14; see also Gourevitch & Shinn (2005), supra note 12, at 8.
107 Peter Nobel, Stakeholders and the legal Theory of the Corporation, in PERSPECTIVES IN COMPANY LAW AND
FINANCIAL REGULATION 165, 176 - 179 (Michel Tison, Hans de Wulf, Christoph van der Elst & Reinhard Steennot,
eds., 2009).
108 See Stigler (1971), supra note 10, Peltzman (1976), supra note 10, Roe (2000), supra note 10 and Roe (2003),
supra note 10.
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corporate governance regulation can be expected to reflect the institutional power of dominant
corporate constituencies. 109
Corporations and the way they are governed are of considerable economic importance. Corporate
governance has a significant effect on the preconditions for the creation of wealth and economic
growth, as well as on the distribution of cash flows and profits from corporate enterprise. It is but
natural that corporate governance should have considerable political implications, as key
corporate constituencies agree and renegotiate their relationships through the political framework.
For example, in markets with a prevalence of concentrated ownership, corporate governance
regulation can be expected to favor blockholders. In markets with dispersed ownership, where
shareholders face coordination problems, corporate governance can be expected to favor
management. In this regard, labor is also a significant corporate constituency, often with
considerable political clout. In basic agency analysis, labor is sometimes excluded as an external
constituency, as contracts between the company and labor are assumed to be complete. 110
However, these contracts are often renegotiated on the basis of the relative bargaining power of
unions. For example, if the role of labor increases significantly in the production chain, this can
be expected to affect corporate governance solutions. It has been argued that the strong position
of labor has had a significant effect among EU countries, with Germany cited as a prime
example.111 Creditors are another external constituency, along with employees, that also has
significant interests in corporate governance that can be pursued through policy and regulation. In
particular, in economies with a financial system dominated by financial intermediaries, such as
banks, the role of external creditors in corporate governance has been significant.
In the vast majority of cases, political economies are sufficiently complex to avoid domination by
single political interests. In other words, a single constituency is rarely in the position to dictate
policy. Gourevitch & Shinn have assessed the potential for political coalitions between different
key corporate constituencies.112 Different constituencies can seek to bargain with each other, or if
interests are insufficiently uniform within a group, their political influence can be divided.
Gourevitch & Shinn identified the key interests of each constituency and assessed to what extent
and in which circumstances two constituencies might form a political coalition in terms of
corporate governance regulation. 113 They identified three models for political conflicts and
coalition preferences in different types of economies. First, the class conflict model posits
shareholders (“owners of capital”) in conflict with employees (“workers”) with labor power. In
this model, management is expected to form a coalition with shareholders.114 If investors are
politically dominant, this model will lead to strong minority protection and dispersed ownership.
However, in economies where employees are dominant, there will be pressure on companies to
provide higher salaries and job security at the cost of maximizing profits. As proposed by Roe,
strong labor calls for a controlling shareholder with whom it can negotiate, giving concentrated
ownership structures an overall relative advantage in that economy.
109 John Armour, Henry Hansmann & Reinier Kraakman, What is Corporate Law? in Kraakman et al. (2009), supra
note 11, at 32.
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Second, in the sectoral cleavage model, constituents with asset-specific investments form
political coalitions to protect their investment. In this model, employees and managers cooperate
to protect their interests in the company and in the industry in general. An example of this model
is the “Corporatist Compromise,” 115 where managers and employees cooperate to promote
stability, the size of the corporation and insiders’ claims on corporate income.116 Here, the
regulatory framework is expected to promote stability, with rules favorable to block-holders and
strong employee protection. Minority shareholder protection will not be strong.
The third model sees shareholders and employees combining their interests to constrain
managerial agency costs. Employees support shareholders with regard to corporate power but are
compensated through job security. Alternatively, employees can have interests aligned with
shareholders in the form of pension fund investments. The preferences of labor will be affected
by how the pension system is structured. For example, the more social security and pensions are
funded on a pay-as-you-go basis, the less of a connection is perceived between corporate
governance and future benefit streams. The more pensions are based on fully funded models and
the more benefits are linked to investment returns, the greater the connection to corporate
governance.117
In what follows, I will turn to analyzing Nordic corporate governance in the light of dominant
political coalitions. On a general level, those Nordic countries with concentrated ownership
display evidence of political coalitions between managers and workers on one side and
controlling shareholders on the other.118 The outcome has been, among others, a broad corporatist
agreement on determining wage levels and terms of employment. However, it has been argued
that in exchange for job security, blockholders have been allowed considerable latitude with
respect to corporate governance in general, and with respect to corporate control in particular. We
shall seek to establish the extent to which this is the case and see how coalitions are reflected in
the Nordic model of corporate governance regulation.
B. THE CORPORATION IN A NORDIC CONTEXT
Generalizations tend to be inaccurate, and the extent to which there really is a common Nordic
model of corporate governance can well be questioned. Even if there are similarities between the
corporate laws of the Nordic countries, it seems that differences remain in these countries’
political economies that affect the dynamics of corporate governance. Institutional investors, for
example, have been more vocal in corporate governance matters in Sweden than in other Nordic
countries, resulting, in practice, in comprehensive self-regulation and stringent requirements on
the equal treatment of shareholders – phenomena that are not as pronounced in the other Nordic
economies. Nevertheless, academics in the Nordic region do identify certain common
characteristics in the Nordic model that will be briefly discussed below.119 First, however, this
section outlines the basic legal structure of the corporation in the Nordic context to establish the
115 Gourevitch & Shinn (2005), supra note 13, at 64-65.
116 SeeMarco Pagano & Paolo Volpin, The Political Economy of Corporate Governance (Centre for Economic
Policy Research Discussion Paper No. 2682, 2001), available at http://www.csef.it/pagano/AER-2005.pdf.
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premises for how corporate governance can affect the relative position of different corporate
constituencies.
1. Legal Structures
The corporation is a legally and socially defined platform for organizing the conduct of economic
activity. The type of corporation portrayed in this study has largely evolved as a product of
financial markets to organize the financing of economic activity in a cost-efficient and reliable
way. Certain specified assets and liabilities are separated for the purposes of producing economic
activity that generates cash flows that are distributed to corporate constituents according to
applicable contractual and regulatory arrangements.
The structure and regulation of business corporations is based on laws and regulations and varies
from country to country, but in an international and comparative context, certain common
characteristics given to corporations in the laws of most jurisdictions have been identified in the
legal literature.120 First, corporations have generally been given independent legal personality.
The corporation is given legal status as an independent contracting party with distinct assets and
liabilities. Second, the corporation as a separate entity from its shareholders or officers assumes
liability for its obligations and these are, as a rule, not passed on. Third, shares in corporations are
transferable, so that shareholding is not linked to a specific person or party, as in connection with
membership in associations or cooperatives, for example. Fourth, the management of
corporations is delegated from shareholders to a board of directors, who act separately from the
operational management. Fifth, and finally, corporations are characterized by investor ownership,
meaning that shareholders who have invested in a company have the right to residual cash flows
from its operations and also have the right to control the corporation – within the limits of the
obligations undertaken by that corporation.
The independent legal personality of the corporation, the partitioning of its assets and the lock-in
of injected capital form the core of what a company is, and they may be an important aspect of its
institutional success.121 While shareholders enjoy limited liability, it is equally important that the
assets of the corporation are protected from shareholders’ creditors and that shareholders are
prevented from withdrawing their share of the corporate assets at will. The lock-in serves to
provide comfort for creditors and other parties dealing with the corporation. In the Nordic
countries, creditor protection has been a particularly important factor, given the traditional
dominance of banks in the financial markets (Until recently, for example, Nordic company laws
have typically maintained the nominal value of shares and liquidity-driven bankruptcy provisions
in such a way that a decrease in a company’s own capital would force the company into
insolvency proceedings). Corporate legal personality also has a strong tradition in the Nordic
countries, with little precedent for “piercing the corporate veil.”
The transferability of shares is another basic characteristic of a corporation, underscoring the
separation of the corporation from its owners. Ownership is not linked to the identity of the
owners, and the corporation’s business can continue without interruption despite changes in
120 Armour, Hansmann & Kraakman in Kraakman et. al., supra note 109, at 5-16.
121 See Henry Hansmann, Reinier Kraakman & Richard Squire, Law and the Rise of the Firm, 119 HARVARD L.R.
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ultimate ownership. It is important to emphasize, in fact, that while shareholders are often
referred to as the owners of a corporation, what they actually “own” are only the shares issued by
the corporation, which give them certain administrative and cash flow rights based on company
law and the articles of association of the company. These rights are balanced, based in part on
law, with the interests of other constituencies. The framework by which this balance is regulated
is the central focus area of corporate governance. While the other characteristics of corporations
are fairly similar around the world, the allocation of corporate control and authority can be
organized in a variety of ways, reflecting the political characteristics of corporate governance. 122
The lock-in of capital and restrictions on shareholder access to corporate assets provide the basis
for the potential reallocation of wealth through corporate governance and for the effects of
regulatory and political intervention. The legal structure of the corporation includes features that
allow for a redistribution of wealth among corporate constituencies based on their political
influence. The outcome of such bargaining will depend on the relevant political economy.
Corporate constituencies can take advantage of the political system to renegotiate the terms of
how corporate assets are allocated between corporate constituencies and the extent of shareholder
rights, for example. The distribution of wealth can be affected, inter alia, by the distribution of
control rights in the company. Thus, the corporate governance structure applicable to the
company is of considerable importance with respect to the interests of the different constituencies.
Moreover, these interests can be pursued by other political means. Employee regulation and
different types of social regulation applied to corporations are obvious examples.
The extent to which a specific structure of corporate governance reflects shareholder primacy or
supports the interests of other stakeholders will depend on political bargaining. In some
economies shareholder supremacy in corporate governance is a given, while in others labor
interests, or those of creditors, for example, play an important role. There is no guarantee that the
way these interests are balanced is optimal or efficient within the institutional environment, as
has been discussed. The effects of path dependence and entrenchment of incumbent interests
suggests that these structures may easily come to favor specific interest groups at the cost of
efficiency.
It has been argued that the corporate governance solutions adopted in the Nordic countries
somehow reflect a “particularly effective middle way”123 between Anglo-Saxon shareholder-
oriented systems and traditional German stakeholder-oriented systems in favoring shareholder
supremacy while providing protection for other stakeholders, including minority shareholders,
creditors and employees.124 The study shall now turn to a brief overview of corporate governance
in the Nordic countries and consider whether in fact it reflects a “middle way” and how such a
system has come about.
2. Elements of Corporate Governance in the Nordic Countries
Below, the study will briefly consider some of the central elements of corporate governance in
the Nordic countries based on formal corporate governance structures. The study will then
consider how these structures reflect the political aspects of corporate ownership, control and
122 Barker (2010), supra note 10, at 3.
123 Hansen (2003), supra note 4, at 1.
124 Id.
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corporate governance. The study will explore how formal structures reflect the influence of
controlling shareholders, what the position of management is and how employees can participate
in governance and how their interests are taken into account. With regard to corporate
governance, key characteristics include the formal position of shareholders and how shareholders
can use their authority, the relationship between majority and minority shareholders, the role and
power of boards of directors, other control mechanisms applied to corporate monitoring as well
as transparency.
Both Sweden and Finland have somewhat recently implemented reforms of corporate law –
Sweden in 2005 and Finland in 2006.125 The new laws were introduced following the decline of
traditional models of corporate finance and corporate ownership and reflect an interest in
modernizing corporate law and increasing investor protection and the interests of minority
shareholders. 126 The corporate governance models one might expect to see, then, would
strengthen shareholder primacy and address block-holding related concerns, particularly as the
corporate landscape is still somewhat dominated by concentrated ownership. Below, this study
will discuss from a qualitative perspective the main mechanisms identified in the indices referred
to above and seek to establish how the Nordic model fares.
Shareholders
The Nordic model of corporate governance has been described as hierarchical, with the general
meeting of shareholders having supreme authority over other corporate bodies.127 The general
meeting has the authority to take key decisions regarding the company, from approving annual
financial statements to decisions regarding key corporate transactions, such as mergers, and
electing and dismissing the board of directors. For example, under Nordic corporate laws, the
general meeting of shareholders always has the right to elect the majority of the board of
directors. Other decisions taken by the general meeting include changing the articles of
association, issuance of shares (or authorizing the board to issue shares), acquisition of the
company’s own shares and liquidation of the company.
Through election and dismissal rights, in particular, the general meeting of shareholders can be
seen to exercise control over other corporate bodies even if the general meeting is not generally
intended to have executive powers. It is also worth noting that staggered boards are typically not
allowed under Nordic company laws. Thus, a general meeting is usually able to dismiss the board
at any time – emphasizing the control of shareholders over management and the board of
directors. The balance of power differs significantly from the more director-centric system in the
United States, for example.
Decisions at shareholders’ meetings are generally taken with a simple majority vote. Cumulative
voting or similar election systems are typically not applied. Decisions on significant corporate
transactions, such as mergers or changes of articles of association, typically require a minimum
125 Ny aktiebolagslag, Regeringens Proposition [New Companies Act, Government Bill] 2004/05:85, at 196-200, and
Hallituksen esitys Eduskunnalle uudeksi osakeyhtiölainsäädännöksi [Government Bill for New Company Legislation]
109/2005, at 16-17.
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41-42 (Erkki J. Hollo ed., 2011).
127 Hansen (2003), supra note 4, at 74.
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of two thirds of the votes given and the shares represented at the meeting. It should be pointed
out, in particular, that where companies have different classes of shares, major corporate
transactions must typically be approved by a qualified majority of the shares and votes in each
class.
It should also be noted that quorum requirements for shareholder meetings are unusual, and for
decisions to be passed it is generally sufficient that the relevant majorities of the shares present
support the decision in question. However, in cases pertaining to a change of rights related to
shares, company law typically also requires the holders of the affected shares to support the
decision.
Minority Shareholder Protection
The principle of equal treatment is a central element in Nordic company law. Company law in
Finland and Sweden, for example, contains explicit provisions on the requirement that no
decisions can be taken by corporate bodies (the general meeting or the board) that favor a
shareholder or a third party at the expense of the company or the other shareholders.128 It is also
the case that board members, pursuant to company law, can be directly liable to shareholders for
decisions that would unduly disadvantage the minority. 129 The principle can have practical
implications with regard to the types of corporate transactions companies can pursue.
Decisions regarding decisive corporate transactions require qualified majority support. Thus,
groups of minority shareholders can veto the decisions of a controlling majority with respect to
changes of articles of association, or mergers and directed share offerings. In connection with
certain transactions, minority shareholders may also have the right to require that their shares be
redeemed at fair value. This is the case in mergers and demergers in Finnish companies, for
example.
In the Nordic countries, any shareholder can generally submit a proposal to a general meeting of
shareholders and can raise counterproposals to those made by the board. Shareholders have the
right to ask questions at the general meeting and the management has a statutory obligation to
provide answers (within certain parameters so as not to divulge trade secrets or other sensitive
information). In Finland and Sweden, shareholders with an aggregate of 10 percent of the shares
in a company can require the convening of a general meeting of shareholders or a special audit
carried out by an auditor for a specific purpose.130 Moreover, in Finland and Sweden shareholders
with a 10 percent holding can require a dividend payment of half of the profits available for
distribution from the last financial period.131 In this regard, again, the system of governance
128 CLAS BERGSTRÖM &PER SAMUELSSON, AKTIEBOLAGETS GRUNDPROBLEM [BASIC PROBLEMS OF THE STOCK
COMPANY] 168-174 (4th ed. 2013); 1 JUHANI KYLÄKALLIO, OLLI IIROLA &KALLE KYLÄKALLIO, OSAKEYHTIÖ [THE
STOCK COMPANY] 537-542 (5th ed. 2012); Hansen (2003), supra note 4, at 104-105.
129 ROLF DOTEVALL, BOLAGSLEDNINGENS SKADESTÅNDSANSVAR [THE LIABILITY OF CORPORATE MANAGEMENT] 231
(2nd ed. 2008), Kyläkallio, Iirola & Kyläkallio, supra note 138, at 566-573, Hansen (2003), supra note 4, at 118.
130 Aktiebolagslagen [Swedish Companies Act] 7:13 and 10:21-23, and Osakeyhtiölaki [Finnish Companies Act] 5:4
and 7:7.
131 Swedish Companies Act 18:11 and Finnish Companies Act 13:7.
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differs markedly from the United States, where it has been unusual for shareholder initiatives to
be favored in corporate governance.132
The Board of Directors and Management
The central administrative company organ is the board of directors, which has the overall
authority and responsibility to arrange the management of the company. In many respects, the
board retains executive powers and can also direct the executive management. The importance of
the fiduciary duties of the board to the shareholders as a collective has increased over the past
decade. In Finland, for example, this has been explicitly stated in preparatory works with respect
to change of control situations. 133 Furthermore, as shareholders have the right to elect the
majority of the board, it can generally be deemed an organ representing the interests of the
shareholders. When a company has a controlling shareholder, the accountability of the board can
be very direct.134
Boards of directors in listed companies generally consist solely of non-executive directors, with
the occasional exception of a chief executive officer, or CEO, who also serves as a board member.
Codes of corporate governance for listed companies also provide additional requirements for
board members. Requirements have been introduced with respect to the independence of
company board members and large shareholders. In Finland, for example, more than half the
board members of a listed company must be independent of the company (i.e., not having been
recently employed by the company) and two of these independent members must also be
independent of large shareholders. Similar rules apply in the other Nordic countries.135
The board is separated from the day to day management of the company but is responsible for
ensuring that sufficient administrative systems are in place and for monitoring corporate
performance vis-a-vis the strategies it has confirmed. Governance principles, policies and risk
management are issues that boards typically manage, as well as monitoring periodic reporting
and approving interim and annual financial statements. Large corporate projects are also typically
in the domain of the board.136
Board structures in the Nordic countries generally fall into the single-tier model of governance,
even if corporate laws in these countries formally recognize different management layers.137 The
board is clearly superior to the management and CEO in administrative terms, with the right to
appoint and dismiss the CEO. In Finland, a two-tier model of governance with a supervisory
board is also possible. However, supervisory boards are increasingly rare and usually have
132 See Lucian A. Bebchuk, The Case for Increasing Shareholder Power, 118 HARV. L. REV. 833 (2005).
133 Government Bill for New Company Legislation 109/2005, at 41.
134 See Bergström & Samuelsson (2012), supra note 128, at 99.
135 Securities Markets Association, Suomen listayhtiöiden hallinnointikoodi [Finnish Corporate Governance Code],
Recommendations 14 and 15 (2010); see also Danish Corporate Governance Committee, Finnish Securities Market
Association, Icelandic Committee on Corporate Governance, Norwegian Corporate Governance Board, Swedish
Corporate Governance Board, Corporate Governance in the Nordic Countries (2009).
136 Bergström & Samuelsson (2012), supra note 128, at 95-97; Kyläkallio, Iirola & Kyläkallio (2012), supra note
128, at 557-558; Hansen (2003), supra note 4, at 116-118.
137 See Jesper Lau Hansen, The Nordic Corporate Governance Model – A European Model? in Tison, de Wulf, van
der Elst & Steennot, eds. (2009), supra note 107.
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limited authority. Generally, this structure emphasizes the primacy of shareholders over other
stakeholders with respect to corporate control.
The day to day administration of the company is delegated to employed management. Typically,
a management team works under the supervision of the CEO, who reports to the board and takes
directions from it. It should be noted that management still has formal status in company law to a
limited extent, though in most Nordic countries management as a formal company organ is
limited to the CEO only. 138 In their analysis of corporate power in Sweden, Henrekson &
Jakobson argue that management has a relatively weak position in relation to shareholders. In
reality the CEO must have the backing of large shareholders in order to remain in his or her
position.
Employees
The Nordic countries have also adopted laws on allowing employees the right to nominate
representatives to the board (or management committees). The rules vary from country to country,
with some allowing employees actual board representation (Denmark and Sweden), others
observer status (Norway) and others still participation in other organs than the board (Finland).139
In Denmark, Norway and Sweden employees in larger companies have the right to nominate their
representatives to the board. Pursuant to Swedish law, for example, employees have the right to
nominate two board members in companies with over 25 employees and three representatives if
the company has an annual average of at least 1,000 employees.140 The number of employee-
nominated board members must not to exceed that of the other members, however. In Norway,
the number of employee-elected members is set at half of those elected by shareholders.
Consequently employee representatives have a minority position and cannot directly affect the
outcome of board decisions. In fact, a recent study finds evidence that shareholders seek to
minimize the number of employee-elected board members.141 In Finland, employees have no
statutory right to nominate representatives to the company’s board of directors. However,
employees do have the right to nominate representatives to management groups where matters
related to employee issues are discussed. 142 Often companies ensure they are in technical
compliance with the requirement by having two different management boards, for example, one
of which is tailored to meet these legal requirements.
Employee legislation can also be seen as an integral part of balancing the interests between
corporate constituencies, even if employee legislation is seldom considered directly related to
corporate governance. However, Nordic countries have adopted regulation on cooperation
measures that must be undertaken between management and employees. Generally, larger
companies must have works councils or similar organizations, where matters pertaining to the
company’s business and financial condition are discussed on an on-going basis. Moreover, in
138 Id.
139 Hansen (2003), supra note 4, at 76.
140 Lag om styrelserepresentation för de privatanställda [Board Representation Act] 1987:1245.
141 Steen Thomsen, Caspar Rose & Dorte Kronborg, Employee Representation and Board Size in the Nordic
Countries (DBJ Discussion Paper Series 1301, 2013), available at
http://www.dbj.jp/ricf/pdf/research/DBJ_DP_1301.pdf.
142 Laki henkilöstön edustuksesta yritysten hallinnossa [Act on Employee Representation on Company
Administration] 1990/725.
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connection with corporate transactions that can affect employment in the company, there are
usually specific requirements for negotiations and cooperation processes that must be followed
prior to any decisions on the matter.143
Other Monitoring Mechanisms
Auditors also perform a monitoring function on behalf of shareholders in the Nordic countries.
For example, statutory auditors are appointed by the general meeting rather than the board and
report back to the shareholders. Auditors generally provide an assessment and recommendation to
the annual general meeting on whether the financial statements and board proposals regarding
profit or loss can be adopted. In Finland and Sweden the activities of the board and management
are also subject to an auditors’ review.
The four Nordic countries have all adopted corporate governance codes for listed companies in
line with other EU jurisdictions. The codes set out procedures for governance and transparency
beyond the requirements of national company law. These codes typically include provisions on
the organization of board work, board committees and the policies that companies should draw
up, as well as procedures and guidance for shareholder participation in general meetings. The
codes also provide requirements on the independence of board members and board committees.
Finally, the codes provide requirements for increased transparency with regard to matters to be
dealt with at general meetings, remuneration issues, and governance principles. The
establishment of corporate governance codes is generally based on self-regulation rather than
statutory provisions.
C. THE POLITICAL ASPECTS OF THE NORDICMODEL OF GOVERNANCE
Having first outlined theories emphasizing the political aspects of corporate governance
regulation and having then described its formal aspects, I will now examine how the Nordic
model of corporate governance reflects these assumptions – i.e., whether the political coalitions
that can be established in the Nordics coincide with the form of ownership and control and
related regulation that the theories assume.
With the prevalence of concentrated ownership and strong labor movements in the Nordics,
political coalitions could be expected to form between controlling shareholders and labor. Thus,
the political approach to corporate governance described above suggests that Nordic corporate
governance should favor shareholder primacy and blockholder control. Unsurprisingly then,
Nordic corporate governance models are based on shareholder primacy. The system ensures
controlling shareholders’ ability to maintain their control rights in corporations. As discussed
above, the general meeting of shareholders is deemed to have considerable influence over
corporate affairs in Nordic company law in relation to the role of the board. 144 Hansen
emphasizes the ability of the general meeting (and thus the controlling shareholder) to appoint
and dismiss the board of directors and the absence of staggered board provisions, for example.
Moreover, it should be noted that the kind of restrictions on shareholder collusion in connection
143 See Örjan Edström, Involvement of Employees in Private Enterprises in Four Nordic Countries, 43
SCANDINAVIAN STUDIES IN LAW 159 (2002).
144 Hansen (2003), supra note 4, at 73-75; Hansen (2009), supra note 149, at 161.
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with general meetings applied in the United States and the United Kingdom are not generally
present in the Nordic countries.145
It should also be noted that in Sweden, in particular, shareholders typically establish nomination
committees (or nomination boards) consisting of representatives of the largest shareholders to
make proposals for new board members to the annual general meeting. In many other
jurisdictions, nomination committees are maintained within the board structure. The Swedish
practice is another reflection of the strong position and influence of both controlling and
institutional shareholders. The acceptance and prevalence of different types of control-enhancing
mechanisms also demonstrates how regulation can be said to particularly support block holders in
the Nordic countries.
As discussed earlier, in an environment with concentrated ownership and strong labor interests,
minority protection mechanisms could be expected to be generally weak. Nevertheless, it is often
argued that Nordic company law provides a high level of protection for minority shareholders.146
The minority protection mechanisms allow minority shareholders to voice their concerns at the
general meeting, and they provide for a certain level of information that must be made available.
Nonetheless, minority shareholders have very few effective control rights in relation to
controlling shareholders. A controlling shareholder can generally control corporate decision-
making and is only restricted with respect to situations where there is a risk of the economic
interests of minority shareholders being abused. In addition, minority shareholders naturally face
coordination problems with respect to the use of their limited governance rights.
Legal standards, such as the equal treatment principle, are based on ex-post enforcement by
actions initiated by aggrieved parties. As a regulatory strategy, such tools are problematic with
respect to large, diverse interest groups with a high threshold for coordinating their activities.147
With respect to enforcing standards or claiming for damages, minority shareholders must turn to
the courts and bear the full risk of the costs in the event of losing the case, while expecting only
limited benefits from a successful claim. Even if legal costs are relatively low in the Nordic
countries, the losing party typically pays the legal fees of the other party as well. Moreover, class
actions or punitive damages are not generally available for these types of situations. Even if the
equal treatment principle and other standards of company law are important and do have an effect
on corporate activities in the Nordic region, they should not be overemphasized in the context of
corporate governance for the abovementioned reasons.
There are nevertheless limited incentives for large shareholders to seek to directly extract private
benefits of control at the cost of minority shareholders. Maintaining concentrated ownership is
relatively cheap in the Nordic countries, and controlling shareholders are compensated for their
holdings in part through the tax system.148 First, control-enhancing mechanisms can be used to
leverage control at low levels of equity ownership. Thus, maintaining control does not tie up as
much capital, thus decreasing the need to extract private benefits. Second, the pecking order of
financing is further enforced by the favorable tax treatment of corporate finance based on
145 See Bebchuk (2005), supra note 132.
146 Bergström & Samuelsson (2012), supra note 128, at 193; Hansen (2009), supra note 137, at 155 and 161.
147 Armour, Hansmann & Kraakman, supra note 11, at 52.
148 Högfeldt (2005), supra note 30, at 555.
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retained earnings and debt. Consequently, controlling shareholders are often able to finance the
operations and investments of the companies they control without further equity investments.
Third, distributing dividends to controlling shareholders using control enhancing mechanisms,
such as pyramids, are typically tax-efficient. 149 As a result, controlling shareholders receive
relative benefits from large holdings through the institutional environment, and there is no direct
need to extract significant private benefits from the minority.
Labor has traditionally formed an important political force in the Nordic countries. Thus, it would
be reasonable to expect labor interests to be represented in company law and corporate
governance. With the political power that labor has wielded, employee representatives might well
hold key positions in corporate decision-making, as has been the situation in Germany. However,
as discussed above, there seems to have developed a balance wherein corporate control has been
allocated to (controlling) shareholders against fairly high levels of job protection in the Nordic
countries. This arrangement has gained the political support of both right-leaning and left-leaning
governments. Högfeldt suggests that the arrangement is based on an implicit undertaking by the
incumbent controlling shareholders to maintain domestic corporate activity and investments.150
While this undertaking has been undermined by globalization, among others, employee interests
have also shifted towards greater minority protection rather than towards requiring more of a
voice in corporate governance.
As was previously discussed, employees have generally enjoyed high levels of job protection in
the Nordic countries. In Sweden, for example, the rule on termination for industrial and
commercial reasons provides that employees must be let go on a last in, first out principle, thus
protecting more experienced “inside” labor. The impracticality of the rule guarantees that in
most cases termination is agreed amicably between the employer and employee representatives,
providing for higher levels of employee compensation. High levels of job protection combined
with satisfactory social programs and unemployment benefits for insider labor have also
decreased pressure for labor to acquire more of a voice in corporate governance.
D. THE EVOLVING POLITICAL ECONOMY AND CORPORATE GOVERNANCE IN THE NORDIC
COUNTRIES
Above, I discussed how models of Nordic corporate governance reflect the structure of corporate
ownership and dominant political coalitions. However, the traditional Nordic model of corporate
governance has evolved significantly over the past decades. The dominance enjoyed by
incumbent shareholders in previous decades has decreased as markets have become more
international. Globalization and technological innovation have also affected industrial structures.
From a focus on raw-material-based industries and machinery, the Nordic countries now also
have large technology, media and service industries. These developments have affected corporate
ownership and corporate governance. Despite the path dependence of regulation, one might
expect to see these developments reflected in recent corporate governance initiatives. Some of the
key factors contributing to this development are discussed briefly below, followed by some
conclusions on possible current trends in Nordic corporate governance.
149 Id.
150 Id. at 554.
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1. Pension Systems and Corporate Governance
Pension systems have a significant influence on corporate governance.151 Many pension systems
rely on different types of contribution schemes. A large part of pensions may be unfunded, with
benefits paid directly from contributions. However, systems increasingly include buffer funds
based on capital market investments. Finally, individual pension plans are typically fully funded
programs. To the extent that pension systems rely on income from capital markets, the interests
of pension beneficiaries become aligned with those of investors. As pension beneficiaries
represent large and influential constituencies, their interests are politically significant. This can be
reflected in regulatory initiatives regarding corporate governance.
There has been an increasing focus on the relationship between pension systems and shareholder
primacy in corporate governance.152 As pension plans shift from depending primarily on an
employer’s funding ability towards capital-markets-based funding, shareholder interests have
become more important for large groups in society. As a result, shareholder interests are of
increasing importance relative to labor-oriented policies.
Sweden
In Sweden a comprehensive pension reform was initiated in 2000 which increased the holdings of
pension funds in Swedish listed companies. With this development comes an increasing interest
in corporate governance solutions that reflect the interests of minority shareholders.153 As a result
of the reform, a pension scheme based on a prefunded, defined benefit system was changed to a
partially funded, notionally defined contribution scheme. Most pension contributions are directed
to “pay-as-you-go,” notionally defined contribution accounts, but some are directed to private
investment reserve funds,154 with large public pension funds holding the most assets (referred to
as AP-fonderna).
Giannetti & Laeven view the Swedish pension reform as an exogenous shock to the structure of
corporate ownership and corporate governance in Sweden.155 The reallocation of assets and the
new inflow of funds into public and private pension funds allowed the authors to analyze how
changes in the structure of institutional ownership affect company performance.156 They found
that the effect on company value varies according to the characteristics and industrial structure of
pension funds. As funds issuing from business groups can be used to entrench corporate control,
their increased holdings do not contribute to corporate value. However, investments by large
public or independent pension funds do have a correlation with increased value.157
151 See Gourevitch & Shinn (2005), supra note 13, at 210-228.
152 SeeMartin Gelter, The Pension System and the Rise of Shareholder Primacy (Fordham University School of Law
Working Paper Series, 2012) available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2079607.
153 SeeMariassunta Giannetti & Luc Laeven, Pension Reform, Ownership Structure, and Corporate Governance:
Evidence From a Natural Experiment, 22 THE REVIEW OF FINANCIAL STUDIES 4091 (2009).
154 Edward Palmer, Swedish Pension Reform, How Did It Evolve, and What Does It Mean for the Future? in SOCIAL
SECURITY PENSION REFORM IN EUROPE 171 (Martin Feldstein & Horst Siebert, Eds., 2002).
155 See Giannetti & Laeven, supra note 153.
156 Id. at 4092.
157 Id. at 4112.
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Pension funds have become active participants in the Swedish market. With significant holdings
and generally long-term investment strategies, they are likely to prefer contributing to corporate
governance instead of selling their holdings if dissatisfied with a company’s performance.158 The
increased focus of institutional investors on corporate governance can enhance scrutiny of
controlling shareholders, thus decreasing private benefits of control. However, it is also possible
for controlling shareholders to attempt to resist monitoring and take steps to ensure continued
control. In fact, in their study Giannetti & Laeven observed that control premiums had risen in
certain cases where public pension funds had increased their positions, which suggests that
ownership concentration has increased. The authors found that company-controlled pension funds,
for example, had increased their holdings as a reaction to an increase in the stake of public
pension funds, which has allowed incumbent owners to entrench their control positions.159
With respect to corporate governance, pension funds can function as monitors of controlling
shareholders with significant political authority. The value of pension fund investments is of
course of some importance to the beneficiaries and can align their interests with those of other
institutional and minority investors with respect to corporate governance.160 If needed, pension
funds have the potential to mobilize political support for regulatory intervention to increase
minority protection with greater ease than other investors without the same political backing.
While pension funds may allow controlling shareholders to retain operational control, as the
institutional framework in Sweden supports a block-holding system, 161 there is likely to be
considerable pressure on controlling shareholders to extract only very limited private benefits of
control. If control still has value to the incumbent owners, they may agree to higher minority
protection mechanisms as long as control is not challenged.
Finland
The pension system in Finland has also undergone significant developments during the past two
decades. The system is partially funded, with the majority of funding still based on pay-as-you-go
contributions.162 The pension system is statutory and closely regulated but managed by private
pension insurance companies. Previously, a significant feature of the pension system was the
availability of pension funds to corporations as loans. The developments of the past decades have
resulted in a stronger emphasis on equity investments and international diversification – though
pension funds still have abnormally large exposure to Finnish equities.163 This is due, so it is
suggested, to the perceived dual role of pension funds, which is not only to secure pension
income but also to contribute to the stability of the Finnish economy. Due to the small size of the
domestic market, the liquidity of these assets is relatively poor. It has also been suggested that
158 Id. at 4099.
159 Id. at 4125.
160 Gourevitch & Shinn (2005), supra note 13, at 145-146 and 213-228.
161 Henrekson & Jakobsson (2012), supra note 38.
162 Jukka Lassila & Tarmo Valkonen, Prefunding in a Defined Benefit Pension System: The Finnish Case, in SOCIAL
SECURITY PENSION REFORM IN EUROPE 263, 263 (Martin Feldstein & Horst Siebert, eds., 2002).
163 See Keith Ambachtsheer, The Pension System in Finland: Institutional Structure and Governance (Evaluation of




Finnish equities are overvalued as a result of pension funds’ disproportionate investment in
Finland.
In relation to size of the market, the holdings of Finnish pension insurance institutions in Finnish
listed companies are considerable. With respect to corporate governance, Finnish pension
institutions have taken active roles in both on-going governance (board nomination processes and
annual general meetings) and corporate transactions. Due to their large size, pension insurance
companies are often involved in the preparatory phase of significant transactions. However, the
dynamic of these relationships may be different from that in Sweden, where pension funds are
often essentially public entities. In Finland corporations are in fact clients of Finnish pension
insurance companies, and it has been suggested that Finnish pension insurance companies are
typically aligned with management interests. In fact, the governing bodies of pension insurance
companies include employer and union representatives based on statute. Pension insurance
companies have, for example, even prevented takeover bids at premiums or voiced their support
for management in proposed corporate coups.164 It has been suggested that the relationships
between pension insurance companies and corporations are not always at arm’s length.165 This
implies that the increased equity stakes of pension insurance companies and their participation in
corporate governance may not have the same effects as in Sweden – i.e. they may not have such a
clear agenda to strengthen the interests of minority shareholders.
2. Globalization and Increasing Product Market Competition
Increases in foreign ownership have had crucial effect on corporate governance in the Nordic
countries over the past decades. In Sweden, foreign ownership has increased from eight percent
in the mid-1980s to over 40 percent in 2012.166 In Finland, foreign share ownership was 36.6
percent in 1996 and over 60 percent in 2007,167 although it had decreased to just over 41 percent
by the end of 2012. 168Finnish statistics for this period are somewhat skewed, however, due to the
disproportionate weight of a single company, Nokia Corporation.
With the increase in foreign ownership, the Nordic model of corporate governance has come
under scrutiny, leading to its comparison with standards in other types of economies. As a large
part of foreign investment originates from the United States and the United Kingdom, the
corporate governance models in these countries have of course become benchmarks against
which the Nordic model has been compared. Incumbent controlling shareholders can be expected
to resist attempts to restrict their control rights through corporate governance initiatives of any
kind. However, they could be expected accept a higher level of transparency with regard to
corporate governance matters, including related party transactions. Increased transparency does
164 Ville-Pekka Sorsa & Antonios Roumpakis, Nordic Welfare Financiers Made Global Portfolio Investors:
Institutional Change in Pension Fund Governance in Sweden and Finland (University of Oxford Working Papers in
Employment, Work and Finance Wpg 10-01, 2010) 69, available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1533376.
165 Ambachtsheer (2013), supra note 163, at 46.
166 Statistics Sweden, Ownership of Shares in Companies Quoted on Swedish Exchanges, available at
http://www.scb.se/.
167 FESE, Share Ownership Structure in Europe, December 2008.
168 Bank of Finland, Pörssiosakkeiden Markkina-arvo ja ulkomaalaisomistus 31.1.1996 – 28.2.2011 [Market Value
and Foreign Ownership of Listed Shares 31.1.1996 – 28.2.2011], available at
http://www.suomenpankki.fi/en/tilastot/.
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not interfere with the key concerns of incumbent owners. Moreover, transparency has generally
attracted political support from labor interests as a tool against managerial opportunism. The EU
Shareholders’ Rights Directives can be seen as an outcome of this development, among others.
As a result of the introduction of the directive, transparency has increased in Nordic listed
companies. However, to date few initiatives have been introduced that restrict the decision-
making rights of controlling shareholders.
It has been argued that open markets and product market competition provide an effective check
on the possible opportunism of different corporate constituents. With effective competition,
inefficient arrangements should be eliminated over time. As discussed, Nordic industry has been
largely export driven. Thus, the markets have been subject to international product market
competition, in turn explaining the relatively low private benefits of control despite a largely
concentrated ownership structure. With globalization and the development of the EU internal
market, international competition has further increased over the two past decades. As markets
have become more competitive, labor interests have shifted from trying to extract rents to
protecting jobs. 169 Labor will increasingly support steps that rationalize businesses, thereby
securing the long-term job security of the workforce as a whole, even where that means lower
wage increases or lay-offs. To some extent these effects have been mitigated by unemployment
benefits and retraining or social programs that externalize the costs to society at large, but they
also make it easier for a corporation to adapt to a changing environment through changes in the
employee-structure.
3. Shifting Industrial Structures, Economic Crisis and the Influence of Labor Unions
Both Sweden and Finland experienced severe economic recession and a banking crisis in the
early 1990s, following financial liberalization in the 1980s. This affected the political dynamic
related to corporate regulation, as the influence of labor declined as a result of the severe
industrial slump. Labor had little vested interest to defend, and no rents were available, leading to
decreased resistance to change. 170 The banking crisis precipitated a change in corporate
ownership that acted as a further catalyst for changes in corporate governance.171
In addition, the politics of unionized labor have also changed. Globalization and technological
development have affected the industrial structure in the Nordic countries. Traditional economic
engines, such as the paper and pulp industry in Finland and Sweden or the car industry in Sweden,
have faced much tougher competition from abroad, forcing these industries to adapt. With
increased competition, there have been no rents available for extraction and the focus of labor
interests has shifted towards ensuring that the preconditions for continuing industrial production
and employment opportunities are maintained. Unions have been forced to accept the new reality
introduced by the globalized market place and have found new ways to promote the interests of
their members. Many of the important new industries that have developed over the past decades,
including technology-driven industries, have a different dynamic that does not support high
levels of employee organization.172 It has been argued that in this environment unions have been
169 Gourevitch & Shinn (2005), supra note 13, at 210-211.
170 Korkeamäki et al. (2007), supra note 17, at 9.
171 Fellman (2008), supra note 70, at 191-199.
172 See New Labour, Alt-Labour, The Economist, Sept. 14, 2013.
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inclined to change their focus from seeking to obtain rents for their members to facilitating an
orderly industrial evolution and looking to promote preconditions for competitive industrial
activity.173 This development usually leads to an increasing interest in transparency and enhanced
minority interests to ensure proper managerial performance.174
4. The EU Regulatory Framework
The regulation of corporations is not solely a national matter, of course. The Nordic countries
have traditionally had similar sources and structures of corporate law and even a tradition of joint
legislative efforts, or at least a tendency to adopt legal solutions from other Nordic jurisdictions.
Over the past decades, the impact of EU regulation has naturally had a significant effect on
Nordic company law, leading also to a decrease in pan-Nordic initiatives to develop corporate
law.
With respect to corporate governance and takeover regulation in EU member states, the EU
regulatory framework has provided a new parallel avenue for regulatory change not subject to the
same capture or dynamic as national regulation. The EU has introduced new dimensions to
corporate governance regulation that can affect the bargaining power of corporate constituencies
significantly. At the EU level, interest groups that are large and organized at the national level
can be fragmented, and new groups that were too small at the national level to be able to organize
can have sufficient critical mass to overcome coordination problems. The political dynamic of
EU-level regulation differs from national regulation in small countries. Constituencies that may
be able to promote their interests effectively at the national level may lack the clout to pursue
their agendas at the EU level. The institutional structures prevalent in smaller EU economies may
be more prone to change than the structures that dominate in economies with more influence in
EU decision-making. Thus, EU regulation may have had a more extensive effect on traditional
corporate governance structures in the Nordic countries than in larger EU member states.
The role of the EU in developing company law has evolved over the years. The EC Treaty
provides the legal basis for pursuing harmonization and development of company law in order to
reduce restrictions on the freedom of establishment pursuant to Article 44(2)(g) of the treaty,
among others. Some company law initiatives have also been made under other provisions, such
as Article 308, which allows appropriate means to be used for achieving the Community’s
goals. 175 It has been suggested that EU institutions have generally provided extensive
interpretation of the powers granted by Article 44(2) and of the possibility of issuing corporate
regulation on this basis. In fact, the number and focus of EU initiatives have often varied
according to the current political and economic dynamic of European integration at any given
period. Overall, EU level corporate regulation has not been particularly comprehensive, and
earlier integration efforts, in particular, have been deemed rather insignificant.176
173 Gourevitch & Shinn (2005), supra note 13, at 220-221.
174 Id. at 221.
175 Article 308 (formerly 235) was the basis for adopting the directive on the European company form, the “Societé
Européenne”, or “SE”.
176 See Luca Enriques, EC Company Law Directives and Regulations: How Trivial Are They?, 27 U.PA.J. INT’L.EC.L.
1 (2006).
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The EU company law directives, however, form a common basis for the type of corporations
discussed in this study. The earlier directives focused on some the basic characteristics of
corporations, including corporate disclosures,177 minimum share capital178 and annual accounts179
and audits.180 Other company law directives have focused on corporate transactions with EU-
wide aspects, such as cross-border mergers181 and takeovers.182 For the purposes of this study, it
is relevant to focus on EU corporate governance initiatives and EU-level regulation addressing
the interests or rights of corporate constituencies. Some of the key instruments in this regard
include the Shareholder Rights Directive,183 the Takeover Directive and the more recent EU
Company Law Action Plan. The EU Commission has also issued recommendations on
management remuneration focusing on shareholder participation in the approval of
remuneration.184
The Shareholder Rights Directive, in particular, seeks to facilitate the participation of
shareholders in corporate decision-making in publicly listed companies, particularly in the
context of shareholder meetings. The directive restricts requirements on share lock-ins and seeks
to facilitate cross-border voting, for example. The directive imposes requirements regarding the
information that must be provided in advance of shareholder meetings185 and participation and
voting by proxy or by electronic means.186
Nordic countries have generally adopted measures to implement minority protection mechanisms
regardless of EU regulation. Implementation of some of the EU level initiatives has nevertheless
required specific new regulatory measures. The EU agenda emphasizing shareholder rights has
also provided clear guidance on the national level for increasing minority protection mechanisms.
177 First Council Directive of 9 March 1968 on Coordination of Safeguards, Which, for the Protection of the Interests
of members and Others, is Required by Member States of Companies Within the Meaning of the Second Paragraph
of Article 58 of the Treaty, With a View to Making Such Safeguards Equivalent Throughout the Community (EEC)
68/151, OJ 1968, L 65/8.
178 Second Council Directive of 13 December 1976 on Coordination of Safeguards, Which, for the Protection of the
Interests of members and Others, is Required by Member States of Companies Within the Meaning of the Second
Paragraph of Article 58 of the Treaty, With Respect to the Formation of Public Limited Liability Companies and the
Maintenance and Alteration of Their Capital, With a View to Making Such Safeguards Equivalent (EEC) 77/91, OJ
1977, L 26/1.
179 Fourth Council Directive of 25 July 1978 Based on Article 54(3)(g) of the Treaty on the Annual Accounts of
Certain Types of Companies (EEC 78/660, OJ 1978, L 222/11) and Seventh Council Directive of 13 June 1983
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5. A Summary of Changes in Nordic Corporate Governance
Corporate governance in the Nordic countries has certainly evolved during the past decade.
Corporate governance codes, for example, have introduced a new focus on corporate governance
procedures. The roles and authority of different corporate organs have been clarified and
transparency has been increased. In Sweden, the corporate governance reforms of the past two
decades have been the consequence, in part, of perceived corporate scandals which have raised
the political salience of corporate governance and increased pressure for more restrictive
legislation.187 The business community has sought to avoid such intervention by dealing with
matters through self-regulation in the form of corporate governance and takeover codes.
On balance, the role of boards of directors may have increased along with these developments.
Due to the adoption of formal procedures, even large shareholders must increasingly interact with
the company through the set corporate governance framework. While boards are still accountable
to controlling shareholders, independence requirements have increased board integrity and
accountability to all other shareholders as well. As was earlier discussed, the role of management
is relatively weak in Nordic corporate governance. CEOs and management remain strictly
accountable to boards and large shareholders, and they have not been able to insulate themselves
from scrutiny in this regard.
Shareholder rights and minority protection have also been a particular focus area in corporate
governance. Based mainly on EU requirements, transparency has increased with regard to
corporate matters, and the participation of shareholders in corporate decision-making has been
facilitated to some extent. Management compensation and related party transactions, for example,
are subject to annual disclosure requirements. Transactions with large shareholders are not
subject to approval by shareholders or independent directors.
The influence of labor on corporate governance has clearly decreased in recent decades,
reflecting shifts in industrial structures and the political economy. In many cases labor
cooperation is limited primarily to informing employees of corporate developments rather than
any level of real consultation or negotiation. As was earlier mentioned, however, international
product market competition has changed labor priorities with respect to corporate governance.
Despite developments in the political economy, no serious challenges have emerged to the
authority of controlling shareholders. Large shareholders are still largely able to dominate
corporate decision-making. As control enhancing mechanisms are generally accepted, it also
remains cost-efficient to retain corporate control.
IV. CHANGE OF CONTROL IN THE NORDIC COUNTRIES
The study now turns to discussing the Nordic model of corporate governance in the context of
takeovers. This section first discusses the potential for the transfer of wealth among corporate
constituencies in control transactions and the characteristics of takeovers in this regard. The
section then turns to takeovers in the context of concentrated ownership and certain
characteristics of takeovers in the Nordic countries. The section ends with an assessment of the
political aspects of takeover regulation in the Nordics.
187 Habbard (2008), supra note 66, at 20.
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A. CHANGE OF CONTROL: AN INTRODUCTION
Corporations must be able to respond effectively to changes in the market environment and to
change and refocus their business in order to remain competitive. 188 The best available
organizational structure for a specific economic activity may vary from period to period. For
example, a particular period may be more conducive than another to the reorganization of
corporate assets to produce some other product or service or indeed to combining of the assets of
one corporation in some manner with those of another corporation. Changes in the business of a
corporation can occur through internal or external reorganization.189 Changes can occur, then,
while retaining the same corporate form or through a change of that form.
Gilson points out that one of the only constants regarding corporate enterprise is that the
corporate environment will be subject to further changes. 190 Thus, the goal of corporate
governance regulation should be to facilitate corporations’ adaptation to new circumstances. In
Sweden, Söderström et. al. state that “[s]ince the conditions of economic activity are constantly
changing the system must also be able to guarantee that control is transferred from less suitable
owners to people who are better fitted to take on the ownership role.” 191 Thus, corporate
governance solutions should support the responsiveness of corporations to changes in their
market environment and to technological development.192 The organizational form of business
should be allowed to evolve and change as freely as possible to the extent that it is of benefit to
the enterprise. In this context, the continuity of a particular corporation, as such, should not be
important. In the same way, it should not generally matter whether a structural reorganization is
executed as a divestment, a joint venture, a merger or a tender offer.
Transaction costs will affect the way in which firms or corporations reorganize.193 Moreover, it is
possible for the interests of corporate constituencies to be affected in different ways depending on
how change is executed, as organizational changes can and will have re-allocative effects. To the
extent that an organizational change is value-increasing, it need not benefit different corporate
constituencies in a similar manner, and some may even be worse off, as suggested in the Kaldor-
Hicks model of efficiency.194 The choice of mechanism whereby corporations reorganize will
also have an effect on wealth transfers among relevant constituencies. So acquisitions executed
as asset transfers, for example, may have different effects on the respective interests of corporate
constituencies than acquisitions effected through statutory mergers (where available), which
again can provide a different outcome than public tender offers.
These factors have a significant effect on corporate governance regulation, as different
constituencies seek to affect regulation to further and protect their own interests. The corporation
188 Ronald Gilson, The Political Ecology of Takeovers: Thoughts On Harmonizing the European Corporate
Governance Environment, 61 FORDHAM L. REV. 161, 174-175 (1992).
189 See Ronald Coase, The Nature of the Firm, 4 ECONOMICA 386 (1937); RONALD COASE, THE FIRM, THEMARKET
AND THE LAW (1988).
190 Gilson (1992), supra note 188.
191 Söderström et al. (2003), supra note 49, at 21.
192 Gilson (1992), supra note 188.
193 See Coase (1937), supra note 189; see also Oliver E. Williamson, Corporate Finance and Corporate Governance,
43 J. OF FIN. 567 (1988).
194 RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 14-17 (1998).
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as a specific organizational form of business is formed and affected by the relevant institutional
and political framework. The structure of firms, and how they are governed, also involves
political considerations. Corporate governance has (re)distributive implications and thus strong
political aspects that cannot be overlooked. As discussed, corporate law and corporate
governance regulation can be expected to reflect the institutional power of dominant corporate
constituencies.195 Changes in regulation can be seen to reflect changes in the relative bargaining
power of these constituencies.
B. DYNAMICS OF TAKEOVERS AND TAKEOVER REGULATION
1. Corporate Constituencies in Takeovers
As takeovers can have a significant effect on corporate constituencies, it is likely that the interests
of politically dominant constituencies are reflected in takeover regulation. Moreover, changes to
regulation can reflect the shifting bargaining power of these constituencies. For example,
employees may be laid off, or the management changed as a result of an organizational change.
Alternatively, shareholders may be worse off as a result of an organizational change that benefits
corporate management. Control transactions, as end-game situations, increase the possibility of
opportunistic behavior. In the context of dispersed ownership, management is often suspected of
“empire building” when planning acquisitions, increasing the size of the firm for their own
benefit beyond what is in the best interest of shareholders or other constituencies.196 On the other
hand, in the context of concentrated ownership, controlling shareholders may seek to extract
control premiums unavailable to other shareholders.197 Changes can be, and often are, affected by
the self-interest of dominant constituencies.
Management and labor can generally be expected to favor regulation that does not facilitate
takeovers. Both constituencies would prefer to avoid change of control without their cooperation.
Maintaining acquired privileges and rents is a key driver in this regard. Controlling shareholders
may favor regulation facilitating change of control without the participation of other corporate
constituencies, but they will look to ensure that their controlling position cannot be challenged
without their cooperation. Minority shareholders are more likely to prefer regulation that
facilitates change of control despite the possible resistance of other corporate constituencies
provided, however, that the offer price is sufficiently high. Minority shareholders are typically
constrained in their ability to coordinate their activities and may be pressured to accept even sub-
premium bids to avoid being locked into a company with low liquidity if other shareholders
accept the bid. Minority shareholders thus need insurance that the price in a tender offer is the
best available.
2. Takeovers and Concentrated Ownership
Takeovers have a considerably different dynamic and corporate governance function depending
on the structure of corporate ownership. In companies with dispersed ownership, the possibility
195 Armour, Hansmann & Kraakman, supra note 109, at 32.
196 Michael C. Jensen & William H. Meckling, Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs and
Ownership Structure, 3. J. FIN. ECON. 305, 308 (1976).
197 See Lucian A. Bebchuk, A Rent Protection Theory of Corporate Ownership and Control (NBER Working Paper
7203, 1999), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=168990.
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of takeovers serves as an external corporate governance mechanism that monitors management
performance. 198 In companies with concentrated ownership, however, change of control is
typically subject to the cooperation of the controlling shareholder. In fact, concentrated
ownership has been seen as a substitute for “the market for corporate control” as a corporate
governance monitoring mechanism.199
Takeovers in the context of concentrated ownership are really not to be compared with takeovers
of companies with dispersed ownership. In an environment of concentrated ownership, takeovers
typically result in a transfer of control from one controlling shareholder to another. This type of
transaction raises the potential for a different type of agency problem than would otherwise be the
case. Basically, a controlling shareholder may seek to obtain a control premium unavailable to
other shareholders.
Takeover regulation should also have a different function in the context of concentrated
ownership. Regulation may be important for the protection of minority shareholders from abusive
behavior by the controlling shareholder. Regulation would then be expected to restrict the
extraction of private benefits of control in the form of unwarranted control premiums, or the
attempt to redeem minority shareholders on unfair terms.200 Regulation should also address the
possibility of a controlling shareholder preferring not to transfer control even when they were no
longer performing an effective monitoring function (“shirking”).
Takeovers can also affect the interests of other corporate constituencies directly or indirectly. It
has been suggested that the premium obtained by the selling shareholders is to some extent
extracted from other corporate constituencies. For example, there is often concern that employee
interests are negatively affected by takeovers, as the buyer typically seeks to reclaim any
premiums paid in connection with the acquisition and to make the acquisition more profitable. It
has been argued that takeovers allow a breach or renegotiation of implicit agreements or
compromises between owners and labor based on the premise of long-term cooperation. With the
change of control, the new ownership might seek to breach these understandings and decrease
employee benefits. For example, in takeovers, defined-benefit pension funds have been
terminated after control has changed.201 However, it seems that the savings from such measures
only correspond to a small portion of the premiums paid in takeovers, and, in fact, wealth
transfers from employees to shareholders do not seem to be a significant source of takeover
gains.202 Furthermore, Gilson emphasizes that implicit arrangements can be expected to represent
solutions that are mutually beneficial to shareholders and employees in a given institutional
environment. 203 Thus, there should be no reason for the acquirer to change efficient
198 SeeMarc Goergen, Marina Martynova & Luc Renneboog, Corporate Governance Convergence: Evidence from
Takeover Regulation 6 (ECGI working paper No. 33, 2005), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=709 .
199 See Becht, Bolton & Röell (2002), supra note 22.
200 Paul Davies & Klaus Hopt, Control Transactions, in Kraakman et. al (2009), supra note 11, at 257.
201 See Jeffrey Pontiff, Andrei Schleifer & Michael S. Weisbach, Reversions of Excess Pension Assets After
Takeovers, 21 RAND J. OF ECONOMICS 600 (1990).
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arrangements.204 In conclusion, takeovers should not generally be seen to present an opportunity
for disenfranchising labor interests.
The main problem in an environment of concentrated ownership is that shirking by the
controlling shareholder prevents takeovers from occurring. A large shareholder may choose to
reject a change of control even where the shareholder is no longer performing an efficient
monitoring function. The shareholder may, in fact, be enjoying non-pecuniary private benefits of
control (political influence or esteem, for example), which cannot easily be compensated for in
monetary terms. Alternatively, the favored position of controlling shareholders as a result of tax
rules and the ease and cost-efficiency of maintaining control decrease his or her non-
diversification costs to such an extent that a sale of the control position is unwarranted despite
lower returns from the business.
Even if the institutional environment favors block-holding, it is important for there to be
mechanisms that facilitate change of control and allow new controlling shareholders to take over
when the old ownership is no longer effective.
3. Dynamics in National and EU Level Regulation
Regulation can generally be deemed to reflect the interests of dominant interest groups or
political coalitions. With respect to corporate governance and investor protection in general,
corporate insiders, entrepreneurs and institutional investors have been identified as the relevant
interest groups that can affect regulation, while outside investors have been deemed too
fragmented to form an effective coordinated group for the purposes of affecting regulation.205
Bebchuk & Neeman argue that corporate insiders can capture the full benefits of any changes to
regulation, and as they can, to some extent, use corporate funds to affect such changes, they are
willing to invest fully in lobbying activity. At the same time, institutional investors are only able
to enjoy part of such benefits, as any benefits they obtain will also benefit other investors.206 It is
claimed that entrepreneurs opt for investor protection that is biased toward supporting raising
capital. This imbalance is deemed likely to tilt corporate governance regulation – including
takeover regulation – to the benefit of corporate insiders and entrepreneurs.207
With respect to takeovers, it is argued that target company interests are likely to influence
national regulation more than the interests of bidders, while at the international level, target
companies may have less influence over regulatory outcomes.208 Roberta Romano has studied the
implementation of state-level takeover regulation in the United States where interest groups
representing management, organized labor and community groups advocated for rules increasing
the threshold for takeovers.209 Where legislatures could be convinced that takeovers would result
in headquarters, jobs and services moving out of state, anti-takeover rules were not difficult to
204 Id.
205 See Lucian A. Bebchuk & Zvika Neeman, Investor Protection and Interest Group Politics (John M. Olin Center
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introduce. Similarly, in Europe, it has been argued that national level regulation is likely to favor
interest groups with a strong domestic lobbying position. Ferrarini & Miller argue that the
interests of corporate insiders remain strong at the national level. As takeovers will be subject to
local regulation, they may be able to lobby for anti-takeover rules that protect their interests. At
the international level, corporate insiders may not have the same relative advantage over the
interests of bidders (and minority shareholders), who may be better able to organize themselves
on an international basis.
In line with the above, national takeover regulation in the Nordic countries can be expected to
favor large shareholders and labor interests by not favoring hostile takeovers and exhibiting
takeover rules that do not challenge the control or decision-making rights of controlling
shareholders with respect to takeover situations, while protecting labor interests by general
employment legislation.
The EU framework nevertheless creates a parallel regulatory framework to national regulation.
Consequently, constituencies are not limited to national regulation but can also pursue agendas
through the EU regulatory framework.210 Callaghan observes that the EU contributes to the
development of a multilevel governance framework – also with respect to corporate governance
regulation. Callaghan argues that this creates new strategic opportunities for interest groups211
and that the EU institutional set-up allows for competing political coalitions to simultaneously
advance different reforms, thus limiting the possibility for interest groups to monopolize policy.
In an EU context, it is also possible that the benefits of cross-border takeovers are not evenly
distributed. Market actors in jurisdictions with a favorable institutional environment may have an
advantage over actors in other jurisdictions. When markets are opened through EU regulation,
some will be better positioned than others to take advantage of the new situation. For example,
bidders in markets with efficient and liquid financial markets can be expected to have better
access to the financing needed for large acquisitions than similar actors in other jurisdictions. The
optionality allowed in the Takeover Directive also skews the playing field, in that the ability of
boards to take defensive action can vary based on the implementation of the relevant provision of
the directive.
The EU Takeover Directive
The introduction of the Takeover Directive was highly relevant to corporate governance. The
adoption of the directive was very controversial, requiring a legislative process lasting almost two
decades. Certain elements of the directive were deemed incompatible with the system of
concentrated ownership, supported by control enhancing mechanisms. that dominated key
markets. From a Nordic perspective the proposed “break-through” rule limiting the effect of dual
share classes was strongly resisted for these reasons.212 The break-through rule would have
deeply affected the Nordic model of corporate ownership and corporate governance with its
emphasis on the position of large shareholders. In the context of takeovers, controlling
210 See Helen Callaghan, How Multilevel Governance Affects the Clash of Capitalisms (MPIfG Discussion Paper
08/5), available at www.mpifg.de (publications, discussion papers).
211 Id. at 10.
212 See Rolf Skog, The European Union’s Proposed Takeover Directive, the “Breakthrough” Rule and the Swedish
System of Dual Class Common Stock, 45 SCANDINAVIAN STUDIES IN LAW 293 (2004).
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shareholders would not necessarily have had a veto over takeover bids. Ultimately, it was decided
that the implementation of the break-through rule was optional, and few EU member states
decided to introduce such a rule in national regulation.
There was also criticism of the mandatory bid rule requiring a shareholder to make a tender offer
for all remaining equity securities if his or her holdings exceeded a given threshold (such
threshold to be no higher than 50%).213 The rule was initially controversial in many EU member
states, including Sweden. Many interest groups were opposed to the rule, arguing it was
inappropriate in an environment with concentrated ownership and would prevent advantageous
restructurings and raise the cost of beneficial changes of control. The idea that minority
shareholders would have an automatic exit right was also questioned.214
4. Recent Development of Nordic Takeover Regulation: Examples
Changes to takeover rules can be expected to reflect changes in the relative bargaining power of
corporate constituencies or changes in the interests of politically dominant corporate
constituencies or political coalitions. Regulatory changes can take place through legislative
processes at the national or international level, but they can also occur through self-regulation. To
some extent, self-regulation is used as a mechanism to pre-empt legislative initiatives. Industry
participants may seek to avoid legislative intervention by taking regulatory steps to mitigate
political concerns, for example. Self-regulation can be a reactionary measure taken when faced
with the threat of more intrusive regulation. In this regard, self-regulation can be seen to reflect
salient political concerns. Below, the study discusses certain developments relevant to the
position of controlling shareholders in takeover regulation (legislation, regulation and self-
regulation, as applicable) in the Nordic countries, mainly Sweden and Finland, and considers how
these developments reflect the changing political economy and the interests of different corporate
constituencies.
Consideration for Different Share Classes
One of the control-enhancing mechanisms used in the Nordic countries is the adoption of
different classes of shares with different voting rights, allowing, for example, founding
entrepreneurs to raise equity financing without relinquishing control. Founders can retain shares
of the super voting class while the company issues shares with a single vote. Through articles of
association and minority shareholder provisions in national company law, the controlling
shareholder can give a sufficient guarantee to equity investors that their investment will be
adequately protected, despite the controlling shareholder maintaining his or her required level of
control.
In Sweden there has been much debate over whether to permit payment of a different
consideration for different classes of shares in takeovers. Indeed, a good case could be made for
paying a different price for shares with superior voting rights. In a change of control context it
should be clear that shares with 20 votes, for example, should be worth more than shares with
one vote. However, the different share price would, of course, allow a controlling shareholder to




be paid a control premium unavailable to other shareholders. In Sweden, takeover rules initially
provided that the relative premiums for different share classes should be same even if the price
could differ. The takeover rules later provided more latitude for how the value of non-listed
shares could be evaluated (typically the controlling block), allowing for some control premiums.
As the influence of institutional shareholders increased, the price difference was limited through
precedents to approximately 10 percent. More recently, new rules have largely eliminated such
premiums altogether.215
In Finland, on the other hand, differences between the considerations paid for shares of different
classes are still allowed. The requirement in Finnish securities law is that the different prices
must be “in a fair and just relationship” to each other.216 Market practice in Finland has also
allowed the payment of premiums to holders of super-voting shares.
Cash Mergers
Pursuant to the EU Takeover Directive, national legislation must provide a shareholder with a
sufficiently sizeable majority the possibility of redeeming the shares of minority shareholders. In
the Nordic countries the thresholds for the “squeeze-out” right have been set at 90 percent of the
shares and votes of the target company.
Due to the lack of deal security caused by the high threshold, there has often been interest in
different means of completing acquisitions at lower levels of shareholding. A statutory merger,
for example, allows a shareholder to integrate the target company and its assets at lower levels of
shareholding, typically two thirds of shares and votes represented at a general meeting of
shareholders. However, in mergers the shareholders of the company being merged are usually
entitled to shares in the receiving company. In cases where the bidder is a much larger company
than the target, a statutory merger may nevertheless allow the acquisition of the target without
changing the balance of control in the acquiring company through dilution of the holdings of the
minority shareholders. However, it is also possible to pay the consideration in a statutory merger
in cash. This would allow the bidder to acquire the target without entitling minority shareholders
to shares in the bidder.
There has been some debate on whether such a cash merger would fulfil the criteria of equal
treatment of shareholders under the national company laws in the Nordic countries. Traditionally,
in Finland and Sweden cash consideration in statutory mergers has not been explicitly forbidden
in company law. However, it was argued that cash consideration might still contravene equal
treatment rules depending on the specific circumstances in each case. Where the intention was to
disenfranchise the minority shareholders, cash consideration could be against company law, but
215 See Göran Nyström & Erik Sjöman, Den svenska takeover-regleringen – ett samspel mellan regelmakaren och
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– AN ANTHOLOGY] 99-100 (Aktiemarknadsnämnden [The Swedish Securities Board], 2011).
216 Hallituksen esitys Eduskunnalle arvopaperimarkkinoita koskevaksi lainsäädännöksi [Government Bill for
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where there were legitimate business reasons for paying the consideration purely in cash, there
may have been no legal obstacles.
In Sweden, specific new regulation was introduced in 2009 prohibiting pure cash-consideration
mergers and requiring that at least 50 percent of the consideration be in shares.217 A previous
measure intervening in cash mergers had raised the threshold for approval of such transactions
from the normal requirement of two thirds to 90 percent of votes given and shares present. The
stated reason for introducing the new rules in the Swedish Companies Act was to increase
minority protection.
In Finland, no such rule has been introduced. In fact, the Helsinki Takeover Code explicitly
suggests that cash mergers could be possible provided there are special circumstances that
support the payment of the merger consideration in cash. While no cash mergers have been
executed to date among listed companies or in connection with takeover situations, the legality of
such transactions cannot be ruled out.
Mandatory Bids
The Takeover Directive introduced the mandatory bid obligation in EU takeover regulation,
granting an exit right to minority shareholders in connection with a transfer of control. Pursuant
to the directive, a shareholder who acquires shares “giving him/her control” of a listed target
company is obligated to make a public bid to all remaining shareholders.218 The thresholds of
shareholdings triggering the bid obligation can be set in national laws, and in the Nordic
countries they have been set at the level of a 30 percent shareholding in the target company. In
addition, some countries have a dual threshold, triggering mandatory bid obligations at the 50
percent level as well.
The directive further provides that an “equitable price” shall be offered in the mandatory bid.219
The price is linked to the highest price paid by the shareholder during a set period prior to the
obligation being triggered. One justification for the mandatory bid rule is that a party obtaining
control may also be in a position to exploit private benefits of control at the expense of the other
shareholders.220 In this regard, the mandatory bid rule prevents inefficient transactions where the
bidder seeks to extract private benefits of control at the cost of the other shareholders rather than
217 Regeringens proposition 2007/08:155, Skärpta fusionsregler, [Government Bill 2007/08:155, Revised Merger
Rules].
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which, added to any existing holdings of those securities of his/hers and the holdings of those securities of persons
acting in concert with him/her, directly or indirectly give him/her a specified percentage of voting rights in that
company, giving him/her control of that company, Member States shall ensure that such a person is required to make
a bid as a means of protecting the minority shareholders of that company. Such a bid shall be addressed at the earliest
opportunity to all the holders of those securities for all their holdings at the equitable price as defined in paragraph 4.”
219 The text of the directive isas follows: “The highest price paid for the same securities by the offeror, or by persons
acting in concert with him/her, over a period, to be determined by Member States, of not less than six months and not
more than 12 before the bid referred to in paragraph 1 shall be regarded as the equitable price. If, after the bid has
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220 Goergen, Martynova & Renneboog (2005), supra note 198, at 11.
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from increased efficiency or synergies. A controlling party may also be in a position to alter the
company’s strategy and business in such a way that they no longer reflect the original investment
of the other shareholders. In such circumstances it has been deemed appropriate to grant an exit
right for minority shareholders. Through the pricing mechanism, the rule also limits the
possibility of paying control premiums to controlling shareholders in change of control
transactions. However, it has also been claimed that the mandatory bid rule increases the price of
takeovers and discourages value-creating transactions.221
The Takeover Directive allows for the granting of exemptions from the obligation to launch a
mandatory bid pursuant to national regimes. In Sweden, for example, remarkably many
exemptions are granted annually.222 There are usually several criteria for exemptions. Typically,
exemptions can be granted where a large shareholder takes measures to address the financial
distress of the target company, where control is transferred within the same group or sphere of
control or where a large shareholder ends up with shares as a result of a share issuance where
other shareholders have not subscribed for their pro rata share, for example. In addition,
exemptions can be temporary or they can restrict a further increase of holdings. Additional
whitewash procedures may also be required for an exemption to be granted. It could be argued
that to the extent that the extraction of private benefits of control has been effectively restricted,
minority shareholders may be sufficiently protected and a mandatory bid would be unwarranted.
The Swedish exemption regime seems to allow controlling shareholders latitude in reorganizing
their holdings, which may well be necessary in a system with concentrated ownership.223 The
fairly liberal regime on exemptions applied in Sweden may represent an appropriate response for
tailoring EU-based requirements to the national corporate environment.
In Finland the number of bids and exemptions is far lower than in Sweden. The threshold for
mandatory bids was decreased from two thirds of shares in connection with the implementation
of the Takeover Directive. Requirements for exemptions were revised in 2013, with the aim of
emphasizing the need for whitewash procedures as a prerequisite for exemptions. Interestingly,
the regime may be more stringent than in Sweden. On the other hand, concentrated ownership
and the need to rearrange group or family holdings have not played as significant a role in the
Finnish corporate environment as they have in Sweden, as discussed earlier.
Recent Changes to Takeover Codes
Swedish takeover rules were originally introduced in 1971. The Swedish Takeover Code has
been amended from time to time, and material amendments were more recently introduced in
2006 and 2009, for example.224 In 2006, the code was amended to reflect the implementation of
the Takeover Directive. In 2009, the code was amended with the aim of enhancing the position of
target shareholders in takeovers. One of the main amendments in 2009 was a change that
generally disfavored any price differences between ordinary and super-voting shares.225 The code
was also amended to increase the binding nature of announcements regarding public tender offers
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and to disfavor any indicative announcements, for example. Requirements regarding the type of
conditions acceptable in public tender offers were also tightened. In 2012 further changes to the
code, largely of a technical nature, were introduced. However, the code was amended to disfavor
break-up fees, even though they were not completely prohibited. Further disclosure requirements
were also introduced for bidders.226 The changes in the Swedish Takeover Code can be seen to
reflect the increasing influence of minority shareholders. The rules seek to limit the possibility of
favoring large shareholders and introduce stringent requirements on bidders with regard to any
action that may influence trading in target shares. However, the rules do not, as such, restrict the
influence of controlling shareholders outside the context of takeovers.
A takeover code was introduced in Finland in 2006.227 It was then amended in 2013, as a result of
changes to the Finnish securities laws, with the introduction of a “comply-or-explain” rule to the
code. The code was originally intended to provide general guidance on the application of central
principles of company and securities laws and promote uniform procedures in takeover situations.
Importantly, there been no significant pressure from institutional investors or other minority
shareholder interest groups with respect to the code provisions. The code also largely
acknowledges the position of controlling shareholders and, for example, recognizes that target
boards and bidders alike will need to consult with such shareholders in advance of tender offers
being launched.
5. Summary of Nordic Developments in Takeover Regulation
As the discussion above demonstrates, takeover regulation seems to be developing along similar
lines to corporate governance regulation in the Nordic countries in general. The main drivers for
change with respect to takeover regulation seem to have been the introduction of the Takeover
Directive and, in Sweden, the increasingly important position of institutional shareholders,
including pension funds. Employee interests seem to have had no significant effect on the
development of takeover regulation. Importantly, however, the revised regulation of takeovers
does not challenge the position of controlling shareholders. The regulatory framework continues
to support concentrated ownership and the rights of large shareholders also with respect to
change of control.
Interestingly, in contrast to Sweden, there has been no focus on minority shareholder interests
with respect to change of control issues in Finland. This is possibly the result of the different
structures of the two countries’ pension systems and their respective effect on corporate
governance. For example, Ambachtsheer has argued that for historical and structural reasons
Finnish institutional investors maintain closer relationships with management and controlling
shareholders, resulting in less pressure on corporate governance than in Sweden.228
226 Id.
227 The Finland Chamber of Commerce, Recommendation Regarding the Procedures to be Complied with in Public
Takeover Bids, 2006 and The Securities Markets Association, The Helsinki Takeover Code, 2013.
228 Ambachtsheer (2013), supra note 163, at 46.
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V. DEVELOPING CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AND THE POLITICAL ECONOMY
This study seeks to identify the regulatory implications of a political economy approach to
corporate governance and takeover regulation in the Nordics. Thus far, an explanation of the
evolution of regulation has been presented and the case made that the political aspects of
regulation must be appropriately recognized. Based on the discussion above, this study now turns
to consider the relationship, in the context of Nordic takeover regulation, between regulatory
development, on the one hand, and shifting political economy on the other and to identify
appropriate regulatory strategies for this environment.
We have seen that corporate governance regulation has evolved in the Nordics in response to
changes caused by the internationalization of markets, the increase of equity financing and the
increasing equity positions of politically important constituencies. With this development,
minority protection has increased, as can be expected. Nevertheless, the basic premises of
corporate control have not changed to the same extent. Concentrated ownership and control
enhancing mechanisms remain important elements in the corporate environment. While an
increase in minority protection mechanisms that do not challenge current control structures are
acceptable to incumbent owners, any initiatives that would affect control are likely to be strongly
resisted. This dynamic should result in low levels of private benefits of control, increased
transparency, sophisticated formal corporate governance rules, the maintenance of control
enhancing mechanisms and favorable treatment of concentrated ownership.
The development of corporate governance and takeover regulation in the Nordics provides
certain insights into the dynamics of regulatory change. It seems that when considering the
development of regulation in this framework, there are at least three factors that should be taken
into account. First, the political economy and the institutional environment define the terms on
which corporate ownership and control are organized and change of control can occur. Changes
in the political economy and the interests of specific corporate constituencies over time can affect
the dynamic of corporate governance and allow for regulatory change as well. Second, the
development of corporate ownership structures and corporate governance is path dependent and
prone to entrenchment. A given structure is often reinforced as complimentary institutions
develop and may remain entrenched even as the political economy evolves. The existing
institutional framework may therefore support the corporate structures of yesterday. The third
aspect to consider is how different constituencies are positioned to promote their interests. For
example, the capacity of different constituencies to overcome coordination costs and organize
themselves will affect their ability to effectively promote their interests through the political
system.229
This section briefly discusses these three elements affecting regulatory change, before concluding
with a discussion of regulatory strategies based on these elements.
A. THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF CORPORATE OWNERSHIP AND CONTROL
As such, concentrated ownership and control enhancing mechanisms are not necessarily
detrimental to firm performance or value. Empirical studies of listed companies in the EU have
229 See Olson (1971), supra note 29.
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supported the view that concentrated ownership can benefit corporate performance through the
monitoring function performed by a large undiversified shareholder, and that concentrated
ownership or the use of control enhancing mechanisms need not be related to the extraction of
private benefits of control. It seems that the preferences and courses of action pursued by
different types of controlling shareholders can be more important factors in this regard.
As has been discussed above, the structure of corporate ownership is a result both of specific
historical and industrial development and of the broader institutional environment. Governance
models evolve and are tailored to dealing with corporate governance problems in a given
institutional environment. Where banks might provide a monitoring function in one type of
economy, blockholders will perform similar functions in others, and specific governance models
evolve to support this.230 It can be argued that as a governance model the “blockholder-system”
has been demonstrably successful, and as such can provide a competitive alternative to dispersed
ownership.
When a controlling shareholder seeks to transfer control and where private benefits of control are
restricted, there should no reason for concern from the perspective of minority shareholders. If
the acquirer is unable to extract private benefits of control he or she must justify any premiums
paid by synergies or by increasing the profitability of the business, which should benefit all
shareholders.
Even if the political economy has increasingly come to favor minority protection with respect to
corporate governance in general, the position of large shareholders remains unchallenged. The
corporate environment in the Nordic countries can still be seen to facilitate concentrated
ownership. While direct private benefits of control are low, there can be other benefits for
controlling shareholders. It has been argued that due to tax rules and the use of control-enhancing
mechanisms, maintaining corporate control is relatively cost efficient. The problem with
concentrated ownership is that incumbent owners have a veto over change of control transactions.
It is difficult to challenge the existing ownership structure even when it has become sub-optimal
or no longer performs value-adding management monitoring functions. In this respect, it may be
important to focus on mechanisms whereby change of control can be induced in these types of
situations.
B. PATH DEPENDENCE AND CORPORATE OWNERSHIP
The structure of corporate ownership and control is strongly affected by historical and industrial
development. As economic enterprise evolves, the nature of production processes will affect the
structure and size of the organizational institutions used to manage such enterprise, including
corporate governance. The business organization suited to large-scale industrial manufacturing
will differ from the organization used for building precision instruments. Corporate finance and
corporate governance solutions in such industries may also be different.
It is important to recognize that historical development is path dependent. Once a given structure
of ownership has been established, it is likely to be reinforced as complementary institutions
230 See Ronald Gilson, Globalizing Corporate Governance: Convergence of Form or Function, 49 AM. J. COMP. L.
329 (2001).
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develop. 231 As discussed by Bebchuk & Roe, 232 the sunk costs, externalities and
complementarities caused by initial choices of ownership structure increase the cost of choosing
alternative structures. 233 Existing structures may also persist as a result of rent-seeking by
incumbents with sufficient (and increasing) bargaining power.234 The regulatory framework can
be seen as a complementary institution that recognizes and reinforces certain ownership
structures due to both efficiency and rent-seeking.
Differences in how corporations are controlled are also reflected in the legal powers of different
corporate constituencies. This, in turn, can contribute to the way ownership structure develops, as
was suggested by a study on the differences between the allocation of legal powers in
jurisdictions with different types of corporate ownership.235 To the extent that the allocation of
legal powers favors directors, for example, it leaves limited possibilities for shareholders to affect
corporate matters. As a consequence, when incumbent shareholders (or management) raise
further equity financing, corporate control can be maintained even without a majority of shares,
provided they have ensured representation on the board of directors. Moreover, there is little
incentive for outside investors to buy larger stakes in the company considering the limited power
they can acquire.236 On the other hand, in models where the allocation of legal powers favors
shareholders, the “original controllers” must ensure they have sufficient voting rights by
maintaining a sufficient majority of shareholdings or by making use of control-enhancing
mechanisms.237 It is important to note that in either case control remains entrenched. In the
context of dispersed ownership, this should result in “strong managers and weak owners,”238
while the opposite should occur in countries with a predominance of concentrated ownership.
In fact, it has been demonstrated that the ownership structures prevalent in a given economy may
not be the most efficient structures for the circumstances. For instance, Grant & Kirchmaier have
studied whether companies with superior performance also represented the dominant structure of
ownership in a given economy and found that dominant ownership structures did not seem to be
consistent with value maximization principles. 239 Grant & Kirchmaier claim that “current
European ownership structures are a function of the complex interaction of historic national
regulation, tax codes, strength of institutional investors and individual/family wealth preferences,
constraints and psychology. The balancing of these interests through the political process at
country level has been a prime determinant of current corporate structures.” Thus, according to
the authors, existing structures of corporate ownership, or corporate governance, are the outcome
of various factors in a given political economy and may not be the most efficient.
231 See North (1990), supra note 12.
232 See Bebchuk & Roe (1999), supra note 33.
233 Id.
234 Id.
235 Sofie Cools, The Real Difference in Corporate Law between the United States and Continental Europe:
Distribution of Powers, 64 (Harvard Law School John M. Olin Center for Law, Economics and Business Discussion
Paper Series, Paper 490, 2004) available at http://lsr.nellco.org/harvard_olin/490.
236 As a significant portion of the largest US corporations are domiciled in Delaware, the laws of this jurisdiction are
used to represent the prevalent position in the United States.
237 Cools (2004), supra note 235, at 64.
238 SeeMARK J. ROE, STRONGMANAGERS,WEAK OWNERS, THE POLITICAL ROOTS OF AMERICAN CORPORATE
FINANCE (1996).
239 Jeremy Grant & Thomas Kirchmaier: Who Governs? Corporate Ownership and Control Structures in Europe,
(SSRN Working Paper, June 7, 2004), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=555877.
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While concentrated ownership may provide a competitive form of corporate ownership and an
effective basis for corporate governance, it is important that control can be changed when
incumbent owners are no longer effective. However, there has been much concern that the
institutional environment in the Nordic countries fails to allow new potential owners to challenge
incumbent controlling shareholders even when they no longer provide an effective monitoring
function.240 The main concern of regulation under these circumstances should be to address
entrenchment of control.241 Regulation should not be designed to challenge existing structures of
ownership or governance mechanisms, but instead to seek to effect a transfer of control by
appropriate means when the current ownership situation is no longer efficient. Regulation could
provide appropriate incentives for transferring control or, at the minimum, should not provide
deterrents to such transfers. The question is what legal strategies are best suited to these purposes
in the relevant institutional environment and in light of the dynamics of legislative processes.
The recent debate on corporate governance in the EU and the Nordic countries also relates to the
“varieties of capitalism” debate regarding different types of corporate governance systems.242 It is
argued that economies can enhance their competitiveness by specialization, i.e., by taking
advantage of the relative benefits that each type of economy has. This argument suggests that the
characteristics of an economy may be accentuated as institutions develop to complement the
system in question. This “varieties of capitalism” argument seems to assume that the basis and
competitiveness of a particular “variety” is stable and sustainable. Nonetheless, as a result of
globalization and technological innovations, the basis for an economic model may change,
leading to the need for different models of governance in order to preserve competitiveness. The
question is whether the “varieties of capitalism” debate can in fact be defined more accurately in
terms of path dependence, where a given “variety” reflects a particular point in the specific
development path of an economy. As economies and political systems develop, complimentary
institutions emerge, and a corporate governance system will develop with political coalitions and
regulatory and governance mechanisms that reflect the interests of politically dominant groups –
i.e. different “varieties of capitalism.” Path dependence suggests that the system is likely to be
entrenched, and deviation from the path becomes increasingly costly and difficult.
C. COORDINATING POLITICAL ACTION
As described by Mancur Olson, different political constituencies have different requisites for
pursuing their interests. 243 Small interest groups with similar interests can be expected to
overcome coordination problems and manage their interests in a satisfactory way. In the Nordic
corporate governance context, controlling shareholders would be an example of this type of
market actor.244 The study has discussed how the interests of controlling shareholders have been
reflected in Nordic corporate governance regulation and how, even as the political economy has
240 Söderström et al. (2003), supra note 49, at 24.
241 See Gilson (2006), supra note 7.
242 See Peter A. Hall & David Soskice, Introduction, in VARIETIES OF CAPITALISM: THE INSTITUTIONAL
FOUNDATIONS OF COMPARATIVE ADVANTAGe (Peter A. Hall & David Soskice eds., 2001).
243 See Olson (1971), supra note 29.
244 See Guido Ferrarini & Geoffrey P. Miller, A Simple Theory of Takeover Regulation in the United States and
Europe 15 (New York University Law and Economics Working Paper 197, 2009), available at
http://lsr.nellco.org/nyu_lewp/197; Armour, Hansmann & Kraakman in Kraakman et. al. (2009), supra note 11, at 52;
see also Högfeldt (2005), supra note 30.
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evolved, the basic premises of concentrated ownership remain strongly supported at the national
level.
According to Olson, large interests groups with similar interests can be expected to pursue those
interests through the political system. Unionized labor, for example, can be expected to use the
political system to protect their interests. Even if labor were not a direct participant or co-decision
maker in corporate governance, its political power is likely to guarantee that its interests are
looked after – within the parameters of the political economy. For example, with respect to
corporate governance and change of control, employee rights are unlikely to be immediately
affected by a change of control transaction. However, an acquirer can change any implicit
contracts or arrangements that may have reflected compromises between owners and employees
and that have become inefficient. What can occur, for example, is that production facilities or
headquarter functions can be moved abroad, or production processes changed and headcounts
decreased. Previously companies were incentivized to grow (largely on a domestic basis), thus
protecting employees from such outcomes. With the opening of markets, such incentives became
increasingly untenable. Moreover, with the increase of foreign ownership, industrial structures
have changed, as have the status and expectations of shareholders. As a result, the status of labor
has decreased and the focus of unions has shifted towards supporting solutions that maintain the
competitiveness of domestic companies.
Large interest groups with dissimilar interests may have difficulties in overcoming coordination
problems or accessing the political system. Minority shareholders have typically been categorized
as a group which struggles to overcome coordination problems. Minority shareholders have often
been deemed to have too divergent agendas and insufficient financial interests to justify the
coordination costs required to organize political cooperation. Thus, minority shareholder interests
can easily be trumped by the interests of more politically dominant groups. In some economies
where the political economy has developed in such a way that labor favors equity interests, the
situation is different. With pension reforms, it has been argued that labor interests are
increasingly shifting towards supporting minority protection, thus creating the political
momentum to develop related regulation.
Based on Olson’s arguments, it might be assumed that institutional investors and other minority
shareholders are not in in the best position to coordinate activities at the political level with
respect to corporate governance or takeover regulation. The interests of these constituencies, then,
may require specific attention from regulators if market-based regulation and investor protection
are desired. Labor is still a large constituency, and their interests are likely to be reflected through
the political system.
VI. CONCLUSIONS: CORPORATE GOVERNANCEDEBATES AND REGULATORY STRATEGIES
This chapter has been concerned with the dynamics of corporate governance and takeover
regulation in the Nordics – mainly in Sweden and Finland. The introduction to the chapter noted
the current debate on whether corporate governance regulation has come to favor the short term
interests of shareholders at the cost of sustainable development and stakeholder interests. The
debate has focused on such issues as shareholder primacy in the context of takeovers.245 It has
245 Nachemson-Ekwall (2012), supra note 25, at 8-12.
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been argued that some recent takeovers may have been based less on synergies or economic
efficiency than on creating short term benefits for shareholders at the cost of other constituencies,
such as employees or creditors.246 Another criticism has been that the externalities of corporate
action, such as loss of jobs or environmental emissions, are not carried by those immediately
profiting from the cash flows produced by the corporation but by society at large.247
This chapter has argued that a political approach to corporate governance can provide the
relevant explanations for recent developments in corporate regulation. The study claims that the
effects of the coordination of political action, path dependence and changes in the political
economy should not be underestimated in explaining corporate governance outcomes. Corporate
governance and takeover regulation have largely evolved as a result of the changes in the broader
political economy in the Nordic countries discussed in this chapter. At the same time, the
institutional framework continues to support concentrated ownership. Finally, the EU has
provided a new avenue for coordinating political action that may circumvent the national
regulatory dynamic and facilitate regulatory change.
A. CORPORATEGOVERNANCE, SHAREHOLDERS AND STAKEHOLDERS
Monitoring by a large undiversified shareholder may well be an effective governance mechanism.
For dispersed shareholders, it makes less sense to take on the cost of active monitoring; instead, it
is more effective for them to liquidate positions where management does not seem to be
performing sufficiently well. A dispersed shareholder system may in fact result in the inadequate
monitoring of management, especially as management can be expected to take steps to make such
monitoring more difficult and entrench their positions. Market-based monitoring mechanisms,
such as takeovers, are deemed to be relatively ineffective at the end of the day.248
However, a system with controlling shareholders is of course vulnerable to the extraction of
private benefits of control by the incumbent shareholder at the cost of minority shareholders.
Nonetheless, due to relatively efficient product market competition, there have not been
excessive rents available for extraction in the Nordic countries. Moreover, the political system
has provided certain benefits for large shareholders, making “stealing” less appealing. Finally,
and most importantly, the increase of politically influential institutional investors provides a
monitoring mechanism with respect to controlling shareholders. Public pension funds, for
example, often hold significant positions in companies with large shareholders. In many cases the
positions may not be sufficiently liquid to allow immediate exit in case of unsatisfactory
performance. Thus, pension funds are likely to allow the controlling shareholder to maintain
control and steer the company, but they will monitor the performance of the controlling
shareholders and, will certainly not allow the extraction of private benefits of control. Even
though they are financial investors, these funds have a high level of political influence, as they
represent labor interests in the form of retirement benefits. Large shareholders in Sweden are well
aware, based on their experience of Swedish regulatory history, that regulatory intervention can
be swift when corporate abuse occurs. In markets where the risk of political action is not as
246 Id. at 12.
247 Sjåfjell (2009), supra note 24, at 197-198.
248 See Bebchuk (2005), supra note 132.
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severe, large shareholders are unlikely to be as responsive. It could be argued the differences in
corporate governance regulation in Finland vis-a-vis Sweden are an example of this.
Based on the review of the evolution of corporate governance mechanisms in the Nordic region
presented in this study, it seems that controlling shareholders are prepared to accept increased
transparency and monitoring of their relationship with the company they control. They also seem
to be prepared to accept restrictions to the extraction of private benefits of control, as they receive
some level of compensation through an overall institutional environment that is beneficial to
large shareholders. However, controlling shareholders are unwilling to allow changes to
corporate governance that challenge their ability to control the corporations where they hold large
stakes. Thus, it is possible that to some extent the institutional environment is still dependent on
concentrated ownership.
B. STRATEGIES FOR REGULATORY INTERVENTION
It remains important to recognize that corporate governance also offers mechanisms for providers
of finance to ensure a return on their investment.249 It matters how corporations are structured,
how revenue is allocated and how economic activity is incentivized. There is no guarantee that
the outcomes of political bargaining or the results of a path dependent development are optimal
or efficient, which raises the question of how these concerns might be addressed through
regulatory intervention in a political corporate environment. This study argues that in corporate
governance regulation it remains important to provide adequate incentives for investors to
provide corporate financing while addressing regulatory concerns characteristic to the relevant
form of governance. In a system with an emphasis on concentrated ownership, this would entail
not challenging the control mechanisms used by large shareholders but, instead, introducing
mechanisms to address abuse of the system, i.e. “stealing” or “shirking” by agents. As discussed
earlier, levels of private benefits of control remain low in the Nordic region (representing a lack
of “stealing”), but it is unclear whether adequate measures have been taken to allow the control of
incumbent shareholders to be challenged when they no longer provide an effective monitoring
function (i.e. “shirking”).
The entrenchment of controlling shareholders is one of the characteristics of a system dominated
by concentrated ownership. As discussed above, it has proved very difficult to introduce
regulation that challenges control per se. It might also be counterproductive to do so in a system
relying on controlling shareholders for corporate monitoring. It should be noted that in
connection with the adoption of certain EU-level corporate governance regulation, including the
Takeover Directive, there was significant resistance to initiatives thought to dilute the control
rights of controlling shareholders. Incumbent shareholder groups were able to mobilize political
support for their position, and regulatory initiatives such as the break-through rule failed (as
perhaps it should). At the same time, other corporate governance mechanisms that increase
minority protection, such as increased transparency requirements, have been passed. Thus, while
incumbent shareholders have been willing to subject their dealings to increased scrutiny,
relinquishing control has been a bridge too far. In designing legal strategies, it may be important
to recognize the key concerns of important constituencies and structure regulation accordingly.
249 Andrei Shleifer & Robert W. Vishny, A Survey of Corporate Governance, 52 J. OF FIN. 737, 737 (1997).
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Instead of challenging incumbent shareholder control, regulation might be introduced that
provides incentives for control transfers.
National regulatory systems may well be vulnerable to capture, and with respect to corporate
governance they may come to favor politically relevant constituencies. Changes in industrial
structures or technological innovation can have a profound effect on the bargaining position of
different constituencies, as changes in product markets affect corporate constituencies
differently.250 Changes in the political environment can have the same effect. With respect to
corporate governance and takeover regulation in EU member states, the EU regulatory
framework has provided a new parallel avenue for regulatory change not subject to the same
capture or dynamic as national regulation. The EU has introduced new dimensions to corporate
governance regulation that can affect the bargaining power of corporate constituencies
significantly. Interest groups that are large and organized at the national level can be fragmented
at the EU level, and new groups that have been too small to organize at the national level can
have sufficient critical mass to overcome coordination problems at the EU level.
The political dynamic of EU level regulation naturally differs from the national regulation of
small countries. Constituencies that may be able to promote their interests effectively at the
national level may lack the clout to pursue their agendas at the EU level. The institutional
structures prevalent in smaller EU economies may be more prone to change than the structures
that dominate in economies with more influence in EU decision-making. Consequently, it is no
surprise that EU corporate governance regulation is not tailored to facilitate structures adopted in
the Nordic countries. However, it is unlikely that EU-level regulation will challenge the key
parameters of the Nordic corporate governance system, i.e., control structures and concentrated
ownership. Instead, further measures are likely to be introduced to increase transparency and the
accountability of large shareholders. In this regard, examples of new regulation could include
enhanced regulatory regimes for related party transactions and the introduction of appropriate
fiduciary duties for controlling shareholders.
250 Peter Nobel (2009), supra note 107, at 176 – 179.
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CHAPTER 4
TOWARDS A NORDIC CORPORATE GOVERNANCE INDEX:METRICS FOR CONCENTRATED
OWNERSHIP
In comparative corporate governance research, it has been recognized that the same metrics
may not be appropriate for assessing the quality of corporate governance in different
institutional environments and different structures of corporate ownership. The analysis of
corporate governance mechanisms for concentrated ownership remains important in this
regard. For example, it has been argued that the quality of corporate governance models in
the Nordic region, with relatively high levels of concentrated ownership but with reportedly
low levels of private benefits of control, is not fully reflected in established corporate
governance indices.
This chapter identifies corporate governance metrics that are relevant in an environment of
concentrated ownership in a Nordic context. The study finds that many of the current
corporate governance indices use metrics that are less relevant than assumed in the context of
concentrated ownership. More attention should be given to adapting corporate governance
mechanisms to the requirements of the relevant corporate environment, and to recognizing
functionally equivalent regulatory mechanisms. The study constructs the basis for a corporate
governance index reflecting these factors. The chapter argues that a number of relevant
mechanisms are, in fact, applied in the Nordic region but these have not been sufficiently
recognized in established indices. Nevertheless, further regulation may be warranted to
overcome minority coordination problems for better enforcement of minority interests.
I. INTRODUCTION
Different criteria for assessing the quality of corporate governance systems have been
developed in comparative corporate governance research.1 In this context it is recognized that
the application of similar metrics to assess the standards of corporate governance in different
institutional environments may be inappropriate, and that corporate governance indices must
be adapted to the relevant corporate environment.2 The structure of corporate ownership has
been an important factor in this regard. The broader institutional environment, including the
1 Rafael La Porta, Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes, Andrei Shleifer & Robert W. Vishny, Law and Finance, 106 J. OF
POL. ECON. 1113 (1998) [hereinafter La Porta et al. (1998) or LLSV]; Rafael La Porta, Florencio Lopez-de-
Silanes, & Andrei Shleifer, Corporate Ownership around the World, 54 J. OF FIN. 471 (1999), Rafael La Porta,
Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes, Andrei Shleifer & Robert W. Vishny, Investor Protection and Corporate
Governance, 58 J. OF FIN. ECON. 2 (2000), Katharina Pistor, Martin Raiser & Stanislaw Gelfer, Law and Finance
in Transition Economies, 8 ECON. OF TRANSITION 325 (2000), Paul Gompers, Joy L. Ishii & Andrew Metrick,
Corporate Governance and Equity Prices (NBER Working Paper 8449, 2001), available at
http://www.nber.org/papers/w8449, and Marina Martynova & Luc Renneboog, A Corporate Governance Index:
Convergence and Diversity of National Corporate Governance Regulations (TILEC Working Paper 12, 2010),
available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1557627.
2 Lucian A. Bebchuk & Assaf Hamdani, The Elusive Quest for Global Governance Standards (John M. Olin
Center Discussion Paper 633, 2009), available at http://www.law.harvard.edu/programs/olin_center/.
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development of complementary institutions and the availability of enforcement systems, must
also be considered when assessing the relevance of corporate governance mechanisms.
This chapter analyzes certain corporate governance metrics used to assess the quality of
corporate governance and identifies variables that are relevant in an environment of
concentrated ownership in a Nordic context. The study finds that in the context of
concentrated ownership many of the corporate governance mechanisms used in current
indices represent less relevant variables than previously assumed. More attention should be
given to adapting corporate governance mechanisms to the requirements of the relevant
corporate environment and recognizing functionally equivalent mechanisms when assessing
the quality of corporate governance. The chapter argues that mechanisms focused on minority
cash-flow rights and measures inducing the transfer of control should be given greater
emphasis. In addition, the scope of corporate governance regulation must be understood
broadly, so as to include not only corporate regulation but tax and securities regulation.
A. BEYOND UNIVERSAL CORPORATE GOVERNANCE INDICES
With the development of comparative corporate governance research, there has been much
interest in developing universal criteria for assessing the standards of corporate governance.3
The work of La Porta et al.4 has been crucial in the development of corporate governance
indices and has formed the basis for further development and refinement of such indices.5
These indices, in turn, have had a significant impact on corporate governance research and
policy.6 They have been used as a guide for developing corporate governance mechanisms
and in promoting corporate governance regimes in developing countries.7 Nonetheless, some
scholars question whether universal metrics are at all appropriate for assessing the quality of
corporate governance systems in very different corporate environments,8 arguing that the
choice of governance system is closely related to the corporate environment and specific
circumstances and that uniform metrics are not suited for such assessments. Bebchuk &
Hamdani argue that at the very least corporate governance indices must be better adapted to
the relevant institutional environment.9 The effects and functions of corporate governance
mechanisms vary depending on the structure of corporate ownership and on the presence of
and access to specific legal institutions, for example. Giving corporate governance
mechanisms the same weight in indices without considering these factors distorts attempts to
compare the quality of corporate governance.10
Bebchuk and Hamdani consequently suggest that separate corporate governance indices be
developed for systems with dispersed and concentrated ownership.11 The dynamics of the
relationship between key corporate constituencies in companies with concentrated or
3 See CONVERGENCE AND PERSISTENCE IN CORPORATE GOVERNANCE (Jeffrey N. Gordon & Mark J. Roe, eds.,
2004).
4 See La Porta et al. (1998); see also La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer & Vishny (2000), supra note 1 and
Rafael La Porta, Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes & Andrei Shleifer, The Economic Consequences of Legal Origins,
46 J. ECON. LIT. 285 (2008).
5 See Pistor, Raiser & Gelfer (2000), supra note 1, and Martynova & Renneboog (2010), supra note 1.
6 See Holger Spamann, Law and Finance Revisited (HLS John M. Olin Cebter Discussion Paper 12, 2008),
available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1095526 and Sanjai Bhagat et al., The Promise and Peril of Corporate
Governance Indices, 108 COLUM. L. REV. 1803 (2008).
7 Bebchuk & Hamdani (2009), supra note 2, at 7-8; see also Bhagat et al. (2008), supra note 6.
8 See Bhagat et al. (2008), supra note 6.
9 See Bebchuk & Hamdani (2009), supra note 2.
10 Id. at 3.
11 Id. at 1-2.
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dispersed ownership is fundamentally different. Arrangements for enhancing shareholder
protection in dispersed ownership may be less relevant or even detrimental in the context of
concentrated ownership.12 Regulation regarding the ability of the board of directors to oppose
takeovers, for example, may be of little relevance in the presence of a controlling shareholder
with an effective veto on most control transactions. Other corporate governance mechanisms
may be called for in the presence of controlling shareholders, who effectively control
corporate strategy and the use of corporate assets. The structure of corporate ownership is one
element of a broader corporate environment defined by industrial and historical
developments, among others. As the institutional environment develops, complementary
institutions evolve, resulting in political and legal institutions with different characteristics,
which also affect corporate governance systems.
In the Nordic context, a number of features related to the structure of ownership define the
corporate governance landscape. The ability of large shareholders to control corporate affairs
is a distinctive and complementary feature of the system. Relevant mechanisms in this regard
include the availability of control enhancing mechanisms; for instance, dual class shares are
common. Shareholder decision rights tend to be robust, and large shareholders can effectively
use their powers through the general meeting of shareholders. Minority shareholders,
however, may lack an effective voice in the absence of cumulative voting, for example. These
features have affected the scores of Nordic countries in some corporate governance indices.13
However, corporate governance metrics based on the ability to challenge the control of large
shareholders may be misguided in this environment. Instead, metrics related to the exit and
cash-flow rights of minority shareholders may be more meaningful. Enforcement mechanisms
should also be available that reflect the ability of different constituencies to overcome
coordination problems. In this respect it is unclear whether a functioning court system is, in
itself, sufficient to provide a meaningful avenue for minority protection if the financial
interests of dispersed minority investors are limited and the risks related to litigation high.
Instead, increased transparency combined with public enforcement may provide an effective
enforcement mechanism for minority interests. The availability and quality of Nordic
corporate governance mechanisms and related legal institutions should be assessed in this
context.
There are convincing arguments for the notion that universal indices are ill-suited to different
structures of corporate ownership.14 This study is concerned with the dynamics of corporate
governance in the context of concentrated ownership in the Nordic countries and focuses on
identifying governance mechanisms that are relevant in this environment. The study seeks to
contribute to the creation of metrics for analyzing the quality of corporate governance in an
environment of concentrated ownership for the purposes of comparative corporate governance
research.
B. CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AND THE INSTITUTIONAL ENVIRONMENT
Corporate governance and the structure of corporate ownership reflect the development of
economic, political, legal and historical conditions.15 For example, the model of ownership
12 Id. at 3.
13 La Porta et al (1998), supra note 1.
14 See Bebchuk & Hamdani, supra note 2.
15 Randall K. Morck & Lloyd Steier, The Global History of Corporate in Governance – An Introduction in A
HISTORY OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AROUND THEWORLD: FAMILY BUSINESS GROUPS TO PROFESSIONAL
MANAGERS 517, 518-522 (Randall K. Morck, ed., 2005); see also Peter Högfeldt, The History and Politics of
Corporate Ownership in Sweden, in A HISTORY OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AROUND THEWORLD: FAMILY
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and governance that has developed in an economy with heavy industry requiring considerable
capital outlays and unskilled labor could be expected to differ from the model in an economy
based on products and services requiring firm-specific investments of skilled labor.
Nevertheless, industrial and historical developments may not support a specific structure of
corporate ownership in all cases.16 For instance, Roe argues that in countries with strong labor
institutions there is likely to be more pressure for corporate governance institutions that favor
employees and less for institutions that support the interests of shareholders.17 For example,
companies are likely to be encouraged to expand to secure employment even at the cost of
profitability and avoid down-sizing and taking disruptive risks.18 In this environment the
institutions needed for dispersed ownership to flourish are not present, whereas a controlling
shareholder, on the other hand, would be in a better position, in relative terms, to bargain over
surplus and to resist political pressures.19
The importance of historical developments and path dependence has been emphasized in the
legal literature on corporate governance.20 Once a given structure has been established, it is
likely to be reinforced as complementary institutions develop.21 With respect to corporate
governance, different systems may develop with the same functional effects. For example,
depending on the environment, corporate performance can be monitored by an undiversified
large shareholder or financial institutions acting as lenders, or it could be performed by
market-based mechanisms, such as takeovers or proxy fights.22 For example, in the context of
concentrated ownership, systems might develop to support controlling shareholders’ ability to
use control. At the same time, however, monitoring mechanisms may develop to address
concerns about the relationship between controlling and minority shareholders. Thus, in an
environment with controlling shareholders, there should be little need to focus regulation on
the ability of shareholders to monitor management; in contrast, there may well be a need for
minority protection mechanisms. In other corporate environments, different, but functionally
similar, monitoring systems may evolve.
Corporate governance mechanisms should be developed to address concerns related to the
relevant environment, but regulation should not undermine the basic premises of the
particular governance system. This means that the standard and quality of corporate
governance regulation must be analyzed and assessed in the context of the relevant
institutional environment, i.e., how well the regulatory framework addresses the
vulnerabilities and potential for abuse in that particular system. To be meaningful, corporate
governance indices should recognize mechanisms that are complementary to the corporate
environment. On the other hand, indices should also identify the problems and potential for
abuse associated with the specific system of governance and assess how these are addressed.
BUSINESS GROUPS TO PROFESSIONALMANAGERS, supra; and Paul Davies et al., Beyond the Anatomy, in
REINIER KRAAKMAN ET AL, THE ANATOMY OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 305 (2ND ED., 2009).
16 SeeMark Roe, Political Preconditions to Separating Ownership from Corporate Control, 53 STAN. L.REV.
539 (2000); see alsoMagnus Henrekson & Ulf Jakobsson, The Swedish Corporate Governance Model:
Convergence, Persistence or Decline?, 20 CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: AN INTERNATIONAL REVIEW 212 (2012).
17 Roe (2000), supra note 16, at 18.
18 Id. at 18-19.
19 Id. at 19.
20 See Lucian A. Bebchuk and Mark J. Roe, A Theory of Path Dependence in Corporate Governance and
Ownership, 52 STAN. L. REV. 127 (1999).
21 See DOUGLASS C. NORTH, INSTITUTIONS, INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE AND ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE (1990).
22 Marco Becht, Patrick Bolton & Ailsa Röell, Corporate Governance and Control 1 (ECGI Finance Working
Paper 02/2002), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=343461.
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Scholars have observed that the structure of corporate ownership is reflected in how
corporations are controlled. This has often been reflected in the allocation of legal powers
among corporate constituencies, which in turn has affected the evolution of ownership
structures. In jurisdictions with dispersed ownership, management generally has the legal
power to control corporate strategy and the use of corporate assets, while in countries where
concentrated ownership is prominent, controlling shareholders have the authority and power
to do so. The regulatory environment commonly reflects the interests of politically dominant
constituencies. It has been noted that “[c]orporate law everywhere clearly reflects the
institutional and political power of a country’s dominant corporate interests, whether they be
banks, prominent families, investment funds, or unions.”23 Nonetheless, at the same time
efforts have been made to shape corporate law to “enhance the efficiency with which
corporations can be financed and managed in the context of the country’s particular pattern of
ownership.”24 Consequently, it seems clear that these aspects should be recognized when
constructing corporate governance indices. In other words, indices should be constructed to
reflect real world political dynamics – without necessarily compromising requirements related
to the quality of the governance system.
C. REGULATORY IMPLICATIONS – THE GOALS OF THE STUDY
Corporate governance rules should be tailored to the relevant institutional environment based
on the suitability of different legal strategies. In different institutional environments, different
mechanisms can be functional substitutes, providing relevant and similar governance
functions.25 Where markets for corporate control are deemed to provide a market-based
monitoring system in an environment of dispersed ownership, large shareholders or financial
institutions26 are deemed to provide a similar function in other corporate ownership structures.
Thus, when the corporate environment differs, so do the relevant corporate governance
mechanisms.
Legal intervention in economic activity can take many forms, varying from the enforcement
of standards of behavior (such as the fiduciary duties of the board) to empowering economic
actors to pursue their rights independently through legal and contractual structures
(shareholders’ meetings, for example). To be effective, the type of legal intervention may
need to be adjusted to the particular circumstances, as discussed. For example, intervention
cannot rely on aggrieved parties’ pursuing their rights independently if they lack the
incentives or means to do so. Another aspect to consider in planning legal intervention and
designing regulations is how they will be received by the affected constituencies and whether
it is feasible that initiatives will pass the legislative process.
Scholars have outlined a typology of legal strategies in the context of corporate governance,
with mechanisms divided into ex ante and ex post regulatory and governance strategies.27 Ex
ante regulatory strategies include rules and ex post regulatory strategies include standards.
Further regulatory strategies concern terms of entry and exit,28 including disclosure
obligations and appraisal rights. Governance strategies grant governance rights, such as
23 John Armour, Henry Hansmann & Reinier Kraakman, What is Corporate Law? 1, 32 in Kraakman et al.
(2009), supra note 15.
24 Id.
25 See Becht, Bolton & Röell (2002), supra note 22, at 1 and 31-36.
26 Id. at 1.
27 John Armour, Henry Hansmann & Reinier Kraakman, Agency Problems and Legal Strategies, 35, 39 in
Kraakman et al. (2009), supra note 15.
28 Id., referred to as “Affiliation Terms.”
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appointment rights (election of the board), decision rights and incentive schemes. For
instance, decision rights can take the form of the right to initiate or ratify management
decisions. Such legal strategies should be tailored to the relevant institutional environment,
including the structure of corporate ownership. Importantly, the mechanisms used to address
regulatory concerns in the context of dispersed ownership may be ineffective in an
environment of concentrated ownership and may, for example, even further entrench
corporate control.29 Moreover, when governance rights are granted to minority shareholders
in such an environment, coordination problems are likely to prevent them from making
effective use of those rights.
The broader legal and institutional environment is also important for choosing appropriate
legal strategies. For example, certain strategies rely on the availability and quality of legal
institutions such as courts or supervisory agencies.30 These institutions are likely to have
developed to complement existing structures of corporate ownership and control and may or
may not provide an effective basis for enforcement. Ex ante rules require support from
regulators who can monitor the markets and respond in a timely manner.31 More general
standards of behavior, on the other hand, require an advanced legal system.32 For example, in
some jurisdictions courts may not be geared to address complex corporate matters in a timely
fashion. Moreover, in the absence of class actions, the balance between risks and potential
returns may, in effect, provide disincentives to use certain corporate governance mechanisms
and hence neutralize minority protection.33 Dispersed minority shareholders are burdened by
coordination problems, and thus mechanisms based on active monitoring, such as standing to
sue, may be less relevant than ex ante rules and regulations.34 The principle of equal treatment
of shareholders, for example, is often enforced ex-post by actions initiated by aggrieved
parties. As a legal strategy, such tools are problematic with respect to large, diverse interest
groups with a high threshold for coordinating their activities.35 Introducing a regulatory
mechanism that is neutralized by the structure of corporate ownership or the lack of effective
enforcement mechanisms is futile, as is its use as a metric in a corporate governance index
without reference to the institutional environment. Moreover, using uniform metrics in
corporate governance indices without taking the relevant structure of ownership into
consideration will produce misleading results.
This chapter seeks to identify the key corporate governance metrics for concentrated
ownership and apply them in a Nordic context. After introducing the theme and objectives of
the study in Section I, the chapter turns to a discussion of the dynamics of corporate
governance in the context of concentrated ownership in Section II. The chapter then describes
certain corporate governance indices currently in use and analyzes the relevance of their key
metrics in an environment of concentrated ownership in Section III. The chapter also
introduces a summary of the relevant metrics for concentrated ownership. In Section IV the
study assesses Nordic corporate governance mechanisms in light of the summary, before
29 See John C. Coates IV, Ownership, Takeovers and EU Law: How Contestable Should EU Corporations Be?
(ECGI Law Working Paper No. 11/2003), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=424720.
30 Armour, Hansmann & Kraakman (2009), supra note 27, at 40 and 46-47.
31 Id., at 52.
32 Id.
33 See Roland Gilson, The Nordic Model in an International Perspective, in THE NORDIC CORPORATE
GOVERNANCE MODEL 94, 103 (Per Lekvall, ed., 2014).
34 See Armour, Hansmann & Kraakman (2009), supra note 27.
35 Id., at 52.
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offering some conclusions in Section V. The basis for a corporate governance index for
concentrated ownership is set out in the Annex.
II. CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AND CONCENTRATED OWNERSHIP
Each form of corporate ownership raises its own set of governance challenges that should be
addressed in the context of the relevant structure of ownership and the broader institutional
environment. This should also be reflected in corporate governance indices. Therefore,
understanding the dynamics of corporate governance in the context of concentrated ownership
constitutes an important goal of this study. This section discusses the corporate governance
issues that arise in the context of concentrated ownership, and the dynamic of corporate
governance in that environment. This assessment will then form the basis for evaluating
corporate governance indices.
A. INTRODUCTION
Rather than implying inferior corporate performance, concentrated ownership can offer a
competitive basis for corporate enterprise.36 While concentrated ownership has been found to
correlate with weaker firm performance in certain regions, 37 a number of studies have found
a positive relationship between firm performance and concentrated ownership.38 A large,
undiversified controlling shareholder may have the incentive and the ability to provide more
effective monitoring of management than that offered by market-based mechanisms in a
dispersed ownership environment.39 For example, if sufficient restrictions are in place to limit
the ability of controlling shareholders to extract private benefits of control through related-
party transactions, the structure may well provide for a competitive form of ownership.40
The dynamics of corporate governance are fundamentally different in the context of dispersed
or concentrated ownership. In companies with concentrated ownership, the relationship
between majority and minority shareholders is a central factor in corporate governance.
Generally, a controlling shareholder is able to effectively monitor management,41 and thus
there is less concern about the relationship between shareholders and management. On the
other hand, there is considerable concern about controlling shareholders’ taking advantage of
their controlling position to use corporate assets to benefit their own interests rather than those
of all shareholders and extracting private benefits unavailable to other shareholders.
Typically, private benefits are extracted in related-party transactions or self-dealing, termed
“diversionary private benefits of control”42 or simply “stealing.”43 However, controlling
shareholders can also use their controlling position to steer the company towards the pursuit
36 See Ronald J. Gilson, Controlling Shareholders and Corporate Governance: Complicating the Comparative
Taxonomy, 119 HARVARD L. REV. 1641 (2006).
37 See Claessens, S, Djankov, S., Fan, J.P.H. and Lang, L.H.P., Disentangling the Incentive and Entrenchment
Effects of Large Shareholdings, 57 J. OF FIN. 2741 (2002).
38 See Torben Pedersen & Steen Thomsen, Ownership Structure and Value of the Largest European Firms: The
Importance of Owner Identity, 7 J. OFMANAGEMENT AND GOVERNANCE, 27-55 (2003).
39 See Ronald J. Gilson & Jeffrey N. Gordon, Controlling Controlling Shareholders, 152 U. PA. L. REV. 785
(2003).
40 Gilson (2006), supra note 36, at 1649-1650 and 1678-1679.
41 See Bebchuk & Hamdani (2009), supra note 2, at 18.
42 Alessio M. Pacces, Control Matters: Law and Economics of Private Benefits of Control 30 (Rotterdam
Institute of Law and Economics, Working Paper 2009/04, 2009), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1448164.
43 Mark Roe, Corporate Law's Limits 16-17 (Columbia Law School Center for Law and Economic Studies,
Working Paper 186, 2002), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/abstract=260582.
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of goals unaligned with the interests of other shareholders, or they can fail to use their
controlling position to monitor management while resisting any transfer of control. These
situations are viewed as “distortionary private benefits of control”44 or simply “shirking.”45
In the case of controlling shareholders, it has been argued that while it is possible to restrict
diversionary private benefits through regulation, it is more difficult to address shirking.46 A
large controlling shareholder may rationally direct the use of corporate assets for purposes
other than the maximization of shareholder value. It is argued that in the presence of control
enhancing mechanisms this danger is accentuated, as the relative economic risk of the
controlling shareholder decreases in relation to his or her level of control.47
However, concentrated ownership can also be seen as stemming from the requirements of the
corporate environment. Concentrated ownership can be viewed as the outcome of bargaining
among corporate constituencies over the terms and conditions of corporate finance and other
firm-specific investments made in the corporate enterprise in a particular institutional
environment. This includes a trade-off between the different types of risk profiles and
appetites of the different constituencies; i.e., the structure of corporate finance, and the
distribution of control and cash flow rights, reflect a trade-off over how the risk profile of the
investment is controlled. The purpose of control is not necessarily to extract private benefits
but to provide a stable corporate ownership structure in a given institutional environment. The
institutional set up may favor, in relative terms, concentrated ownership over other structures
of ownership.48
It is possible that the controlling constituent prioritizes control rights over cash-flow rights,
whereas other investors take the opposite view, allowing the parties to seek an optimal
balance in the form of the financial structure of the corporation. Indeed, for minority
shareholders, individual investments may represent only part of a portfolio of financial
investments. In this context the financial aspects of the investment, including cash-flow rights
and the liquidity of the investment, are prioritized over control rights. At the same time, the
controlling shareholder holds an illiquid position and seeks to maximize its value through the
use of its control rights. In many cases, controlling shareholders need not be opposed to the
cash-flow and exit rights of minority shareholders as such, provided that their control rights
remain unchallenged.
Instead of being a means of extracting private benefits, corporate control may be an important
condition for firm-specific investments in certain circumstances. In fact, corporate control has
also been associated with the ability to pursue value maximizing strategies that markets are
not fully able to price.49 For the purposes of corporate governance regulation, it may be just as
important to recognize the interests of the controlling constituents (or agents) as to
acknowledge the need to protect minority shareholders.50 Thus, minority protection
44 Pacces (2009), supra note 42, at 14.
45 See Roe (2002), supra note 43.
46 Id.
47 See Lucian A. Bebchuk, Reinier Kraakman & George Triantis, Stock Pyramids, Cross-Ownership and Dual
Class Equity: The Mechanisms and Agency Costs of Separating Control From Cash-Flow Rights in
CONCENTRATED CORPORATE OWNERSHIP 445 (Randal Morck, ed., 2000).
48 See Enrico C. Perotti & Ernst-Ludwig von Thadden, The Political Economy of Dominant Investors (Tinbergen
Institute Discussion Paper 2004-091/2), available at http://dare.uva.nl/document/5462; see also Roe (2000),
supra note 16.
49 See Zohar Goshen & Assaf Hamdani, Corporate Control and Idiosyncratic Vision, 125 YALE L.J. 560 (2013).
50 Id. at 560.
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mechanisms should not undermine the controlling shareholder by challenging his or her
decision rights.
Below, this study describes some of the key characteristics of corporate governance in the
context of concentrated ownership. The purpose of the study is to establish how corporate
governance metrics can be adapted to these characteristics.
B. PRIVATE BENEFITS OF CONTROL
Private benefits of control can be extracted in various ways. For example, in an environment
of dispersed ownership, there is concern about management primarily pursuing its own
interests over those of shareholders. Managers may look to establish “perks” (i.e., non-
market-based remuneration and benefits of office) or strive to pursue interests that diverge
from those of other corporate constituencies. Takeover activity, for example, is often seen as
“empire building” by management if a clear economic basis is lacking for corporate
acquisitions. In concentrated ownership, a controlling shareholder may take a disproportionate
share of the company’s current earnings through related-party transactions (or “tunneling”),
for example. The controlling shareholder may also fail to use its controlling position to
effectively monitor management performance while resisting any transfer of control.
Controlling shareholders may also attempt to freeze out the minority or may seek to sell their
controlling block at a premium unavailable to other shareholders.
These methods of extraction are in all material respects substitutes, and should thus be
addressed in corporate governance. Hence, limiting the control premiums of large
shareholders in takeovers, for example, makes little sense if controlling shareholders are able
to extract private benefits of control through related-party transactions – and vice versa. In
contrast, Gilson and Gordon argue that regulation facilitating sale of control may create the
potential for greater efficiency gains than favoring freeze outs by controlling shareholders.51
As long as there are effective limits on the extraction of private benefits of control from
ongoing operations, an acquirer of a controlling block will have to increase efficiency to
obtain benefits from the transaction – which then come to benefit the minority shareholders as
well.52
When assessing the quality of corporate governance regimes, it is important to identify
whether legal regimes seek to restrict the extraction of private benefits by controlling
shareholders through such mechanisms as related-party transactions or tunneling. With the
decrease in private benefits (given that their complete elimination is unlikely), controlling
shareholders may be less inclined to maintain control in the face of value adding control
transactions if they can no longer contribute to the enterprise. As discussed by Gilson and
Gordon, it may be less problematic, at the margin, if limited private benefits are obtained in
connection with the sale of control.
C. CONCENTRATION OF CORPORATE CONTROL
A central characteristic of concentrated ownership is the ability of a controlling shareholder to
control corporate strategy and the use of corporate assets. In the context of concentrated
ownership, it is often the case that corporate control is concentrated with the controlling
shareholder, with minority shareholders generally having a very limited ability to use
shareholder rights to affect corporate control. For example, in many jurisdictions a controlling
51 See Gilson & Gordon (2003), supra note 39.
52 Id. at 21-22.
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shareholder often has de facto control over the general meeting. There has been concern that a
controlling position is open to abuse and that mechanisms restricting controlling shareholders
from disenfranchising minority shareholders have been insufficient.53 Is has also been argued
that monitoring agent behavior is more effective in dispersed ownership, where management
is accountable to shareholders and market-based mechanisms.54 Nevertheless, it has also been
suggested that corporate control is likely to be concentrated regardless of the structure of
ownership,55 and that this is a key characteristic of corporate governance more generally.56
Legal systems support management control in jurisdictions with a prevalence of dispersed
ownership, while shareholder power may be stronger in jurisdictions with a prevalence of
concentrated ownership.57
The concentration of control with a controlling shareholder has a significant effect on the
dynamics of corporate governance. The main function of shareholder rights in this context is
to ensure that the controlling shareholder can effectively monitor management and control the
company. In this environment minority shareholders can expect to have little decision-making
rights with regard to corporate strategy or the use of corporate assets, and in many respects
voting rights at general meetings are apparent only. As the controlling shareholder is likely to
dominate decision-making on corporate affairs, corporate governance mechanisms based on
voting rights and participation (i.e. “voice”) are less relevant. The controlling shareholder
provides the monitoring function in this regard. In fact, the ability of a minority shareholder to
challenge the corporate power of the incumbent controlling shareholder may result in the
former engaging in opportunistic behavior, as a smaller investment is at stake vis-à-vis that of
the large shareholder. However, minority protection mechanisms remain an important aspect
of corporate governance for the protection of the exit and cash-flow rights of the minority
against potential abuse from large shareholders.
D. CONTESTABILITY OF CONTROL
An important task of corporate governance is facilitation of the ability of corporations to
adapt to changing business environments. Corporate governance systems, including the
structure of corporate ownership and control, may strengthen over time, as complementary
institutions develop.58 As legal systems evolve, the position of the controlling constituents is
strengthened in relative terms and even entrenched. At the same time, the nature of the
corporate environment is one of pervasive change,59 and it is vital that the organization of a
business enterprise can be efficiently adapted to changing circumstances. As the business
environment changes due to technological or market developments, corporations should be
able to adapt their organizational structures60 to the new environment, and this should be
facilitated by regulation. Corporate governance and the transfer of corporate control are
53 Becht, Bolton & Röell (2002), supra note 22, at 17-21, see also Lucian A. Bebchuk, Efficient and Inefficient
Sales of Corporate Control, 109 Q´LY J. ECON. 957 (1994).
54 Becht, Bolton & Röell, supra note 22, at 12-17.
55 SeeMartin Hellwig, On the Economics and Politics of Corporate Finance and Corporate Control in
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: THEORETICAL AND EMPIRICAL PERSPECTIVES 95 (Xavier Vives, ed., 2000).
56 See Pacces (2009), supra note 42, at 9 and 30.
57 See Sofie Cools, The Real Difference in Corporate Law between the United States and Continental Europe:
Distribution of Powers 64 (Harvard Law School John M. Olin Center for Law, Economics and Business
Discussion Paper Series, Paper 490, 2004) available at http://lsr.nellco.org/harvard_olin/490.
58 See Bebchuk & Roe (1999), supra note 20 and Cools (2004), supra note 57.
59 Ronald J. Gilson, The Political Ecology of Takeovers: Thoughts on Harmonization of the European Corporate
Governance Environment, 61 FORDHAM L. REV. 161, 175 (1992).
60 Id. at 170.
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important elements in this respect.61 However, in terms of regulatory responses, the self-
reinforcing nature of the structure of corporate ownership and control poses a severe
challenge. Consequently, facilitating changes of corporate ownership may, in fact, be as
important as attempting to address concerns related to the corporations’ existing ownership
structure through regulation.62
A central characteristic of concentrated ownership is the difficulty in transferring control even
where such change could be value-increasing.63 Ownership structures should vary and evolve
according to the market requirements of the day.64 However, it may not be in controlling
shareholders’ interest to relinquish control unless they are compensated for potential future
private benefits, which creates a disincentive for controlling shareholders to agree to some
value-increasing control transfers.65 Moreover, it has proven difficult to challenge the control
of an incumbent controlling shareholder by regulatory means. Control can be exercised on the
basis of a variety of governance mechanisms, and controlling shareholders are likely to adapt
to any regulatory changes aimed at challenging control rights.66
The dynamic of takeovers, for example, is different in companies with dispersed and
concentrated ownership. In companies with dispersed ownership, the possibility of a hostile
takeover can be used as a market-based mechanism to monitor management performance. As
unsatisfactory performance is reflected in the share price, a bidder will be able to offer a
premium to shareholders and thus change management. In companies with concentrated
ownership, however, the controlling shareholder holds the key to control of the company and
has a veto right regarding control transactions. If a controlling shareholder is able to extract
private benefits, it will not be in his or her interests to sell the company, even at a premium,
unless future private benefits are compensated for. It has also been observed that where a
controlling shareholder enjoys purely non-pecuniary private benefits, such as political
influence or social standing,67 it can be even more difficult to compensate the incumbent for
the purposes of a control transaction.
To the extent that control cannot readily be contested, other means may be required to induce
transfers of control if the current structure has become sub-optimal. The fact that control
cannot be challenged does not necessarily mean that control will not be transferred. It has
often been pointed out that even though concentrated ownership is predominant in Sweden,
the country has traditionally had a high level of takeover activity. Efforts should thus be made
to ensure that the independent transfer of control is appealing to controlling shareholders
when they can no longer provide an efficient monitoring function and, on the other hand, that
maintaining a controlling position in such circumstances is less attractive.
E. CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AND ENFORCEMENT
Several factors must be taken into account when considering appropriate regulatory responses
to policy concerns. The problems that arise in the context of corporate governance can be
addressed by substantive legal mechanisms that differ in accordance with the characteristics
61 Id. at 164.
62 Id. at 174-175.
63 See Bebchuk (1994), supra note 53.
64 Gilson (2006), supra note 36 at 1645.
65 See Bebchuk (1994), supra note 53.
66 Coates (2003), supra note 29, at 6.
67 See Jeremy Grant & Thomas Kirchmaier: Who Governs? Corporate Ownership and Control Structures in
Europe, (SSRN Working Paper, June 7, 2004), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=555877.
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of the relevant institutional environment. As described by Mancur Olson, different political
constituencies have different requisites for pursuing their interests.68 To the extent that a small
homogenous group has similar interests they are likely to be able to coordinate their efforts to
affect political and regulatory outcomes. On the other hand, heterogeneous groups with
similar interests have considerable coordination problems and may need protection from
regulatory intervention.69 Similarly, in the context of legal strategies, Kraakman et al. argue
that controlling shareholders may be well positioned to pursue governance rights (decision
rights etc.) through private enforcement, while the interests of dispersed minority
shareholders require protection through regulatory strategies, such as rules and standards,
preferably enforced by public authorities.
In jurisdictions where corporate ownership is concentrated and a smaller group can benefit
from lower coordination costs, legal institutions are likely to evolve that grant these
constituencies authority to exercise and enforce control rights efficiently – ultimately through
legal action, if necessary. Minority shareholders are not in a similar position to defend their
interests. Where ownership is dispersed, there is more need for rules and standards that
protect minority shareholder interests,70 and they can be enforced by public authorities.
Increased transparency, clear regulations and independent agencies are the relevant
mechanisms in this environment. In fact, in such jurisdictions the court system may lack the
necessary features to pursue matters of this kind. In particular, the assessment of standards
that are adjudicated ex post, such as principles of equal treatment and other general principles
of company law, may include discretion that does not lend itself to efficient and timely
enforcement. In some cases, these issues have been addressed by introducing specialized
commercial courts or by allowing class actions suits.
III. CORPORATE GOVERNANCEMETRICS FOR CONCENTRATED OWNERSHIP
This section describes certain corporate governance metrics that have been applied to
determine the quality of corporate governance systems in connection with concentrated
ownership. The key metrics discussed include those identified by La Porta et al. (LLSV),
Djankov et al.,71 Bebchuk, Cohen & Ferrell,72 Bebchuk & Hamdani,73 Gompers, Ishii and
Metrick,74 Pistor75 and Martynova & Renneboog.76 The metrics will be analyzed to determine
their relevance in the context of regulatory concerns related to concentrated ownership that
have been discussed in this chapter. Based on this analysis, this section r will then introduce a
new summary of measurement variables for assessing corporate governance in the context of
concentrated ownership.
A.MEASURING SHAREHOLDER PROTECTION
68 SeeMANCUR OLSON, THE LOGIC OF COLLECTIVE ACTION: PUBLIC GOODS AND THE THEORY OF GROUPS
(1971).
69 Id.
70 Armour, Hansmann & Kraakman (2009), supra note 27, at 52.
71 See Simeon Djankov, Rafael La Porta, Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes and Andrei Shleifer, The Law and
Economics of Self-Dealing, 88 J. OF FIN. ECON. 430 (2008).
72 See Lucian A. Bebchuk, Alma Cohen & Allen Ferrell, What Matters in Corporate Governance? (HLS John
M. Olin Center Discussion Paper 491/2005), available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/so13/papers.cfm?abstract_id=593423.
73 See Bebchuk & Hamdani (2009), supra note 2.
74 See Gompers, Ishii & Metrick (2001), supra note 1.
75 Katharina Pistor, Patterns of Legal Change: Shareholder and Creditor Rights in Transition Economies, 1
EBOR 59, 72-79 (2000).
76 Martynova & Renneboog (2010), supra note 1.
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The level of shareholder protection has been measured, among others, on the basis of selected
legal provisions. The much cited index developed by La Porta et al. identifies the factors
believed to be relevant when measuring the level of investor protection in jurisdictions with
different types of legal systems. La Porta et al. use these variables to assess investor
protection in terms of the relationship between both shareholders and management, and
minority and controlling shareholders.77 These include (i) the requirement that shares are not
blocked before general meetings, (ii) the possibility of mailing a proxy vote at general
meetings, (iii) the percentage of share capital required to call an extraordinary general
meeting, (iv) pre-emptive rights when new shares are issued, (v) cumulative voting (a
mechanism whereby the minority may nominate a proportional number of board members)
and (vi) protection mechanisms providing oppressed minority shareholders with exit rights or
the standing to challenge corporate decisions (such as mergers, changes to articles or asset
sales).78
The metrics presented by La Porta et al. may reflect factors for overall good corporate
governance in that they measure the ease with which shareholders can participate in corporate
governance more generally. However, the La Porta et al. index has faced some criticism.79 For
example, the measurement variables fail to recognize the specific characteristics of different
corporate governance systems or the possibility of the functional equivalence of different
types of corporate governance mechanisms. Independently, voting rights or even standing to
sue may be less relevant for minority protection in an environment of concentrated ownership
than the appropriate regulation of related-party transactions, for example. Moreover, each of
the six metrics is given the same value in the La Porta et al. index, which does not necessarily
reflect their relevance relative to one another.
While the La Porta et al. index has been an important benchmark, it has been developed and
modified by several scholars.80 For example, in a study on transition economies, Pistor adds a
mandatory one-share-one-vote rule and rules on minimum dividends to the shareholder rights
index. Her study also regroups shareholder rights into “Voice,” “Exit,” “Anti-management,”
“Anti-block holding” and “Stock market integrity” indices.81 “Voice” includes mechanisms
for shareholders to vote and affect corporate decisions in relation to their holdings (including
the LLSV mechanisms). “Exit” includes rules that facilitate the right of shareholders to exit
their investment at fair value. An example of an “Exit” rule is the right of minority
shareholders opposing major changes (mergers or changes to articles) to require redemption
of their shares. “Anti-management” rights and “Anti-block holding” rights are used to assess
the relative weight given by a legal system to the conflict between shareholders and
management, and between block-holders and minority shareholders, respectively. “Anti-block
holding” mechanisms include rules on cumulative voting, quorum rules and rules providing
judicial recourse.82 The “Stock market integrity” index measures mechanisms that protect the
integrity of the market as a whole, such as insider rules and the existence of independent
77 La Porta et. al. (1998), supra note 1, at 1127.
78 Id. at 1123, 1127-1128.
79 See Bebchuk & Hamdani (2009), supra note 2; see also Gilson (2006), supra note 36.
80 SeeMarco Pagano & Paolo Volpin, The Political Economy of Corporate Governance, 95 THE AMERICAN EC,
REV. 1005 (2005); see also Holger Spamann, The “Antidirector Rights Index” Revisited, 23 THE REV. OF
FIN.STUDIES 467 (2009) and Pistor (2000), supra note 75.
81 Pistor (2000), supra note 80; see also Pistor, Raiser & Gelfer (2000), supra note 1.
82 See Pistor (2000), supra note 75, at 95-99.
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market regulators. Pistor points out that such mechanisms, which provide market liquidity,
can be functional substitutes for other shareholder rights.83
Pistor’s study was conducted in the context of analyzing legal developments in transition
economies.84 However, her identification of different types of indices and her recognition that
there can be functional substitutes for different mechanisms are useful for developing a
taxonomy of corporate governance mechanisms. This allows for a choice of mechanisms
depending on the dynamics of the institutional environment. In the context of concentrated
ownership, for example, granting “Voice” rights to minority shareholders can also allow
opportunistic behavior and can be strongly opposed by controlling shareholders. “Exit” rights,
on the other hand, could provide a feasible substitute in this environment. Moreover, clearly
identifying “Anti-block holding” metrics provides an important basis for the meaningful
analysis of the relationship between controlling and minority shareholders in an environment
of concentrated ownership.
B. THE ENTRENCHMENT INDEX
Entrenchment of the incumbent structure of ownership may be a considerable concern in the
context of concentrated ownership. The size of their holdings and the resultant voting rights
often give controlling shareholders a de facto veto over control transactions. There has been
some concern that corporate governance systems based on concentrated ownership are
insufficiently effective at monitoring controlling shareholders. There seems to be a lack of
effective mechanisms for restricting the ability of controlling shareholders to disenfranchise
minority shareholders and for challenging the control of incumbent controlling shareholders
when they no longer contribute to the enterprise.85 Entrenchment is not a phenomenon limited
to controlling shareholders, however. It appears that control is often concentrated and difficult
to challenge, regardless of governance and ownership structures.86
Bebchuk, Cohen & Ferrell emphasize the importance of identifying variables in corporate
governance indices that are relevant and effective, and in their study they focus on
mechanisms that address entrenchment in the context of dispersed ownership.87 Their work is
based on the selection of relevant measurement variables from a broader index of metrics
developed by Gompers, Ishii & Metrick, where each metric was given a similar weight in the
index. The variables Bebchuk, Cohen & Ferrell identify include constitutional limitations on
shareholder voting power (staggered boards, limits to amend by laws and supermajority
requirements for mergers and charter amendments), as well as takeover readiness, reflecting
the defensive posture of management (poison pills and golden parachutes). These mechanisms
are less relevant in the context of concentrated ownership, of course. However, their approach
highlights entrenchment as a key concern in corporate governance. As discussed above, this
concern is certainly relevant in the context of concentrated ownership and warrants separate
variables for that environment as well. Another important contribution made by Bebchuk,
Cohen & Ferrell is the recognition that not all corporate governance mechanisms necessarily
have the same relevance, and hence care should be taken to the weight each is given in an
index.88
83 Id. at 74.
84 Pistor (2000), supra note 75, at 71-72.
85 Becht, Bolton & Röell (2002), supra note 22, at 17-21, see also Bebchuk (1994), supra note 53.
86 See Pacces, supra note 42.
87 See Bebchuk, Cohen & Ferrell (2004), supra note 72.
88 Id. at 1-2.
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Entrenchment mechanisms used in the context of concentrated ownership typically include
control enhancing mechanisms, such as multiple share classes or extra voting rights granted
on the basis of holding shares for a requisite time. Control can also be enhanced through
pyramids or cross-shareholdings, for example. However, it should be noted that some of these
mechanisms may be complementary to a concentrated ownership environment. In a corporate
environment where concentrated ownership provides a successful monitoring mechanism,
control enhancing mechanisms can be used to leverage this mechanism.89 Thus, it is not clear
that these mechanisms are detrimental per se, provided the potential for abusing them is
appropriately addressed.
However, it is still the case that mechanisms should be available to decrease entrenchment
and enable transfer of control or change of ownership where the incumbent shareholder no
longer provides an effective monitoring function. Mechanisms could be developed that induce
such changes without directly challenging the ability to control the corporation. One approach
to this situation is to first ensure that the ability of controlling shareholders to extract private
benefits of control is limited, then introduce mechanisms that limit any negative impact of the
transfer of control for controlling shareholders and that indeed encourage such transfers, and
finally make maintaining controlling positions less appealing (in relative terms) if corporate
performance is unsatisfactory.
In a concentrated ownership environment, an entrenchment index should include – as a basis
– corporate governance mechanisms related to the regulation of self-dealing and related party
transactions. An effective anti-entrenchment policy, where the control of controlling
shareholders is not directly challenged, is premised on restricting private benefits of control.
In addition, the metrics would then include dividend taxation in corporate pyramids and
taxation of transfer of control positions by controlling shareholders. In several jurisdictions
dividend taxation allows tax free payments of dividends in a pyramid – facilitating the use of
pyramid systems.90 High income taxes on transfer of control positions may also prevent
controlling shareholders from selling even when such sale would be otherwise justified and in
the interest of all the company’s shareholders. Finally, the ability of controlling shareholders
to take advantage of losses in controlled companies for their own tax purposes, would again
be an example of a disincentive to sell the position, even when performance was loss-making.
C. PROTECTINGMINORITY SHAREHOLDERS
Djankov et al. have introduced an index specifically adapted to concentrated ownership.91 The
index is based on a functional analysis of mechanisms available to protect outside investors
against self-dealing transactions. The index consists of elements related to private and public
enforcement for controlling self-dealing and stock market development. Private enforcement
(ex ante and ex post) variables include disclosure obligations and requirements for approval
by disinterested shareholders, as well as standing to sue for minority shareholders and the
assessment of the prerequisites for successful actions (access to evidence and burden of
proof). Public enforcement variables include sanctions imposed on inappropriate self-dealing
(including tax evasion), while stock market development variables include stock market
89 See Gilson (2006), supra note 36.
90 See Randall Morck, How to Eliminate Pyramidal Business Groups: The Double taxation of Intercorporate
Dividends and Other Incisive Uses of Tax Policy 136 in TAX POLICY AND THE ECONOMY, VOLUME 19 (James M.
Poterba, ed., 2005).
91 See Djankov et al. (2008), supra note 71.
148
capitalization, control premiums in control transactions, the number of listed firms and IPOs
(in relation to population / GDP) and the level of ownership concentration.
The index clearly identifies certain key characteristics of a concentrated ownership
environment. Self-dealing is a key concern in this environment. The index also correctly
identifies disclosure obligations and public enforcement as key variables.92 However,
approval by disinterested shareholders might not be an appropriate mechanism in this
environment, given applicable coordination problems. In fact, minority shareholders may well
be driven by opportunistic agendas if they had the right to approve related-party transactions
with controlling shareholders. Moreover, mere standing to sue may again be problematic,
considering the coordination problems of dispersed and diversified minority shareholders. An
advantage of the Djankov et al. index is its inclusion of an assessment of the prerequisites for
successful actions, and especially the burden of proof.93 With respect to self-dealing, a reverse
burden of proof might well be introduced to ensure related-party transactions involving
controlling shareholders are of an arm’s length nature. Importantly, this mechanism would not
prevent related-party transactions or challenge the control of the incumbent shareholder.
Mechanisms may still be needed to regulate the imbalance in the risks of legal action for
minority shareholders (such as class actions, specialized courts or the ability of independent
agencies or ombudsmen to take action, for example).
Anti-Block Mechanisms
A number of mechanisms identified in the LLSV index or by other scholars are also relevant
in the context of concentrated ownership. Pistor has identified the following mechanisms as
“Anti-block” mechanisms potentially relevant in the context of concentrated ownership94:
i. Cumulative voting (and other rules ensuring proportional board representation)
ii. Minority recourse against general meeting decisions
iii. Pre-emptive rights of shareholders
iv. A general meeting quorum requirement
v. A minority right to require redemption
vi. Mandatory takeover bid thresholds
vii. Disclosure requirement of block acquisitions
The index outlined above, with rules allowing shareholders to liquidate their investment, is
also relevant in the context of concentrated ownership. The index includes rules whereby (i)
the right to transfer shares is not restricted by law (and may not be limited by charter), (ii) any
formal requirements for transferring shares are limited to endorsement and registration, (iii)
minority shareholders have a put-option in case they oppose major transactions, including
mergers, reorganization, sale of major assets, charter changes etc., and (iv) a mandatory
takeover bid is triggered at a certain level of ownership (25%, 30% or 50%). Other
mechanisms in the LLSV and Pistor indices that are relevant in the context of concentrated
ownership include (i) the minority right to convene a general meeting, (ii) minimum dividend,
(iii) mandatory one-share-one-vote systems, (iv) the minority right to establish an audit
commission and (v) qualified majority requirements for fundamental decisions.
92 Id. at 463.
93 Id.
94 See Pistor (2000), supra note 75.
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Bebchuk & Hamdani also focus on corporate governance metrics in the context of
concentrated ownership and identify certain key factors in this context, including (i) the
allocation of power between majority and minority shareholders, (ii) the regulation of self-
dealing and freezeouts, and (iii) director independence. They argue that the ability of minority
shareholders to block certain fundamental transactions may be an important element of
corporate governance. Self-dealing, on the other hand, is usually a key concern in the context
of concentrated ownership, and mechanisms for addressing this could include disclosure,
voting requirements and fiduciary duties.95 Finally, in a concentrated ownership environment,
director independence should be assessed in relation to the controlling shareholder, of course,
while in dispersed ownership independence should be assessed in relation to management.96
Martynova & Renneboog have constructed a corporate governance index for EU member
states including separate indices for protecting shareholder interests with respect to
management, minority interests with respect to the controlling shareholders, and creditor
interests with respect to shareholders.97 Martynova & Renneboog take a functional approach,
identifying regulation of all types that protects and enforce the interests above. They
categorize protective measures based on the legal strategy applied and identify the following
instruments as relevant for the purposes of the protection of minority shareholder interests:
Appointment Rights: (i) mandatory minority board representation, (ii) rules allowing voting
caps, (iii) a ban on dual-class shares.
Decision Rights: (i) supermajority requirements for general meetings, (ii) the right to convene
a general meeting. Scores in the index depend on the level of shareholdings applied to the
provisions above.
Trusteeship strategy: The strategy aims at ensuring board independence from the controlling
shareholder, and the relevant corporate governance mechanisms include (i) non-shareholder-
elected board members and (ii) a ban on the CEO acting as chairman of the board (in 1-tier
board structures) and a clear ban on overlaps between management and supervisory boards (in
2-tier board structures).
Affiliation Rights: (i) an equal treatment rule, (ii) disclosure of block-holdings, (iii) a
mandatory bid rule, (iv) a sell-out rule, (v) a minority claim right in cases of expropriation and
(vi) a break-through rule eliminating super voting rights in takeover situations.
Lele & Siems have constructed more comprehensive indices for both shareholder protection
and minority protection.98 The authors’ goal was to compare the development of corporate
governance regulation in different jurisdictions, and their indices emphasize variables that
reflect differences in corporate governance systems. The authors also focused on coding to
provide a fuller body of measurement variables. Their index for minority protection includes
the following elements:
95 Bebchuk & Hamdani (2009), supra note 2, at 46.
96 Id.
97 Martynova & Renneboog (2010), supra note 1, at 3.





1 for a 50% quorum for an extraordinary shareholders’ meeting (when it is




1 if supermajority requirements (2/3 or 3/4) apply for
amendments of articles of association, mergers, and voluntary
liquidations; 0 if no such rules exist.
3.
One share – one
vote
(1) Default rule: 1 if the principle exists as a default rule; 0
otherwise.
(2) Multiple voting rights prohibited: 1 if prohibited; 2/3 if “grandfather clause”
applied, i.e., allowed only for companies that already have them; 1/3 if
government approval required; 0 otherwise.
(3) Capped voting rights prohibited: 1 if prohibited; 2/3 if allowed only for





1 if shareholders can cast all their votes for one candidate or if there is a
proportional representation mechanism for the board by which minority







1 if a shareholder cannot vote if the vote favors him or her








(1) Appraisal rights: 1 if they exist for mergers, amendments of
articles and sales of major company assets; 0 if they do not exist at
all.
(2) Mandatory bid: 1 if there is a mandatory bid for the remaining shares in
case of purchase of 30% or 1/3 of the shares; 0 if there is no mandatory bid at
all.
(3) Mandatory public offer: 1 if there is a mandatory public offer for purchase
of 10% or less of shares; 0.5 if the buyer has to make a mandatory public offer





1 if shareholders who acquire at least 3% of the capital have to disclose; 0.75 if





(1) Substantive law: 0 if the majority decisions of the general meeting
have to be accepted by the outvoted minority; equals 1 if some kind of
substantive control is possible (e.g., in cases of amendments to the articles of
association, ratification of management misconduct, exclusion of the pre-
emption right, related parties transactions, freeze outs); 0.5 if this control covers
only flagrant abuses of majority power.
(2) Shareholder action: 1 if every shareholder can file a claim against
a resolution by the general meeting because he or she regards it as void or
voidable; 0.5 if there are hurdles such as a threshold of at least 10% voting





(1) Exclusion of director’s duty of care in articles: 0 if possible and 1 otherwise.
(2) Rules on duration of director’s appointment: 1 if mandatory and 0
otherwise.
(3) Board composition (supervisory boards, non-executive directors): equals 1
if mandatory and 0 otherwise.
(4) Other topics: 1 if there is a general rule that company law is
mandatory; 0 if company law is a “model off the
shelf”; 0.5 if there is no general rule.
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The indices outlined above emphasize the need to separately assess the quality of corporate
governance systems with regard to the relationship between controlling and minority
shareholders. The indices provide a number of similar metrics in this regard. Below, this
study analyzes the application of these metrics in an environment of concentrated ownership,
and seeks to identify corporate governance mechanisms that are adapted to a concentrated
ownership environment and that also provide useful information on the quality of the
governance system.
D. ASSESSINGMECHANISMS FOR CONCENTRATED OWNERSHIP
The effects of regulatory mechanisms can vary considerably depending on the specific
institutional environment. An environment of concentrated ownership may support certain
mechanisms and institutions, while others may be less relevant. The basic premise is that
large shareholders have considerable interests to pursue through corporate governance
mechanisms, whereas smaller diversified shareholders will face coordination problems when
pursuing monitoring action. Thus, different types of regulatory intervention are required to
address the interests of these different constituencies.
Governance Strategies and Regulatory Strategies
A number of corporate governance mechanisms are either less relevant in an environment of
concentrated ownership or function differently than in dispersed ownership systems. Legal
strategies for protecting minority interests in concentrated ownership should principally
include regulatory strategies, such as rules and standards and entry and exit rights.
Enforcement of these strategies may require action by public agencies to overcome
coordination problems. This could entail a focus on securities regulation and tax regulation,
for example, and the ability of independent agencies to enforce minority interests. Anti-block
mechanisms should also be assessed from this perspective.
In an environment of concentrated ownership, controlling shareholders are generally able to
pursue their interests independently. Consequently, it is likely that governance strategies will
be employed with respect to the relationship between shareholders and managers. For
example, in an environment with large shareholders the right to appoint and remove directors
will probably be effective. Minority shareholders, however, are not in a similar position to
defend their interests, and with respect to the relationship between controlling shareholders
and minority shareholders, regulatory strategies are often required. Thus, standards for
director behavior are important in this context. Standards may also be needed to protect
minority shareholders from potential abuse by controlling shareholders. Entry and exit rights
are also important for minority shareholders and are reflected in such mechanisms as
mandatory bid rules. Similarly, large shareholders might be able to enforce their rights
through private means, whereas minority shareholders would need recourse to public
enforcement. An interesting question is whether some governance strategies might also be
suitable for the relationship between controlling shareholders and minority shareholders. For
example, rather than seeking to attempt to provide mechanisms that challenge the control of
large shareholders, regulation might instead strive to incentivize controlling shareholders to
transfer control when appropriate.
Less relevant aspects of corporate governance in the context of concentrated ownership
include takeover defense regulation (addressing poison pills, for example), and shareholder
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voting procedures. A controlling shareholder will generally have an effective veto on control
transactions, and so control is not contestable in the same manner as in companies with
dispersed ownership. Shareholder voting procedures are not without merit, but they lack the
importance they have in dispersed ownership environments. In fact, with respect to the
protection of minority interests, it should be emphasized that shareholder voting rights, or
“voice,” are merely one corporate governance mechanism, and there may be other
functionally equivalent mechanisms that can be used.
An important aspect of corporate governance is that the legitimate interests of the “agent”
must also be protected. In order to allow the “agent” to make firm-specific investments, there
must be some guarantees that they will not be confiscated by the “principals.” For the
purposes of corporate governance regulation, recognition of the rights of the controlling
constituents (or agents) may be just as important as acknowledgement of the need to protect
minority shareholders.99 The ability to use decision rights is usually of paramount importance
to controlling shareholders and – considering, for example, their typically undiversified and
illiquid holdings – provides the basis for their ability to create value on their investment and
manage their investment risk.100 The ability of minority shareholders to challenge their
control can undermine the basis of their investment and, in fact, can be seen by controlling
shareholders as attempted confiscation of their property. Indeed, when risk profiles are
sufficiently different, minority shareholders with potentially limited risks and a diversified
portfolio could well use minority rights against a heavily invested controlling shareholder in
an opportunistic manner. If minority shareholders are granted veto-rights on corporate
transactions, they may well take advantage of their different risk profile, and consequent
strengthened bargaining position, to require special treatment or unwarranted premiums.
Thus, a corporate governance index for concentrated ownership should not favor such
mechanisms as break-through rules, or emphasize the veto rights of minority shareholders,
provided sufficient protections are in place to protect their cash-flow and exit rights. In a
concentrated ownership environment, it may also be important that large shareholders are able
to rearrange their holdings and manage their investments. Mechanisms can be introduced that
balance the ability of controlling shareholders to control the use of corporate assets and the
cash-flow rights of the minority. Redemption rights and exemptions from mandatory bid
schemes, for example, can be relevant in this regard.
Below, this study briefly assesses some of the key metrics used in the indices discussed above
in this section.
Voting Rights
Anti-Block mechanisms and their related measurement variables include the use of voting
rights by minority shareholders – including cumulative voting and qualified majority
requirements. However, it is unclear whether mechanisms related to voting rights are key
elements for protecting minority interests in an environment of concentrated environment.
Decision rights, such as election of board members and requirements for management
proposals to be confirmed by shareholders, are deemed governance strategies that require a
level of coordination among shareholders. Decision rights are certainly important, as they
relate to the ability of shareholders to monitor management. In a concentrated ownership
environment, this monitoring is conducted by the controlling shareholder, however.
99 Goshen & Hamdani (2013), supra note 49, at 560.
100 VEIKKO VAHTERA, OSAKEOMISTUKSEN RISKI JA SÄÄNTELY [The Risks and Regulation of Share Ownership]
(2011), at 411-416.
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Nevertheless, it is certainly important that the controlling shareholder cannot wantonly make
fundamental changes to the company. In this respect, qualified majority requirements for
significant corporate decisions, such as mergers or changes of the corporate charter or articles,
can be seen as a relevant mechanism for minority protection. However, a more important
question is the extent to which the minority should have veto rights, or indeed whether exit
rights are the more appropriate (or alternative) mechanism for these types of situations. As
discussed earlier, the need to protect the interests of the controlling shareholder must also be
recognized when choosing legal strategies. In this regard, the balance between qualified
majority requirements and minority exit rights can be seen as the result of bargaining between
corporate constituencies.
Cumulative voting for board positions has been introduced in certain jurisdictions101 in such a
way that minority shareholders can elect a limited number of board members while still
allowing the controlling shareholder to control the board. Nonetheless, it is unclear whether
cumulative voting is a necessary element of this mechanism, as minority shareholders still
need to overcome coordination problems to make effective use of their voting rights. In other
jurisdictions, corporate governance codes or stock exchange rules require that the board
include members that are independent of large shareholders, which can provide a functional
equivalent to cumulative voting.
An important feature in many regions across the EU is the use of control structures that
support the concentration of control in listed companies.102 In these structures control is
generally separated by various means from cash-flow rights, allowing certain shareholders to
retain a higher degree of control over a company than their relative share of equity ownership
would suggest. The most common control mechanisms in use in the EU include pyramid
structures, multiple share classes, shareholders’ agreements, as well as voting and ownership
caps.103 In a structure with multiple share classes, different voting rights are attached to
different classes of shares. By retaining shares of a class with high voting rights, a controlling
shareholder is able to retain control of a company even if it issues new shares, providing they
have low voting rights.
Control enhancing mechanisms can, in fact, be seen as complementary mechanisms used to
leverage the monitoring function of controlling shareholders in the absence of alternative
governance institutions. Through control enhancing mechanisms, controlling shareholders can
obtain economies of scale and decrease firm specific risk.104 Nonetheless, the opposite view,
according to which the differentiation of cash flow and voting rights increases the potential
for majority shareholders to pursue their own benefits, must also be recognized. The premise,
101 Luca Enriques, Henry Hansmann & Renier Kraakman, The Basic Governance Structure: Minority
Shareholders and Non-Shareholder Constituencies, 89, 91, in Kraakman et al (2009), supra note 15.
102 See Grant & Kirchmaier (2004), supra note 67.
103 Shearman & Sterling, Proportionality Between Ownership and Control in EU Listed Companies 25 (External




104 Ronald J. Gilson & Alan Schwartz, Constraints on Private Benefits of Control: Ex Ante Control Mechanisms
versus Ex Post Transaction Review 4 (ECGI Law Working Paper 194, 2012), available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=2129502.
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then, that control enhancing mechanisms can serve a legitimate governance purpose, must be
based on the application of effective limits on the extraction of private benefits of control.105
On a general level, parties should have freedom of contract with respect to different corporate
finance and corporate governance structures. The promotion of specific structures of
governance or ownership through regulation is generally unwarranted. For example, it can be
argued that introducing the concept of one-share-one-vote would be an inappropriate
limitation of the outcomes of bargaining and freedom of contract.106 However, adopting this
approach does not mean that regulatory intervention is unwarranted as such. It is clear that
different corporate governance structures are vulnerable to abuse in different ways, and there
is no guarantee against the various corporate constituencies being primarily driven by self-
interest at the cost of others. The possibility of abuse must be recognized and addressed in the
context of the institutional environment.
Minority Recourse
Anti-Block metrics also include the requirement for minority recourse against decisions by
the general meeting. The possibility of ex-post assessment of corporate decisions may be a
valid requirement; however, to be relevant minority recourse against general meeting
decisions would require facilitation by public enforcement institutions. As discussed, minority
shareholders face coordination problems, as they individually carry the full risk of a negative
outcome in the courts, while they are only entitled to their pro rata share of a positive
outcome. Moreover, if minority shareholders have diversified their investments, they have
even lower incentives to pursue their rights through the court system.
Special features may need to be introduced to facilitate minority interests. For example,
specialized courts or agencies may be needed to improve the balance of interests and related
risks between controlling and minority shareholders in such situations. With respect to
assessing the appropriateness of related-party transactions, it could also be possible to
introduce fiduciary duties for the controlling shareholder and/or include provisions on the
burden of proof in shareholder litigation in such cases (i.e., introducing such measures as
entire fairness standards). Trusteeship strategies could also be introduced. For example, the
possibility of requiring a special audit provides the minority with an avenue to address
inappropriate related-party transactions. The mechanism is sometimes deemed invasive, and
may impede the on-going business of a corporation. However, the mechanism does provide
the possibility of a professional review of corporate records to reveal potential wrongdoing
without challenging control, and without unduly burdening the minority shareholders so as to
make the mechanism irrelevant.
Pre-emptive Rights and the Equal Treatment of Shareholders
The equal treatment principle often applied in company law is an important element of
minority protection. As a sharing rule it provides a governance strategy whereby the
controlling shareholder’s returns are tied to those of the minority – on a pro rata basis.107
105 See Bebchuk, Kraakman & Triantis (2002), supra note 47.
106 Peter Nobel, Stakeholders and the Legal Theory of the Corporation, in PERSPECTIVES IN COMPANY LAW AND
FINANCIAL REGULATION 176, 177 (Michael Tison, Hans de Wulf, Christoph van der Elst & Reinhard Steennot,
eds., 2009).
107 Armour, Hansmann & Kraakman (2009), supra note 27, at 42.
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The pre-emptive rights of shareholders represent an important standard of company law
related to the equality of shareholders, which as a principle may provide a significant
benchmark for setting standards and rules related to the actions of a controlling shareholder.
Such actions would include related-party transactions, dividend payments (or the decision not
to pay dividends), and the issue of new shares. Thus, provided satisfactory enforcement or ex
post assessments mechanisms are included, this could be an important metric for assessing
minority protection.
Cash-flow and Exit Rights
Cash-flow and exit rights can be useful minority protection mechanisms, which potentially
shield financial investments in the absence of “voice.” In many respects, “exit rights” provide
a functional equivalent or fall-back for “voice.” Indeed, the individual investments of
diversified minority shareholders often represent just part of a financial portfolio. In this
respect, an exit right at fair value provides a liquidity event allowing a similar financial
reinvestment. This can allow for efficient regulatory bargains between shareholders focusing
on control rights and those prioritizing the financial aspects of the investment. The controlling
shareholder could be granted broader control rights in exchange for increased liquidity for the
minority shareholders.
The minority dividend right protects the minority from abuse by the majority owners in the
form of “starving.” Controlling shareholders may be in a different position to extract returns
on their investments than minority shareholders. However, minority dividend provisions may
also be subject to manipulation even when they are applied, and effective protection requires
that the calculation of the dividend be appropriately regulated. Certain related-party
transactions, such as group contributions, could be disqualified from the calculations, for
example.
Minority redemption rights are typically applied when a large shareholder obtains a
sufficiently sizeable majority. This allows the majority shareholder to redeem all remaining
shares, but it also provides an exit for the minority. The redemption threshold, often 90
percent or higher of all shares and votes, could be made subject to some discretion and linked
to the availability of relevant minority protection mechanisms. Where such mechanisms are
no longer available, the possibility of redemption may be an equitable outcome. Often,
however, the influence of minority shareholders is insignificant where a controlling
shareholder holds close to 90 percent of shares, and there could be arguments for lowering the
threshold closer to the level where the minority has effective veto rights on significant
corporate decisions. This could also increase “deal security” and the ability of controlling
shareholders to pursue corporate transactions or rearrange their holdings.
Redemption rights may also apply in connection with significant corporate transactions, such
as mergers. In some countries, redemption rights also apply in connection with significant
changes to the corporate charter. Typically, such rights are triggered where the changes
negatively affect the rights of shareholders (such as changing the rights of a class of shares,
for example).108 However, it has been argued that in some of these situations exit rights are
not necessarily justified.109 A merger or change in the company’s articles of association, for
108 Edward Rock, Paul Davies, Hideki Kanda & Reinier Kraakman, Fundamental Changes, 183, 185 in
Kraakman et al (2009), supra note 15.
109 Vahtera (2011), supra note 100, at 329 and 359; but see TIMO KAISANLAHTI, SIDOSRYHMÄT JA RISKI
PÖRSSIYHTIÖSSÄ [INTEREST GROUPS AND RISK IN A LISTED COMPANY] 73-74 (1998).
156
example, has been seen to reflect the outcome of arm’s length corporate decisions where
qualified majority requirements provide sufficient protection for the minority. However, it is
also possible to see an exit-right mechanism as a trade-off. For example, qualified majority
requirements may have been set at a lower level in exchange for exit rights. In some countries
(including the Nordics) mergers, for example, are approved by a majority of 2/3 of the votes
and shares in attendance at a general meeting, but there are jurisdictions with higher majority
requirements or majority requirements linked to the total number of outstanding shares.110
Lower majority requirements allow controlling shareholders to use their control rights to
restructure the business enterprise, but they also provide increased minority protection. The
different specific majority requirements reflect different policy outcomes.
Nevertheless, as a minority protection mechanism, a redemption right provides increased
liquidity when a fundamental change is introduced that can have a significant effect on the
investment of a minority shareholder, and where the shareholder is unwilling to pursue an
investment with a different risk profile. Under such circumstances, the redemption right can,
in fact, be seen as an extension of a functional equivalent to a veto right (i.e., “voice”).
Moreover, the redemption right is a preferable mechanism to veto rights in that it does not
challenge the decision rights of the controlling shareholder, thereby allowing changes in the
corporation to take place.
The mandatory bid mechanism also provides exit rights for minority shareholders; however, it
is unclear whether the mandatory bid mechanism is appropriate under all circumstances in a
concentrated ownership environment. The mandatory bid rule prevents inefficient transactions
where the value sought by the bidder would be extracted from the target company at the cost
of the other shareholders rather than from increased efficiency or synergies. However, the rule
also generally limits the possibility of paying control premiums to controlling shareholders in
change of control transactions. Thus, the mandatory bid rule may protect minority
shareholders, but it can also increase the price of takeovers and discourage bidders from
making takeover bids in the first place – even if they are potentially value-creating.111
Therefore, the mandatory bid rule can have negative implications in an environment with
concentrated ownership, as it reduces trade in control positions. It has been argued, however,
that as a matter of principle, the mandatory bid rule can neither be deemed clearly superior
nor inferior to other functionally equivalent mechanisms; rather, the effect of the rule depends
on the applicable actual circumstances.112 In cases where buyers can extract significant private
benefits of control at the cost of the minority shareholder, a mandatory bid rule may be called
for. However, if the extraction of private benefits of control by a new buyer is effectively
restricted, there should be no need for a mandatory bid rule.113 This suggests that the
application of the mandatory bid rule should be selective and based on the applicable level of
minority protection mechanisms.
Disclosure Requirements
Pistor et al. mention disclosure of block-holding positions as an anti-block mechanism. This
provides the means for shareholders to monitor whether a control position is being pursued or
110 Rock et al (2009), supra note 108, at 197-198.
111 Marc Goergen, Marina Martynova & Luc Renneboog, Corporate Governance Convergence: Evidence from
Takeover Regulation 11 (ECGI working paper No. 33/2005), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=709023.
112 Erik Berglöf, & Mark Burkart, European Takeover Regulation, 18 ECON. POLICY 171, 175 (2003), available
at http://www.jstor.org/stable/1344656.
113 See Gilson & Gordon (2003), supra note 39.
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if such a position is transferred. Disclosure rules are more generally an important element of
minority protection. Increased transparency allows for better monitoring of related-party
transactions and how control positions are used, while not challenging the control position
itself. Disclosure rules are often part of securities regulation and are enforced by public
authorities. Provided the quality of the regulatory framework is adequate, this also improves
the position of minority shareholders, who may be insufficiently incentivized to engage in
monitoring by themselves. Disclosure rules are therefore generally an appropriate – even
preferred – mechanism in a concentrated ownership environment.
Trusteeship Arrangements
Trusteeship arrangements can also be applied for the purposes of monitoring the actions of
controlling shareholders. As discussed earlier, a mechanism which ensures that the board
includes members who do not represent the interests of a controlling shareholder may well be
warranted in an environment of concentrated ownership. The independent board members
could perform a gatekeeper or trusteeship function provided they have the proper authority
and incentive to carry out their monitoring duties (personal liability, for example). In addition
to independent directors, external parties, such as auditors or independent financial experts,
have also been used as trustees. It is possible, for example, to require statements from
independent experts to support the arm’s length nature of related-party transactions.
The broader efficacy of gatekeeper or trusteeship arrangements has nevertheless been called
into question.114 It is unclear whether trustees are always properly incentivized to conduct
monitoring or whether they have been granted adequate authority in this regard. Overall,
trusteeship arrangements can be seen as a complementary mechanism used to enhance other
minority protection mechanisms.
F. A CORPORATE GOVERNANCE INDEX FOR CONCENTRATED OWNERSHIP
Based on its analysis of the indices discussed above, this chapter now provides an outline for
a minority protection index for corporate governance systems based on concentrated
ownership.
In a system with a prevalence of concentrated ownership, it is assumed that large shareholders
monitor management, and have satisfactory means to do so, as suggested by Olson115 and
Kraakman et al.116 As there are often companies with different types of ownership structures
in a given jurisdiction, a single index may be insufficient for describing the quality of the
corporate governance system as a whole. Moreover, Bebchuk & Hamdani suggest that indices
for assessing the protection of minority rights should be kept separate from indices assessing
shareholder rights in general. Aggregating these indices would allow manipulation of the
score by promoting the regulation of relationships which are less relevant in the given
environment.
The list below describes the key parameters for a minority protection index, as well as the
various mechanisms that are relevant in each case. It is recognized that there may be
functional equivalents for a number of mechanisms, and allowance is made for the
development of metrics on this basis. The key parameters identified are (i) mechanisms for
114 See John C. Coffee, Jr., Understanding Enron: It’s About the Gatekeepers, Stupid (Columbia Law &
Economics Working Paper No. 207, 2002), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=325240.
115 See Olson (1971), supra note 68.
116 See Armour, Hansmann & Kraakman (2009), supra note 23.
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restricting the extraction of private benefits of control by controlling shareholders, (ii)
mechanisms providing an exit or cash-flow for minority shareholders (to protect them from
“starving”), (iii) mechanisms to induce voluntary transfer of control (as break-through
mechanisms or other mandatory provisions may undermine the basis of a concentrated
ownership system), (iv) measurement variables for enforcement mechanisms for minority
rights – to ease the coordination problems of minority shareholders.
The list of relevant parameters emphasizes certain characteristic features of concentrated
ownership. First, it recognizes the coordination problems of minority shareholders and does
not consider voting rights the primary mechanism for minority protection. While qualified
majority requirements may be argued for in connection with significant corporate changes,
the specific majority requirements can be balanced against exit rights. Second, minority
shareholders may need to be supported by legal institutions to enforce their rights. Especially
where ex-post standards are used to regulate the behavior of controlling shareholders, it may
be necessary to provide mechanisms that decrease coordination costs (for example, special
courts or a shifted burden of proof). Third, an important characteristic of concentrated
ownership is that the controlling shareholder is able to control the use of corporate assets and
has an effective veto, which cannot easily be challenged, on change of control transactions.
Thus, other mechanisms may be warranted to induce a voluntary change of control (such as
tax treatment of the transfer control). This also emphasizes the importance of understanding
corporate governance regulation in broader terms and thus including regulation that has an
overall effect on the relative positions of the key constituencies of the corporation.
PARAMETERS FOR AN INDEX FOR MINORITY PROTECTION
Availability of mechanisms to restrict private benefits of control (through tunneling)
- Qualified majority requirements for key corporate decisions (mergers, change of articles,
deviation from pre-emption rights);
- Disclosure obligations regarding block-holding positions and related party transactions;
- Procedural requirements for related party transactions (third party approval or assessment;
not necessarily by minority shareholders);
- Equal rights of shareholders (providing the legal basis for preventing private benefits of
control or the disenfranchisement of minority shareholders);
- Requirement for independent directors or similar minority representatives.
Availability of mechanisms to protect cash-flow rights
- Mechanisms allowing for minimum dividends and for the redemption of minority shares
(put and call) or mechanisms that require an offer to be made at fair price at 1) a set level of
ownership and 2) in connection with significant changes to the corporate enterprise.
Mechanisms to induce voluntary transfer of control
- Neutral tax treatment for maintaining a set level of shareholdings;
- Neutral or favorable tax treatment of transferring control;
- Exemptions available from mandatory bid requirements.
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Mechanisms for Facilitating Minority Coordination Problems for Effective Enforcement
- Entire fairness requirements and reversed burden of proof for related-party transactions;
- Availability of class action suits (especially in cases related to enforcement of standards,
such as the principle of the equal treatment of shareholders);
- Special courts or tribunals for company law matters or agencies promoting minority interests
(including takeover panels and special redemption proceedings);
- Public enforcement of securities laws (mandatory bid, redemption price assessment).
The parameters above provide a framework for assessing the quality of corporate governance
systems with respect to the relationship between controlling and minority shareholders. The
mechanisms for facilitating minority coordination problems and enforcement are, in part,
functional equivalents. If class actions are available, for example, a reverse burden proof may
be unnecessary. The relevance and weight of each mechanism should thus be assessed in the
context of the institutional environment. With respect to the other parameters, the mechanisms
identified each provide protective measures and should be weighted accordingly.
IV. ASSESSMENT OF NORDICMODELS OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE
This chapter discusses the key corporate governance mechanisms available in the Nordic
region and then assesses how they reflect concerns related to a system with a high level of
concentrated ownership.
A. INTRODUCTION
Nordic corporate governance has traditionally been characterized by relatively high levels of
concentrated ownership and the application of different types of control mechanisms.117 Yet,
empirical studies report low levels of private benefits of control in these countries.118 For
example, certain studies have found the value of block-holdings in the Nordics to be at the
same level as in Anglo-Saxon countries, a higher value for block-holdings representing the
existence of private benefits of control linked to such blocks.119
Ownership concentration in the Nordic countries remains relatively high, with the largest
shareholder having a reported average (mean of a data set of the largest listed companies)
ownership share of 23.5 percent and the top five shareholders together a 44.8 percent share.120
Ownership by key families has decreased, as have their spheres of influence; however, over
60 percent of companies in the Nordics still have at least one shareholder with over 20 percent
of the votes and over 20 percent have a shareholder with more than 50 percent of the votes.121
Foreign ownership has increased considerably since the 1980s, and new industries have
117 See Johan E. Eklund, Corporate Governance and Investments in Scandinavia – Ownership Concentration
and Dual-class Equity Structure (CESIS Electronic Working paper Series, 2007), available at
http://www.infra.kth.se/cesis/documents/WP98.pdf.
118 Martin Holmén & Peter Högfeldt, Pyramidal Discounts: Tunneling or Agency Costs? (ECGI Working Paper
73, 2005), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=667743.
119 Tatiana Nenova, The value of corporate voting rights and control: A cross-country analysis, 68 J. OF FIN.
ECON. 325, 327 and 340 (2003).
120 Eklund (2007), supra note 117, at 9.
121 Högfeldt (2005), supra note 15, at 518-522, and Gilson (2014), supra note 33, at 99-100.
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emerged to challenge the traditional dominance of heavy industry, such as natural resources
and machinery based industries, that dominated the economies of Finland and Sweden during
the larger part of the 20th century.
Control enhancing mechanisms supporting the control of incumbent shareholders are common
in environments with concentrated ownership. Control enhancing mechanisms generally
function by separating voting rights from cash-flow rights by different means, allowing
incumbent shareholders to maintain a higher degree of control than their relative share of
equity holdings would entitle them to. The control mechanisms used in the Nordic countries
include multiple share classes, voting caps and pyramid ownership structures, for example.122
According to Eklund, in the Nordic countries the largest shareholder holds an average of more
than 20 percent of the capital and close to 30 percent of the voting rights.123 In Norway124
some 14 percent of listed companies are reported to employ a dual-class share structure, while
in Denmark and Finland the figure is more than 30 percent and in Sweden some 55 percent.125
In turn, Faccio & Lang, report the use of dual-class share structures at 29 percent of listed
companies in Denmark, 44 percent in Finland, 11 percent in Norway and 62 percent in
Sweden.126 The low figure for Norway has been explained by the fact that government
authorization has been required for the introduction of dual-class share structures. As a
compensating factor, Faccio & Lang report that 33 percent of listed companies in Norway had
pyramid structures, while the corresponding share in the other Nordic countries was
significantly lower.127
Despite the high levels of concentrated ownership and the use of control enhancing
mechanisms, the reported private benefits of control appear low in the Nordic region. In
analyses of the value of control-blocks, Nordic countries have fared very well. As mentioned
earlier, a higher value for control-blocks represents the existence of private benefits of control
linked to such blocks. However, in an analysis by Nenova,128 the value of control-blocks was
found to be a mere one percent or less of market capitalization in Nordic jurisdictions, while it
was already four percent in the United States, for example.
However, in some corporate governance indices, Nordic countries receive only an average
rating. Moreover, while the Nordic countries have achieved good ratings in the LLSV index,
according to Nordic commentators their scores nevertheless fail to reflect the quality of their
governance systems. The average score in the LLSV index, which groups countries according
to legal families, was 3.00 for countries in the Scandinavian legal family, when it was 4.00 for
countries in the English legal family and 2.33 for countries in the German legal family.129
122 See the EU Proportionality Report, supra note 103.
123 Eklund (2007), supra note 117, at 28.
124 Oyvind Bohren & Bernt Arne Odegaard, Corporate Governance and Economic Performance in Norwegian
Listed Companies, 21 (Norwegian School of Management Working Paper, 2001), available at http://finance-
old.bi.no/~bernt/governance/Report_Performance.pdf.
125 See Hans Tson Söderström, Erik Berglöf, Bengt Holmström, Peter Högfeldt & Eva M. Meyersson Milgrom,
Corporate Governance and Structural Change, European Challenges (SNS Economic Policy Group Report,
2003) available at http://meyersson.com/ekoradet1-CorpGovEuropean.pdf.
126 SeeMara Faccio & Larry H.P. Lang, The Ultimate Ownership of Western European Corporations, 65 JFE
365, (2002).
127 Id. at 380-381.
128 Nenova (2003), supra note 119, at 340.
129 La Porta et al. (1998), supra note 1, at 1122-1123 (explanations of variables) and 1131 (metrics for
Scandinavian countries).
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Furthermore, the acceptance of dual class share structures has raised concern about the Nordic
model of corporate governance, despite the low value of control-blocks.
Below, different corporate governance indices including the Nordic countries are presented
for comparative purposes:





































0 0 1 0 0 0 .10 2
Finland 0 0 1 0 0 1 .10 3
Norway 0 1 1 0 0 1 .10 4
Sweden 0 0 1 0 0 1 .10 3












Denmark 2 2 0 8 12
Finland 1 2 2 5 10
Norway 1 2 2 7 12
Sweden 2 2 2 4 10
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130 Id.
131 Martynova & Renneboog (2010), supra note 1, at 33-34.
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Gourevitch & Shinn Minority Shareholder Protections Index132
Country Information Oversight Control Incentive Total
Index
Denmark 44 43 40 16 36
Finland 60 36 60 16 43
Norway 66 29 80 16 48
Sweden 67 36 60 22 46
Germany 44 29 20 41 33
UK 81 60 100 53 74
United
States
86 100 100 100 97
While the LLSV analysis is important, it should be recognized that company laws have
developed since then, and thus the scores should be recalculated. For example, in Finland
oppressed minority provisions were included in the new Companies Act of 2006.
Furthermore, international comparisons have been subject to much criticism. In terms of the
analysis of the Nordic countries, criticism has focused on how the Nordic model has been
graded, and a number of efforts have been made to describe the benefits and qualities of the
model.133 There have also been attempts to emphasize the effects of informal institutions as an
explanation for why the moderate scores in corporate governance indices incorrectly reflect
the quality of corporate governance in the Nordic region. Such explanations have been based,
among others, on the effect of the social norms characteristic of the Nordic environment or on
the non-pecuniary nature of control benefits (such as the social status associated with
corporate ownership).134 The “Small world” characteristics of ownership in Scandinavia, with
its bearing on reputational factors have also been analyzed.135 It has also been suggested that
low levels of crime and high levels of tax compliance in the Nordic countries136 help explain
the behavior of controlling shareholders. Even the role of the press has been mentioned as a
factor contributing to the better monitoring of controlling shareholders.137
A number of factors affect corporate governance relationships, and the framework for
corporate governance regulation cannot be limited to corporate and securities laws and
regulations. Tax laws can have a significant effect on the costs of corporate ownership. On a
132 PETER GOUREVITCH & JAMES SHINN, POLITICAL POWER AND CORPORATE CONTROL 48 (2005).
133 See Jesper Lau Hansen, A Scandinavian Approach to Corporate Governance, 50 SCANDINAVIAN STUDIES IN
LAW 125 (2007), and Lekvall (ed.) (2014), supra note 33.
134 See Gilson (2006), supra note 36.
135 Evis Sinani, Anna Stafsudd, Steen Thomsen, Christopher Edling & Trond Randoy, Corporate Governance in
Scandinavia: Comparing Networks and Formal Institutions, 5 EUR. MANAGEMENT REV. 27 (2008).
136 See John C. Coffee Jr., Do Norms Matter?: A Cross-Country Examination of the Private Benefits of Control
(Columbia Law School Center for Law and Economic Studies Working Paper No. 183, 2001), available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/Paper.taf?abstract_id=257613.
137 See Alexander Dyck & Luigi Zingales, The Corporate Governance Role of the Media in THE RIGHT TO TELL:
THE ROLE OFMEDIA IN DEVELOPMENT 107 (Roumeen Islam. ed., 2002).
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general level, the effects of informal institutions can also certainly be recognized.138 On a
macro level they may well provide proxies for the quality of the governance system in
general. However, these institutions may not provide (nor even be intended to provide) a
sufficient basis for enforcement. For instance, it is unclear whether informal institutions have
a sufficient impact in situations where the potential for conflicts of interest is accentuated,
such as in takeovers or other end-game situations.
Political explanations for corporate governance and the political economy of the Nordic
region should not be underestimated. Low levels of private benefits of control have also been
linked to the broader political environment for corporate ownership. For example, Holmén &
Högfeldt study pyramid structures in Sweden and indeed find increased agency costs in these
types of structures.139 Nevertheless, they find no indications of tunneling or the direct
extraction of private benefits. They believe that controlling owners in financially developed
countries such as Sweden are subject to more scrutiny based on well-developed accounting
and judicial standards, and that there is less room for direct “stealing” in this type of
environment. The authors suggest that the agency costs and discounts related to pyramid
structures can be explained by investment behavior (over-investment) based on relatively
inexpensive capital obtained from retained earnings as compared to external financing.140 The
cost of financing is affected, among others, by the favorable tax treatment of dividends in
pyramid structures,141 thus indicating political support for block-holding. In Sweden and
Finland, dividends paid to legal entities are generally tax-exempt. Large shareholders can
structure their holdings so that little tax is paid on dividend payments. In some other
jurisdictions, pyramid ownership is efficiently restricted through dividend taxation.142 The
authors conclude that “[t]ax rules that regulate cash flows within the pyramid substitute for
weak minority protection and limit incentives for outright stealing.”143
In other words, controlling shareholders do obtain benefits from holding control blocks rather
than diversified positions, but those benefits are based on the institutional environment and
the tax system rather than on the direct transfer of wealth through “stealing” from minority
shareholders. The explanation for the low levels of private benefits of control is thus at least
in part political. Through political influence and bargaining, controlling shareholders have
obtained favorable treatment for concentrated ownership. The Nordic corporate governance
system may well restrict the extraction of private benefits of control directly from minority
shareholders while still supporting control by large shareholders, but the background of the
governance system is linked to a political approach to corporate governance.
B. SHAREHOLDER CONTROL RIGHTS
The Nordic model of corporate governance has been described as hierarchical, with the
general meeting of shareholders having supreme authority over the other corporate bodies.144
The general meeting has the authority to take key decisions regarding the company, from
approving annual financial statements to decisions regarding key corporate transactions, such
as mergers, and to electing and dismissing the board of directors. For example, under the
138 See Sinani et al., supra note 135.
139 Holmén & Högfeldt (2009), supra note 118, at 135-136.
140 Id. at 170.
141 Id. at 136-137.
142 SeeMorck (2005), supra note 90.
143 Holmén & Högfeldt (2009), supra note 118, at 172.
144 JESPER LAU HANSEN, NORDIC COMPANY LAW – THE REGULATION OF PUBLIC COMPANIES IN DENMARK,
FINLAND, ICELAND, NORWAY AND SWEDEN 74 (2003).
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corporate laws of the Nordic countries, the general meeting of shareholders always has the
right to elect the majority of the board of directors. Other decisions taken by the general
meeting include changing the articles of association, the issuance of shares (or authorizing the
board to issue shares), acquisition of the company’s own shares and the liquidation of the
company.
Through election and dismissal rights, in particular, the general meeting of shareholders can
be seen to exercise control over the other corporate bodies, even if the general meeting is not
generally intended to have executive powers. It should also be noted that staggered boards are
typically prohibited under Nordic company laws. Thus, a general meeting is usually able to
dismiss the board at any time – emphasizing the control of shareholders over management and
the board of directors. The balance of power differs significantly from the more director-
centric system in the United States, for example.
Decisions at shareholders’ meetings are generally taken with a simple majority vote.
Cumulative voting or similar voting systems are not typically applied. Decisions on
significant corporate transactions, such as mergers or changes of articles of association,
commonly require a minimum of two thirds of the votes given and the shares represented at
the meeting. It should be pointed out, in particular, that where companies have different
classes of shares, major corporate transactions, such as statutory mergers or demergers, must
typically be approved by a qualified majority of the shares and votes in each class. Moreover,
the issuance of new shares in deviation from pre-emptive rights (i.e. directed offerings) must
be supported by a qualified majority and based on corporate requirements. Moreover, there is
specific regulation of the pricing of new shares in such offerings to protect shareholders from
dilution – generally shares must be issued at market price, with underpriced offerings
potentially breaching equal treatment standards. Thus, groups of minority shareholders can
veto the decisions of a controlling majority with respect to changes of articles of association,
or mergers and directed share offerings.
It should be noted that there are generally no quorum requirements for shareholders’
meetings, and it is usually sufficient for decisions to be passed that the relevant majorityof the
shares present support the decision in question. However, in cases concerning changes to the
rights related to shares, company laws typically require that the holders of the affected shares
support the decisions as well.
The shareholder rights described above allow controlling shareholders to dominate corporate
strategy, as can be expected in an environment with a tradition of concentrated ownership.
The general meeting of shareholders provides a fairly effective means for a controlling
shareholder to control the board and thereby direct corporate strategy. The lack of quorum
requirements and cumulative voting supports the control rights of controlling shareholders.
Minority shareholders have a voice with regard to significant transactions, such as mergers,
and when articles of association are amended, but in other respects their powers are limited.
Indeed, minority block-holders can find themselves with very little input or insight into
corporate affairs when faced with a larger controlling shareholder.
C. RESTRICTING PRIVATE BENEFITS OF CONTROL
The principle of equal treatment is a central element in Nordic company laws. The company
laws of Finland and Sweden, for example, contain explicit provisions on the requirement that
no decisions can be taken by corporate bodies (the general meeting or the board) that favor a
165
shareholder or a third party at the cost of the company or the other shareholders.145 Moreover,
board members, pursuant to company law, can be directly liable to shareholders for decisions
that would unduly disadvantage the minority.146 It should also be noted that there is a reverse
burden of proof in Finland with respect to related-party transactions involving board members
and controlling shareholders alike,147 and this principle can have practical implications for the
types of corporate transactions companies can pursue.
Sweden has adopted requirements for related-party transactions in listed companies. For
example, significant transactions with controlling shareholders are subject to approval by a
general meeting, where the votes of the shareholder in question are not taken into account. An
assessment of the transaction and related information must be made available to the
shareholders in advance.148 However, disclosure requirements regarding related-party
transactions are less rigorous in Finland, being mainly based on IFRS rules, whereby
disclosure occurs annually after the fact. In Finland, the financial supervisory authority
monitoring IFRS compliance has noted that the quality of disclosure and compliance with
IFRS rules on related-party transactions remains somewhat unsatisfactory. It should also be
noted that EU prospectus regulations imposes comprehensive disclosure requirements for
related-party transactions. The rules are applied when a listed company issues securities to the
public (including to its shareholders) or applies for the listing of new securities on a stock
exchange. More stringent regulation of related-party transactions is expected from the EU
with the forthcoming amendments to the Shareholders’ Rights Directive. In Finland, changes
have been proposed to the Finnish Corporate Governance Code to require consideration of
specific procedures for related-party transactions. However, requirements have not been
introduced for third party statements or similar assessments – one reason perhaps being that
EU guidance is still pending.
In Finland and Sweden shareholders with an aggregate of 10 percent of the shares in a
company can require that a general meeting of shareholders be convened or that a special
audit be carried out by an auditor for a specific purpose.149 Moreover, management has the
obligation to respond to shareholder queries at general meetings, provided the answers are
unlikely to harm the company’s business. These possibilities allow minority shareholders to
gain some insight into possible tunneling.
Corporate governance codes for listed companies impose additional requirements on board
members. For instance, requirements have been introduced with respect to the independence
of board members and large shareholders. In Finland, for example, more than half of the
board members of listed companies must be independent of the company (i.e., not recent
employees) and two of these independent members must also be independent of large
shareholders. Similar rules apply in the other Nordic countries.150 Independent directors can
145 CLAS BERGSTRÖM & PER SAMUELSSON, AKTIEBOLAGETS GRUNDPROBLEM [Basic Problems of the Stock
Company] 168-174 (4th Ed. 2013); 1 JUHANI KYLÄKALLIO, OLLI IIROLA &KALLE KYLÄKALLIO, OSAKEYHTIÖ
[The Stock Company] 537-542 (5th Ed. 2012); Hansen (2003), supra note 144, at 104-105.
146 ROLF DOTEVALL, BOLAGSLEDNINGENS SKADESTÅNDSANSVAR [The Liability of Corporate Management] 231
(2nd ed. 2008), Kyläkallio, Iirola & Kyläkallio, supra note 88, at 566-573, Hansen (2003), supra note 144, at
118.
147 Osakeyhtiölaki [Finnish Companies Act] 22:1-2.
148 Aktiemarknadsnämndens uttalande [Swedish Securities Council Statement] 2012:5.
149 Aktiebolagslagen [Swedish Companies Act] 7:13 and 10:21-23, and Finnish Companies Act 5:4 and 7:7.
150 Securities Markets Association, Suomen listayhtiöiden hallinnointikoodi [Finnish Corporate Governance
Code], Recommendations 14 and 15 (2010); see also Danish Corporate Governance Committee, Finnish
Securities Market Association, Icelandic Committee on Corporate Governance, Norwegian Corporate
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be a fairly important mechanism for minority protection, and in this sense, it is interesting that
the requirement is only based on non-statutory corporate governance codes.
Increased transparency and improved practices for dealing with related-party transactions may
well be warranted in the Nordic region. The position of independent board members may also
need to be strengthened. Currently, the protection of minority interests relies on the integrity
of a very limited number of directors.
D. PROTECTION OFMINORITY CASH-FLOWRIGHTS
In Finland and Sweden shareholders with a 10 percent holding can require a dividend
payment of half the profits available for distribution from the last financial period.151 The
provision protects the minority from attempts by the controlling shareholder to “starve” the
minority, for example. While the ten percent threshold can be deemed reasonable for the
purposes of minority protection, minimum dividend rules should also address the possibility
of the controlling shareholders taking measures aimed at minimizing the sums available for
dividend payments. For example, while legitimate investments must be accepted, it is less
clear that group contributions (i.e. the possibility to transfer funds to parent entities for
accounting and tax purposes) should be taken into account in determining the minimum
dividend.152 The problem of controlling shareholders minimizing dividend payments should
be addressed through regulatory means to ensure the provisions on dividend rights remain
relevant.
A redemption obligation is in place in both Finland and Sweden. A shareholder holding more
than 90 percent of the shares/votes of a company has the right and obligation to redeem the
minority shares at a fair price. In both countries any disputes in this regard are settled in
arbitration, with the arbitration costs carried by the redeeming shareholder.
In connection with certain transactions, minority shareholders may also have the right to
require that their shares be redeemed at a fair value. For instance, in Finland shareholders
opposing a merger have the right to have their shares redeemed at fair price. However, in
Sweden no such right exists. It should also be noted that the exit rights of minority
shareholders in Finland solely concern statutory mergers or demergers, not, for example, the
sale of major assets or change of articles.
Mandatory bids also provide a mechanism for minority exit rights. In both Finland and
Sweden, mandatory bids are triggered by a shareholder (acting alone or with concert parties)
exceeding a holding of 30 percent of the votes of a listed company. In Finland, an additional
threshold of 50 percent is also applied. In connection with mandatory bids, the price is based
on the highest price paid by the party obliged to make the offer during a set period, unless the
financial regulator decides otherwise. Thus, the financial regulator provides a monitoring
function on behalf of the minority shareholders. As discussed earlier, however, it is unclear
whether a transfer of control should trigger exit rights in every situation. It is not necessarily
detrimental to minority shareholders if a control block is transferred from one shareholder to
another – provided that private benefits of control cannot easily be extracted.
Governance Board, Swedish Corporate Governance Board, Corporate Governance in the Nordic Countries
(2009).
151 Swedish Companies Act 18:11 and Finnish Companies Act 13:7.
152 See Finnish Supreme Court Ruling 2015:104; see also Helsinki Appellate Court Ruling S 10/1082, 3520,
29.11.2011.
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Minority exit rights have received particular attention in connection with cash-mergers. It has
been argued that the possibility of merging a listed company using a cash consideration can
be used to circumvent the 90 percent threshold set for the redemption of minority shares. The
majority required for a statutory merger in Finland and Sweden is two-thirds of the votes at a
general meeting of shareholders. Under Swedish rules, however, at least half of the merger
consideration must be in shares. In Finland, cash mergers are deemed possible though
controversial, so much so that the Finnish Takeover Panel has issued a statement emphasizing
the problematic nature of cash mergers and the implicit disenfranchisement of minority
shareholders.153 However, the amended Helsinki Takeover Code issued after this statement
explicitly recognizes that cash mergers are possible in Finland in certain circumstances.154
The fact that in Finland dissenting shareholders are allowed to require redemption at fair
value in connection with mergers may have provided the basis for more flexibility in this
regard.
Overall, Finland and Sweden have the relevant mechanisms to support minority cash-flow
and exit rights. However, they may still require some adjustment. For example, when
calculating the minimum dividend, provisions must ensure that the controlling shareholder
cannot manipulate the amounts payable. Furthermore, the percentage payable and the
percentage of votes required for the payment of the minimum dividend might also require
adjustment.
E. INDUCING TRANSFER OF CONTROL
If controlling shareholders are unable to extract private benefits of control, they should be
incentivized to agree to control transfers on the same terms as minority shareholders.
However, if private benefits are non-pecuniary (i.e., reputational considerations or social
status), they may be more difficult to quantify, and thus it may be harder to induce control
transfers.155
As discussed above, the Nordic corporate environment supports concentrated ownership in a
way that can affect the decision to transfer control. For example, both Finland and Sweden
have rules whereby dividend payments from listed companies are usually tax exempt for
private corporations, provided their holdings exceed 10 percent of the shares in the target
company. This allows dividends to be paid through pyramid structures, thus incurring lower
taxes than when paid to beneficial holders directly. This may favor maintaining ownership at
higher levels and lead to decisions on dividend payments by controlling shareholders that
might otherwise be economically unsound.
On the other hand, in both countries shareholders with a position of over 10 percent of the
shares in a listed company (in Finland this applies to private companies as well) can sell their
shares without paying tax on profits. This provision may well induce transfer of control by
virtue of tax savings in these situations.
F. EFFECTIVE ENFORCEMENT
Countries in the Nordic region have generally scored well with respect to the quality of legal
institutions and the overall rule of law. In La Porta et al., for example, the Nordic countries
153 Statement of the Takeover Panel 2009 on Merger Considerations.
154 The Helsinki Takeover Code, Recommendation 14, available at http://cgfinland.fi/files/2013/12/helsinki-
takeover-codeweb.pdf.
155 Grant & Kirchmaier (2004), supra note 67, at 19-20.
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received top scores in different legal enforcement metrics. In the World Bank’s analysis, also
referred to in the context of corporate governance indices, the Nordic region also does very
well. However, this analysis misses certain key points.
As outlined by Kraakman et al., and as discussed earlier, the effectiveness of legal strategies
depends, in part, on the ability of interested parties to overcome coordination problems. While
smaller constituencies, such as large shareholders, are able to take advantage of governance
rights, the interests of dispersed minority shareholders require specific regulatory strategies,
such as rules or standards. In addition, coordination problems can significantly affect their
ability to pursue and enforce their rights. As earlier discussed, if the financial interests of
dispersed minority investors are limited and the risks related to litigation are high, there may
be insufficient incentive for minority shareholders to pursue their interests through courts or
other legal institutions. Moreover, it is unclear whether general courts are geared to address
corporate law problems in a way that supports the enforcement of minority rights in a timely
and cost-effective manner. Traditionally, the Nordic countries have not had a litigation-based
legal system, and it may be difficult to develop the courts to meet these requirements. For
example, general courts may lack the required routines or expertise in corporate matters.
However, there may be other mechanisms available for overcoming the coordination
problems of minority shareholders.
For enforcement mechanisms to be effective and relevant, they must take minority
coordination problems into account and provide instruments that improve the position of
minority shareholders without allowing for opportunistic behavior. Such enforcement
mechanisms could include the possibility of class action law suits, for example, or specialized
tribunals or courts where the cost risks of litigation are appropriately addressed. Additional
mechanisms include, of course, enforcement by public authorities, such as securities
regulators and tax authorities.156
In fact, minority shareholders in the Nordic countries are indeed supported by certain public
enforcement institutions. For example, mandatory bid requirements apply to listed companies
based on securities laws. Thus, minority interests are monitored by the authorities supervising
the financial markets at little cost to the shareholders. The same applies to disclosure
obligations.
It should further be noted that in Finland the minority redemption process is a special
statutory process regulated in the Companies Act, where the costs are generally carried by the
party redeeming the shares.157 This allows the minority to challenge the redemption price
without exposure to significant legal costs. In Finland this possibility is routinely used by
activist minority shareholders, who buy a small position, challenge the redemption price and
demand coverage for legal costs, in connection with public takeovers. Nevertheless, the size
of the transactions involved has been small enough to render these problems largely
insignificant.
Moreover, in Finland a reversed burden of proof is applied in cases concerning related-party
transactions between the company and board members or controlling shareholders. This can
be seen as a step towards creating fiduciary duties for controlling shareholders and clearly
provides further support for minority interests.
156 See Djankov et al. (2008), supra note 71.
157 Finnish Companies Act 18:8.
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However, minority shareholders wishing to challenge corporate decisions breaching the
principles of the equal treatment of shareholders generally have to rely on general courts.
Finland and Sweden lack courts specialized in corporate affairs or special tribunals that could
address corporate matters on an expedited basis. The Nordic countries also lack functioning
class action systems. Moreover, the legal fees of the opposing side are generally borne by the
losing party. Thus, minority shareholders face considerable risks when pursuing their interests
through the courts.
Sweden has an established tradition of self-regulation in relation to public takeovers and the
merger and acquisition of listed companies. For instance, the Swedish Takeover Panel has a
long-held practice of issuing statements on proper procedures in change of control situations.
The panel also has the right to grant exemptions from mandatory bid obligations. The panel
structure has the potential to provide a monitoring mechanism that promotes minority
interests and eases coordination problems. The panel is a specialized body that provides
guidance on an expedited basis in a process tailored to corporate requirements, and it has
made considerable contributions to the development of Swedish takeover markets and to
minority interests. More recently, a takeover code and a takeover panel have also been
established in Finland. The code is mainly a codification of best practices in takeover
situations, compensating for the lack of regulatory guidance and legal precedent, while the
role of the panel has remained very small.
It should be noted, however, that self-regulatory organs may well be established to protect the
interests of incumbent constituencies, and may promote prevalent or even entrenched market
practices. In this regard, these panels are not always an efficient mechanism for the protection
of minority interests.
Based on the discussion above, this chapter includes scores for Finland and Sweden in the
minority protection index (Annex). The scoring is only rudimentary and is intended to
highlight the relative strengths of the Nordic corporate governance system, on the one hand,
and the areas requiring improvement, on the other. It has been emphasized that not all
corporate governance mechanisms are equally relevant and that care should be taken over the
weight each is given in an index.158 For example, from another index with a broader range of
metrics, Bebchuk, Cohen & Ferrell find only a small number of measurement variables that
are relevant for a dispersed ownership environment. Thus, it is far from clear that the more
mechanisms there are, the better the quality of corporate governance will be. Consequently, in
order to provide an example of how different measurement variables can be given different
values depending on their relevance in a specific index, each metric in the minority protection
index has been granted a value of one, except for the principle of equal treatment, which has
been granted a value of two. The index also includes references to EU regulation, where
relevant, to give an overview of where EU regulation has provided standards with which
Nordic countries must comply, and to give some insight into the still fragmented nature of EU
company law regulations.
V. CONCLUSIONS
There are valid reasons for questioning the use of a single yardstick for measuring the quality
of corporate governance systems.159 The appropriate governance structures depend on the
context – including the structure of corporate ownership, the quality of legal institutions and
158 Bebchuk, Cohen & Ferrell (2004), supra note 72, at 1-2.
159 See Bebchuk & Hamdani ( 2009), supra note 2 and Bhagat et al (2008), supra note 6.
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the broader institutional environment. However, this does not rule out the relevance of
measuring how corporate governance systems address the potential for abuse in a specific
environment. Separate indices may be called for, on the one hand, for the relationship
between shareholders and management and, on the other, for the relationship between
controlling and minority shareholders. Furthermore, additional indices could address the
position of creditors and employees.160
The Nordic model of corporate governance has scored reasonably well in established
corporate governance indices. However, some of these indices have been geared to an
environment of dispersed ownership and have assessed factors that are irrelevant in the
Nordics. Moreover, some of the indices specifically tailored to an environment of
concentrated ownership also seem to miss some of the dynamic of corporate governance in
this environment. It is unclear, for example, whether “voice” is a key mechanism for
protecting the interests of minority shareholders or whether there might be more significant
functional equivalents. Indeed, “voice” is only one mechanism among many others.
Moreover, “voice” can also allow the minority to behave in an opportunistic manner in
situations where a diversified minority and an undiversified large shareholder have different
risk profiles.
Overall, the Nordic model provides a number of relevant and important corporate governance
mechanisms that are well adapted to an environment of concentrated ownership. The
administrative powers of general meetings of shareholders allow for the effective monitoring
of management by large shareholders, and equal treatment requirements and exit rules provide
for a level of minority protection that seems to have resulted in low levels of private benefits
of control. The Nordic countries also have some mechanisms for inducing the transfer of
control when such transfer is called for, including favorable tax treatment for certain large
shareholders when divesting their holdings. On the other hand, the Nordic countries also have
tax systems which favor block-holding – thus providing an incentive for maintaining
controlling positions.
With regard to the enforcement of minority rights, there are elements in the Nordic model that
facilitate minority interests. In relation to redemption rights, for example, Finnish and
Swedish company law provides for a statutory arbitration process when a majority
shareholder with over 90 percent of the shares and votes in a company wants to redeem the
remaining shares. In Finland, the same process is also used for mergers and demergers where
minority shareholders opposing the transaction require redemption. Furthermore, mandatory
bid situations are subject to securities regulation and are enforced by financial regulators. The
same applies to the disclosure of related-party transactions.
However, certain key parameters of company law remain within the jurisdiction of the general
courts. For example, the equal treatment of shareholders provides a basis for ensuring that
private benefits of control are not extracted. However, equal treatment principles are generic
standards that are assessed ex post by general courts. Minority shareholders face considerable
coordination problems in pursuing their interests through the court system, as diversified
minority shareholders with limited financial interests carry the full risk of unsuccessful
litigation. Moreover, a court system with lengthy proceedings and a lack of specialization in
corporate matters is an unsatisfactory dispute resolution mechanism for corporate matters.
160 Pistor (2000), supra note 75, at 79.
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An important corporate governance measurement variable would be the availability of a
specialized dispute resolution system or agency for the promotion of minority interests. In line
with the Nordic tradition, one could even consider the establishment of a minority shareholder
ombudsman. An ombudsman could pursue minority shareholder interests and draw attention
to practices, established or otherwise, that may be problematic from the perspective of the
equal treatment of shareholders. An ombudsman’s office does not necessarily require
establishment by public authorities; rather, it could be an office set up by the stock exchange
or minority shareholder interest groups. For example, in Sweden small shareholders are
represented by a vocal interest group; however,it is unclear to what extent their actions are
driven by an analytical approach to minority coordination problems rather than populist
agendas.
The informal institutions identified in a number of studies as explanations for the quality of
the Nordic model of corporate governance are not unimportant.161 Reputational issues and
other non-pecuniary benefits of ownership may certainly affect corporate governance.162
However, the underlying reasons and drivers for such informal institutions may still warrant
further analysis for a better understanding of their relevance and effect. It is also unclear
whether they are effective in such circumstances as takeovers or other end-game situations.
Moreover, it may be difficult to develop mechanisms for minority shareholders to take
advantage of these informal institutions in specific situations.
Corporate governance systems can, in fact, also be analyzed from the perspective of political
economy, which provides the framework for possible corporate governance solutions. The
Nordic environment, to an important extent, has been defined by the dynamics of small
economies with export driven industries,163 where only limited private benefits have been
available and where globalization has had a significant effect on the development of corporate
governance.164 The basic structure of concentrated ownership remains intact – with its
associated control enhancing mechanisms and other complementary institutions.
Nevertheless, at the same time increasing international investment and changes in the political
economy have increased requirements for low levels of private benefits of control and a high
level of minority protection.165 The political economy also provides the framework for
possible regulatory responses to the current corporate governance model. As discussed earlier,
intervention in the control rights of controlling shareholders may be inappropriate in this
environment. However, increased transparency requirements, for example, would be a good
fit for this model. Moreover, there are unlikely to be fundamental problems in introducing
more specialized dispute resolution mechanisms for corporate matters, or in otherwise
facilitating the ability of minority shareholders to enforce their cash-flow and exit rights and
monitor the actions of the controlling shareholder based on the equal rights of shareholders.
161 See Sinani et al. (2008), supra note 135.
162 See Jonas Agnblad, Erik Berglöf, Peter Högfeldt & Helena Svancar, Ownership and Control in Sweden:
Strong Owners, Weak Minorities, and Social Control, 228, in THE CONTROL OF CORPORATE EUROPE (Fabrizio
Barca & Marco Becht, Eds., 2002).
163 See Timo Korkeamäki, Yrjö Koskinen & Tuomas Takalo, Phoenix Rising: Legal Reforms and Changes in
Valuations in Finland During the Economic Crisis 29 (Bank of Finland Research Discussion Papers, 2007),
available at http://www.suomenpankki.fi/en.julkaisut/tutkimukset/keskustelualoitteet/Documents/0701netti.pdf.
164 Karl-Oskar Lindgren, The Variety of Capitalism in Sweden and Finland in THE CHANGING POLITICAL
ECONOMY OF SMALLWEST EUROPEAN COUNTRIES 45, 56-57 (Uwe Becker, ed., 2011).
165 See Korkeamäki et al (2007), supra note 163, and Ari Hyytinen, Ilkka Kuosa&Tuomas Takalo, Law or
Finance: Evidence from Finland 30 (ETLA Discussion Paper No. 775, (2001), available at
http://hdl.handle.net/10419/63926.
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The characteristics of good corporate governance vary depending on the institutional
environment. This creates challenges for the introduction of supranational regulation, where
the same regulatory framework is applied in jurisdictions with different structures of
corporate ownership and legal institutions of varying quality and character.166 Developing
legal strategies for EU-level regulation of corporate governance remains challenging in this
regard, as the same mechanisms can have different – even contradictory – results in different
institutional environments.167 Efforts should be made to ensure that regulatory mechanisms
are introduced that are tailored to the relevant environment. Furthermore, in planning
regulatory intervention and in choosing legal strategies more attention should be paid to
functionally equivalent regulatory mechanisms. The assessment of the quality of corporate
governance throughout the EU is an important factor for planning regulatory intervention.
Developing representative metrics for different types of corporate governance environment
provides a basis for such assessments.
166 ANDREW JOHNSTON, EC REGULATION OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE, 144-146 (2010).
167 See Coates (2003), supra note 29.
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ANNEX








Finland: Disclosure requirements apply at set
intervals from 5% of shares and votes in a
listed company
Sweden: Disclosure requirements apply at set
intervals from 5% of shares and votes in a
listed company
EU Regulation: Disclosure requirements apply
at intervals that can be set nationally but that







Finland: IFRS rules on related party
transactions applied, but according to the
FFSA compliance unsatisfactory; new rules
being introduced in the Finnish CG Code;
Special audit can be required by a 10 percent
minority.
Sweden: IFRS rules applied; Swedish
Securities Council guidance requires that
significant related party transactions must be
disclosed.
Special audit can be required by a 10 percent
minority, or with the support of 1/3 of votes at
a general meeting.
EU Regulation: IFRS rules applied to listed
companies.
Special audit can be required by 10 percent
minority.
Disclosures rules on related-party transactions
proposed through amendments to the SHRD.
Disclosure of any “special advantage” granted
to founders of a company required under the
2nd Company Law Directive.
Finland: 0.5 / 1
Sweden: 1/1




approval or assessment; not
necessarily by minority
shareholders)
Code whereby listed companies shall apply
procedures required for related-party
transactions.
Sweden; Significant related-party transactions
are subject to general meeting authorization,
where the votes of a related party (including a
controlling shareholder) are not taken into
account.
EU Regulation: Proposal for amendments to
the SHRD to introduce procedural




legal basis for preventing
private benefits of control
or disenfranchisement of
minority shareholders)
Finland; Provisions included in the Companies
Act (general standard only).
Sweden: Provisions included in the Companies
Act (ABL 4:2, 7:47 and 8:41); (general
standard only).
EU Regulation: Principle of equal treatment
adopted in Second Company Law Directive







Finland: Majority of board members in listed
companies to be independent of the company
and two of these also independent of large
shareholders (based on CG Code on a comply-
or-explain basis)
Sweden: Majority of board members in listed
companies to be independent of the company
and two of them also independent of large
shareholders (based on CG Code on a comply-
or-explain basis)
EU Regulation: No requirements
Finland: 0.5 / 1










Finland: qualified majority requirements apply
(in mergers majority to be obtained in each
share class)
Sweden; qualified majority requirements apply
(in mergers majority to be obtained in each
share class)
EU Regulation: Qualified majority
requirements apply (in mergers majority to be
obtained in each share class; (Art 7 of the
Merger Directive); decisions on certain capital




support (Second Company Law Directive, Art.
44)
Minimum dividend right Finland: Shareholders representing 1/10 of
shares can require a minimum dividend (OYL
13:7). However, there are no protective
provisions on the calculation of distributable
amounts.
Sweden: Shareholders representing 1/10 of
shares can require a minimum dividend (ABL
18:11). However, there are no protective
provisions on the calculation of distributable
amounts.





shares (put and call) or
offer at fair price at set
level of ownership
Finland: redemption (put/call) at ownership
exceeding 90 percent of shares and votes.
Sweden: redemption (put/call) at ownership
exceeding 90 percent of shares and votes.
EU Regulation: redemption (put/call) at
ownership exceeding 90–95 percent of shares






shares (put and call) or
offer at fair price in
significant transactions
(mergers, demergers etc.)
Finland: redemption right for shareholders
opposing mergers or demergers
Sweden: no cash redemption right (cash-
mergers prohibited – more than half of the
consideration value shall consist of shares
(ABL 23:2)
EU Regulation: No redemption rights apply in
mergers: the merger directive recognizes the
possibility of redemption in national regulation
(Art. 28 a).
Finland: 0.5 / 1




Neutral tax treatment for
maintaining a set level of
shareholding
Finland: Tax treatment of dividends favors
pyramid holding structures (provided ultimate
investment in listed company is over 10%)
Sweden: Tax treatment of dividends favors
pyramid holding structures (provided ultimate





Neutral or favorable tax
treatment for transferring
control
Finland: Tax treatment favors sale of shares by
large shareholders (sale is tax exempt if
holding is over 10% and booked as fixed
assets)
Sweden: Tax treatment favors sale of shares by
large shareholders (sale is tax exempt if








Finland: Exemptions available, but practice is
limited
Sweden: Exemptions available and extensive
number of precedents
EU Regulation: Exemptions allowed provided














Finland: reverse burden of proof applied to
board members and controlling shareholders
Sweden: no reverse burden of proof; but
fairness opinions required (based on Swedish
Securities Council Statement 2012:5)
EU Regulation: arm’s length requirements
apply to certain related-party transactions
(Second Company Law Directive Art 26)
Finland: 1/1
Sweden: 1/1
Availability of class action
suits or other mechanisms
to ease minority
coordination problems
(especially in cases related
to enforcement of
standards, such as the
principle of the equal
treatment of shareholders)
Finland: No class action; shareholders
representing 10 percent of shares can sue on
behalf of the company but risk bearing the full
legal costs personally
Sweden: No class action; shareholders
representing 10 percent of shares can sue on
behalf of the company but risk bearing the full
legal costs personally.
EU Regulation: No EU-wide rules.
Finland: 0/1
Sweden: 0/1
Special courts or tribunals





Finland: Special arbitration used for
redemption proceedings; takeover panel
established, but with very limited practice
Sweden: Special arbitration used for




proceedings) established, but with very limited practice






Finland: Supervisory authority available to
enforce mandatory bid rules and fair price
provisions
Sweden: Supervisory authority available to
enforce mandatory bid rules and fair price
provisions
EU Regulation: A supervisory authority must




Aggregate Score Finland: 12 / 17
Sweden: 13 / 17
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CHAPTER 5
THE LAW AND POLITICS OF THE EU COMPANY LAW ACTION PLAN TOWARD A FEDERAL
SYSTEM OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE REGULATION IN THE EU?
This chapter considers the law and politics of the EU Company Law Action Plan and
considers resulting implications for adopting legal strategies for EU level corporate
governance regulation. The study acknowledges that the EU institutions have an increased
role in corporate matters after the financial crisis and that the EU is likely to remain an
important source of corporate governance regulation. A key question is how this affects the
interests of corporate constituencies and the political dynamics of corporate governance in
the EU.
The chapter finds that the action plan has not introduced significant changes in the relative
positions of corporate constituencies – despite the increased political salience of corporate
governance. However, the action plan does reflect the trend towards centralization of
regulation to larger political forums, and the decreasing scope for national regulation. The
chapter argues that more emphasis is needed on the choice of appropriate legal strategies
and on regulatory design sat the EU level that better facilitate diverse corporate governance
models in the EU and that are tailored for different structures of corporate ownership and
control.
I. INTRODUCTION: CONTROVERSY OVER THE COMPANY LAWACTION PLAN
With its company law and corporate governance action plan published in 20121 the EU
Commission has pursued a more interventionist policy with respect to corporate governance
regulation than previously. The agenda for regulatory initiatives includes, among other,
regulatory responses to perceived short-termism in the market, engagement of shareholders
and better enforcement of corporate governance regulation2. Based on the Company Law
Action Plan, the Commission has made detailed regulatory initiatives, including proposed
amendments to the Shareholder Rights Directive3.
The EU Commission’s initiatives and the notion of increased EU level regulatory intervention
in corporate governance have caused concern among key corporate constituents across the
EU4. The initiatives have been argued to decrease the competitiveness of publicly listed
1 Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and
Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions, Action Plan: European Company Law and Corporate
Governance – a Modern Legal Framework for More Engaged Shareholders and Sustainable Companies,
COM(2012) 740/2 (Dec. 12, 2012) [hereinafter Company Law Action Plan].
2 Id. at 3-5.
3 Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council amending Directive 2007/36/EC as
Regards the Encouragement of Long-term Shareholder Engagement and Directive 2013/34/EU as Regards
Certain Elements of the Corporate Governance Statement, COM(2014) 213 final, 2014/0121 (COD) (Apr. 9,
2014).
4 Nikki Tait, Brussels Unveils Corporate Governance Plans, FT, Apr. 5, 2011; Alison Smith & Nikki Tait,
Corporate Governance Divides Opinion, FT, Apr. 21, 2011.
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companies in the EU and consequently of the EU financial markets5. In responding to the
initiatives, market participants have emphasized that corporate governance issues should be
regulated primarily at the national level and that the EU should limit its involvement in this
field6. Market participants have also expressed concern about the application of regulation
related to social policies or external political interests to corporate governance matters
specifically7.
Considering the opposition to many of the proposals, it is unclear to what extent they will all
be successfully implemented in the form initially contemplated by the Commission. Yet these
initiatives, as such, are important in the context of the debate on the role of EU corporate
governance regulation and emphasize the political aspects of corporate governance in the EU.
It is important to understand the drivers underlying the Company Law Action Plan and the
reasons for the EU Commission for seeking to increase its role in corporate governance
regulation. This study adopts a political approach to EU regulatory initiatives, including the
Company Law Action Plan and the Shareholder Rights Directive. The study considers the
relationship between EU and national level corporate governance regulation in light of the
trend towards more centralized sources of regulatory policy, including the EU, the G-20 and
the OECD, that has emerged after the financial crisis8. In this regard the study will consider
how a federal or multilevel structure of corporate governance regulation may evolve in the
EU.
The chapter will be structured as follows. Section II will provide an overview of the debate on
EU initiatives in the field of corporate governance, the dynamics of harmonization and
regulatory competition, and the possible regulatory implications of the increased political
salience of corporate governance at the EU level. Section III will then introduce the Company
Law Action Plan from 2012 and certain regulatory instruments introduced pursuant thereto.
The political dynamic of the Company Law Action Plan is discussed in section IV. Finally,
the study considers the preconditions for the evolution of a federal or multilevel model of
corporate governance regulation in the EU in section V.
II. CHALLENGES FOR INTRODUCING EFFECTIVE EUREGULATION
There has been much debate in Europe as to the proper role of the EU with respect to
company law and corporate governance9. EU initiatives have been subject to considerable
5 Report of the Reflection Group on the Future of EU Company Law, at 10, 2011, available at
http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/company/docs/modern/reflectiongroup_report_en.pdf [hereinafter the EU
Reflection Group Report].
6 See Luca Enriquez & Matteo Gatti, The Uneasy Case for Top-Down Corporate Law Harmonization in the
European Union, 27 U.PA.J.INT’L.ECON.L. 939 (2006).
7 Massimo Belcredi & Guido Ferrarini, Corporate Boards, Incentive Pay and Shareholder Activism in Europe:
Main Issues and Policy Perspectives, in BOARDS AND SHAREHOLDERS IN EUROPEAN LISTED COMPANIES 29
(Massimo Belcredi & Guido Ferrarini, eds., 2013).
8 FINANCIAL REGULATION AND SUPERVISION, A POST-CRISIS ANALYSIS (Guido Ferrarini, Klaus Hopt & Eddy
Wymeersch, eds., 2012), THE REGULATORY AFTERMATH OF THE GLOBAL FINANCIAL CRISIS (Elis Ferran, Jane
Hill & John Coffee, eds., 2012), UNCTAD, CORPORATE GOVERNANCE IN THEWAKE OF THE FINANCIAL CRISIS,
SELECTED INTERNATIONAL VIEWS (UNCTAD/DIAE/ED/2010/2), 2010.
9 See John Armour, Who Should Make Corporate Law? EC Legislation versus Regulatory Competition (ECGI -
Law Working Paper No. 54/2005), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=860444 or
http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.860444; John Armour & Wolf-Georg Ringe, European Company Law 1999-2010:
Renaissance and Crisis (ECGI – LawWorking Paper No. 175/2011, Oxford Legal Studies Research Paper No.
63, 2010), available at ttp://ssrn.com/abstract=1691688 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1691688; Luca
Enriques, Company Law Harmonization Reconsidered: What Role for the EC (ECGI Law Working Paper No 53,
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criticism and the EU has even been deemed to have failed in its goal to develop competitive
corporate governance regulation10. Enriquez & Gatti argue that it has not been demonstrated
that the EU Commission is any better than national regulators in addressing market failure
and that, in fact, EU initiatives have not lead to decreased transaction costs, but increased
them as a result of the added complexity and uncertainty of national corporate laws resulting
from the impact of EU regulation11. Many commentators and interest groups alike have
argued that corporate law should be enacted at the national level and that any EU initiatives
should be minimized and in any case limited to cross-border aspects of corporate action
only12. National corporate law has been argued to include established elements that are
specific to member states so that supranational intervention would disturb the evolved
complementarities with existing economic structures13.
It has proved challenging to introduce EU level regulation and regulatory outcomes have
often been deemed unsatisfactory. It has been argued that even if the EU has issued a broad
range of company law regulation, the real impact of EU company law has been limited. EU
regulation has not really covered core areas of company law, such as fiduciary duties or
remedies available to shareholders14. Instead, regulation has focused on technical areas, where
national governments might have legislated even without EU intervention. Earlier integration
efforts have been argued to have been rather limited in scope15 while some of the more
comprehensive reform initiatives in the 1990’s failed in the face of significant political
resistance16. All in all, the scope of company law harmonization has been fairly limited
compared to capital markets regulation, for example, which may be more directly related to
core EU policies (free movement of capital)17.
The quality of regulatory outcomes of EU initiatives has also been subject to criticism. The
enactment of efficient rules has been difficult, and political compromises have often been
necessary. This has at times resulted in regulatory outcomes that have been argued to have
been misguided and ineffective18. The impact of EU level corporate legal rules has been
limited, for example, by the optionality sometimes provided in how the rules can be
2005), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=850005; Enriques & Gatti (2006), supra note 6, Gerard Hertig &
Joseph A. McCahery, Company and Takeover Law Reforms in Europe: Misguided Harmonization Efforts or
Regulatory Competition? (ECGI Law Working Paper No 12/2003), available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=438431.
10 Enriques (2005), supra note 9, at 11.
11 Enriquez & Gatti (2006), supra note 6, at 940.
12 See, inter alia, Peter Böckli, Paul Davies, Eilis Ferran, Guido Ferrarini, José Garrido, Klaus Hopt, Alain
Pietrancosta, Katharina Pistor, Rolf Skog, Stanislaw Soltysinski, Jaap Winter & Eddy Wymeersch, European
Company Law Experts, Response to the European Commission’s Consultation on the Future of European
Company Law, 2012, 1-5, available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2075034 [hereinafter Expert Report 2012].
13 Armour & Ringe (2011), supra note 9, at 4 – 5.
14 See Enriques (2005), supra note 9.
15 See Luca Enriques, EC Company Law Directives and Regulations: How Trivial Are They?, 27 U.PA.J.
INT’L.EC.L. 1 (2006).
16 See Proposal for a Fifth Directive on the Structure of Public Limited Companies and the Powers and
Obligations of Their Organs, COM(83) 185 final, 1983, OJ C240/2 [hereinafter the Fifth Company Law
Directive Proposal].
17 Armour & Ringe (2011), supra note 9, at 27.
18 See Enriques & Gatti (2006) supra note 6.
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implemented. This was the case in connection with the Takeover Directive19, where some of
the mechanisms introduced by the EU Commission were strongly opposed20.
It has also been pointed out that EU level corporate regulation has been under-enforced21. The
Commission is deemed to lack the resources to efficiently monitor compliance. Member
states have at times also failed to introduce efficient sanctions regarding compliance with
some of the EU initiated legal rules. The national implementation of EU corporate law has
also been inconsistent, as rules have been adapted to local legal systems22. As a result of these
shortcomings, it has been argued, EU corporate regulation has often been marginalized – even
trivial23.
The criticism seems to support the case for developing corporate governance regulation at the
national level and relying on regulatory competition to promote better regulation and market
integration. However, the dynamics of regulatory development are more complex, and it is
not always clear that national regulation fares better in an increasingly international corporate
environment. The Company Law Action Plan is based on the perception that the existing
largely national regulatory frameworks regarding corporate governance in the EU member
states have been inadequate for the purposes of appropriate monitoring of management and
for sufficient investor protection24. While national systems of corporate governance are
adapted to the existing institutional environment they may also reflect the entrenched interests
of dominant corporate constituencies25. An emphasis on national level regulation can
strengthen path dependence in regulation and serve to promote the national lock-in of
corporate enterprise and weaken market integration26. Despite the observed challenges, then,
EU level corporate governance regulation cannot so easily be dismissed.
A. HARMONIZATION VS. COMPETITION
The criticism of EU corporate governance regulation is closely related to the debate on
whether harmonization or regulatory competition is the better avenue to pursue market
integration in the European Union. Commentators have questioned the extent to which it is
appropriate to introduce uniform EU level corporate governance regulation considering the
variation in corporate environments through the EU member states27. The alternatives to
harmonization include negative integration through the courts (i.e. enforcing the EU
19 Directive 25/2004/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 21 April 2004 on Takeover Bids,
2004 O.J. (L142) [hereinafter Takeover Directive]; see also Thomas Papadopoulos, The Mandatory Provisions
of the EU Takeover Bid Directive and Their Deficiencies, 1 LFMR 525-533 (2007).
20 See Rolf Skog, The Takeover Directive – an Endless Saga?, 13 EUR. BUS. L. REV. 301-312 (2002).
21 Enriques (2006), supra note 15, at 12-17.
22 Id. at 50-55.
23 Id. at 1.
24 Company Law Action Plan, supra note 1, at 3-4.
25 See Guido Ferrarini & Geoffrey P. Miller, A Simple Theory of Takeover Regulation in the United States and
Europe (New York University Law and Economics Working Paper 197, 2009), available at
http://lsr.nellco.org/nyu_lewp/197.
26 ANDREW JOHNSTON, EC REGULATION OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 113-116 (2009); see also Enriques
(2005), supra note 9, at 9-11 and Roger Van den Bergh, Regulatory Competition or Harmonization of Laws?
Guidelines for the European Regulator, in THE ECONOMICS OF HARMONIZING EUROPEAN LAW (Alain Marciano
& Jean-Michel Josselin, eds., 2002).
27 See Enriquez & Gatti (2006), supra note 9.
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freedoms) or leaving matters to be regulated at the national level and relying on regulatory
competition to force competitive solutions to develop in the EU28.
The reasons traditionally given for promoting harmonization are based on the recognition that
a framework of common rules facilitates cross-border business and prevents distortions in the
internal market based on differences in national laws29. Such differences increase transaction
costs and legal uncertainty, which hinders the free movement of capital and the freedom of
establishment. If legal protections are different, investors may be reluctant to make cross-
border investments, for example. Differences in national laws can also cause distortions in the
form of costs from different minimum capital and disclosure rules, among other. These
differences can have an unwarranted effect on the legal form of enterprise in cross-border
situations.
There are equally convincing arguments supporting a policy of regulatory competition,
however. As corporate constituencies are able to choose among different jurisdictions, the
most competitive regulatory environment will attract more interest and persist. Different types
of regulatory requirements can also better be met as corporations or businesses with different
characteristics can choose the regulatory environment that best fits their needs. Further,
allowing national regulation to develop provides the opportunity to test different regulatory
approaches, while harmonization leads to a monopoly of regulation with resulting
inefficiencies30.
At the EU level, national courts and the European Court of Justice (the “ECJ”) can intervene
in national measures that contravene the EU treaty freedoms, including the freedom of
establishment, without positive harmonization. In this regard it can be noted that as EU level
legislative processes stalled due to political differences in relation to the development of EU
level company law, rulings of the ECJ have promoted further market integration31. In the
context of corporate law, several landmark judgments on the freedom of establishment from
the Centros-case in 199932 to the more recent Vela case decided in 201233 have slowly paved
the way for regulatory competition within the EU. With ECJ judgments supporting negative
harmonization by developing the freedom of establishment for corporations in the EU,
regulatory competition has often been argued to be a superior mechanism for developing
corporate governance in the EU34.
28 For a discussion, see Johnston (2009), supra note 26, at 146-213.
29 See Christiaan Timmermans, Harmonization in the Future of Company Law in Europe, in CAPITALMARKETS
AND COMPANY LAW 628 (Klaus Hopt & Eddy Wymeersch, eds., 2003).
30 Enriquez (2005), supra note 9, at 2.
31 Johnston (2009), supra note 26, at 146.
32 Case C-212/97, Centros Ltd v Erhvervs- og Selskabsstyrelsen [1999] ECR I-1459; the establishment of a
company in the UK for the purposes of the setting up branches in Denmark was argued to be abuse of the
freedom of establishment. the ECJ stated (para. 27) that ”the fact that a national of a Member State who wishes
to set up a company chooses to form it in the Member State who rules of company law seem to him the least
restrictive and to set up branches in other Member States cannot, in itself, constitute an abuse of the right of
establishment.”
33 Case C 378/10 VALE Építési kft. [2012] ECR 00000; the question related to the possibility of a company
established in a Member State to convert into a company established under foreign law. The ECJ confirmed that
if the host state allows for conversion as such, then “the refusal by the authorities of a Member State, in relation
to a cross-border conversion, to record in the commercial register the company of the Member State of origin as
the ‘predecessor in law’ to the converted company is not compatible with the principle of equivalence if, in
relation to the registration of domestic conversions, such a record is made of the predecessor company.”
34 See Enriques & Gatti (2006), supra note 6.
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There has been some concern, however, that regulatory competition could lead to a “race to
the bottom” where EU member states would develop regimes that cater to select interest
groups and that may disenfranchise different corporate stakeholders, such as minority
shareholders or employees35. In other words, national regulation would result in externalities
with effects outside the relevant jurisdiction that would not be “fixed” by regulatory
competition. Reference has been made to the emergence of a “European Delaware” in this
respect36. It has been argued that the corporate constituency with the authority or possibility to
affect re-establishment or incorporation decisions would receive favored treatment, and that
Delaware law, for example, can be seen to favor management over shareholders in this
regard37. Corporate ownership remains more concentrated in the EU than in the United States,
and it would likely be controlling shareholders who would be in the position to pursue such
decisions. Thus, in the EU, there might be concern that minority protections, creditor
protection or labor interests would be affected by re-incorporations38. There have been some
signs of companies being incorporated in the UK due to low capital requirements or in order
to avoid codetermination regulation, for example39.
The prerequisites for effective real-world regulatory competition have also been debated40.
Regulation is only one factor affecting companies, and benefits from regulatory arbitrage in
the field of corporate law or corporate governance may not be significant enough to cover
costs of relocation. Taxation has typically been a more dominant feature in this regard. It is
also not clear whether EU member states would, in fact, have sufficient incentives to develop
policies with the specific aim of attracting companies to re-establish in their jurisdictions. In
the United States, it seems that Delaware has become the predominant jurisdiction for
incorporation and that other states lack incentives to attract new incorporations41. It has been
argued that in the EU there would similarly be lack of incentives for member states to supply
regulation tailored to attract corporate incorporations42. Benefits may be limited, risky and
long-term, while the investments required would be immediate and costly. Moreover,
franchise taxes are generally prohibited in the EU, except where the company has its real seat,
and companies are otherwise generally taxed where operations take place43. There is also a
risk for political repercussions at the EU level for an active policy of attracting incorporations
at the cost of other EU member states.
In the EU, considerable national lock-ins remain for corporations subject to a plethora of
regulation varying from labor regulation to taxation, which hinder efficient cross-border
establishment. Also, the differences in the institutional environments (including
35 See Johnston (2009), supra note 26, at 123-124.
36 Id.
37 See Lucian A Bebchuk & Assaf Hamdani, Federal Corporate Law: Lessons from History (Harvard Law
School John M. Olin Center of Law, Economics and Business Discussion Paper Series 558, 2006), available at
http://lsr.nellco.org/harvard_olin.
38 Johnston (2009), supra note 26, at 124.
39 See John Armour, Who Should Make Corporate Law? EC Legislation Versus regulatory Competition (ESRC
Centre for Business Research, University of Cambridge Working Paper No. 307, 2005), available at
http://www.cbr.cam.ac.uk/fileadmin/user_upload/centre-for-business-research/downloads/working-
papers/wp307.pdf.
40 Johnston (2009), supra note 26, at 176-184.
41 SeeMarcel Kahan & Ehud Kamar, The Myth of State Competition in Corporate Law, 55 STAN. L. REV. 679
(2002); Marcel Kahan, The State of State Competition for Incorporations (ECGIW LawWorking Paper 263,
2014), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2474658.
42 Johnston (2009), supra note 26, at 182.
43 Id.
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complementary institutional structures) do not necessarily facilitate an expedited process of
regulatory competition. Altogether, there is some concern that the premises for regulatory
competition in the EU are still incomplete, and cannot necessarily be relied on to provide a
mechanism for EU wide regulatory development. Also, negative harmonization based on
court rulings and interpretations of the EC Treaties is often argued to be too slow to support
efficient market integration. Thus positive harmonization may remain a relevant avenue for
pursuing EU policies in the field of company law for the time being.
B. CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AND PERCEIVED DIFFERENCES IN ECONOMIC SYSTEMS IN
THE EU
The differences in economic systems that are deemed to prevail in the EU pose an extra
challenge for introducing uniform EU regulation in the field of corporate law. The effects of
EU level regulatory intervention may differ among the member states depending on the
institutional environment, which does not facilitate the creation of a level playing field.
Institutions develop to complement existing features of the corporate environment44. In this
type of environment the introduction of supranational rules can have very different and
unintended consequences45. For example, corporate governance mechanisms that are relevant
in the context of dispersed ownership may not be meaningful or effective in a concentrated
ownership environment, where the relevant regulatory concerns are completely different. The
effects of regulation can also depend on the availability of enforcement systems, such as court
systems or agencies, where the quality of the relevant institutions across the EU can vary
considerably46. It has been argued, for example, that the introduction of a mandatory break-
through rule in the Takeover Directive would, in reality, likely not have facilitated
challenging the control of large shareholders but lead to the further increase in the
concentration of ownership and control as owners would have reacted to the new regulation47.
The relevant institutional environment affects initial choices of corporate ownership structure
that tend to be path dependent explaining why different structures of corporate ownership and
different corporate governance systems persist. When a given structure of corporate
governance has been established, it is likely to be reinforced48. Bebchuk & Roe49 suggest that
sunk costs, externalities and complementarities caused by initial choices increase the cost of
alternative structures. Existing structures may also persist due to rent-seeking by controlling
constituencies. The regulatory framework can be seen as a complementary institution that
recognizes and reinforces certain ownership structures both due to efficiency and rent-
seeking. The entrenchment of corporate control is often a distinctive feature in corporate
44 See Lucian A. Bebchuk and Mark J. Roe, A Theory of Path Dependence in Corporate Governance and
Ownership, 52 STAN. L. REV. 127 (1999).
45 SeeMarc Goergen, What Do We Know about Different Systems of Corporate Governance? (ECGI Finance
Working Paper 163, 2007), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract_id=981531; see also Johnston (2009), supra
note 26, at 181.
46 See EU Commission, Study on Monitoring and Enforcement Practices in Corporate Governance in the
Member States, Sept. 23, 2009, available at
http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/company/docs/ecgforum/studies/comply-or-explain-090923_en.pdf; see also
European Commission Green Paper, Building a Capital Markets Union, COM(2015) 63 final, at 9 and 24-25,
Feb. 16, 2015.
47 John C. Coates IV, Ownership, Takeovers and EU Law: How Contestable Should EU Corporations Be? 12
(ECGI Law Working Paper 11/2003), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=424720.
48 See DOUGLASS C. NORTH, INSTITUTIONS, INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE AND ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE (1990).
49 See Bebchuk & Roe (1999), supra note 44.
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governance50. Addressing this issue through regulatory intervention might be challenging
regardless of the structure of ownership. The self-reinforcing nature of the structure of
corporate ownership and its relationship to the applicable regulatory framework is important
to recognize in initiatives to develop corporate governance regulation.
The effects of the potential entrenchment of control are important to consider in connection
with corporate governance regulation. It has been argued that change is a pervasive
characteristic of the interaction between economic, political and corporate environments51.
Technological changes affect the business and organizational environments of corporations,
and it is vital that the organizational structures of business can be adapted to changing
circumstances. Regulation should facilitate the possibilities of corporate enterprise to adapt to
changes in their environments. At the same time, as discussed above, entrenchment of control
has often been seen as a factor in any corporate governance system52. Regulatory models are
needed to counter entrenchment and to facilitate corporate acquisitions and the transfer of
control, for example. As regards the EU, this may be a challenge distinctive to national
regulatory systems where regulation may have been entrenched to the benefit of dominant
corporate constituencies. Representing a broader variety of corporate systems, the EU may
well have a legitimate role as the source for regulatory initiatives as national governance
systems have shown signs of further consolidating existing control structures53.
This discussion emphasizes the importance of addressing corporate governance issues in the
context of existing structures of ownership and control. It is important, regardless of the
source of regulation, be it national or supranational, that corporate governance regulation be
adapted to the characteristics of the relevant institutional environment. This does not mean
that EU level regulation would be suboptimal as such, or that national level regulation is per
se superior, but only that regulatory mechanisms should be better adapted to the prevailing
institutional environment. EU level legal strategies should not disenfranchise specific forms
of ownership or governance but, instead, seek to address the potential for abuse within
existing governance structures. It is important to identify the relevant relationships that are
vulnerable to abuse and then to apply appropriate legal strategies tailored to the institutional
environment.
C. A POLITICAL APPROACH TO EUCORPORATE GOVERNANCE REGULATION
Regulation can be seen as the outcome of the interaction between political and market
structures, reflecting the impact of interested market participants and the political
environment54. Changes in regulation can be seen to reflect changes in the relative bargaining
power of these constituencies. The political economy sets out the broader parameters for
feasible regulatory outcomes. Within these parameters, the public choice literature identifies a
50 See ALESSIOM. PACCES, RETHINKNG CORPORATE GOVERNANCE – THE LAW AND ECONOMICS OF CONTROL
POWERS 14, 411-413 (2012).
51 Ronald J. Gilson, The Political Ecology of Takeovers: Thoughts on Harmonization of the European Corporate
Governance Environment, 61 FORDHAM L. REV. 161, 175 (1992).
52 Pacces (2012), supra note 50.
53 See Guido Ferrarini & Geoffrey P. Miller, A Simple Theory of Takeover Regulation in the United States and
Europe (New York University Law and Economics Working Paper 197, 2009), available at
http://lsr.nellco.org/nyu_lewp/197; see also Van den Bergh (2002), supra note 26.
54 SeeMark Roe: Political Preconditions to Separating Ownership from Corporate Control, 53 STAN.L.REV.
539 (2000); see alsoMARKROE, POLITICAL DETERMINANTS OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE (2003).
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“market for regulation” where regulatory changes are the result of bargaining among relevant
constituencies, including market participants, regulatory agencies and politicians55.
Politics and corporate governance systems are interlinked56. Corporations and the way they
are governed are of considerable economic importance. Corporate governance has a
significant effect on the preconditions for the creation of wealth and economic growth, as well
as on the distribution of the cash flows and profits from corporate enterprise. It is natural that
corporate governance should have considerable political implications as key corporate
constituencies agree and renegotiate their relationships through the political framework57.
Corporate constituencies are also interest groups that can use political means to further their
own interests. In fact, a two-way causation has been identified between the two so that
politics and corporate governance can be said to co-evolve58. Different political conditions
impact the structure of corporate governance systems, while different corporate governance
systems can similarly cause different political reactions59.
Promoting the Interests of Corporate Constituencies
The political economy of corporate governance is generally analysed in relation to how the
respective interests of different corporate constituencies are balanced in relative terms.
Shareholders, management and employees are often identified as the main corporate
constituencies in this regard. Creditors and increasingly, with the increasing political interest
in corporations, tax payers at large are other groups with interests in corporate governance
that they enforce through policy decisions and regulation. Depending on the structure of the
economy and the political system different constituencies may have different bargaining
power resulting in a variety of corporate governance models – some reflecting the pre-
eminence of shareholder interests and others the more continental structure reflecting labour
and creditor interests, for example.
The ability of different constituencies to promote their own interests can vary. Olson60 argues
that smaller interest groups with homogenous interests will overcome coordination problems
and be able to protect their interests in a satisfactory way. Large interests groups with similar
interests can be expected to pursue their interest directly through the political system. Labor
interests, for example, can be expected to be reflected in this way. On the other hand, large
interest groups with dissimilar interests may not be able to coordinate their action in specific
issues. With respect to corporate governance minority shareholders may be a group with some
difficulty in overcoming coordination problems. Minority shareholders may have diverging
agendas and may not have sufficient financial interests involved to allow for efficient political
cooperation. Based on Olson’s arguments, minority shareholders may be the group that would
not be in the best position to coordinate activities at the political level with respect to
corporate governance or takeover regulation. The interests of these constituencies, then, may
55 See George Stigler, The Theory of Economic Regulation, 6 BELL J. OF ECON. 2, 3-21 (1971); Samuel Peltzman,
The Economic Theory of Regulation After a Decade of Deregulation 13 (Brookings Papers on Economic
Activity, 1989).
56 SeeMarianna Belloc & Ugo Pagano, Politics-Business Co-Evolution Paths: Workers’ Organization and
Capitalist Concentration, 33 INT.L. REV. OF L. AND ECON. 23 (2013); see also Ugo Pagano, The Evolution of the
American Corporation and Global Organizational Biodiversity, 35 SEATTLE U. L. R. 1271, 1272 (2012).
57 See Roe (2000), supra note 54, Roe (2003), supra note 54.
58 Pagano (2012), supra note 56, at 1272.
59 Id.
60 SeeMANCUR OLSON, THE LOGIC OF COLLECTIVE ACTION (2ND ED., 1971).
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require specific attention from regulators if market based regulation and investor protection
are desired.
With respect to corporate governance and investor protection in general, corporate insiders,
entrepreneurs and institutional investors have been identified as relevant interest groups that
can affect regulation, while outside investors have been deemed a group too dispersed to be
able to be an effective coordinated group for the purposes of affecting regulation61. Bebchuk
& Neeman argue that corporate insiders can capture the full benefits of any changes to
regulation and as they can, to some extent, use corporate funds to affect such changes, they
are willing to invest fully in lobbying activity. At the same time, institutional investors will
have the burden of being able to capture only part of such benefits as any benefits they obtain
will also benefit other investors62. Entrepreneurs are argued to opt for a balance in investor
protection that supports raising capital. This imbalance is deemed likely to tilt corporate
governance regulation to the benefit of corporate insiders and entrepreneurs63. This suggests,
in line with Olson, that the interests of outside investors may require regulatory attention.
Political economies are sufficiently complex so that they are rarely dominated by single
political interests. In other words, a single constituency is rarely in the position to dictate
policy. Gourevitch & Shinn have assessed the potential for political coalitions between
different corporate key constituencies64. Different constituencies can seek to bargain with
each other, or if interests are not sufficiently uniform within a group, their political influence
can be divided. For example, employees and managers may cooperate to promote stability,
the size of the corporation and insiders’ claims on corporate income65. On the other hand, the
industrial dynamic may also encourage shareholders and employees to combine their interests
to constrain managerial agency costs66.
A factor further increasing the complexity of these relationships is the development of the
ownership landscape and the institutionalization of shareholding67. Shares are often mainly
held through intermediaries that have independent interests that may or may not be aligned
with those of beneficial owners. Where ultimate shareholders may have long-term investment
horizons, intermediaries may have short-term interests related to their compensation
systems68, for example. They may thus support and encourage short-term policies69. This has
been a concern raised by the EU Commission in the context of the Company Law Action Plan
as well. There are concerns that the different time-horizons of investors and their
representatives give rise to a set of horizontal conflicts among shareholders, and that
61 See Lucian A. Bebchuk & Zvika Neeman, Investor Protection and Interest Group Politics (John M. Olin
Center Program on Corporate Governance Discussion Paper 603, 2007), available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1030355.
62 Id. at 3-7.
63 Id.
64 PETER GOUREVITCH & JAMES SHINN, POLITICAL POWER AND CORPORATE CONTROL 60-68 (2005).
65 SeeMarco Pagano & Paolo Volpin, The Political Economy of Corporate Governance (Centre for Economic
Policy Research Discussion Paper No. 2682, 2001), available at http://www.csef.it/pagano/AER-2005.pdf.
66 Gourevitch & Shinn (2005), supra note 64.
67 Usha Rodriques, Corporate Governance in an Age of Separation of Ownership from Ownership, 95 MINN.
L.REV. 1822, 1828 (2011).
68 Christoph van der Elst & Erik Vermeulen, Europe’s Corporate Governance Green Paper: Do Institutional
Investors Matter? 6 (Tilburg Law School Legal Studies Research Paper Series 14, 2011), available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1860144.
69 Rodrigues (2011), supra note 67, at 1829.
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empowering shareholders in these circumstances may lead to increased “short-termism”70.
However, it is possible that while investors may have long-term interests, they are indifferent
to how these goals are achieved and may well prefer a series of short-term investments in a
diversified portfolio. In any case, it is argued, there should be more transparency with regard
to the policies pursued by these intermediaries71.
In studying the development of corporate governance regulation it is possible to look at how
regulatory initiatives affect the current interests of corporate constituencies. Thus, to better
understand the development of EU level corporate governance regulation, and of the
significance of the Company Law Action Plan, for example, it is important to look at how the
action plan initiatives could affect the interests of key corporate constituencies. Considering
the concern caused by the Company Law Action Plan among certain key interest groups, it is
interesting to analyse whether the action plan could reflect a political shift in EU level
corporate governance regulation.
The Market for Regulation at the National and International Levels
The public choice literature recognizes that regulation can generally be deemed to reflect the
interests of dominant interest groups or political coalitions. The dynamics of the market for
regulation may differ at the national and international levels; the ability of interest groups to
organize and to affect regulation may be different at the national than at the international
level, for example. Also, the introduction of supranational regulation as a partially parallel
regulatory framework makes the regulatory dynamic far more complex.
The introduction of the EU framework has established a parallel regulatory framework to
national regulation. Constituencies can pursue regulatory agendas through both the national
and the EU regulatory frameworks72. The preference for regulatory competition (national
regulation) or harmonization (EU regulation) may also be driven by how the relevant
constituency can best promote its interests in relation to other constituencies. Constituencies
with considerable sunk costs and a high threshold for corporate mobility may not be able to
take advantage of the freedom of establishment. To prevent competitors from taking
advantage of more competitive regimes they would opt for EU level harmonization setting
similar rules throughout the EU that would cater to existing industrial structures.
Constituencies with lower costs for relocating, on the other hand, will lobby for national
regulation and regulatory competition, as they can move their operations to jurisdictions with
more favourable regulation, for example73.
An important element in the ability of interests groups to pursue their interests is that the
dynamics of the market for regulation may be different at the national and international levels.
The ability of interest groups to coordinate their action may be different at the national and
international levels. Certain interest groups may have significant influence on regulation at
the national level, while their ability to influence EU level regulation can be limited. Ferrarini
70 Company Law Action Plan, supra note 1, at 5 and 9.
71 Id.
72 See Helen Callaghan, How Multilevel Governance Affects the Clash of Capitalisms (MPIfG Discussion Paper
08/5, 2008), available at www.mpifg.de (publications, discussion papers).
73 See Jeanne-May Sun & Jacques Pelkmans, Regulatory Competition in the Single Market, 33 J. OF COMMON
MARKET STUDIES 67 (1995).
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& Miller argue that the interests of corporate insiders remain strong at the national level74.
With respect to takeovers, for example, target company interests may have more influence at
the level of national regulation than the interests of bidders. At the domestic level, interest
groups representing management, labour and community groups are likely to advocate for
rules that increase the threshold for takeovers75. At the international (or federal) level,
however, the influence of these interest groups may be more balanced76. Corporate insiders
may not have the same relative advantage over the interests of bidders (and minority
shareholders) who may better be able to organize themselves on an international basis.
The concerns identified above have some support in findings from the United States. In
analyzing the development of state corporate regulation, Bebchuk & Hamdani find that states
have generally favored corporate insiders whereas federal regulation has more consistently
favored external investors and minority shareholders77. The authors argue, in line with
Ferrarini & Miller, that corporate insiders do not have the same political influence at the
federal level and that other constituencies are better able to cooperate at this level of
regulation – possible due to economies of scale. In a long-term empirical analysis, Cheffins,
Bank & Wells support this view and argue that U.S. federal regulation has played a crucial
role in enhancing shareholder rights78.
The political dynamics of supranational regulation are more complex than with regard to
regulation at the national level. At the EU level it may be more difficult for individual interest
group to promote their interests by affecting EU policies and regulations, for example. The
EU provides an alternative and parallel framework for pursuing interests through the political
system resulting in a system of multilevel governance that may be less prone to be dominated
by specific policies. The EU institutional set-up allows for competing political coalitions to
simultaneously advance different reforms thus limiting the possibility for interest groups to
monopolize policy79. Callaghan, for example, argues that the multilevel system established
with the introduction of the EU framework increases strategic opportunities for using
regulation to pursue policies across the EU – regardless of the national system of corporate
governance80. Also, the institutional set-up of the EU allows different types of policies to be
pursued simultaneously. In other words, it is not as easy for a single interest group (or
coalition) to dominate the political agendas regarding a particular field of regulation. This can
result in reforms reflecting, at the same time, different policies81.
In an EU context it is also possible that benefits of regulation are not evenly distributed.
Market actors in jurisdictions with a favourable institutional environment may have an
advantage over actors in other jurisdictions. When markets are being opened through EU
regulation, some will be better positioned than others to take advantage of the new situation.
74 See Guido Ferrarini & Geoffrey P. Miller, A Simple Theory of Takeover Regulation in the United States and
Europe 15 (New York University Law and Economics Working Paper 197, 2009), available at
http://lsr.nellco.org/nyu_lewp/197.
75 See Roberta Romano, The Political Economy of Takeover Statutes, 112 VIRGINIA L.R. 111 (1987).
76 See Ferrarini & Miller (2009), supra note 74.
77 See Lucian A. Bebchuk & Assaf Hamdani, Federal Corporate Law: Lessons from History (HLS John M. Olin
Center Discussion Paper Series, 2006), available at http://lsr.nellco.org/harvard_olin.
78 See Brian R. Cheffins, Steven A. Bank & Harwell Wells, The Race to the Bottom Recalculated: Scoring
Corporate Law Over Time (ECGI Law Working Paper 261, 2014), available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract_id=2475242.
79 Id. at 10.
80 See Callaghan (2008), supra note 72.
81 Id.
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The Political Salience of Corporate Governance
It is important to note that the different regulatory approaches to developing corporate
governance regulation in the EU – harmonization and regulatory competition –have
significant political implications. The different approaches are linked to expected regulatory
outcomes and reflect underlying political preferences. The dynamics of positive and negative
integration also differ. Negative integration and regulatory competition are often associated
with a market oriented or laissez-faire approach to corporate regulation82. Generally negative
integration limited to enforcing treaty freedoms would result in deregulation at the national
level, for example, as incompatible national rules would be trumped by treaty freedoms. Also,
this approach relies less on political decision making and more on an increased role of the
ECJ. Positive integration through harmonization initiatives, on the other hand, always requires
sufficient political support, whereas the effects of such harmonization initiative can vary
depending on the policies pursued at the supranational level83.
Market integration in the EU has over the past decade been largely based on negative
integration reflected in the string of landmark cases by the ECJ. Also, the principles of
subsidiarity and proportionality included in the Treaty on European Union84 point towards a
preference of negative integration by requiring that any centralized measures must be
appropriately justified. The principle of proportionality, moreover, requires EU initiatives not
to “exceed what is necessary to achieve the objectives of the Treaties”85. It has also been
argued that the policies underlying EU level regulation have reflected a neo-liberal political
agenda and a “marketization” of corporate control86. The more recent initiatives to introduce
EU level corporate governance regulation may thus have reflected a clear diversion from
previous policies resulting in strong reactions from affected constituencies.
Another political factor that affects the development of corporate governance regulation is the
political salience of corporate governance. Corporate governance regulation does not
generally draw considerable public attention. The matters at hand are not of immediate
interest to the public and in many respects are in the focus of specialized interest groups
only87. The main constituencies traditionally identified in the corporate governance context
include different groups of shareholders, management and employees. Creditors are another
external constituency, along with employees, that also has significant interests in corporate
governance that can be pursued through policy and regulation.
As long as corporate governance regulation remains a “low salience”88 matter the political
dynamic, and the related “market for regulation”, is mainly dominated by the traditional
interest groups, i.e. investors, management and employee groups. However, to the extent that
corporate governance related issues do become matters of “high salience” that dynamic can
82 Johnston (2009), supra note 26, at 115-116.
83 Id.
84 Consolidated version of the Treaty on European Union, Oct. 26, 2012, OJ C 326, available at http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=celex%3A12012M%2FTXT [hereinafter TEU].
85 Id., Art 5. See also Consolidated Version of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, Oct. 26,
2012, OJ C 326, available at http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-
content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:12012E/TXT&from=EN [hereinafter the TFEU].
86 See Bastiaan van Apeldoorn & Laura Horn, The Transformation of Corporate Governance Regulation in the
European Union: From Harmonization to Marketization, in THE TRANSNATIONAL POLITICS OF CORPORATE
GOVERNANCE REGULATION 77 (Henk Overbeek, Bastiaan van Apeldoorn & Andreas Nölke, eds., 2007).
87 See PEPPER D. CULPEPPER, QUIET POLITICS AND BUSINESS POWER (2011).
88 Id. at 54-55.
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change significantly. Significant reforms of securities and corporate law are often launched in
the aftermath of market crisis89 and such initiatives may be affected by the sense of urgency
and public outcry related to the crisis90.
In connection with the financial crisis matters related to corporate governance have been the
focus of public interest. Corporate governance arrangements have been recognized to include
elements related to corporate legitimacy and possible externalities caused by corporations on
society. The concerns in this regard can be that inadequate management accountability would
lead to excessive risk taking which, if those risks realized, would fall upon society at large to
cover. However, as the salience of corporate governance regulation increases, it can be used
as an avenue to pursue politically topical issues in order to demonstrate the responsiveness of
the political system to public concerns. The matters that do become “high salience” issues are
likely to be matters that capture the public interest. The traditional dynamic related to
corporate governance regulation no longer applies to these issues, and it is possible that
corporate constituencies and their lobby representatives are not able to resist regulatory action
in these areas. Politicians now respond to completely different interest groups and must be
seen to be active in the face of a public outcry.
The problem with high salience matters is that regulation might be introduced that is costly
and ill-advised and has a negative effect on the competitiveness of the regulated businesses.
The regulated activities may be targeted for political reasons rather than based on sound
regulatory policies. With respect to recent corporate governance initiatives, listed companies
have already been subject to a regulatory framework at the EU level as several directives
apply specifically to the governance of listed companies. As these companies are already
captive to regulation, the threshold is lower to specifically target listed companies with new
regulatory initiatives.
The Centralization of the Sources of Regulation
There has been much political focus on corporate governance in the years following the
financial crisis. The EU Commission, for example, has voiced its concern that inadequate
corporate governance arrangements may have contributed to the financial crisis. The EU
Commission is not alone in these concerns as OECD reports on corporate governance and the
financial crisis have also found that “weaknesses in remuneration, risk management, board
practices and the exercise of shareholder rights had played an important role in the
development of the financial crisis”91. Interestingly, the EU is addressing these very same
concerns in the Company Law Action Plan. The G-20 group of countries has also published
statements on the need to develop financial regulation and the corporate governance of
financial institutions.
The examples described above suggest that regulatory initiatives can move to international
forums outside of traditional political frameworks. The work at the OECD level and at the G-
89 See Klaus J. Hopt, Comparative Corporate Governance: The State of the Art and International Regulation 16-
17 (ECGI Working Paper No. 170, 2011), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract_id=1713750, John Armour &
Wolf-Georg Ringe, European Company Law 1999 - 2010: Renaissance and Crisis 6 (ECGI Working Paper No
175, 2011), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1691688, AFTER ENRON: IMPROVING CORPORATE LAW AND
MODERNIZING SECURITIES MARKETS (John Armour and JA McCahery, eds. 2006).
90 Hopt (2011), supra note 89, at 17.
91 OECD, CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AND THE FINANCIAL CRISIS: KEY FINDINGS ANDMAINMESSAGES, 2009,
available at http://www.oecd.org/corporate/ca/corporategovernanceprinciples/43056196.pdf [hereinafter OECD
Corporate Governance Report].
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20 summits has considerable political effect on how regulation is adopted. Countries
participating in the relevant international summits have undertaken to cause regulation to be
adopted along the lines agreed in common statements of purpose. Consequently, the basis for
regulatory intervention has, to some extent, been formulated and agreed in connection with
international summits rather than through the political frameworks at the national or even
regional levels, such as the EU. For the EU this development represents a challenge to its
regulatory independence, but it also provides an opportunity for the EU Commission to
establish itself as a participant in international regulatory work. It seems, however, that the
national level political framework within the EU is becoming less significant in this process.
This trend emphasizes the importance of EU level regulation. Moreover, it is this
development that may form the basis for the federalization of EU corporate and corporate
governance regulation. I.e. the political prerequisites for maintaining the national level as a
source of regulation may be diminishing in an increasingly globalized world, where perceived
market failures will be addressed by global forums.
Finally, the public choice literature identifies the regulators as one of the key actors in the
market for regulation – such as the EU institutions. The EU Commission and the EU agencies
have independent agendas for expanding their own authority and influence at the cost of
national authorities. Current political trends support these efforts, as has been discussed
above.
D. REGULATORY IMPLICATIONS
This study is concerned with the development of corporate governance regulation in the EU in
light of recent EU initiatives in the field. The study adopts a political approach to corporate
governance and, first, recognizes that the impact of EU level corporate governance regulation
is likely to remain significant. The political dynamics of regulatory development seems to
suggest that regulatory initiatives are likely to be centralized to more international forums,
and that the role of the EU will increase in importance at the cost of national regulation.
Moreover, institutional complementarities and national lock-ins remain strong enough so
regulatory competition may not provide solutions sufficiently quickly, and that there will
therefore be pressure to introduce further EU level initiatives.
It is clear that the institutional environment varies significantly within the EU, and that
developing uniform regulation to be applied through the EU will continue to pose significant
challenges. However, this does not imply that national level regulation and regulatory
competition are necessarily the superior alternative. Instead, these factors must be better taken
into account in the legal strategies adopted at the EU level.
When preparing regulatory initiatives it is also important to recognize and identify the
political aspects of corporate governance regulation. The feasibility of introducing specific
regulatory mechanisms must also be considered in light of the political dynamic. The political
economy sets out the framework for feasible regulation, and changes in political influence
affect regulatory preferences. This means that regulators should consider alternative
regulatory mechanisms to address regulatory concerns and choose mechanisms and regulatory
designs that are politically feasible.
This study will consider these aspects with respect to the Company Law Action Plan of 2012,
and the key regulatory proposals thereunder. The study will consider whether the action plan
reflects a shift in the relative bargaining power among key corporate constituencies in the EU.
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The study also considers how the Company Law Action Plan is adapted to different corporate
governance systems – with a focus on concentrated ownership, which remains a prevalent
feature in the European corporate environment.
III. THE EUCOMPANY LAWACTION PLAN
EU regulation of company law has evolved significantly over the past decade. After the
failure of comprehensive initiatives, such as the Fifth Company law Directive Proposal92, the
EU Commission in 2003 issued a communication with the aim of modernizing company
law93. In this action plan, the Commission adopted a more instrumental view on
harmonization94. The introduction of EU level regulation would be based on an impact
assessment and an analysis of the needs of businesses95. Harmonization efforts would not be
introduced for the purposes of creating a level playing field alone. Regulatory intervention
was also to be focused primarily on cross-border aspects of business where EU regulatory
intervention could be better justified. Also, the regulatory mechanisms that would be used at
the EU level should be “flexible in application, but firm in the principles”96. At the same time
the EU also pursued a policy of simplifying the business environment for companies
envisaging the development of a principles-based regulatory model corporate law in the EU97.
Following the financial crisis, the Commission has pursued a more interventionist agenda
with respect to corporate governance. The EU Commission first targeted financial institutions
and introduced, among other, requirements on board structures in financial institutions98. The
Commission then published a green paper on developing the EU corporate governance
framework for listed companies in general99 (the “Corporate Governance Green Paper”).
Based on the feedback received on the Corporate Governance Green Paper the Company Law
Action Plan was published in late 2012. Many of the more controversial initiatives in the
green paper had been deleted from the action plan. However, there has still been strong
opposition to many of the proposals in the plan100.
92 Supra note 16.
93 Communication from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament - Modernising Company
Law and Enhancing Corporate Governance in the European Union - A Plan to Move Forward, COM2003(284)
(May 21, 2003) [hereinafter the “Company Law Action Plan 2003].
94 See John Armour and Wolf-Georg Ringe, European Company Law 1999 - 2010: Renaissance and Crisis
(ECGI Working Paper No 175, 2011), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1691688
95 Report of the High Level Group of Company Law Experts on a Modern Regulatory Framework for Company
Law in Europe, at 4 and 29-31, Nov. 4, 2002, available at
http://www.ecgi.org/publications/documents/report_en.pdf.
96 Company Law Action Plan 2003, supra note 93, at 4.
97 Resolution of 21 May 2008 on a Simplified Business Environment for Companies in the Area of Company
Law, Accounting and Auditing, EUR. PARL. DOC. (2007/2254(INI)), [2009] OJ C279E/36.
98 See http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/bank/regcapital/index_en.htm, and Regulation 575/2013 of the
European Parliament and of the Council of 26 June 2013 on Prudential Requirements for Credit Institutions and
Investment Firms and Amending Regulation (EU) No 648/2012 (1); see also Directive 2013/36/EU of the
European Parliament and of the Council of 26 June 2013 on Access to the Activity of Credit Institutions and the
Prudential Supervision of Credit Institutions and Investment Firms, Amending Directive 2002/87/EC and
Repealing Directives 2006/48/EC and 2006/49/EC (1).
99 See European Commission Green Paper, The EU Corporate Governance Framework, COM(2011) 164 final
(Apr. 5, 2011) [hereinafter the “Corporate Governance Green Paper”].
100 See Swedish Corporate Governance Board, Views on the EU Green Paper on the Corporate Governance




Pursuant to the Company Law Action Plan the Commission has launched, and intends to
launch, a number of specific regulatory initiatives101. One of the more important initiatives is
the proposed amendment of the Shareholder Rights Directive102. The directive was intended
to facilitate the use of shareholder rights throughout the EU setting minimum standards on
access to information prior to general meetings, provisions on proxy voting and voting
without physical participation. The directive also prohibited requirements for share blocking
whereby a shareholder would not be able to trade shares during a period of time before the
shareholders’ meeting in order to use voting rights. Other initiatives taken so far include
amendments to the Accounting Directives103 and a Recommendation on corporate governance
disclosures104.
A. REGULATORY POLICIES OF THE COMPANY LAWACTION PLAN
The stated starting point of the Company Law Action Plan has been to address shortcomings
in corporate governance that, in the view of the Commission, have contributed to the lack of
accountability in the management of corporations. The Commission points out that in the
prevalent systems of corporate governance “[s]hareholders have a crucial role to play in
promoting better governance of companies”105 and finds shortcomings in this regard. The
Commission argues that there has been a “lack of shareholder interest in holding management
accountable for their decisions and actions, compounded by the fact that many shareholders
appear to hold their shares for only a short period of time” and also finds shortcomings in the
effectiveness of corporate governance rules based on the “comply-or-explain” principle106.
Regulatory Policies
In the Company Law Action Plan, the EU Commission identified three different areas for
further regulatory initiatives. With the aim of modernizing company law and the corporate
governance framework the Commission looks to ways of (i) enhancing transparency, (ii)
engaging shareholders and (iii) supporting companies’ growth and competitiveness especially
with regard to enhancing cross-border business. The Commission identifies several measures
to be taken pursuant to these principles, some of which will be briefly referred to here. First,
to increase transparency, the Commission states it will, among other, strengthen disclosure
requirements with regard to risk management and board diversity policies, as well as
corporate governance reports. Institutional investors and asset managers will be required to
disclose voting and engagement policies and their voting records. Second, shareholder
engagement would be facilitated by introducing regulation on say-on-pay and related party
transactions. The Commission has also sought to promote shareholder engagement by
clarifying the relationship between investor cooperation on corporate governance and “acting
in concert”. Importantly, the Commission also looks to facilitate the use of shareholder rights
– noting that a significant portion of shareholdings in the EU are held cross-border and that
101 See the Company Law Action Plan, supra note 1, at 17-18.
102 Supra note 3.
103 Directive 2013/34/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 June 2013 on the Annual
Financial Statements, Consolidated Financial Statements and Related Reports of Certain Types of Undertakings,
Amending Directive 2006/43/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council and Repealing Council
Directives 78/660/EEC and 83/349/EEC, OJ 29.6.2013, L182/19.
104 Commission Recommendation of 9 April 2014 on the Quality of Corporate Governance Reporting (‘Comply
or Explain’), (2014/208/EU).
105 Company Law Action Plan, supra note 1, at 3.
106 Id.
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costs related to using shareholder rights may hinder shareholder oversight in these
situations107.
“Short-termism”
An important element underlying the Company Law Action Plan, as well as the proposed
amendments to the Shareholder Rights Directive, is the perceived need to engage
shareholders to avoid “short-termism” in the markets. There has been an emerging perception
that short-term performance of companies has been overly emphasized by investors and
managers alike, and that this could pose significant problems108. Short-termism has been
defined as “the excessive focus of corporate managers, asset managers, investors and analysts
on short-term results, whether quarterly earnings or short-term portfolio returns, and a
repudiation of concern for long-term value creation and the fundamental value of firms”109.
For companies this could entail seeking to increase stock prices or profits by “inflating current
earnings at the expense of the long-term health of the firm by, for example, decreasing
discretionary expenses, under-investing in long-term assets, or taking on excessive risk to
maximize short-term earnings”110.
A basic problem has been that management has been rewarded based on short-term
performance and has not been incentivized to pursue long-term interests. The development of
short-term trading strategies has supported this trend. This behavior becomes a problem if
markets fail to price such corporate action appropriately. There has been some concern that
companies provide information that signals superior short-term performance at the cost of
long-term health of the corporation. Findings in the area of behavioral economics have also
been referred to with regard to incorrect pricing of company stock. These include hyperbolic
discounting, i.e. the behavioral tendency to heavily discount long-term income. In other
words, pricing is too heavily based on short term performance111. Herding has also been
identified as a problem exasperating this tendency – i.e. the pattern of investors following “the
market” without independent analysis of the underlying values. It has also been argued that
low-frequency events or risks, such as the financial crisis, are also not properly taken into
account in market based pricing.
Based on these assumptions, the Commission emphasizes the need for involving long-term
investors in corporate decision making. The Commission believes that shareholder
engagement is primarily suited to improve long-term returns to shareholders and that
therefore investors with a long-term view have an interest in engagement. The proposals for
addressing these concerns include facilitating the participation of these shareholders in
corporate decision making. The Commission believes that the passiveness of these
shareholders is due, in part, to the costs and uncertain returns of participating in corporate
decision making. Individual shareholders incur costs for their participation which are not in
appropriate relation to their interests (free-rider problem). If shareholder participation is
facilitated, there will be more direct shareholder engagement in corporate decision making
107 Supra note 3, at 5.
108 See CFA CENTER FOR FINANCIAL INTEGRITY & BUSINESS ROUNDTABLE INSTITUTION FOR CORPORATE
ETHICS, BREAKING THE SHORT-TERM CYCLE, 2006, available at http://www.corporate-ethics.org/pdf/Short-
termism_Report.pdf.
109 Lynne L. Dallas, Short-Termism, the Financial Crisis, and Corporate Governance, 37 J. OF CORP. L. 264, 267
(2011).
110 Id.
111 Id. at 269.
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which would also allow long-term views to be appropriately reflected in corporate decision
making.
However, there is some doubt as to the extent of “short-termism” in the markets and even, in
fact, to whether this is a real and significant problem at all.112 It has been argued that there is
no clear evidence that these developments pose a structural problem. It can also be questioned
whether discouraging short-termism and favoring long-term investments might also have
negative consequences. There might be more tolerance of ineffective management and sub-
par performance, for example. Overall, there may be inadequate evidence of the effects of this
perceived phenomenon to form a solid basis for significant policy choices113. It is also
important to recognize that concerns regarding “short-termism” can be used as a pretext to
promote unrelated regulatory policies or the interests of corporate or political constituencies.
In any case, to understand the true dynamics of the Company Law Action Plan, it is justified
to assess how the initiatives introduced pursuant to the plan affect interests of relevant
constituencies.
B. INCREASING TRANSPARENCY IN CORPORATE GOVERNANCE
The Company Law Action Plan includes several steps to increase transparency with the stated
aim of having better informed shareholders, and allow better interaction in matters pertaining
to corporate governance. The steps identified in the Company Law Action Plan include
disclosure of board diversity and management of non-financial risk, as well as measures to
allow companies to better identify their shareholders.
Diversity Reports
The EU Commission has been concerned with the diversity issues in respect of board
structure. Gender equality in employment relationships and gender balance in the business
environment in general have been topical issues for some time. Gender balance on boards of
directors, in particular, has been an important political issue in a number of EU member states
as well. Some EU (or EEA) member states, including France, Germany, Italy and Norway,
have already introduced gender quotas for listed companies. Other countries have addressed
the matter through corporate governance codes and other non-binding programs. Political
pressure has been increasing to introduce mandatory quotas on a broader basis. However, it
could be argued that such requirements would limit shareholders’ control rights and introduce
unwarranted external requirements on corporate governance.
The Corporate Governance Green Paper inquired whether listed companies should ensure a
better gender balance on boards114. The paper also noted the lack of international diversity on
boards of directors stating that one in four large listed companies in the EU has no foreign
board members115. Proposals regarding gender or other quotas on boards were strongly
112 See European Company Law Experts, Response to the European Commission’s Green Paper “The EU
Corporate Governance Framework”, 2011, available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1912548 [hereinafter Expert
Report 2011].
113 Id. at 14; see also Ronald Gilson & Jeffrey Gordon, The Agency Costs of Agency Capitalism: Acitivist
Investors and Revaluation of Governance Rights, 113 COLUMBIA L.R. 863 (2013), introducing activist investors
as a mechanism for addressing governance challenges.
114 Corporate Governance Green Paper, supra note 99, at 6-7; see also Proposal for a Directive of the European
Parliament and of the Council on Improving the Gender Balance Among Non-executive Directors of Companies
Listed on Stock Exchanges and Related Measures, November 14, 2012, COM(2012) 614 final.
115 Corporate Governance Green Paper, supra note 99, at 6.
197
opposed in the feedback to the Corporate Governance Green Paper and the Commission has
opted to pursue increased transparency regarding diversity issues. In the Company Law
Action Plan the Commission argues that diversity of views among board members enables the
board to effectively engage and challenge management, where as insufficient diversity could
lead to “group-think” and less effective oversight116. The Commission takes the view that
increased transparency regarding board diversity could make companies reflect on the
benefits of diversity. Subsequent to the Company Law Action Plan, amendments have been
introduced to the Accounting Directives obligating larger companies to disclose their
diversity policies with regard to the board and management and how these have been
implemented117.
Diversity and gender equality are important matters in society at large - no less so in the
business and corporate communities. It is interesting, however, that these policies are being
pursued specifically through regulation targeting the boards of publicly listed companies. The
Commission fails to explain why it prioritizes the corporate governance of listed companies,
in particular, as a forum for focusing on gender equality118.
Improving Corporate Governance Reporting
The Commission also looks to improve corporate governance reporting. In the Company Law
Action Plan, the Commission has identified shortcomings in the quality of explanations of
companies opting out from corporate governance regulation which is applied on a “comply-
or-explain” basis, which was adopted as a feature of softer enforcement of corporate
governance codes in EU accounting regulation119. In spring 2014 the Commission issued a
recommendation on improved corporate governance reporting in this regard120. In the
recommendation the Commission notes that member states have taken some steps to improve
the quality of explanations and that there has been gradual improvement. Nevertheless, the
Commission emphasizes the need for clearer and better explanations, and issues guidelines to
be noted by member states and bodies responsible for national corporate governance codes.
The Company Law Action Plan also looks to facilitate the ability of companies to identify
their shareholders. If companies do not know who their shareholders are they may not be able
to understand shareholder preferences and concerns and cannot engage in dialogue in matters
pertaining to corporate governance. A degree of transparency is already provided by the
notification requirements in the Transparency Directive121 related to shareholdings over
certain thresholds. However, there has been an interest among corporations and other market
116 Company Law Action Plan, supra note 1, at 6.
117 Directive 2013/34/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 June 2013 on the Annual
Financial Statements, Consolidated Financial Statements and Related Reports of Certain Types of Undertakings,
Amending Directive 2006/43/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council and Repealing Council
Directives 78/660/EEC and 83/349/EEC and Directive 2014/95/EU of the European Parliament and of the
Council of 22 October 2014 Amending Directive 2013/34/EU as Regards Disclosure of Non-financial and
Diversity Information by Certain Large Undertakings and Groups.
118 Belcredi & Ferrarini (2013), supra note 7, at 29.
119 Directive 2013/34/EU, supra note 103, Article 20.
120 See Commission Recommendation 2014/208, supra note 104.
121 Directive 2004/109/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 15 December 2004 on the
Harmonisation of Transparency Requirements in Relation to Information about Issuers Whose Securities Are
Admitted to Trading on a Regulated Market and Amending Directive 2001/34/EC [herein the Transparency
Directive”].
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participants for at least the issuers to have better insight into the identity of their shareholders.
In the Company Law Action Plan the Commission confirms its aim to facilitate this122.
C. ENGAGING SHAREHOLDERS
An important aspect of the Company Law Action Plan is the effort to facilitate shareholder
engagement. The Commission sees that “(e)ffective, sustainable shareholder engagement is
one of the cornerstones of listed companies’ corporate governance model”123. The
Commission argues that shareholders should have better oversight and control over certain
corporate affairs, such as management remuneration and related party transactions, for
example.
The key policies pursued in this regard were included in the Commission proposal to amend
the Shareholders Rights Directive. The proposed changes to the directive look to further
facilitate shareholder engagement and include provisions on say-on-pay and shareholder
approval of related party transactions. The proposed amendments also include enhanced
transparency requirements for institutional investors, asset managers and proxy advisers.
Say-on-Pay
According to the proposal the general meeting of shareholders will have increased oversight
and control over management remuneration. A general meeting must approve the
remuneration policy of a listed company every three years and can also vote annually on the
company’s reported remunerations. The directive does not regulate the level or form of
remuneration as such.
The proposals on say-on-pay have been subject to further revision in the legislative process
involving the Council and the EU Parliament124. The revisions have mainly focused on further
strengthening disclosure requirements and the transparency of management remuneration.
Related Party Transactions
The Commission proposal also included new regulation on related party transactions.
According to the initial proposal of the Commission, related party transactions representing
more than five percent of the company’s assets or transactions with a significant impact on
profits or turnover must be approved by shareholders, and a shareholder involved in the
transaction would be excluded from the vote. Enhanced disclosure obligations would apply to
smaller related party transactions. Also, a report assessing whether the transaction is on
market terms would need to be obtained from an independent third party.
The Commission has expressed concern that regulation regarding related party transactions
has been unsatisfactory. At the EU level, only disclosure has been required with respect to
122 Company Law Action Plan, supra note 1, at 7.
123 Id. at 8.
124 See Council of the European Union, Interinstitutional File 2014/0121(COD), 20 March 2015, 7315/15, Art
9b, at 42-42, and European Parliament, Report on the Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and
of the Council Amending Directive 2007/36/EC as regards the Encouragement of Long-term Shareholder
Engagement and Directive 2013/34/EU as regards Certain Elements of the Corporate Governance Statement,
May 12, 2015, A-8-0158/2015, and European Parliament, Long-term Shareholder Engagement and Corporate
Governance Statement, July 8, 2015, P8_TA-PROV(2015)0257 [hereinafter Parliament Amendments].
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related party transactions. In the context of concentrated ownership, in particular, disclosure
has been seen as an inadequate means to effectively prevent the potential for abuse125.
The Commission proposal has been controversial in this regard, and subject to intense
debate126. The Council and the EU Parliament have proposed amendments to the proposal that
would allow member states to provide for alternative measures to regulate related party
transactions, including approval by administrative bodies (instead of the general meeting of
shareholders only) and allow related party shareholders to participate in voting on the
transactions provided measures are available that protect the minority shareholders in these
situations127.
Institutional Investors and Intermediaries
New requirements are also placed on institutional investors. The Commission proposes to
require institutional investors and asset managers to develop a policy on shareholder
engagement, including guidelines on the monitoring and engaging in dialogue with individual
companies and on the exercise of voting rights. Institutional investors and asset managers are
also required to disclose “how their equity investment strategy … is aligned with the profile
and duration of their liabilities and how it contributes to the medium to long-term
performance of their assets”128. The proposal further explicitly requires asset managers to
disclose whether they are incentivized to make investment decisions based on medium to
long-term company performance, including non-financial performance.
The Commission’s initiative follows the introduction of the shareholder stewardship code for
institutional investors in the United Kingdom in 2010129. The UK Stewardship Code sets out
standards for how institutional investors should engage with the investee companies and
requires disclosure of the investors’ policies in this regard. The code is addressed to asset
managers who manage funds on behalf of institutional shareholders, including pension funds,
insurance companies, and investment trusts. The code is issued by the UK Financial
Reporting Council, a self-regulatory organization promoting corporate governance. The
introduction of the code was also based on the understanding that the effectiveness of
prevailing corporate governance models assumes that shareholders actively engage with and
monitor corporate decision making. There was concern that shareholders were not sufficiently
taking on these duties.
Acting in concert
In line with the goal of facilitating shareholder engagement the Commission has looked to
clarify regulation regarding the ability of shareholders to cooperate in matters pertaining to
corporate governance. It has been unclear to what extent provisions regarding “acting in
concert” in the Takeover Directive for the purposes of triggering the requirement to make a
mandatory public tender offer might limit the ability of shareholders to exchange information
125 Corporate Governance Green Paper, supra note 1, at 17.
126 See Klaus Hopt, Corporate Governance in Europe – A Critical Review of the European Commission’s
Initiatives on Corporate Law and Corporate Governance, 12 N.Y.U. J.L. & BUS. 139, 155-158 (2015).
127 Supra note 124.
128 Supra note 3, Article 3f.




and to cooperate130. In 2013 the European Securities and Markets Authority issued a white list
outlining means of cooperation that would not trigger acting in concert issues under the
Takeover Directive131. However, the white list is very limited in scope reflecting current
practices in member states and does not provide much added comfort to shareholders beyond
the language of the directive. The Commission also decided not to open the Takeover
Directive for amendments – possibly due to the risk of increased protectionist tendencies in
many EU member states132.
Employee share ownership
In the Company Law Action Plan the EU Commission investigates the possibility to promote
employee shareholdings in listed companies. The Commission believes that shareholdings by
employees could increase “the proportion of long-term-oriented shareholders”133. The EU
Commission recognizes that employees are less diversified than other shareholders, as they
rely on income from the company as both employees and shareholders and would therefore be
interested in the long-term sustainability of the company. The Commission sets out to identify
obstacles to trans-national employee share ownership-schemes and will then look to
“encourage employee share ownership throughout Europe”134.
D. FACILITATING CROSS-BORDER OPERATIONS OF EUCOMPANIES
The EU Commission has also stated it wishes to facilitate freedom of establishment of
companies and enhance legal certainty through the development of EU company law. In the
Company Law Action Plan, the Commission publishes its intention to investigate cross-
border transfers of registered offices of companies in the EU in light of the Vale-ruling135. The
Commission is also looking to consider further facilitating cross-border mergers and
demergers. The directive on cross-border mergers136 already allows for companies to merge
with others across the EU member states, but uncertainties are said to remain with regard to
differing procedural and substantive rules related to mergers, such as creditor’s rights or
methods for the valuation of assets, for example137. The Company Law Action Plan also
explicitly makes reference to allow for cross-border demergers as well, which have not been
universally recognized in the EU. The action plan also refers to developing EU level legal
forms for companies, including corporate forms better adapted to smaller corporations, and
developing the SE form. These initiatives could form the basis for more regulatory
competition among the EU member states. The first steps in this regard have already been
witnessed with a trend of German companies opting to re-establish in the UK through the SE
structure. There has also been a notable increase in the number of cross-border mergers in the
EU138.
130 Company Law Action Plan, supra note 1, at 11.
131 The European Securities and Markets Authority, Information on shareholder cooperation and acting in
concert under the Takeover Bids Directive, ESMA/2013/1642 Public Statement.
132 Hopt (2015), supra note 126, at 197-198.
133 Company Law Action Plan, supra note 1, at 11.
134 Id.
135 Case C 378/10 VALE Építési kft. [2012] ECR 00000.
136 Directive 2005/56/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 October 2005 on Cross-border
Mergers of Limited Liability Companies, (OJ L 310, 25.11.2005).
137 Company Law Action Plan, supra note 1, at 12.
138 Bech-Bruun & Laxidale, Study on the Application of the Cross-Border Mergers Directive, Markt/2012/031/F,
available at http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/company/mergers/index_en.htm.
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IV. AN ASSESSMENT OF THE POLITICAL ASPECTS OF THE COMPANY LAWACTION PLAN
In relation to the debate on corporate governance in the EU there has been concern on how
EU level corporate governance regulation reflects the political evolution of the EU. There has
been much research about the liberalization and marketization139 of corporate law in the EU
on terms, some argue, that do not take into account the differences in economic structures
among EU member states and that subsequently can have negative effects on economic and
social development. The failures in introducing more comprehensive corporate governance
initiatives at the EU level have been explained with reference to the differences in the
economic systems. Political resistance has been explained with references to the position of
labour in corporate governance, among other. As discussed, the Fifth Company Law Directive
Proposal was one of the more controversial initiatives in this regard. It reflected a model with
significant labour participation in governance, but met heavy resistance within the EU. The
proposal was ultimately not adopted, and some years later a company law action plan was
introduced that represented a less intrusive regulatory approach and reflected increasingly
pro-business policies140. The Takeover Directive has been seen as another milestone with one
of the failed versions argued to “constitute the high water mark of an attempt to import neo-
liberal governance structures into Continental Europe”141. It has been argued that the
development of EU level corporate governance regulation since the introduction of the
Company Law Action Plan 2003 has represented a shift towards Anglo-Saxon governance
and a marketization of corporate control linked with an overall political shift towards market
liberalism at the EU level142.
In light of the developments referred to above it is interesting to assess the political aspects of
the 2012 Company Law Action Plan. The controversy surrounding these initiatives suggests
that they may reflect a change in the overall policies of EU corporate governance. The
political economy implications of the Company Law Action Plan will be considered in more
detail below.
A. THE COMPANY LAWACTION PLAN AND CORPORATE CONSTITUENCIES
Shareholders, Management, Employees
The amendment of corporate governance regulation can be seen, to an extent, to reflect
changes in the relative political bargaining power of affected constituencies. In analyzing the
Company Law Action Plan it can be helpful to consider which corporate constituencies would
be best served by the Commission initiatives – and which would not be.
The relative bargaining power of the key corporate constituencies, i.e. shareholders,
management and employees, in a particular institutional environment, is reflected in how
corporate governance regulation allocates cash flow and control rights among these
constituencies. Differences in how corporations are controlled are reflected in the legal
139 See van Apeldoorn & Horn (2007), supra note 86; and LAURAHORN, REGULATING CORPORATE
GOVERNANCE IN THE EU: TOWARDS AMARKETIZATION OF CORPORATE CONTROL (2011).
140 See Company Law Action Plan 2003, supra note 93.
141 John W. Cioffi, The Collapse of the European Union Directive on Corporate Takeovers: The EU, National
Politics, and the Limits of Integration (Berkeley Roundtable on the International Economy, Discussion Paper
September 28, 2001) available at http://www.brie.berkeley.edu/publications/John%20Cioffi's%20paper.pdf.
142 Horn (2011), supra note 139.
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powers of different corporate constituencies143. Corporate constituencies can use the political
system to renegotiate these legal powers – or the terms of their relationships with each other.
Financial crisis or the evolution of new regulatory systems, such as an increase of the relative
influence of EU level regulation, can be factors that allow politically dominant constituencies
to change the terms of the bargain. In this regard, it can be noted that the Company Law
Action Plan highlights excessive risk-taking by corporations, and emphasizes the role of long-
term investors and the stability of corporations. The promotion of low-risk policies could
generally be argued to benefit employees and creditors at the cost of dispersed
shareholders144. Encouraging employee ownership may also be interpreted in this light. As a
shareholder block employees may favor policies that support increased employment levels
rather than value maximization or the competitiveness of the corporation. Employees may not
be concerned with the value of the share as such, as long as the company’s business remains
on a satisfactory level to guarantee continued employment.
As such, it would not be unexpected that regulation would favor creditor and labor-oriented
interests in the political environment following the financial crisis. In fact, in connection with
the Commission initiated corporate governance reform there have been proposals that could
have resulted in increased influence of management and employees and in the entrenchment
of corporate control. For example, the Reflection Group Report145, to address “short-
termism”, proposed allowing companies to amend their articles “to make it easier for longer
term objectives to prevail over short-term oriented pressure of certain shareholders”146.
Company articles could provide explicitly, for example, that “the board and the management
of the company have to run it primarily in the interests of the company…which may have a
priority over the interests of individual shareholders if these two are in conflict and if serving
the short term interest of shareholders would have a direct impact on the long-term viability
of the company”147. The introduction of regulation in this respect could well have had a
significant effect on the relative power of the board and management vs. that of shareholders.
The initiative would have been a step towards “director primacy” giving the board the central
position in corporate hierarchy. Also, the Corporate Governance Green Paper suggested that
steps might be taken to encourage employee shareholdings in order to obtain shareholder
blocks with, possibly, more long-term oriented goals. These proposals were not adopted in the
Company Law Action Plan, however. In fact, on the whole the action plan does not
significantly alter the balance of control rights towards increased control by management and
employees.
The stated goal of the Company Law Action Plan is to facilitate shareholder engagement
which would be in line with shareholder-oriented corporate governance policies. The say-on-
pay provisions empower shareholders, and mechanisms for monitoring related party
transactions increase investor protection. The Company Law Action Plan also seeks to
facilitate cross-border establishment and to limit national restrictions in this regard. These
policies favor a shareholder-oriented model of corporate governance as well. At the same
143 See Sofie Cools, The Real Difference in Corporate Law between the United States and Continental Europe:
Distribution of Powers (Harvard Law School John M. Olin Center for Law, Economics and Business Discussion
Paper Series, Paper 490, 2004) available at http://lsr.nellco.org/harvard_olin/490.
144 See Gourevitch & Shinn (2005), supra note 64.
145 See Reflection Group Report, supra note 5.
146 Id. at 37.
147 Id. at 37-38.
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time, however, new disclosure obligations on intermediaries slightly increase the costs of
shareholder engagement.
As discussed above, there is a perceived conflict between the interests of beneficial
shareholders and those of intermediaries, including asset managers and other parties who hold
shares on behalf of the ultimate investors. The Company Law Action Plan seems to recognize
this conflict and seeks to address the perceived regulatory concerns regarding the incentives
of the intermediaries through increased transparency requirements. While the proposals would
not result in significant changes in the relative control rights and interests among corporate
constituencies, intermediaries would end up with increased costs for holding shares on behalf
of diversified shareholders.
Corporate Governance and Concentrated Ownership
It is interesting to observe how the proposals are adapted to different structures of corporate
ownership. Concentrated ownership remains predominant in many EU jurisdictions, and
controlling shareholders maintain strong control rights overall. At the same time the evolution
of institutional shareholding has resulted in more transparency in corporate governance
systems. How do the Company Law Action Plan initiatives affect the relative rights of
controlling shareholders?
In an environment of concentrated ownership the new say-on-pay rules are likely to have less
of an impact, as controlling shareholder are already able to directly impact the principles of
management remuneration148. However, the proposals on related party transactions directly
affect the ability of large shareholders to transact with a listed corporation. According to the
initial Commission proposal transactions between the company and a major shareholder
would need to be approved by the general meeting of shareholders if the value of the
transactions was more than five per cent of the company’s assets. The shareholder transacting
with the company would not be allowed to vote in such matters. In the context of
concentrated ownership this could invite opportunistic behavior from minority shareholders
with relatively smaller interests involved. In the context of a concentrated ownership system,
minority shareholders could even look to extract benefits from approving such transactions.
However, transactions between the company and the main shareholder may be an important
element of the relationship and a key to the success of the corporate enterprise. Alternative
control mechanisms that would be less problematic in this context might include setting
standards for related party transactions, and requiring approval by independent board
members or review by third party independent experts.
As discussed, the Commission proposal has raised much controversy and amendments have
been introduced during the legislative process. To some extent the changes would address the
concerns identified above. The amended proposals provide that related party transactions can
also be approved by administrative bodies instead of the general meeting of shareholders.
They would also allow a related party shareholder to participate in voting for approving the
transactions, provided minority protection mechanisms are applied that address the potential
for abuse. However, the proposals do not address the nature of such mechanisms nor do they
analyze what type of mechanisms wouold be appropriate and effective in the context of
concentrated ownership. It will be interesting to observe how these concerns affect the final
regulatory instruments introduced at the EU level.
148 Belcredi & Ferrarini (2013), supra note 7, at 31-32.
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It is also unclear whether the reporting requirements for institutional investors will have the
expected effects in companies with concentrated ownership. First, it is not clear that the
requirements regarding increased monitoring are cost-effective in the first place, as
institutional investors will be carrying the burden of monitoring. However, in connection with
concentrated ownership these requirements seem superfluous. A considerable portion of listed
companies in the EU will have controlling shareholders, such as families, foundations and
institutions, with large block-holding positions. These types of shareholders are likely to
already be engaged in active monitoring of management. Increasing the administrative burden
of institutional investors in this type of environment will not increase the ability of institutions
to affect the matters of the corporation, and may not be as relevant.
These observations are relevant in highlighting the differences in regulatory concerns in
different types of corporate environments that are prevalent in the EU, and the challenges
related to introducing EU level instruments that are applied throughout the EU area.
B. POLITICAL SALIENCE AND EXTERNAL CORPORATE GOVERNANCE CONSIDERATIONS
In the context of the financial crisis it is to be expected that the political salience of corporate
governance has increased and that legislators must cater to the desires of voters with an
increased focus on the corporate environment. Listed companies are subject to a regulatory
framework at the EU level and several directives apply specifically to the governance of listed
companies. As these companies are already captive to such regulation, the threshold is lower
to introduce new regulation in this field.
The Company Law Action Plan can be seen as a representative case of crisis-based regulatory
initiatives. The financial crisis also triggered a crisis in corporate governance regulation149.
Studies issued in the aftermath of the crisis seeking to understand its reasons identified,
among other, insufficient monitoring of risk taking in financial institutions in particular, but in
corporations more generally as well150. There is clearly a notion that regulation is needed to
correct market failures that occur in a deregulated environment. In this regard the statements
underlying the more recent regulatory initiatives reflect a clearly different approach to
corporate regulation at the EU level than prior to the financial crisis. The political dynamic
changed and allowed regulators to introduce initiatives that may not have been feasible before
the crisis.
It is possible that the proposals regarding diversity issues can be understood in terms of
political salience as well. Diversity is clearly an important issue and has become a matter of
high political salience. Corporate governance regulation related to listed companies has
provided an avenue to pursue this policy, with regulatory initiatives demonstrating a robust
political response to concerns among the electorate regarding both diversity and corporate
governance in light of the financial crisis. Yet it has not been demonstrated why diversity
issues should be raised with respect to the constitution of boards of listed companies, in
particular; rather than as a broader pursuit in the corporate environment151.
The EU Parliament proposals to change the Commission proposal on amending the
Shareholders Rights Directive also reflect the political salience of corporate governance. The
149 See Laura Horn, Corporate Governance in Crisis? The Politics of EU Corporate Governance Regulation, 18
European L. J. 83 (2012).
150 See OECD Corporate Governance Report, supra note 91.
151 Belcredi & Ferrarini (2013), supra note 7, at 29.
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Parliament initiatives included a number of matters that have received much public attention,
such as management remuneration, corporate taxation and corporate social responsibility152.
C. CONCLUSIONS ON THE CHARACTERISTICS OF THE COMPANY LAWACTION PLAN
The Corporate Governance Green Paper was interpreted by many as suggesting that
considerable amendments were underway with regard to the status quo of corporate
governance in the EU153. Yet it seems that the political dynamic of the Company Law Action
Plan is both less controversial and different than what was initially expected of the new
initiatives.
It seems that, in fact, the Company Law Action Plan does not seek to materially affect the
relationships between the traditional corporate constituencies – shareholders, management
and employees. EU policy during the past decade has favoured shareholder-oriented corporate
governance, which on a general level is not affected by the action plan. The proposals seek to
facilitate shareholder engagement; there is no increase in protecting management from
shareholder monitoring; and employee participation in corporate governance was not much
enhanced as the initiatives for increased employee ownership remain muted. Overall, the
Company Law Action Plan, in this regard, can be seen to be in line with a policy of favouring
shareholders over managers or employees in matters pertaining to corporate governance and
control.
However, the Company Law Action Plan does seek to address agency concerns related to the
perceived “horizontal conflict of interests” between long-term investors and beneficial holders
on the one hand and institutional investors and intermediaries on the other hand. In this
regard, the Company Law Action Plan raises topical themes as these relationships have been
subject to much research and debate over the past years154.
The more important aspect to consider is how the Company Law Action Plan reflects the
increased political salience of corporate governance at the international level and general
political concerns in a post-crisis environment. It can be argued that corporate law and
corporate governance regulation have been used as an avenue for political action unrelated to
corporate governance concerns as such. There has been an increased pressure for political
reactions to the financial crisis which has been channelled to corporate governance regulation
due to the high political salience of corporate matters in the aftermath of the financial crisis.
Also, listed companies have been subject to “regulatory capture” – i.e. they have already been
subject to a regulatory framework that regulators have been able to take advantage of.
Overall, corporate governance regulation has been an avenue for demonstrating political
action for the electorate.
Mainly, however, the Company Law Action Plan is a reflection of the EU having
strengthened its position as a source for corporate regulation at the cost of the member states.
This trend emphasizes the importance of developing the characteristics of EU corporate
governance regulation. There has been concern that the legislative procedures at the EU level
are not satisfactory and that, generally, regulatory initiatives have been watered down due to
political compromises. In many cases regulatory initiatives at the EU level have failed or
resulted in inadequate compromises that are unclear or insufficient for effective and consistent
152 See Parliament Amendments, supra note 124.
153 See, for example, supra note 100.
154 See Rodrigues (2011), supra note 67.
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implementation at the national level155. In this respect it is interesting to note that some of the
more controversial issues in the Corporate Governance Green Paper have been deleted from
the Company Law Action Plan, and the proposed regulatory mechanisms have in many cases
been limited to increased disclosure, rather than mechanisms transferring control rights
among corporate constituencies. A further important aspect to consider is the ability of the EU
to introduce regulatory mechanisms that can be applied throughout the varying institutional
landscape of the EU. Both regulatory concerns and the effects of regulatory mechanisms vary
depending on the corporate and institutional environment, including the structure of corporate
ownership and the availability and quality of legal institutions for enforcement156.
The issues above raise some concerns regarding the use of EU level regulation to pursue a
competitive corporate governance framework, and, in any case, must be taken into account in
developing EU level corporate governance regulation. Many scholars have observed these
challenges with respect to EU regulation and proposed legislative processes where the
regulatory impact is reached indirectly over time through soft law initiatives157. It seems that
more work is needed with regard to the development of competitive policies, as well as the
quality of the legislative processes at the EU level, and the instruments and regulatory tools
available at the EU level.
V. TOWARDS FEDERAL REGULATION OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE IN THE EU?
Many aspects of corporate law have been regulated at the EU level over the past decades – yet
corporate governance matters are often seen to be matters where there must be room for
national regulation, and where the effects of EU regulation have been limited so far. The
Company Law Action Plan has represented a new turn in this respect. Could the Company
Law Action Plan form the basis for the development of a centralized system of corporate
governance regulation in the EU?
A. THE LEGAL BASIS FOR CENTRALIZED CORPORATE GOVERNANCE REGULATION IN THE
EU
The EU framework provides a legal basis for a more centralized system of corporate
governance in the EU, if the political preconditions for such actions are met. The trend
towards the centralization of regulation in the field of financial and corporate affairs and the
increase of the role of the EU in that context158 suggest that the EU can be an increasingly
important source of corporate law and corporate governance regulation.
The legal basis for harmonization in the TFEU159 has been seen to allow for further regulatory
initiatives to be made at the EU level. The legal basis for corporate law harmonization is
found in the provisions on the establishment of an internal market, as well as provision on the
freedom of establishment for undertakings160 and the prohibitions on restrictions on the
155 Expert Report 2012, supra note 12, at 4.
156 See Goergen (2007), supra note 45.
157 See Simon Deakin, Reflexive Governance and European Company Law (Centre for Business Research,
University of Cambridge, Working Paper No. 346, 2007), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1002678; and
Johnston (2009), supra note 26, at 240-242.
158 See Alex Warleigh-Lack, “The European and the Universal Process”? European Union Studies, New
Regionalism and Global Governance, in HANDBOOK OF EUROPEAN UNION POLITICS 561 (Knud Jörgensen, Mark
A. Pollack & Ben Rosamond, eds., 2007).
159 TFEU, supra note 85.
160 Id., Article 49.
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setting-up of agencies, branches or subsidiaries in member states. The European Commission
can introduce company law directives, for example, in order to safeguard the rights of
corporate constituencies throughout the EU161. The Commission could also introduce further
measures to harmonize corporate governance regulation based on its authority to introduce
directives to prevent restrictions affecting the establishment or functioning of the common
market162.
The EU Commission takes the view that there is a justification for EU intervention also in
light of the subsidiarity and proportionality principles. The EU should generally intervene
only to the extent such intervention provides better results than action by member states – EU
action should also be limited to what is necessary and proportionate in order to achieve the
objectives of the pursued policies. In the context of the proposal to amend the Shareholder
Rights Directive the Commission has noted that the EU equity market has become a European
and international market163. In this international corporate environment, the Commission
argues, action by member states alone would provide uneven levels of transparency and
investor protection resulting in “difficulties and costs” and a lack of “effective tools to protect
their investments” in connection with cross-border holdings164. The EU Commission goes on
to argue that, without EU regulation, there would be different rules across the member states
with only partial and fragmented remedies165.
The Commission nevertheless recognizes that the national level also has a role as a source for
corporate governance regulation in the EU. In its proposal to amend the Shareholders Rights
Directive, the Commission argues that member states should have flexibility in implementing
principles regarding disclosure and transparency “in order to allow the norms to adequately fit
into the distinct corporate governance frameworks”166.
The Commission’s initial proposals included mechanisms that went beyond disclosure rules,
including requirements for approving remuneration policies and related party transactions by
general meetings of shareholders. These propositions represented more robust interventions in
corporate governance, and supports the view that the EU seeks a stronger role as a source of
corporate governance regulation – at the cost of member states. The principles outlined in the
Company Law Action Plan and in the proposal to amend the Shareholder Rights Directive can
be seen as the initial steps of a formal basis for moving towards a more centralized system of
corporate governance. As the investment environment has become international, the basis for
investor protection must be increasingly uniform.
The EU has pursued a vigorous agenda of harmonization in the field of capital markets
regulation over the past decade and even more so after the financial crisis. Indeed, the new
European Commission has laid out a goal of achieving a capital markets union in its political
program167. Importantly, some of the directives issued thereunder have considerable effects
on corporate affairs – and on corporate law. The Transparency Directive, for example,
161 Id., Article 50(2)(g).
162 Id., Article 114.
163 Supra note 3, at 6.
164 Id.
165 Id.
166 Id. at 7.
167 Jean-Claude Juncker, Political Guidelines for the Next European Commission: 'A New Start for Europe: My
Agenda for Jobs, Growth, Fairness and Democratic Change', 27 June 2014, available at
http://ec.europa.eu/about/juncker-commission/docs/pg_en.pdf
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established a framework for periodic and on-going disclosure requirements for listed
companies, whereas the Takeover Directive regulates the corporate steps that can be taken by
a target company in a takeover situation, and sets redemption obligations and redemption
rights for shareholders in different situations (including regulation on mandatory offers and
squeeze-out as well as on the use of shareholder rights in concert). This development may
provide the basis for further EU action in the field of corporate law and corporate governance
as well. The EU Commission has justified intervention in the field of corporate governance
with the internationalization of equity capital markets and the increase in cross-border share
ownership. Thus the Commission may well take the view that it has a central role in
regulating companies, the securities of which are subject to public trading, also as regards
corporate law matters. Some of these initiatives may even be applied to non-listed companies,
as conceptually it may not always be relevant in matters pertaining to corporate law and
corporate governance whether a company is listed or not168.
B. AMULTILEVEL SYSTEM OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE REGULATION
The history of EU corporate law has demonstrated that the variation of corporate governance
systems poses significant challenges for introducing uniform rules at the EU level. At the
same time recent developments support a trend towards a larger role for EU level corporate
governance regulation – albeit based on mechanisms with a limited impact on the existing
relationships among corporate constituencies. In many cases, moreover, EU regulation seems
to leave more latitude to national level regulation as well as to self-regulation than in the
context of capital markets regulation, for example.
Instead of a corporate governance system based on “federal” style centralized codes, it is
possible that in the field of corporate governance we will see a development of a multilevel
system of corporate governance regulation. The EU regulatory framework has provided a new
parallel avenue for regulatory change not subject to the same capture or dynamic as national
regulation. Interest groups that are large and organized at the national level can be fragmented
at the level of the EU, and new groups that have been too small at the national level to be able
to organize can at the EU level have sufficient critical mass to overcome coordination
problems, for example. Callaghan points out that the EU contributes to the development of a
multilevel governance framework – also with respect to corporate governance regulation169.
This can create new strategic opportunities for interest groups170 while the EU institutional
set-up allows for competing political coalitions to simultaneously advance different reforms
thus limiting the possibility for interest groups to monopolize policy. This can promote a
recognition of the acceptability of variety in corporate governance solutions in the EU, while
allowing for EU level monitoring of corporate governance systems against increased
entrenchment.
C. LEGAL STRATEGIES FOR EUCORPORATE GOVERNANCE REGULATION
To the extent that the EU maintains its position as a key source of corporate governance
regulation it is important to focus on the competitiveness of the legal strategies adopted at the
EU level. The Company Law Action Plan and the regulatory instruments issued thereunder
demonstrate that there is much work to do in order to develop EU regulation in this regard.
168 See EU Reflection Group Report, supra note 5, at 10.
169 See Callaghan (2008), supra note 72.
170 Id. at 10.
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First, regulatory intervention should be adapted to the relevant institutional environment.
Corporate governance regulation will have different effects depending on, for example, the
structure of corporate ownership, and the quality of legal institutions. Certain initiatives in the
Company Law Action Plan did not reflect the requirements of a concentrated ownership
environment, for example. For the purposes of choosing appropriate legal strategies, it is
important that the potential of abuse is addressed within the framework of the relevant
institutional environment, and that solutions are introduced that appropriately address the
characteristics of this environment.
Second, it has not been clearly demonstrated that a specific system of corporate governance is
superior as such. No single structure of corporate ownership or control is necessarily superior
to others, and different forms of corporate governance may be adapted to different
environments and different types of enterprise171. The corporate environment is the result of
historical economic and industrial developments and the structure of corporate ownership and
control reflects these developments172. Corporate governance models that evolve in the
context of an economy with heavy industry will be quite different from those in an economy
dominated by trade or high technology industries, for example. Each system of governance
has regulatory challenges and can be subject to abuse. Thus regulatory models should allow
for and promote a variety of corporate governance solutions. The Company Law Action Plan
does not seem to be particularly tailored for concentrated ownership structures, for example.
The limited guidance on shareholder cooperation does not provide a basis for developing
good governance in an environment with large shareholders, for example. Moreover, the
proposals on regulating related party transactions allow for opportunistic behavior by
minority shareholders. More focus is needed on developing instruments that address
regulatory concerns while supporting prevalent corporate structures.
Third, regulation should facilitate the possibilities of corporate enterprise to adapt to changes
in their environments. Change is a pervasive characteristic to the interaction between
economic, political and corporate environments173. Technological changes affect the business
and organizational environments of corporations, and it is vital that the organizational
structures of business can be adapted to changing circumstances. At the same time,
entrenchment has often been seen as a relevant factor in any corporate governance system.
Regulatory models are likely needed to counter entrenchment and to facilitate corporate
acquisitions and the transfer of control, for example. Indeed, the EU Reflection Group makes
the same observation with regard to the goals of EU regulation stating that a “flexible legal
framework can itself facilitate adaptation and organizational change and thus reveal itself to
be an important factor to sustain competitiveness of European business”174.
Fourth, the effects of political salience on regulatory initiatives must be recognized and
addressed. The dynamic of regulatory development is different in circumstances of high
171 SeeMasahiko Aoki & Gregory Jackson, Understanding an Emergent Diversity of Corporate Governance and
Organizational Architecture: An Essentiality-Based Analysis 3 (SIEPR Discussion Paper 07-19, 2007), available
at http://www-siepr.stanford.edu/repec/sip/07-019.pdf; Gilson (1992), supra note 51, at 175; MASAHIKO AOKI,
TOWARD A COMPARATIVE INSTITUTIONAL ANALYSIS (2001).
172 SeeMark Roe, Political Preconditions to Separating Ownership from Corporate Control, 53 STAN. L. REV.
539 (2000); and Peter Högfeldt, The History and Politics of Corporate Ownership in Sweden, in AHISTORY OF
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AROUND THEWORLD: FAMILY BUSINESS GROUPS TO PROFESSIONALMANAGERS 517,
518-522 (Randall K. Morck, ed., 2005).
173 Gilson (1992), supra note 51, at 175.
174 EU Reflection Group Report, supra note 5, at 7.
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political salience in that initiatives can be driven by unrelated political agendas. In such cases









LAW AND POLITICS OF SUPRANATIONAL REGULATION: DYNAMICS OF EU CORPORATE
GOVERNANCE REGULATION
This chapter builds on the previous parts of the study. It seeks to synthesize the findings of the
study in the context of the development of EU corporate governance regulation. As
emphasized throughout the study, the same EU regulation can have different and unintended
effects in different jurisdictions – depending on the broader institutional variances throughout
the EU. Also, the effects of the institutional structures of the EU, and the politics thereof, must
be brought into the analysis regarding the development of regulation.
EU integration represents a model for coordinating interaction between economies and
political systems in an internationalized environment. Understanding how supranational
systems work and developing regulation at this level remains an important venture. The
significance of EU level corporate governance regulation has been increasing in the years
following the financial crisis. At the same time EU regulatory initiatives in this field have
been subject to much criticism. It has been argued that the EU initiatives have not been
adapted to corporate environments prevalent in the EU and have decreased the
competitiveness of EU listed companies and the EU financial markets.
This study argues that the EU level will continue to be a significant source of corporate
governance regulation, but that EU regulation must be designed to better adapt to the varied
institutional environment across the EU. To that end a better understanding of the dynamics
of EU policymaking remains important. This chapter analyzes EU policymaking in the context
of corporate governance regulation and considers the implications for developing
supranational regulatory initiatives.
I. SUPRANATIONAL POLICY-MAKING AND EUCORPORATE GOVERNANCE REGULATION
A. INTRODUCTION
The significance of EU level corporate governance regulation has been increasing in the years
following the financial crisis. Corporate law and corporate governance have become focal
areas of European integration1. International political trends have supported the concentration
of regulatory initiatives to supranational political forums, including the EU2. The effects of
1 See European Commission, The EU Corporate Governance Framework, Green Paper, Brussels, April 5, 2011,
COM(2011) 164 final [hereinafter the “Corporate Governance Green Paper”], John Armour & Wolf-Georg
Ringe, European Company Law 1999-2010: Renaissance and Crisis (ECGI LawWorking Paper 175, 2011),
available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1691688, and Klaus Hopt, Corporate Governance in Europe – A Critical
Review of the European Commission’s Initiatives on Corporate Law and Corporate Governance, 12 N.Y.U. J.L.
& BUS. 139 (2015).
2 FINANCIAL REGULATION AND SUPERVISION, A POST-CRISIS ANALYSIS (Guido Ferrarini, Klaus Hopt & Eddy
Wymeersch, eds., 2012), THE REGULATORY AFTERMATH OF THE GLOBAL FINANCIAL CRISIS (Elis Ferran, Jane
Hill & John Coffee, eds., 2012), UNCTAD, Corporate Governance in the Wake of the Financial Crisis, Selected
international Views (UNCTAD/DIAE/ED/2010/2), 2010.
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this trend can be observed in the increased scope of EU regulatory initiatives in corporate
matters, as well as in the more strict normative nature of many new EU initiatives3. In these
circumstances it remains important to study EU harmonization efforts.
At the same time, EU corporate governance initiatives have been subject to much criticism4.
Recent initiatives have been argued to decrease the competitiveness of publicly listed
companies in the EU and consequently of the EU financial markets5. In responding to the
initiatives, market participants have emphasized that corporate governance issues should be
regulated primarily at the national level and that the EU should limit its involvement in this
field6. However, some of this criticism may well be self-serving and it is not always clear that
national regulation provides for superior results in an increasingly international corporate
environment7. While national systems of corporate governance are adapted to the existing
institutional environment, they may also reflect the entrenched interests of dominant corporate
constituencies8. An emphasis on national level regulation can strengthen path dependence in
regulation and serve to promote the national lock-in of corporate enterprise and weaken
market integration. It has also been argued that with respect to corporate governance
regulation there may be insufficient incentives for effective real world regulatory competition
in the EU9 so that positive harmonization and EU level corporate governance regulation
cannot so easily be dismissed altogether.
Nevertheless, it seems clear that more work is needed with regard to the development of
competitive policies, as well as the quality of the legislative processes, at the EU level10. In
many cases, EU regulation has not been adapted to varied corporate environments across the
EU, or initiatives have been subject to such political compromise that the effects of regulation
remain limited11. It remains important to analyze EU policies with regard to corporate
governance regulation with the aim to develop the legal strategies for, and the design of, EU
corporate governance regulation.
3 See European Commission, Action Plan: European Company Law and Corporate Governance – A Modern
Legal Framework for More Engaged Shareholders and Sustainable Companies, COM(2012) 740/2, 12
December 2012.
4 See Luca Enriques, EC Company Law Directives and Regulations – How Trivial Are they? 27 U. PA. J. INT.
ECON. L. 1 (2006), Luca Enriques & Matteo Gatti, The Uneasy Case for Top-Down Corporate Law
Harmonization in the European Union, 27 U. PA. J. INT. ECON. L. 939 (2006), Hopt (2015), supra note 1, at 21-
22.
5 European Commission, Report of the Reflection Group on the Future of EU Company Law, 2011, available at
http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/company/docs/modern/reflectiongroup_report_en.pdf [hereinafter the EU
Reflection Group Report], at 10.
6 Hopt (2015), supra note 1, at 167-169.
7 See Jean-Michel Josselin & Alain Marciano, Introduction: The Economics of the Constitutional Moment in
Europe, in THE ECONOMICS OF HARMONIZING EUROPEAN LAW 1, 9 (Alain Marciano & Jean-Michel Josselin,
eds., 2002).
8 See Guido Ferrarini & Geoffrey P. Miller, A Simple Theory of Takeover Regulation in the United States and
Europe 15 (New York University Law and Economics Working Paper 197, 2009), available at
http://lsr.nellco.org/nyu_lewp/197.
9 ANDREW JOHNSTON, EC REGULATION OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 177, 182 and 212-213 (2009).
10 DERMOTMCCANN, THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF THE EUROPEAN UNION 85 (2010).
11 See Enriquez (2006), supra note 4.
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B. POLICY-MAKING IN A SUPRANATIONAL ENVIRONMENT
The dynamics of policy-making and regulatory processes are complex – particularly in a
supranational context. A hard-defined “political system”12, the EU provides a particularly
interesting platform with respect to policy-making. The political framework of the EU cannot
merely be seen as an intergovernmental system, far less as a framework of agreements
whereby certain sovereign functions have been delegated for purposes of efficiency13. With
the evolution of European integration the EU has developed into a political system in its own
right14. The EU institutions affect how agendas are set and how policy can be pursued through
the political system. At the same time, the EU and national levels interact and provide parallel
avenues for regulatory action.
On a general level, policy and regulation must be understood and studied in their economic
and political context. Regulatory action (or inaction) is the result of political processes with
their own dynamics, including the effects of interest groups, political constituencies and the
institutional political structure. The economic theory of regulation suggests that regulation is
driven by a “market for regulation” where political actors trade regulatory benefits for
resources and where regulation can be captured by dominant interest groups15. In this model
the redistributive effects of regulation are emphasized. Indeed, it is important to recognize that
economic regulation will of course affect the distribution of wealth in the form of the
reallocation of risks or opportunities, for example. It is rarely the case (if ever) that regulation
would address “market failures” in a pareto-optimal manner16. Dominant, well organized
constituencies will be able to benefit from regulatory intervention. Single political interests
need not dominate policy, however, as utility maximization by political entrepreneurs is still
likely to result in regulation that takes into account some concerns of other political coalitions
as well17. Industrial and political developments can affect the relative bargaining power of
political constituencies resulting in changing policy agendas and new regulatory initiatives.
These general dynamics also apply to policy-making at the supranational level. However, the
interplay between national and supranational levels and the characteristics of the institutional
environment must also be taken into consideration when studying supranational policy and
regulation. In some cases supranational regulation may trump national rules, but often the
different regulatory levels provide parallel and sometimes competing avenues for interest
groups to pursue their interests. Overall, the introduction of the EU framework has introduced
a parallel regulatory framework to national regulation18. Constituencies can pursue regulatory
agendas through both the national and the EU regulatory frameworks and in many instances
the EU institutional framework has been said to have resulted in a multilevel system of
governance in the EU19. The dynamic of policy-making depends on the type of policies in
12 SIMON HIX & BJÖRN HOYLAND, THE POLITICAL SYSTEM OF THE EUROPEAN UNION, 3RD ED., 1-2 and 12-16
(2011); see alsoMark A. Pollack, Theorizing EU Policy-Making, in POLICY-MAKING IN THE EUROPEAN UNION,
6TH ED. 15, 27 (Helen Wallace, Mark A. Pollack & Alistair R. Young, eds., 2010).
13 Pollack (2010), supra note 12, at 16-21.
14 Id. at 27.
15 See George Stigler, The Theory of Economic Regulation, 6 BELL J. OF ECON. 2, 3-21 (1971).
16 ANTHONY I. OGUS, REGULATION, LEGAL FORM AND ECONOMIC THEORY 59 and 72 (1994).
17 See Samuel Peltzman, The Economic Theory of Regulation After a Decade of Deregulation 13 (Brookings
Papers on Economic Activity, 1989); see also Gary Becker, A Theory of Competition Among Pressure Groups
for Political Influence, 98 Q´LY J. OF ECON. 371 (1983).
18 See LIESBET HOOGHE &GARYMARKS, MULTI-LEVEL GOVERNANCE AND EUROPEAN INTEGRATION (2000).
19 See Helen Callaghan, How Multilevel Governance Affects the Clash of Capitalisms (MPIfG Discussion Paper
08/5, 2008), available at www.mpifg.de (publications, discussion papers).
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question – whether regulatory or distributive, for example20. Depending on the policy at hand
the scope of EU authority will differ, as will the dynamics of agenda-setting and decision
making regarding regulatory intervention at the EU level. The alliances, political and
regional, may vary depending on the matters at hand.
The authority and characteristics of the supranational regulatory institutions are also key
factors with respect to how policies are formed. The authority of the supranational institutions
may be narrowly defined, or they may have structures suited for certain policy-regimes better
than others. Altogether, the EU has provided an opportune avenue for regulatory policy-
making for responding to emerging changes in the international economy21 with an increased
need for coordinating standards among private actors on a cross-border basis. The EU model
has been successful in combining transnational standards with national differences22. The
institutional structure, with negotiation processes supported by the EU legal system, but with
less immediate parliamentary pressures, has also been deemed an important factor in this
regard23. Both national policy-makers and industrial interest groups have found the EU as an
opportune avenue to pursue policy and change in the industrial and economic systems of EU
member states. The “regulatory mode” of the EU24 has been well-adapted for pursuing
policies related to corporate regulation, which at the national level may be entrenched and
based on historical industrial structures.
It has been pointed out that the influence of interest group can differ at the national and EU
levels. For example, Ferrarini & Miller argue that the interests of corporate insiders remain
strong at the national level25. With respect to takeovers, for example, interest groups
representing management, labour and community groups are likely to advocate for rules that
increase the threshold for takeovers26. At the international (or “federal”) level, however,
corporate insiders may not have the same relative advantage over the interests of bidders (and
minority shareholders) who may better be able to organize themselves on an international
basis. Empirical studies from the United States support this analysis27. The preference for
regulatory competition (national regulation) or harmonization (EU regulation) may also be
driven by how the relevant constituency can best promote its interest – in relative terms.
Constituencies with considerable sunk costs and a high threshold for corporate mobility may
not be able to take advantage of the freedom of establishment. To prevent competitors from
taking advantage of more competitive regimes they would opt for EU level harmonization
setting similar rules throughout the EU that would cater to existing industrial standards and
20 Helen Wallace & William Wallace, Overview: The European Union, Politics and Policy-Making, in
HANDBOOK OF EUROPEAN UNION POLITICS 339, 340-344 (Knud Erik Jorgensen, Mark A. Pollack & Ben
Rosamond, eds., 2007).
21 Helen Wallace, An Institutional Anatomy and Five Policy Modes, 69, 95 in POLICY-MAKING IN THE EUROPEAN
UNION, supra note 12.
22 Id.
23 Id.; see also Simon Hix, The European Union as a Polity (I), 141, 145 and 152 in HANDBOOK OF EUROPEAN
UNION POLITICS, supra note 20.
24 Wallace (2010), supra note 21.
25 See Ferrarini & Miller (2009), supra note 8.
26 See Roberta Romano, The Political Economy of Takeover Statutes, 112 VIRGINIA L.R. 111 (1987).
27 See Brian R. Cheffins, Steven A. Bank & Harwell Wells, The Race to the Bottom Recalculated: Scoring
Corporate Law Over Time (ECGI Law Working Paper 261, 2014), available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract_id=2475242, Lucian A. Bebchuk & Assaf Hamdani, Federal Corporate Law: Lessons
from History (Harvard Law School John M. Olin Center for Law, Economics and Business Discussion Paper
Series 8-5-2006, 2006), available at http://lsr.nellco.org/harvard_olin.
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structures28. Constituencies with lower costs for relocating, on the other hand, will lobby for
national regulation and regulatory competition, as they can move their operations to
jurisdictions with more favourable regulation, for example29.
A further important aspect is how regional differences affect regulatory processes - in addition
to the more traditional interest group dynamics. With respect to corporate governance, for
example, policy has generally focused on the relationships among investors, management and
employees. The dynamics of these relationships are quite different across the EU increasing
the complexity of pursuing policy at the EU level. In connection with key regulatory
initiatives there have been significant cleavages in traditional politically defined interests at
the EU level that have been based on regional differences in corporate governance systems.
This has been the case, for example, with respect to support for the Takeover Directive in the
EU parliament30.
The institutional structure of the EU also affects policy-making. The dynamics of agenda-
setting and decision-making in the key institutions, including the Council, the Commission
and the EU Parliament, have their own dynamics that affect regulatory processes and
outcomes. Also, the EU institutions do not only reflect the interests of national constituencies,
but drive their own agendas as well. For example, the EU institutions may have an interest in
increasing their overall influence as such. The different EU bureaucracies may be able to
identify potential political alliances when promoting new regulatory initiatives31 to ensure that
the initiatives are acceptable to key political and industry actors. It is possible that the
interests of industry representatives and governments vary among jurisdictions depending on
the applicable economic structures, and that different alliances would be formed from time to
time with regard to political and lobbying efforts. These efforts may overshadow the
analytical advancement of the structure and design of regulation.
C. REGULATORY IMPLICATIONS
Developing policies and introducing regulation in the field of corporate governance at the EU
level raises complex issues. A number of EU initiatives have been specifically criticized for
failing to take into account the institutional landscape in which regulation is supposed to be
applied32. Also, certain EU initiatives have failed to be introduced altogether as they
challenged key interests of politically dominant constituencies in the EU33.
With regard to corporate governance, there has at times been tension between regions with
different corporate governance systems that transcend traditional political cleavages. The
introduction of EU level regulation that is perceived to conflict with complementary
28 Roger Van den Bergh, Regulatory Competition or Harmonization of Laws? Guidelines for the European
Regulator, in THE ECONOMICS OF HARMONIZING EUROPEAN LAW, supra note 7, at 27, 37-38.
29 See Jacques Pelkmans & Jeanne-Mey Sun, Regulatory Competition in the Single Market, 33 J. OF COMMON
MARKET ST. 67 (1995).
30 THE POLITICAL SYSTEM OF THE EUROPEAN UNION, supra note 12, at 214-216, see also Helen Callaghan &
Martin Höpner, European Integration and the Clash of Capitalisms: Political Cleavages over Takeover
Liberalization, 3 COMP. EUR. POLITICS 307 (2005).
31 McCann (2010), supra note 10, at 117.
32 SeeMarc Goergen, What Do We Know about Different Systems of Corporate Governance? (ECGI Finance
Working Paper 163, 2007), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract_id=981531; see also Arman Khachaturyan, The
One-Share-One-Vote Controversy in the EU, 8 European Bus. Org. L. Rev. 335 (2007).
33 See Enriquez (2006), supra note 4.
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institutions has raised concerns that have affected political alliances and party loyalties at the
EU level34. These concerns might be alleviated by adopting legal strategies adapted, as far as
possible, to the existing institutional environment while retaining set regulatory goals. The
question arises as to whether the legal strategies and the design of regulation could be
developed at the EU level to better take into account the characteristics and challenges of a
supranational regulatory environment. Another question is whether the political dynamics of
corporate governance regulation allow for developing legal strategies in this manner.
The form and design of legal intervention are key factors for the efficient enforcement of
policy. Strategies can vary from specific rules or standards to regulatory frameworks based on
contractual arrangements. Enforcement of legal strategies can be based on private actions
(court systems) or on public authorities, such as regulatory agencies. Different legal strategies
may be required to ensure that legal intervention has the desired effects in different
institutional environments. For example, the enforcement of certain legal strategies may
depend on the quality of available court systems. Legal strategies are also likely to vary
depending on the applicable institutional environment so that they address the concerns and
interests of dominant constituencies.
Developing legal strategies in a supranational framework, such as the EU, provides for special
challenges as the institutional environment varies across affected jurisdictions. Where one
strategy may be appropriate in some EU member states due to the structure of corporate
ownership, for example, another strategy may be called for in other jurisdictions with a
different corporate environment. The effects of EU level regulation differ across the affected
jurisdictions depending on the relevant applicable market structures and the broader
institutional environment. In some cases the effects have been contradictory to the stated
goals of EU regulation35. There is also only a limited set of regulatory mechanisms available
at the EU level, and both the implementation and the interpretation of EU regulation can vary
across the member states36. The EU also largely relies on the member states to provide
mechanisms for enforcing the regulation originating at the EU level. The design of EU
regulation and the choice of regulatory mechanisms are relevant in this regard, and may need
to be better adapted to different institutional environments.
The EU political institutions and the political processes for EU regulation pose their own
challenges for pursuing regulatory initiatives at the EU level. Regulation is the result of
political processes and the efforts of affected constituencies pursuing their interest through the
markets for regulation. In this respect, the study recognizes that corporate law can be expected
to reflect the institutional power of dominant corporate constituencies37. However, the EU
framework has added considerable complexity to the political dynamic of regulatory
development. The EU process for introducing regulation has its own characteristics with
respect to interest group input and political dynamics of the legislative process38. The EU
political institutions provide an alternative and additional framework to national institutions
with respect to interest group input and the regulatory markets. The agendas and alliances of
34 Supra note 30.
35 John C. Coates IV, Ownership, Takeovers and EU Law: How Contestable Should EU Corporations Be? 12
(ECGI Law Working Paper 11/2003), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=424720.
36 Alasdair R. Young, The European Process in Comparative Perspective, 45, 61-63 in Wallace, Pollack &
Young (2010), supra note 12.
37John Armour, Henry Hansmann & Reinier Kraakman, What is Corporate Law?, 1, 32, in KRAAKMAN ET. AL.,
THE ANATOMY OF CORPORATE LAW – ACOMPARATIVE AND FUNCTIONAL APPROACH (2nd ed., 2009).
38 See Callaghan (2008), supra note 19.
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affected constituencies and interest groups may differ across the EU creating a challenging
political dynamic to be taken into account when considering feasible strategies for regulatory
intervention at the EU level.
In summary, at the EU level it is not sufficient to address specific policy concerns within a
given institutional setting. In fact, developing EU level legal strategies poses at least two
different kinds of challenges that vary from regulatory intervention at the national level. First,
the effects of EU level regulation vary depending on the institutional environment in different
member states and, second, the political processes related to the enactment of EU regulation
create a multilevel governance framework that affects how interest groups can best promote
their agendas through regulatory intervention. These factors must be taken into account also
when considering the development of EU corporate governance regulation and different
mechanisms for regulating control transactions.
This chapter will assess the legal strategies used at the EU level with respect to corporate
governance regulation, and consider how these strategies might be developed to better reflect
the complex regulatory environment. I first briefly outline a typology of strategies and then
propose further considerations and amendments based on a political approach to corporate
governance regulation. I will then also consider the premises for a qualitative framework for
developing EU corporate governance policy and regulation.
II. CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AND THE EU
In order to understand the dynamics of EU corporate governance regulation, it is important to
first reflect on the nature of corporate governance and the economic and policy implications
of corporate governance regulation. To highlight the challenges that face EU regulatory
initiatives in this regard, this chapter will discuss the nature of corporate governance and how
corporate governance relates to the institutional environment in an EU context. The study will
then turn to the political and legislative dynamics of EU regulation, and the evolution of EU
policies on corporate governance.
A. AVARIED CORPORATE ENVIRONMENT
The characteristics of the corporate and financial environments vary across the EU. Factors
resulting in these differences include differences in industrial structures, the openness of the
economy, and the structure of the financial system, for example. As regional differences have
emerged they have been strengthened as complementary institutions arise to address issues
related to the relevant corporate environment.
One of the significant factors differentiating companies with respect to corporate governance
is the prevalent structure of corporate ownership. The level of concentration of ownership and
the type of shareholders affect have a significant effect on the type of corporate governance
systems that emerge to address relevant concerns related to each type of ownership. Dispersed
ownership among large companies is more common in the United Kingdom and, to a lesser
extent, in the Netherlands, while it has been rare elsewhere in the EU39. The type of dominant
owners has also varied and included governments, families and financial institutions40.
Corporate governance systems have evolved nationally to reflect the concerns that have arisen
39 Torben Pedersen & Steen Thomsen, European Patterns of Corporate Ownership: A Twelve-Country Study, 28
J. OF INTERNL. BUS. ST. 759, 767 (1997).
40 Id.
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in each case. In dispersed ownership systems the relationship between management and
shareholders has typically been of greater interest, while in countries with concentrated
ownership the position of minority shareholders in relation to controlling shareholders may be
of particular interest.
There has been considerable resistance to a number of EU initiatives that relate to company
law and corporate governance, such as the proposal for the Fifth Company Law Directive41,
the Takeover Directive, and the one-share-one-vote initiative42, for example. Distinct
company law and corporate governance systems have developed at the national level in the
EU member states, and introducing change has been met with political resistance as nationally
established institutions and the interests of dominant constituencies have been challenged. It
has been noted that there has been less resistance against the introduction of new regulation
when there are no national level structures or interest groups that are immediately
challenged43.
It has proved challenging to introduce EU level regulation in this varied environment. The
application of the same regulatory mechanism can have different results across a varied
institutional landscape such as the EU44. Specific regulatory mechanisms may not be adapted
to prevailing systems of corporate governance which may lead to unintended results. The
structure of corporate ownership will affect the relevance of different regulatory mechanisms,
as will the quality of enforcement, for example. This can disenfranchise specific governance
models and prevent the development of a level playing field. Rules that are effective in one
type of environment may be less relevant in another corporate environment. For example,
regulating the duties of the board of directors (especially in takeover situations) is important
in the context of dispersed ownership, while the same regulation has less relevance in a
concentrated ownership environment. Also, regulation intended to decrease control enhancing
mechanisms introduced in the EU Takeover Directive have been argued to have the opposite
potential as controlling shareholders would have ensured their control rights would not be
challenged by new regulatory initiatives45.
B. THE COMPLEXNATURE OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE
Different corporate constituencies have often voiced their frustration over new initiatives for
EU corporate governance regulation. Compliance requirements have been deemed costly and
unnecessary, and the EU framework a negative factor for the competitiveness of EU listed
companies46. In such criticism corporate governance regulation is sometimes seen as an
endogenous burden for companies that increases administrative costs while providing little
added value. Indeed, regulation is not cost-neutral and it is not always clear that legislators are
able to produce regulation with an optimal design – often the opposite is the case, as has been
41 Amended Proposal for a Fifth Directive Founded on Article 54(3)(g) of the E.E.C. Treaty Concerning the
Structure of the Public Limited Companies and the Powers and Obligations of Their Organs, 26 O.J. EUR.
COM. (No. C240) 2 (1983) [hereinafter the Fifth Company Law Directive Proposal]; see Johnston (2009), supra
note 9, at 139-139.
42 See Khachaturyan (2007), supra note 32.
43 Armour & Ringe (2011), supra note 1, at 27.
44 Marc Goergen, Marina Martynova & Luc Renneboog, Corporate Governance Convergence: Evidence from
Takeover Regulation 29 (ECGI working paper No. 33/2005), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=709023.
45 See Coates (2003), supra note 35.
46 See Enriques & Gatti (2006), supra note 4; see also Communication from the Commission to the European
Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions,
Better regulation for better results - An EU agenda, COM(2015) 215 final, Strasbourg, May 19, 2015.
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argued with regard to many EU initiatives47. However, corporate governance is complex, of
course, and the function or purpose of new regulation is sometimes overseen.
In its simplest form corporate governance can be understood in an organizational context as
“the system by which companies are directed and controlled”48 with the aim of reducing
transaction costs. Similarly, corporate law could be viewed as a default framework for the
legal organization of business enterprise49. The function of corporate governance would be to
address the collective action problems of various corporate claimholders and to reduce “the
scope for value-reducing forms of opportunism among different constituencies”50.
However, corporate governance is not only related to the organizational aspects of enterprise.
The distributional aspects of corporate governance are a significant factor in this regard. The
basis for how the revenue from the enterprise is distributed will have an effect on the
willingness of corporate constituencies to make investments in the corporate enterprise. In
this respect the notable definition by Shleifer & Vishny provides that “corporate governance
deals with the ways in which suppliers of finance to corporations assure themselves of getting
a return on their investment”51. Shleifer& Vishny emphasize that production capital is
actually specified so that it is committed to the enterprise (resulting in sunk costs). As
different constituents consider firm-specific investments of capital or labor resulting in such
costs, there must be sufficient assurance that they will be repaid. Corporate governance
mechanisms are intended to provide that assurance52. Pursuant to the definition above the goal
of the corporate governance mechanisms is to provide a basis for an optimal balance in the
terms and conditions of different types of contributions of production capital (equity, debt,
labor etc.) from time to time. The Shleifer & Vishny definition suggests that corporate
governance arrangements are much like contractual arrangements or covenants that are
negotiated among the parties and affected by the risks and returns involved.
However, corporate governance is a more complex phenomenon not easily defined based on a
purely contractual approach. At best, the theories related to costs of contracting suggest that
the implicit contracts underlying the relationships between corporate constituents are
incomplete53. Corporate governance provides the means and mechanisms by which potential
conflicts of interest among different corporate constituencies are resolved. It is important to
recognize, however, that the dynamics of corporate governance can change. Corporate
constituents can seek to renegotiate these contracts if their bargaining power increases over
time with each party seeking to increase its stake from the income of the enterprise54.
47 See Luca Enriques, Company Law Harmonization Reconsidered: What Role for the EC (ECGI Law Working
Paper No 53/2005), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=850005.
48 Report of the Committee on the Financial Aspects of Corporate Governance, 1992, at 2.5, available at
http://www.ecgi.org/codes/documents/cadbury.pdf.
49 Armour, Hansmann & Kraakman (2009), supra note 37, at 2.
50 Id.
51 Andrei Shleifer & Robert W. Vishny, A Survey of Corporate Governance, 52 J. OF FINANCE 737, 737 (1997).
52 Id. at 738.
53 See Philippe Aghion & Patrick Bolton, An Incomplete Contracts Approach to Financial Contracting, 59 R.
ECON. STUDIES 473 (1992).
54 Manuel A. Utset, Towards a Bargaining Theory of the Firm, 80 CORNELL L. REV. 540, 609 (1995).
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Corporate Governance as a Framework for Bargaining
Importantly, it is also possible to approach the corporation and corporate governance as a
framework for continuous or at least recurring bargaining among self-interested actors with
varied interests who can obtain benefits from mutual cooperation55. Bargaining occurs in, and
is affected by, the broader institutional environment, involving market institutions and
processes, the industrial and political environment and formal and social norms56. This
approach recognizes that governance of the corporation does not occur in a vacuum, and is
affected by the relevant institutional environment that participants interact with, and based
which participants can also form coalitions for increased bargaining power57. Bargaining can
take the form of explicit or implicit contracts that parties may seek to renegotiate from time to
time as their relative bargaining power evolves. The relative bargaining power among the
corporate constituencies can change as a result of technological or industrial changes, for
example, or through political developments and the introduction of new regulation.
Bargaining does not need to be direct but corporate constituencies can affect the internal
relationships through the political system, for example. Importantly, this approach recognizes
the legal and economic aspects of corporate governance, but incorporates the political aspects
of corporate governance to the definition.
A relevant prerequisite for bargaining is the fact that contracts are necessarily incomplete, as
discussed above, and it is generally not possible to fully regulate the relationships among
corporate constituencies ex ante. When an investor has made a significant firm-specific
investment (be it a shareholder, debt holder, manager or employee) it is difficult to withdraw
the investment and it becomes less liquid. Once an equity investment is made, for example, it
may not be possible to withdraw it and the investor is dependent on the continued
performance of other constituencies. Similarly, an employee will be more dependent on the
specific corporation once the employee has invested in firm-specific skills that may be
difficult to take elsewhere. Other constituencies may look to take advantage of this and
attempt to renegotiate the terms of their respective investments as their relative bargaining
power changes. Investors will be aware of this risk, of course, and require ex ante guarantees
to protect their initial investment58. However, as contracts are necessarily incomplete (and as
the alternatives available to the investors will likely have the same characteristics in an
environment of incomplete contracts) there will be room for such renegotiations59.
The structure of corporate finance and the corporate governance framework provide for the
building blocks for bargaining. In this context, the corporation and corporate finance can be
approached from the perspective of financial contracting60. In simple terms financial
contracting in the corporate context can be seen as the understanding between the
55 SeeMASAHIKO AOKI, TOWARD A COMPARATIVE INSTITUTIONAL ANALYSIS (2001), John C. Coffee, Unstable
Coalitions: Corporate Governance as a Multi-Player Game, 78 GEO L. J. 1495 1989-1990 and Utset, supra note
54.
56 Masahiko Aoki & Gregory Jackson, Understanding an Emergent Diversity of Corporate Governance and
Organizational Architecture: An Essentiality-Based Analysis 3 (SIEPR Discussion Paper 07-19, 2007), available
at http://www-siepr.stanford.edu/repec/sip/07-019.pdf.
57 See Aoki (2001), supra note 55, at 287-291; Coffee, supra note 55; see also PETER GOUREVITCH & JAMES
SHINN, POLITICAL POWER AND CORPORATE CONTROL (2005).
58 See Luigi Zingales, Corporate Governance 16 (NBER Working Paper 6309, 1997), available at
http://www.nber.org/papers/w6309 .
59 Id. at 3.
60 See OLIVER HART, FIRMS CONTRACTS AND FINANCIAL STRUCTURE 8, 118-120 (1995).
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entrepreneur with an idea but no funds and the investor with funds but no idea61. The structure
of corporate finance and the corporate governance of the corporation are the result of
bargaining between these actors. In financial contracting theory the entrepreneur negotiates
cash flow and governance rights with the providers of financing62. Entrepreneurs and
investors can agree on the allocation of control rights and cash-flow rights with the aim of
finding the best outcome to meet the specific requirements and priorities of each party. The
different priorities of the actors and their relative valuation of control and cash-flow rights
provide a basis for the bargaining over how cash-flow and governance rights are allocated
between them. As discussed, different types of financial instruments, i.e. equity, debt and
convertibles, are the basic the building blocks of corporate finance and corporate
governance63. The structure of corporate finance sets the framework for ex-post bargaining
over control. Debt-financing generally allows the entrepreneur to maintain control, for
example. However, higher levels of debt increase the risk of default with the result, typically,
that control will be passed on to the investors. Equity-financing, on the other hand, generally
provides control to the investors. Financial instruments with contingent control rights, such as
convertible debt, provide a further model of allocating governance rights in that control is
transferred upon a triggering event typically linked to the performance of the enterprise.
Corporate governance can thus be approached as a broad framework for on-going
bargaining64 among corporate constituencies over the terms of corporate finance. Corporate
governance regulation, then, covers a broader scope of regulation than provisions in corporate
law that directly apply to the corporate rights and obligations of stakeholders and include, for
example, tax laws, employee regulation and contract law. The regulation of legal institutions,
such as commercial courts and agencies, are also relevant, as enforcement mechanisms are a
key factor in legal strategies related to corporate governance. Finally, corporate governance
cannot be understood without reference to the economic and political systems that create the
framework for bargaining for the relevant constituencies.
Bargaining and Politics
New legal regulation can also be seen as a mechanism for changing the original corporate
governance framework. Corporate constituencies are also interest groups that can use political
avenues to pursue corporate interests, and changes in regulation can be seen to reflect changes
in the relative bargaining power of these constituencies. The relationship between
entrepreneurs and investors will be renegotiated, in part, through political and regulatory
intervention as the political bargaining power of these constituencies evolves. Corporate
governance regulation can be expected to reflect the interests of politically dominant
constituencies. Different constituencies have different requisites for pursuing their interests in
this regard, however65. Theories on political coordination suggest that small interest groups
with similar interests overcome coordination problems to sufficiently promote their interests.
Groups of large shareholders in an environment of concentrated ownership have often been
61 Oliver Hart, Financial Contracting 1 (NBER Working Paper 8285, 2001) available at
http://www.nber.org/papers/w8285.
62 Id. at 1-2, 10-12, see also Zohar Goshen & Assaf Hamdani, Corporate Control and Idiosyncratic Vision, 125
YALE L.J. 560 (2013).
63 See Hart (2001), supra note 61.
64 Aoki (2001), supra note 55, see also Peter Nobel, Stakeholders and the Legal Theory of the Corporation, in
PERSPECTIVES IN COMPANY LAW AND FINANCIAL REGULATION 176 (Michel Tison, Hans de Wulf, Christoph van
der Elst & Reinhard Steennot, eds., 2009).
65 SeeMANCUR OLSON, THE LOGIC OF COLLECTIVE ACTION (1971).
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identified as this type of constituency. On the other hand, the interests of large interests
groups with similar interests are generally reflected through the political system. Labour
interests, for example, have been argued to be largely represented through these avenues.
However, large interest groups with dissimilar interests may be more vulnerable than others
as they may face disproportionate coordination costs. Minority shareholders, for example,
may have sufficiently diverging agendas and too small financial interests to allow for efficient
coordination. The interests of these constituencies, then, may require special attention.
Changes in bargaining power may reflect changes in the overall political economy. As
industrial structures develop and the political economy evolves the initial outcome of
bargaining may become sub-optimal. In other words, the original allocation of control is no
longer value maximizing from a property rights perspective. At the same time, the relative
bargaining power of the corporate constituents may change. As a consequence, the framework
for feasible corporate governance outcomes changes. Technological change can affect the
relative importance of different types of firm-specific investments in this regard. For example,
the increase of the importance of human capital in relative terms has been referred to in many
instances. The outcome of the dispute between the new owners and the manager and former
owner of the advertising agency Saatchi & Saatchi has been referred to as the case in point in
this regard66. As the new shareholders did not accept the salary requirements of the former
chairman he left the company together with others to set up a competing enterprise – and took
a significant portion of the company’s assets with them in the form of the human capital.
It has been argued that change is the central characteristic of the system involving the
interaction between economic, political and corporate environments67. Technological change
affects the business and organizational environments of corporations, and it is vital that the
organizational structures of business can be adapted to changing circumstances. Corporate
acquisitions and the transfer of control are important elements in this respect. The transfer of
control can be seen as a process whereby access to the corporate assets is transferred to a
party that, due to technological or other changes, for example, can use them more efficiently
and can give them a higher value68. It is therefore important that the transfer of control is
appropriately facilitated, but as discussed, the pervasiveness of control is a central
characteristic of corporate governance. Creating incentives for changing the structure of
corporate ownership may consequently be as important as trying to regulate the concerns
related to currently dominating structures of corporate ownership.69 Moreover, many of the
governance mechanisms based on monitoring by external parties are not as effective as has
been assumed. This suggests that it remains important to continue to develop different
approaches to corporate governance regulation.
On a general level parties should have freedom of contracting with respect to different
corporate governance solutions and it is generally not warranted to promote specific structures
of governance or ownership through regulation. However, it is also the case that the outcomes
of bargaining are not necessarily optimal or efficient – especially in the longer term as the
political economy evolves. Also, in many cases bargaining is carried out in “an institutional,
66 See Raghuram G. Rajan & Luigi Zingales, The Governance of the New Enterprise, in CORPORATE
GOVERNANCE, THEORETICAL & EMPIRICAL PERSPECTIVES (Xavier Vives, ed., 2000).
67 Ronald J. Gilson, The Political Ecology of Takeovers: Thoughts on Harmonization of the European Corporate
Governance Environment, 61 FORDHAM L. REV. 161, 175 (1992).
68 Id. at 164.
69 Id. at 174-175.
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legal, standardized framework”70 that shapes the solutions and may or may not coincide with
the optional structures for the enterprise in question. Political considerations also have a
considerable impact in this respect. The ex-post bargaining process is therefore very
important. Moreover, it has been emphasized that as the corporate environment evolves
organizations must have the ability to adapt, in which context the transfer of control is a key
element. However, due to the characteristics of corporate governance and deficiencies in
many corporate governance mechanisms corporate control may be entrenched so that control
is not necessarily transferred when it would be efficient. Consequently, it may well be
justified to continue to consider new regulatory concepts and mechanisms.
The EU provides a forum for regulatory changes discussed above. Relevant questions that
arise in this context include how the EU institutions are attuned to dealing with these types of
policy issues, and how the structure of the EU institutions affects regulatory outcomes.
C. CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AND THE INSTITUTIONAL ENVIRONMENT
Corporate governance and the structure of corporate ownership are closely related to
industrial and historical conditions, and reflect the development of economic, political, legal
and historical conditions71. The model of ownership and governance that has developed in an
economy with heavy industry requiring considerable capital outlays and untrained labor could
be expected to differ from the model that has evolved in an economy based on services or
products requiring firm-specific investments of skilled labor, for example. Industrial and
historical developments may not in all cases support a specific structure of corporate
ownership72. The systems of corporate ownership and corporate governance are likely to have
developed based on the requirements of existing circumstances. Roe argues, for example, that
in countries with strong labor institutions there is likely to be pressure for more corporate
governance institutions that favor employees and less for institutions that support the interests
of shareholders73. Companies are likely to be encouraged to expand to secure employment
even at the cost of profitability, for example, and to avoid down-sizing as well as not to take
disruptive risks74. In this environment the institutions needed for dispersed ownership to
flourish are not present, whereas a controlling shareholder, on the other hand, would be in a
relatively better position to bargain over surplus and to resist political pressures75.
The importance of historical development and path dependence has been emphasized in the
legal literature on corporate governance76. Once a given structure has been established, it is
70 See Bruno Deffains & Dominique M. Demougin, Governance: Who Controls Matters (SFB 649 Discussion
Paper No 53, 2006), available at http://hdl.handle.net/10419/25136.
71 Randall K. Morck & Lloyd Steier, The Global History of Corporate in Governance – An Introduction, in A
HISTORY OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AROUND THEWORLD: FAMILY BUSINESS GROUPS TO PROFESSIONAL
MANAGERS 517, 518-522 (Randall K. Morck, ed., 2005); see also Peter Högfeldt, The History and Politics of
Corporate Ownership in Sweden, in AHISTORY OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AROUND THEWORLD: FAMILY
BUSINESS GROUPS TO PROFESSIONALMANAGERS, supra, at 517; and Paul Davies et al., Beyond the Anatomy,
305, in Kraakman et. al. (2009), supra note 37.
72 SeeMark Roe, Political Preconditions to Separating Ownership from Corporate Control, 53 STAN. L. REV.
539 (2000); see alsoMagnus Henrekson & Ulf Jakobsson, The Swedish Corporate Governance Model:
Convergence, Persistence or Decline?, 20 CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: AN INTERNATIONAL REVIEW 212 (2012).
73 Roe (2000), supra note 72, at 18.
74 Id. at 18-19.
75 Id. at 19.
76 See Lucian A. Bebchuk and Mark J. Roe, A Theory of Path Dependence in Corporate Governance and
Ownership, 52 STAN. L. REV. 127 (1999).
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likely to be reinforced as complementary institutions develop77. With respect to corporate
governance different systems may develop with the same functional effects. For example,
depending on the environment, corporate performance can be monitored by an undiversified
large shareholder or by lending financial institutions, or monitoring can be based on market-
based mechanisms, such as takeovers or proxy fights78. Different legal solutions and corporate
governance regulations would be relevant in these cases. In this context it is important to note
that there is little evidence that a specific model of corporate ownership or corporate
governance is superior. Each system of corporate governance has its strengths and
weaknesses, but the weaknesses should be addressed in the context of the system.
There is some concern that the differences in economic systems that are deemed to prevail in
the EU pose an extra challenge for introducing uniform EU regulation in the field of corporate
law specifically. It is argued that national level regulation is often better adapted to the
relevant institutional environment so that new regulation fits into the regulatory framework
and that concepts are not introduced that are foreign to the reigning system of corporate
governance79. It has been easier to introduce EU regulation in fields without strong national
level institutions that would be challenged by the introduction of new regulatory models. It
has been noted, for example, that EU regulation related to financial services has met less
resistance, as many EU member states did not have developed market structures to defend80.
However, distinct company law and corporate governance systems have generally developed
at the national level in the EU member states over several decades, if not centuries. Efforts to
introduce EU regulation will conflict with established structures reflecting the interests of
dominant constituencies and the dynamic of the domestic systems81.
The effects of EU level regulatory intervention may differ among the member states
depending on the institutional environment, which does not facilitate the creation of a level
playing field. Institutions can develop to complement existing features of the corporate
environment. In this type of environment the introduction of supranational rules can have very
different and unintended consequences82. For example, corporate governance mechanisms
that are relevant in the context of dispersed ownership may not be meaningful or effective in a
concentrated ownership environment, where the relevant regulatory concerns are completely
different83. The effects of regulation can also depend on the availability of enforcement
systems, such as court systems or agencies, where the quality of the relevant institutions
across the EU can vary considerably84. It has been argued, for example, that the introduction
of a mandatory break-through rule in the Takeover Directive would, in reality, likely not have
facilitated challenging the control of large shareholders but lead to the further increase in the
concentration of ownership and control as owners would have reacted to the new regulation85.
This discussion emphasizes the importance of addressing corporate governance issues in the
context of existing structures of ownership and control. It is important, regardless of the
77 See DOUGLASS C. NORTH, INSTITUTIONS, INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE AND ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE (1990).
78 Marco Becht, Patrick Bolton & Ailsa Röell, Corporate Governance and Control 1 (ECGI Finance Working
Paper 02/2002), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=343461.
79 Johnston (2009), supra note 9, at 181.
80 Armour & Ringe (2011), supra note 1, at 27.
81 Id.
82 See Goergen (2007), supra note 32; see also Johnston, supra note 9, at 181.
83 Id. at 16-17.
84 See Young (2010), supra note 36.
85 See Coates (2003), supra note 35.
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source of regulation, be it national or supranational, that corporate governance regulation be
adapted to the characteristics of the relevant institutional environment. This does not mean
that EU level regulation would be inappropriate as such or that national level regulation is
superior per se, but only that regulatory mechanisms should be better adapted to the
prevailing institutional environment. Corporate governance mechanisms should be developed
to address concerns related to the relevant environment, but regulation should not undermine
the basic premises of the relevant governance system. This means that the standard and
quality of corporate governance regulation has to be analysed and assessed in the context of
the relevant institutional environment; i.e. how well does the regulatory framework address
the vulnerabilities and potential for abuse in that particular system. EU level legal strategies
should not disenfranchise specific forms of ownership or governance but, instead, seek to
address the potential for abuse within existing governance structures. It is important to
identify the relevant relationships that are vulnerable to abuse and then to apply appropriate
legal strategies tailored to the institutional environment.
D. EVOLVING EU POLICIES REGARDING CORPORATE GOVERNANCE
The evolution of EU policies on corporate governance can be reviewed in light of the political
dynamics referred to above. Below, I consider recent developments in EU corporate
governance regulations in light of these dynamics.
EU policies regarding corporate matters and corporate governance have varied over the years.
Until recently, it has been argued that the impact of EU regulation has, in fact, been limited
with respect to corporate law86. Early integration of company law had slowed down at the end
of the last millennium – in part due to remaining fundamental differences in corporate
governance across the EU. However, EU regulation of company law has evolved significantly
over the past decade. After the failure of more comprehensive initiatives, such as the Fifth
Company law Directive Proposal, the EU Commission in 2003 issued a communication with
the aim of modernizing company law87. In this action plan, the Commission adopted a more
instrumental view on harmonization88. The introduction of EU level regulation would be
based on an impact assessment and an analysis of the needs of businesses89. Harmonization
efforts would not be introduced for the purposes of creating a level playing field alone.
Regulatory intervention was also to be focused primarily on cross-border aspects of business
where EU regulatory intervention could be better justified. Also, the regulatory mechanisms
that would be used at the EU level should be “flexible in application, but firm in the
principles”90. At the same time the EU also pursued a policy of simplifying the business
environment for companies envisaging the development of a principles-based regulatory
model corporate law in the EU91.
86 See Enriques (2006), supra note 4.
87 Communication from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament - Modernising Company
Law and Enhancing Corporate Governance in the European Union - A Plan to Move Forward, COM2003(284)
[hereinafter the Company Law Action Plan 2003].
88 See Armour & Ringe (2011), supra note 1.
89 See Report of the High Level Group of Company Law Experts on a Modern Regulatory Framework for
Company Law in Europe, 4 November 2002, 4 and 29-31, available at
http://www.ecgi.org/publications/documents/report_en.pdf [hereinafter High Level Group Report].
90 Company Law Action Plan 2003, supra note 87, at 4.
91 European Parliament Resolution of 21 May 2008 on a simplified business environment for companies in the
area of company law, accounting and auditing (2007/2254(INI)), [2009] OJ C279E/36
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More recently, several factors have affected the agendas outlined by the EU Commission92.
The European Court of Justice has supported the freedom of establishment of corporations
through a string of landmark decision from the Centros-case in 199993 to the Vela case
decided in 201294. With the evolving jurisprudence it has become more difficult for member
states to restrict the movement of companies across EU borders. Recent EU regulatory
initiatives have looked to further facilitate cross-border establishment.
The development of EU level capital markets regulation has also affected company law
matters95. The EU has pursued a vigorous agenda of harmonization in the field of capital
markets regulation. Importantly, some of the directives issued thereunder have considerable
effects on corporate affairs – and on corporate law. The Transparency Directive, for example,
established a framework for periodic and on-going disclosure requirements for listed
companies, whereas the Takeover Directive regulates the corporate steps that can be taken by
a target company in a takeover situation, and sets redemption obligations and redemption
rights for shareholders in different situations (including regulation on mandatory offers and
squeeze-out as well as on the use of shareholder rights in concert). More recently, the
Commission has launched a program to establish a capital markets union to promote growth
of European companies through better access to financial markets96. In this context the
Commission has emphasised the link to corporate governance in inadequate corporate law and
corporate governance rules, as well as the effects of non-harmonized and uncoordinated
insolvency and tax laws97. The Commission also highlighted problems resulting from
differences in regulatory enforcement98. This development may provide the basis for further
EU action in the field of corporate law and corporate governance as well. The EU
Commission has justified intervention in the field of corporate governance with the
internationalization of equity capital markets and the increase in cross-border share
ownership99.
Finally, following the financial crisis, the Commission has pursued a more interventionist
agenda with respect to corporate governance. The EU Commission first targeted financial
institutions and introduced, among other, requirements on board structures in financial
institutions100. The Commission then published a green paper on developing the EU corporate
governance framework for listed companies in general101. Based on the feedback received on
the Corporate Governance Green Paper the Commission launched a new action plan for
92 Armour & Ringe (2011), supra note 1, at 2.
93 Case C-212/97, Centros Ltd v Erhvervs- og Selskabsstyrelsen [1999] ECR I-1459.
94 Case C 378/10 VALE Építési kft. [2012] ECR 00000.
95 See Armour & Ringe (2011), supra note 1.
96 See Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic
and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions, Action Plan on Building a Capital Markets Union,
COM(2015) 468 final, 30.9.2015.
97 European Commission, Building a Capital Markets Union, Green Paper COM(2015) 63 final, 18.2.2015, at 9
and 24-25.
98 Id. at 24-25.
99 Id.
100 See http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/bank/regcapital/index_en.htm, and Proposal for a Directive of the
European Parliament and of the Council on the access to the activity of credit institutions and the prudential
supervision of credit institutions and investment firms and amending Directive 2002/87/EC of the European
Parliament and of the Council on the supplementary supervision of credit institutions, insurance undertakings
and investment firms in a financial conglomerate, Brussels, 20.7.2011, COM(2011) 453 final, 2011/0203
(COD).
101 See the Corporate Governance Green Paper, supra note 1.
230
modernizing EU company law in late 2012102. Many of the more controversial initiatives in
the Corporate Governance Green Paper have been deleted from the action plan. However,
there has still been strong opposition to many of the proposals in the plan103. Pursuant to the
Company Law Action Plan, the Commission has launched, and intends to launch, a number of
specific regulatory initiatives104. One of the more important initiatives is the proposed
amendment of the Shareholder Rights Directive105. The directive was intended to facilitate the
use of shareholder rights throughout the EU setting minimum standards on access to
information prior to general meetings, provisions on proxy voting and voting without physical
participation. The directive also prohibited requirements for share blocking whereby a
shareholder would not be able to trade shares during a period of time before the shareholders’
meeting in order to use voting rights. Other initiatives taken so far include amendments to the
Accounting Directives106 and a Recommendation on corporate governance disclosures107.
It has been argued that EU policy during the past decade has favoured shareholder-oriented
models of corporate governance108. Despite the political rhetoric, this policy has not
significantly changed in the aftermath of the financial crisis based on the regulatory
instruments introduced as a part of the Company Law Action Plan. What has changed is that
the EU has strengthened its position as a source for corporate regulation at the cost of the
member states. There is less room for optionality in EU regulations, and more mandatory
provisions superseding voluntary codes, for example.
This trend emphasizes the importance of developing the characteristics of EU corporate
governance regulation. There has been concern that the legislative procedures at the EU level
are not satisfactory and that, generally, regulatory initiatives have been watered down due to
political compromises. It seems the EU political systems remain vulnerable to the political
salience of corporate matters resulting at times in less optimal regulatory outcomes. Policies
have also not necessarily been adapted to different institutional environments. This has
resulted in new regulation having unwarranted effects. An important aspect to consider is the
ability of the EU to introduce regulatory mechanisms that can be applied throughout the
varied institutional landscape of the EU. Both regulatory concerns and the effects of
102 Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and
Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions, Action Plan: European Company Law and Corporate
Governance – a Modern Legal Framework for More Engaged Shareholders and Sustainable Companies,
COM(2012) 740/2 [hereinafter the Company Law Action Plan].
103 See Swedish Corporate Governance Board, Views on the EU Green Paper on the Corporate Governance
Framework, 19.7.2011, available at
http://www.bolagsstyrning.se/media/53853/views%20on%20eu%20cg%20framework%20from%20the%20swed
ish%20cg%20board%202011-07-19.pdf.
104 See the Company Law Action Plan, supra note 102, at 17-18.
105 Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council amending Directive 2007/36/EC as
regards the encouragement of long-term shareholder engagement and Directive 2013/34/EU as regards certain
elements of the corporate governance statement, Brussels, 9.4.2014, COM(2014) 213 final, 2014/0121 (COD),
hereinafter [SHRD II].
106 Directive 2013/34/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 June 2013 on the Annual
Financial Statements, Consolidated Financial Statements and Related Reports of Certain Types of Undertakings,
Amending Directive 2006/43/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council and Repealing Council
Directives 78/660/EEC and 83/349/EEC, OJ 29.6.2013, L182/19.
107 Commission Recommendation of 9 April 2014 on the Quality of Corporate Governance Reporting (‘Comply
or Explain’), (2014/208/EU).
108 See Laura Horn, Corporate Governance in Crisis? The Politics of EU Corporate Governance Regulation, 18
EUROPEAN L. J. 83 (2012).
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regulatory mechanisms vary depending on the corporate and institutional environment,
including the structure of corporate ownership and the availability and quality of legal
institutions for enforcement.
III. THE POLITICAL DYNAMICS OF EUCORPORATE GOVERNANCE REGULATION
A central aspect in developing EU corporate governance regulation is related to the political
dynamics of regulatory initiatives. Regulatory responses are the result of political processes
and the efforts of affected constituencies pursuing their interest through the markets for
regulation109. These dynamics affect the selection of areas to be regulated, the choice of
regulatory goals, as well as the form and design of regulatory instruments. Regulatory
outcomes will depend on the evolving preferences of interested constituencies, as well as on
the structure of political institutions110.
It is important to recognize the effects of supranational political systems, such as the EU, on
the political dynamics of corporate governance regulation. The regulatory dynamic of the EU
has been subject to much research111. The EU and its institutions form a political system akin
other national or regional systems. The EU cannot merely be seen as an intergovernmental
forum for the member states, of course, but rather as an independent political system
facilitating the development of a multilevel governance system112. Moreover, EU integration
as such, together with its institutional forms, reflects a polity in itself whereby certain political
and economic agendas may be promoted113. In addition, the EU political institutions and the
political processes for EU regulation pose their own challenges for pursuing regulatory
change at the EU level114. The agendas and alliances of affected constituencies and interest
groups may differ at the national and the EU levels115 creating a challenging political dynamic
to be taken into account when considering feasible strategies for regulatory intervention at the
EU level. These characteristics of the EU must be understood when considering how EU
regulation is formed.
This chapter will first discuss factors that affect the political and legislative dynamics at the
EU level with regard to EU corporate governance regulation. The chapter will then provide a
brief overview of recent EU policy and regulation related to corporate governance and how it
can be seen to reflect the dynamics referred to above.
A. IMPLICATIONS OF THE “REGULATORY STATE”
Considering the constraints set on the EU institutions the considerable increase in both the
amount and scope of regulatory initiatives originating from EU institutions has been found
109 See Peltzman, Towards a More General Theory of Regulation, 19 J. OF LAW AND ECON. 211 (1976), and
George J. Stigler (1971), supra note 15.
110 See Gourevitch & Shinn (2005), supra note 57.
111 See, inter alia, Hix & Höyland, supra note 12, THE ECONOMICS OF HARMONIZING EUROPEAN LAW, supra
note 7, THE TRANSNATIONAL POLITICS OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE REGULATION (Henk Overbeek, Bastiaan
van Apeldoorn & Andreas Nölke, eds., 2007), REGULATING EUROPE (Giandomenico Majone, ed., 1996),
WAYNE SANDHOLTZ & ALEC STONE SWEET, EUROPEAN INTEGRATION AND SUPRANATIONAL GOVERNANCE
(1998), and POLICY-MAKING IN THE EUROPEAN UNION, supra note 12.
112 See Pollack (2010), supra note 12, at 36-37; see also Callaghan (2008), supra note 19.
113 Pollack (2010), supra note 12, at 34-42; see also LAURAHORN, REGULATING CORPORATE GOVERNANCE IN
THE EU: TOWARDS AMARKETIZATION OF CORPORATE CONTROL (2011) andMcCann (2010), supra note 10.
114 See Callaghan (2008), supra note 19.
115 See Ferrarini & Miller (2009), supra note 8, at 15.
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puzzling116. Member states could be expected to be on their guard in delegating authority or
allowing supranational legal decisions bind domestic policies. An important factor to
consider, however, is that the European Union has a variety of policy domains with different
dynamics. In certain policy matters, such as defense and security, national governments may
retain more sovereignity while the role of the EU institutions is broader in others, such as in
the agricultural policies of the EU or, importantly, key areas of economic regulation.
The development of the EU has reflected the emergence of the “regulatory state”. As the role
of government has evolved over the 20th century, the importance of the government as a
source of economic and social regulation has increased. Another mechanism for steering
economic policy has been public ownership of assets. However, this avenue has much
decreased in Europe in the decades following the Second World War. As the role of
government has changed, it has been argued that the EU, as a political system, is increasingly
alike any other government systems. However, with limited taxation and budgetary powers,
the role of regulation is emphasized as a means to pursue policy. This is supported by the
hierarchical legal system adopted in the EU.
The EU has provided an opportune forum for regulatory policy-making in the EU region for
responding to emerging changes in the international economy117 with an increased need for
coordinating standards among private actors on a cross-border basis. The EU model was
successful in combining transnational standards with national differences118. The institutional
structure, with negotiation processes supported by the EU legal system, but with less
immediate parliamentary pressures, has also been deemed an important factor in this regard.
Thus both national policy-makers and industrial interest groups have found the EU as an
opportune avenue to pursue policy and change in the industrial and economic systems of EU
member states.
The characteristics discussed above have political implications. Political analysts have
suggested that EU corporate governance initiatives have promoted market liberal policies
over the past decade. In particular, the EU single market program has contributed to this
development119. There has been much debate on the dynamics of the single market program –
and whether supranational actors or bargaining member states had the decisive role in
launching the program120. Transnational business interests have been argued to have a central
role, directly and/or indirectly, in this regard, while the EU Commission has been seen as the
central policy entrepreneur, setting the agendas towards market integration121.
The institutional structure of the political decision-making processes will also affect the
dynamic of policy-making and regulatory outcomes. Certain institutional characteristics of the
EU “regulatory mode” have been identified, including the following:
- “The central role of the Commission in defining and pursuing regulatory objectives
(often economically motivated);
116 Giandomenico Majone, The Rise of Statutory Regulation in Europe, in REGULATING EUROPE, supra note 111,
at 56-57 and 61.
117 Wallace (2010), supra note 21.
118 Id.
119 Wallace & Wallace (2007), supra note 20, at 345, and Alasdair R. Young, The Politics of Regulation and the
Internal Market 373, 376-377 in HANDBOOK OF EUROPEAN UNION POLITICS, supra note 20.
120 Young (2007), supra note 119, at 374.
121 Id. at 374-375.
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- Cooperation between the Commission and stakeholders and experts;
- The Council as a forum for agreeing minimum standards and the level of
harmonization;
- The role of the EU legal system as a means to ensure even implementation, and to
provide redress to private actors;
- The role of the European Parliament in introducing non-economic factors to the
regulatory initiatives;
- The central role of regulatory agencies; and
- Extensive opportunities for interest groups to influence EU level regulation” 122.
The effects of these factors must be assessed in order to better understand the dynamic of the
EU corporate governance regulation. The EU Commission has a central role in defining the
regulatory agenda – also with respect to initiatives in the field of corporate governance. The
institutional structure of the EU allows stakeholders (both political and economic
stakeholders) to seek to influence these agendas. Competitiveness of the EU region and
facilitating the development of the single market have been used as arguments underlying
new corporate governance initiatives123. This may reflect the influence of investors over those
of corporate insiders, who may have more influence at the national level and benefit from less
intrusive EU level regulation. The increasing role of the EU with respect to corporate law in
general has also been driven by the role of the EU legal system and landmark rulings of the
European Court of Justice (the “ECJ”) from the Centros-case in 1999124 to the more recent
Vale case decided in 2012125.
B. INTEREST GROUPS AND REGIONAL VARIETIES
With respect to corporate governance, the EU has resulted in a multilevel governance
framework126 where different interest groups can seek to coordinate political action both at
national and EU levels. The institutional structure of the EU will also affect which policies
can best be pursued at the EU level and which are the parties that are able to best coordinate at
different levels of governance127. In this respect it is important to note that similar interest
groups in the different member states may or may not favor the same policies at the EU level.
Indeed, there have been clear regional differences in the EU with respect to preferred policies
in corporate governance. The Takeover Directive has often been referred to as an example of
regulatory initiatives where these differences was most pronounced and reflected different
systems of corporate governance128.
122 Wallace (2010), supra note 21, at 95-96.
123 See the Company Law Action Plan, supra note 102.
124 Case C-212/97, Centros Ltd v Erhvervs- og Selskabsstyrelsen [1999] ECR I-1459.
125 Case C 378/10 VALE Építési kft. [2012] ECR 00000.
126 See Hooghe & Marks (2000), supra note 18; Callaghan (2008), supra note 19; Pollack (2010), supra note
112.
127 Young (2007), supra note 119, at 383.
128 Supra note 30.
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Interest Groups
The shareholders, management and employees of a corporation are often identified as the key
constituencies in corporate governance129. Other relevant interest groups include lenders and
other providers of external financing, as well as politicians in times when the political
salience of corporate governance has been pronounced130.
Different corporate constituencies will seek to promote their interests through corporate
governance regulation, among other. Corporate constituencies are also interest groups that can
use political means to further their own interests. Regulation can be seen as the outcome of
the interaction between political and market structures, reflecting the impact of interested
market participants and the political environment131. In this respect corporate law and
corporate governance regulation can be expected to reflect the institutional power of dominant
corporate constituencies132. For example, in markets with a prevalence of concentrated
ownership, corporate governance regulation can be expected to favour blockholders. In
markets with dispersed ownership, where shareholders face coordination problems, corporate
governance can be expected to favour management. In this regard labor is also a significant
corporate constituency often with considerable political clout. In basic agency analysis labor
is sometimes excluded as an external constituency as the contracts between the company and
labor are assumed to be complete133. However, these contracts are often renegotiated
depending on the relative bargaining power of unions. If the role of labor increases
significantly in the production chain, for example, this can be expected to affect corporate
governance solutions. In the EU it has been argued that the strong position of labor has had a
significant with Germany as an example134. Creditors are another external constituency that
also has significant interests in corporate governance that can be pursued through policy and
regulation. In particular, in economies with a financial system dominated by financial
intermediaries, such as banks, the role of external creditors in corporate governance has been
significant.
Typically, corporate governance and corporate governance regulation have been studied in the
context of the interaction of the interest groups described above. However, corporate
governance can also have external political elements as legislators respond to political
pressures more or less related to corporate matters – as has been the case in the aftermath of
the financial crisis. For example, the EU legislative process is subject to political concerns
and the need to address politically salient issues can be seen in EU initiatives – regardless of
their relevance to the governance of business enterprise. As long as corporate governance
regulation remains a “low salience”135 matter the political dynamic, and the related “market
for regulation”, is mainly dominated by the traditional interest groups, i.e. investors,
management and employee groups. However, to the extent that corporate governance related
129 John Armour, Henry Hansmann & Reinier Kraakman, Agency Problems and Legal Strategies 35, 35-37, in
THE ANATOMY OF CORPORATE LAW, supra note 37.
130 See PEPPER D. CULPEPPER, QUIET POLITICS AND BUSINESS POWER, 2011.
131 See Stigler (1971), supra note 15, Peltzman (1976), supra note 109, Roe (2000), supra note 72, MARK ROE,
POLITICAL DETERMINANTS OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE (2003).
132 Armour, Hansmann & Kraakman (2009), supra note 37, at 32.
133 Gourevitch & Shinn (2005), supra note 57, at 8.
134 Id.
135 See Culpepper, supra note 130.
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issues do become matters of “high salience”136 that dynamic can change significantly.
Significant reforms of securities and corporate law are often launched in the aftermath of
market crisis137 and such initiatives may be affected by the sense of urgency and public outcry
related to the crisis138. There has been an increased pressure for political reactions to the
financial crisis which has been channelled to corporate governance regulation due to the high
political salience of corporate matters in the aftermath of the financial crisis as well as to the
fact that listed companies have been subject to “regulatory capture” – i.e. they have already
been subject to a regulatory framework that regulators have been able to use. Corporate
governance regulation has been an avenue for demonstrating political action for the electorate.
Regional Variety
Industrial and economic structures in the EU vary. With respect to the corporate environment
there are considerable differences among the EU member states. In the EU, the debate on
corporate governance has been related to the “varieties of capitalism” debate in political
science seeking to understand institutional differences and similarities among economies139.
With regard to corporate governance the “varieties of capitalism” approach looks at how the
structure of national economies is reflected in the structure of corporate ownership and in how
coordination problems are resolved in different economic systems, and what the roles of
different institutions and organizations are in this respect140. Corporate governance systems
generally reflect the overall structure of the economy and provide different regulatory
solutions. Scholars have categorized economies into liberal market economies and
coordinated market economies based on the systems of coordination used to organize business
activities and relationships with third parties. Firms in market liberal economies refer to
market-based arrangements, whereas relational contracting and collaborative relationships are
more important for firms in coordinated market economies.141 Market oriented models are
generally deemed to emphasize shareholder primacy, but are also associated with models of
dispersed corporate ownership and strong management control dominant in the United States
and, to some extent, the United Kingdom (also referred to as “Anglo-Saxon” governance
models). Coordinated market models have been deemed to dominate much of the continental
EU and are based on stakeholder oriented models of governance characterized by labour
involvement in governance and by block-holder control. An important aspect of the “varieties
of capitalism” –approach is that the structure of the economic system is supported by the
development of complementary institutions, such as sources of financing or governance
structure, adapted to the requirements of the specific economy. This will promote the
performance of the firms within the economy but also lead to the specialization of economies
on specific types of production.
136 Id.
137 See Klaus J. Hopt, Comparative Corporate Governance: The State of the Art and International Regulation,
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The “varieties of capitalism” debate can possibly be defined in terms of path dependence
where a given “variety” reflects a particular point in the specific development path of an
economy. Nevertheless, the approach highlights the fact that different corporate governance
environments raise different governance issues that require different solutions. This, of
course, creates considerable challenges for EU wide regulation. In an EU context it is also
possible that benefits of regulation are not evenly distributed. Market actors in jurisdictions
with a favourable institutional environment may have an advantage over actors in other
jurisdictions. When markets are being opened through EU regulation, some will be better
positioned than others to take advantage of the new situation. In fact, connection with
corporate governance regulation, there have been regionally based cleavages between the
northern and southern regions of the EU as well as between the northern and eastern regions.
The Takeover Directive, though dated, has often been referred to in this regard, as will be
discussed briefly below.
Varying Interest Group Influence
Some scholars believe that with the development of EU level regulation traditional industry
groups will be able to coordinate their actions on an international level and focus their efforts
to lobby favourable EU level regulation142. However, others argue that the EU framework
creates a multilevel framework of regulation that affects how interested constituencies can
pursue their interests through the political systems143.
The preference for regulatory competition (national regulation) or harmonization (EU
regulation) may be driven by how the relevant constituency can best promote its interest – in
relative terms. Constituencies with considerable sunk costs and a high threshold for corporate
mobility may not be able to take advantage of the freedom of establishment. To prevent
competitors from taking advantage of more competitive regimes they would opt for EU level
harmonization setting similar rules throughout the EU that would cater to existing industrial
structures. Constituencies with lower costs for relocating, on the other hand, will lobby for
national regulation and regulatory competition, as they can move their operations to
jurisdictions with more favourable regulation, for example144. It has been argued that large
transnational business interests prefer harmonized regulation as they can operate with the
same standards throughout the EU – and may have the ability to coordinate political action
efficiently at the EU level145.
It is also possible that key industry groups with considerable political leverage at the national
level are not be able to affect EU level corporate regulation in the same way. For example,
Ferrarini & Miller argue that at the national level takeover regulation may be more likely to
favour target companies and their management, while the relative position of institutional
investors may be better at the EU level, for example146. At the domestic level, interest groups
representing management, labour and community groups are likely to advocate for rules that
increase the threshold for takeovers147. At the international (or federal) level, however, the
142 Hix & Hoyland (2010), supra note 12, at 211.
143 See Hooghe & Marks (2000), supra note 18.
144 See Pelkmans & Sun, supra note 29.
145 Young (2007), supra note 119, at 374-375.
146 Ferrarini & Miller (2009), supra note 8, at 15.
147 See Roberta Romano, The Political Economy of Takeover Statutes, 112 VIRGINIA L.R. 111 (1987).
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influence of these interest groups may be more balanced148. Corporate insiders may not have
the same relative advantage over the interests of bidders (and minority shareholders) who may
better be able to organize themselves on an international basis.
The concerns identified above have some support in findings from the United States. In
analyzing the development of state corporate regulation, Bebchuk & Hamdani find that states
have generally favored corporate insiders whereas federal regulation has more consistently
favored external investors and minority shareholders149. The authors argue, in line with
Ferrarini & Miller, that corporate insiders do not have the same political influence at the
federal level and that other constituencies are better able to cooperate at this level of
regulation – possible due to economies of scale. In a long-term empirical analysis, Cheffins,
Bank & Wells support this view and argue that U.S. federal regulation has played a crucial
role in enhancing shareholder rights150.
It has been argued that altogether it may be more difficult for individual interest group to
promote their interests at the EU. The EU provides an alternative and parallel framework for
pursuing interests through the political system resulting in a system of multilevel governance
that may be less prone to be dominated by specific policies. The EU institutional set-up
allows for competing political coalitions to simultaneously advance different reforms thus
limiting the possibility for interest groups to monopolize policy151. Callaghan, for example,
argues that the multilevel system established with the introduction of the EU framework
increases strategic opportunities for using regulation to pursue policies across the EU –
regardless of the national system of corporate governance152. Also, the institutional set-up of
the EU allows different types of policies to be pursued simultaneously. In other words, it is
not as easy for a single interest group (or coalition) to dominate the political agendas
regarding a particular field of regulation. This can result in reforms reflecting, at the same
time, different policies.
C. THE INSTITUTIONAL STRUCTURE AND THE LEGISLATIVE PROCESS
The institutional structure of the EU will also have a significant effect on policy and
regulation. The structure of political institutions affects how regulatory agendas are set and
how general political and specific interest group agendas affect the regulatory processes.
Understanding the roles and interactions of the EU legislative institutions is important in this
regard.
The Commission
The EU Commission has a central position as an initiator of regulatory initiatives. The
Commission can use different political tools to pursue its goals, including agenda setting
powers and packaging of regulatory proposals to maximize the likelihood of their acceptance,
148 See Ferrarini & Miller (2009), supra note 8.
149 See Lucian A. Bebchuk & Assaf Hamdani, Federal Corporate Law: Lessons from History (HLS John M.
Olin Center Discussion Paper Series, 2006), available at http://lsr.nellco.org/harvaard_olin.
150 See Brian R. Cheffins, Steven A. Bank & Harwell Wells, The Race to the Bottom Recalculated: Scoring
Corporate Law Over Time (ECGI Law Working Paper 261, 2014), available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract_id=2475242.
151 See Callaghan, supra note 19.
152 Id.
238
or mobilizing interest groups to set political pressure on national governments or the
European Parliament153. The key question that arises is how the regulatory policies of the
Commission are formed. The EU polity and the interaction among member states and relevant
supranational actors in defining EU policies are of course important in this regard. As
discussed above, the policies of the past decades have favored a liberalist agenda in economic
policy – also with respect to corporate regulation.
It is important to recognize that regulatory policies include discretion by regulatory agencies.
Agency theory is often applied in political relationships, where regulatory agencies are
established to serve the interests of their appointees, but where those agencies will have
sometimes considerable discretion over how they use their authority. This model is also used
to describe the position of the European Commission. The Commission is not a perfect
“agent” of member states, of course, but has independent interests and can use its powers
selectively154. While the Commissioners are appointed by national governments, the
Commission ultimately has considerable discretion in setting agendas and pursuing policies
not always favored by their “principals”. Moreover, as the Commission has several national
principals with diverging interests, this discretion is further increased. In terms of regulation
theory the Commission has been seen as a “policy entrepreneur”155. The Commission can
select policies, set agendas and restrict choices available to other political actors, and involve
other constituencies in the political processes to increase pressure or to build coalitions for
pursuing its policies of choice156. The Commission can identify potential political alliances
when promoting new regulatory initiatives to ensure that the initiative is acceptable to key
political and industry actors and that the structure and design of these initiatives takes the key
concerns of these constituencies into consideration. It is possible that the interests of industry
representatives and governments vary among jurisdictions depending on the applicable
economic structures, and that different alliances would be formed from time to time with
regard to political and lobbying efforts.
The view of the Commission as a coherent single actor has also been challenged, and the
internal dynamics of the Commission have been studied based on the agendas of individual
commissioners, who can be seen to represent interests of their national parties, transnational
parties at the EU level, their respective governments or their respective fields of responsibility
in the Commission (directorate general)157. The incentives and the dynamics of the
Commission may vary depending on the matter at hand, but in specific controversial cases
individual Commissioners have been argued to have acted as national agents or as
representatives of their respective fields of responsibility158.
The Legislative Dynamics
While the initiative for introducing new regulation generally lies with the EU Commission,
the legislative process of the EU has evolved over the years, and now includes the EU
Council of Ministers as well as the EU Parliament in increasing roles.
153 Hix & Hoyland (2010), supra note 12, at 25 and 47-48.
154 Id. at 212.
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J. OF EUR. PUB. POL. 1145, 1148-1151 (2008).
158 Id.; see also Robert Thomson, National Actors in International Organizations: The Case of the European
Commission, 41 COMP. POL. STUDIES 169, 187-188 (2007).
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The workings of the Council of Ministers have been fairly opaque, but research has
nevertheless focused on the deliberative nature of the process regarding new legislative
proposals. Empirical research suggests that there are often considerable efforts to reach
consensus in the Council, but that when voting occurs, a tendency of regional blocks has been
observed, where policies favored by countries in Northern Europe can be seen to differ from
those in the South and the Eastern parts of the EU159. This regional dynamic varies but has
been seen in situations where EU regulation would have a significant impact on regionally
established structures.
Interestingly, the voting patterns of the EU parliament often follow the international party
affiliations of the parliamentarians rather than national or regional blocks160. One explanation
provided for this group loyalty has been that parliamentarians divide tasks to cope with the
extensive legislative agendas, and rely on party associates to pursue similar policies across
these agendas. They also have little to gain from deviating from set policies of their parties as
matters at the EU level rarely have immediate high salience with national electorates161.
Hence voting patterns that do deviate from this pattern may be of some interest. For example,
where voting patterns would deviate so that they would be aligned with national or regional
blocks it could be argued that the legislative proposal might have collided with national or
regional interests of particular political significance. The voting patterns of the EU parliament
have been studied in connection with the introduction of the Takeover Directive, for
example162.
The Takeover Directive
The legislative history of the Takeover Directive has often been used as an example of the
complexity of introducing EU regulation, and, though preceding the Lisbon Treaty and thus
representative of an earlier legislative process, serves the purposes of this study as well. The
directive has a long and infamous history extending over 20 years from first being introduced
by the Commission on more than one occasion until being finally approved in 2003, with an
earlier version of the directive having failed to be adopted in 2001 by the closest margin
possible163.
The Takeover Directive has been seen as an effort to introduce mechanisms that facilitate the
development of an active market for corporate control164. This has been interpreted as a polity
in itself – as a marketization of corporate control that, in the “varieties of capitalism”
literature, was not adapted to corporate governance systems prevalent in the EU. The takeover
mechanism as such was seen to provide a means to circumvent decision making power related
to change of control in EU listed companies benefitting shareholders at the cost of employees
159 See The EU Council Enlarged: North-South-East or Core-Periphery? 12 EUROPEAN
UNION POL. 87 (2010).
160 See Simon Hix, Abdul Noury & Gérard Roland, Voting patterns and alliance formation in the
European Parliament, 362 PHIL. TRANS. R. SOC. B, 821 (2009).
161 Id. at 829.
162 See Callaghan & Höpner (2005), supra note 30, Bastiaan van Apeldoorn & Laura Horn, The Transformation
of Corporate Governance Regulation in the EU – From Harmonization to Marketization, in THE
TRANSNATIONAL POLITICS OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE REGULATION, supra note 111, at 77, 90-95, and Wonka
(2008), supra note 157, at 1155-1158.
163 See Rolf Skog, The Takeover Directive – an Endless Saga?, 13 EUR. BUS. L. REV. 301 (2002); see also supra
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and management165, and that this ran against the whole system of corporate governance
established in many EU jurisdictions. For example, a change of control could lead to a breach
of implicit agreements among corporate constituencies and the emphasis of share price and
dividends over the provision of stable jobs and wages. It has been pointed out, however, that
the mere change of control should not trigger a need to terminate implicit agreements if those
have formed the basis of an effective corporate governance arrangement166.
The differences in how the Takeover Directive would affect member states were of
significance for the political dynamics of the legislative process. A uniform takeover
framework has different implications nationally depending on the system of corporate
governance167. Firms in jurisdictions lacking active markets for corporate control may become
targets more easily than in countries where such markets have been the norm168. Different
national starting points may thus result in the benefits of a uniform framework being initially
distributed unevenly. But such immediate consequences may not be so unusual in the context
of supranational harmonization, where regulation in some countries may be required to be
changed more than in others. Importantly, however, a uniform takeover framework may also
include elements that challenge complementary institutions in a specific system of corporate
governance. This may increase the salience of the legislative proposal and result in strong
national and regional political pressure. Individual provisions of the draft directive included
elements that were argued to directly challenge the basis of these corporate governance
systems. The break-through rule limiting the effects of control enhancing mechanisms in
takeover situations was deemed to challenge the decision rights of controlling shareholders,
while the neutrality rule prevented management from independently adopting measures that
may hinder the completion of a takeover bid.
The Commission pursued the introduction of EU level takeover regulation on several
occasions since the 1970’s, but a draft proposal was issued by the Council only in 2000. It can
be noted that the final negotiations in the Council were stalled by Spain for reasons seen to be
related to the status of Gibraltar rather than to the directive169. The European parliament
proposed a number of amendments to the proposal resulting in a conciliation process. A key
issue was the neutrality requirement opposed by, among other, the German MEP acting as
rapporteur on the directive. It has been presented that the German car industry heavily lobbied
the Council and the Parliament to prevent the board neutrality requirement in the proposed
directive170. As a result, Germany announced it would withdraw its support for the Council
proposal, but opening the negotiated proposal raised considerable opposition from other
member states and the draft directive was left unchanged in this regard. Lobbying remained
heated in the parliamentary phase creating regional cleavages among the largest political
groups in the EU parliament171. The large center-left and center-right groups split along
regionally or nationally aligned groups with, for example, most German MEP’s voting against
165 Id. at 312-313.
166 See Gilson (1992), supra note 67, at 189-191.
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the proposal, while most of the UK MEP’s supported the proposal172. The smaller political
groups with leftist agendas, as well as those on the right, did vote along party lines173.
Interestingly, in working towards the final version of the directive, there were further efforts
to introduce certain controversial mechanisms. A break-through rule had been introduced to
limit the effects of different control enhancing mechanisms in connection with takeovers. In
order to isolate Scandinavian countries that were opposed to the directive, it was proposed
that the rule should cover the effects of different share classes (often used in Scandinavia) but
not the use of double voting rights applied in French companies174. At the end of the day the
break-through rule was introduced, but subject to a national opt-in used by very few member
states.
The fact that the vote in the EU parliament followed national and regional blocks certainly
reflected the fact that the proposal challenged considerable national or regional political
interests. This time the regulatory proposal had challenged fundamental structures of national
and regional economies that raised the concerns of EU parliamentarians.
Proposal to Amend the Shareholder Rights Directive
The Commission proposal to amend the Shareholder Rights Directive is a more recent
controversial corporate governance initiative. The proposal was launched in 2014 pursuant to
the Company Law Action Plan, and included several significant elements, including
transparency and decision-making regarding director remuneration, decision-making
regarding related party transactions and facilitating the exercise of shareholder rights175.
One of the more controversial proposals addresses related party transactions. The
Commission proposed that shareholders must be granted to right to vote on significant related
party transactions and that where the transaction involves shareholders, such shareholder does
not have the right to participate in the vote. The policy goals of the proposal are related to the
protection of minority shareholders against abuse by directors or controlling shareholders.
However, the proposal provides minority shareholders a veto right that challenges and may
undermine control rights of controlling shareholders.
The proposal has been subject to much debate and has been heavily negotiated in the Council.
During the Council process the provision has been amended significantly. First, the revised
Council proposal allows for related party transactions to be approved by other corporate
bodies than shareholders’ meetings – provided that procedures are followed “which prevent a
related party from taking advantage of its position and provide adequate protection for the
interests of …. minority shareholders”176. Moreover, the Council proposed that the approval
procedure does not need to apply, subject to the discretion of member states, to transactions
entered into in the ordinary course of business and concluded on normal market terms177. In
these cases, the “administrative or supervisory body of the company shall establish an internal
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procedure to periodically assess whether these conditions are met”, while the related parties
shall be excluded from participating in such assessment. Finally, the proposal provided that
member states may allow a related party shareholder to participate in a relevant vote
“provided that national law ensures appropriate safeguards which apply before or during the
voting process to protect the interests of … minority shareholders, by preventing the related-
party from approving the transaction despite the opposing opinion of the majority of
shareholders who are not related parties or despite the opposing opinion of the majority of
independent directors”178.
The amended proposal can be seen to represent concerns related to governance systems based
on concentrated ownership and may reflect regional cleavages in the Council. While related
party transactions and private benefits of control have been problematic in some parts of the
EU, others report very low levels of private benefits despite concentrated ownership (the
Nordic region, for example)179. In connection with the proposal, the German legislation on
groups of companies has been seen as a regional approach to related issues, where Germany
may well prefer its own existing solutions180. The Council proposal recognizes that related
party transactions may be appropriate and that granting minority shareholders veto rights can
challenge control rights of controlling shareholders in an opportunistic manner. However, the
proposal remains fragmented and seems to reflect political negotiations and the lack of
sufficient institutional analysis of corporate governance mechanisms in different types of
corporate environments. The proposal could have included more thorough and detailed
regulation of transparency of related party transactions and of legal standards applied to such
transactions.
The proposal has also been subject to debate at the level of the European Parliament. A
revised proposal was submitted by the Parliament rapporteur in May 2015, including
amendments to the proposed rules of related party transactions181. The Parliament proposed
somewhat stricter requirements on related party transactions but maintained the dynamic
adopted by the Council that makes the provision better adapted to different types of corporate
environments. For example, Parliament did not require general meetings to approve all related
party transactions with shareholders, and allowed different mechanisms to be used to assess
the fairness of the dealings. In many respects, the proposals of the Parliament incorporated
external corporate governance elements in increased transparency requirements and in
targeting politically salient concerns. In fact, the parliamentary revisions could even be argued
to represent efforts by parliamentarians to react to the high salience of corporate governance
to appease the electorate rather than the result of an institutional analysis of the effects of the
adopted regulatory position.
The dynamics related to SHRD II highlight the effects of regional cleavages in EU level
corporate governance regulation. The proposal will likely be further amended during the
legislative process, but it seems that the regional interests are likely to be reflected in the
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amendments. The Commission can already be criticized, however, for neglecting a
sufficiently robust institutional analysis of the policy area to be regulated, or indeed of the
expected political dynamic triggered by the initial proposal. Clearly, more work could have
been done to formulate a proposal better adapted to the varied EU corporate environment.
D. THE REGULATORY POLITICS OF EUCORPORATE GOVERNANCE REGULATION
Understanding the politics of EU corporate governance regulation is important for a better
understanding of the regulatory outcomes, and how these outcomes are likely to develop in
the future. It should also be a part of the legislative process to identify the anticipated political
dynamic related to regulatory initiatives. It would be important for the EU Commission, for
example, to be able to identify potential political allies when promoting regulatory programs.
The drivers of key constituencies affected by the regulatory initiative should be understood
and, where possible, taken into account in designing regulatory mechanisms.
The dynamics of policy making depends on the type of matter at hand and the perceived
distribution of costs and benefits from the initiative, for example182. If costs are dispersed and
benefits concentrated, small interest groups are incentivised to lobby for favourable outcomes;
if costs are concentrated but interests diffuse, the policy entrepreneur will likely need to
mobilize political support in order to pursue the policy successfully183. On the other hand, if
costs and benefits are both dispersed, interest groups are unlikely to form and policy will be
driven by majoritarian politics; and if costs and benefits are both concentrated, policy will be
affected by interest-group politics184. It has been argued that on balance entrepreneurial policy
making is more pronounced at the EU level due to the smaller role of redistributive policies,
among other185. Interest groups dynamics may also otherwise differ at the supranational level.
The regulatory politics vary with respect to corporate governance regulation. However, on a
general level, the supranational level of intervention provides economies of scale for diverse
interests to coordinate political action and has been seen to provide outcomes that represent
such interests186 (or that at least are more balanced than national level outcomes187). However,
when promoting such interests it is important to seek outcomes that do not unnecessarily
burden or challenge the position of other interest groups. More importantly, the outcomes
should not undermine governance systems. With respect to corporate governance regulation,
this emphasizes the need to adapt regulatory mechanisms to their institutional environments.
The institutional structures of the EU have a significant impact on the regulatory processes.
Understanding the institutional dynamics of the EU is also important so that initiatives can be
successfully introduced through the legislative process. In this regard the dynamics of the EU
Council and the Parliament are increasingly important – as was experienced in connection
with the introduction of the Takeover Directive, for example. With regard to corporate
governance regulation it remains important to understand potential regional varieties in
governance systems and how this is represented in the effects of regulation.
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IV. LEGAL STRATEGIES AND REGULATORY DESIGN IN THE EU
This chapter has discussed the dynamics of EU corporate governance regulation – including
the interaction between national and supranational levels of regulation, the influence of
interest groups and the effects of the institutional structures of the EU on regulatory processes
and outcomes. The study now turns to considering the implications of these factors for
developing EU corporate governance regulation and related legal strategies. This chapter
considers the regulatory implications of the dynamic described above.
As discussed, the key problems identified at the EU level relate to the effects of EU regulation
which have been deemed to vary depending on the relevant corporate environment, including
the structure of corporate ownership, the characteristics of legal institutions and the prevalent
financial systems, for example188. Another problem has been that EU regulation has often
argued to be the result of unsatisfactory legislative processes and significant compromises
resulting in watered-down regulation189. Finally, there is only a limited array of regulatory
instruments available at the EU level and both interpretation and enforcement relies often on
member states resulting in varied application through the EU190.
This chapter discusses legal strategies for corporate governance regulation and the
preconditions for developing regulation at the EU level.
A. LEGAL STRATEGIES FOR CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AT THE EULEVEL
Different legal strategies can be used to address corporate governance concerns – ranging
from standards for decision making in the corporation (fiduciary duties or equality of
shareholders) to mechanisms allowing shareholders to veto corporate decisions or to change
management, for example. For the purposes of this study it is interesting to consider what
implications the dynamics of EU corporate governance regulation has on the choice of legal
strategies at the EU level. Additional challenges result from the nature of EU regulation –
often requiring national implementation and enforcement measures.
Armour, Hansmann & Kraakman have introduced a typology of legal strategies for dealing
with agency problems in the context of corporate governance regulation191. While this
approach may remain rooted in agency theory it provides an important benchmark for
assessing the scope of mechanisms and instruments available for regulators, as well as the
effectiveness or relevance of these in different environments. This study briefly outlines the
typology and then proposes further considerations and amendments to the typology based on
a political approach to corporate governance regulation.
The authors separate ex ante and ex post mechanisms, as well as regulatory strategies and
governance strategies. They then discuss the institutional environments in which these
different strategies and mechanisms can be meaningfully introduced. The authors identify
four subsets of regulatory strategies and six subsets of governance strategies, and divide those
into ex ante and ex post categories as per the table below.
188 Johnston (2009), supra note 9, at 181.
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Strategies for Protecting Principals192











Ex Ante Rules Entry Selection Initiation Trusteeship
Ex Post Standards Exit Removal Veto Reward
Regulatory strategies that may be used to constrain the activities of the agent include rules (ex
ante) and standards (ex post). Many corporate governance matters may require more complex
assessments that cannot readily be regulated through specific rules but lend themselves better
to ex post assessments of propriety (standards such as the fiduciary duties of management, for
example). Further regulatory strategies identified by Kraakman et. al. include the terms of
entry and exit for principals193. Terms of entry include disclosure obligations for agents
(managers) providing information for outside investors prior to becoming shareholders. Exit
terms would include appraisal rights and transferability of shares, for example.
Governance strategies include appointment rights, i.e. the right to select and remove agents.
Selection rights apply both to the agency relationship between shareholders and managers and
the relationship between majority and minority shareholders (i.e. allowing board selection
rights to minority holders as well).194 Other governance rights include decision rights and
agent incentives. Decision rights can take the form of the right to initiate or ratify
management decisions, i.e. which corporate decisions are subject to shareholder approval.
Significant differences can be identified in this regard between jurisdictions with a tradition of
predominantly concentrated ownership and others with dispersed ownership, for example195.
Agent incentives are generally based on mechanisms whereby agents are rewarded based on
their performance. Legal rules may provide frameworks for relevant management
compensation schemes in this regard. With respect to the relationship between majority and
minority shareholders loyalty is based on a sharing rule whereby the agent’s returns are tied to
those of the principal (the principle of equal treatment, for example).
The choice of legal strategies differs depending on the relevant institutional environment.
Governance strategies may be appropriate where the principals are able to overcome
coordination problems and pursue their rights independently with the support of available
legal institutions. The right to appoint and remove directors can be effective in an
environment with large shareholders, for example. On the other hand, there is some evidence
that in environments with dispersed shareholders directors may become isolated from the
effects of shareholder voting196.
Regulatory strategies may be appropriate, on the other hand, where principals are not able to
effectively pursue their interests. Diversified minority shareholders, for example, may not be
in a position to defend their interests independently, and would benefit from regulatory
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strategies being pursued. Shareholders with small diversified investments may not have
sufficient stakes at risk to justify taking on monitoring costs. Moreover, the cost is generally
carried by the individual shareholder whereas the outcome would benefit all shareholders.
These coordination problems often require legal strategies based on rules and standards or
monitoring by supervisory authorities, for example.
Ex ante strategies are important for allowing economic actors to assess in advance the legal
framework for their economically relevant agency relationships. However, ex ante strategies
are also inflexible and may not allow a more advanced assessment of complex agency
relationships. Ex post strategies allow for a more detailed assessment of the behavior of
economic actors, but require advanced legal institutions, such as courts that can effectively
and reliably adjudicate these types of issues.
The choice of a specific legal strategy to address regulatory concerns does not need to be
exclusive. Different legal strategies could be used together where a specific mechanism might
be insufficient due to weak enforcement, for example.
Applied to corporate governance regulation in an environment with concentrated ownership,
for example, the above would suggest that politically dominant controlling shareholders
should be able to pursue their interests independently. Consequently, governance strategies
would likely be used with respect to the agency relationship between shareholders and
managers. In this environment shareholders will likely be able to – de facto – enforce their
rights at general meetings of shareholders. Minority shareholders, however, are not in a
similar position to defend their interests and with respect to the relationship between
controlling shareholders and minority shareholders regulatory strategies might be observed.
Thus standards for director behavior are important in that context, for example. Standards
may also be needed to protect minority shareholders from potential abuse by controlling
shareholders. Entry and exit rights would also be important for minority shareholders, and are
reflected in mandatory bid rules, for example. Similarly, large shareholders might be able to
enforce their rights independently through the courts or otherwise whereas minority
shareholders would need to refer to public enforcement through supervisory authorities. An
interesting question is whether some governance strategies might also be suitable for the
relationship between controlling shareholders and minority shareholders. In particular,
incentive structures might be suitable for protecting the interests of large groups with
coordination challenges. For example, regulation might seek not to attempt to provide
mechanisms that challenge the control of large shareholders, but instead look to incentivize
controlling shareholders to transfer control when a change of ownership structure is called for.
It is important to understand how the choice of legal strategies can be relevant for the
effectiveness of regulation. The application of legal strategies not suited for the environment
results in ineffective or even irrelevant regulation. Allowing for legal action through the
courts, for example, may be less relevant if there are clear disincentives for potential plaintiffs
to pursue claims. In many cases the interest of individual plaintiffs is too small or the quality
of the court systems too unreliable (including duration of process) to justify the risks related
to pursuing such action.
In several cases, legal strategies have been introduced in EU corporate governance regulation
that have not been suited to the varied systems of corporate governance throughout the EU.
The break-through rule introduced as an optional element in connection with the Takeover
Directive, for example, has been argued not to have been adapted to its intended use in a
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concentrated ownership environment, and would more likely have resulted in increased
ownership concentration instead of the opposite.
B. POLITICAL ASPECTS OF CHOOSING LEGAL STRATEGIES
The political environment must also be considered in the choice of legal strategies.
Regulatory goals are based on policy agendas, which can be the results of political
compromises. However, sometimes the design of regulation or the choice of legal strategy can
affect the feasibility of introducing regulatory initiatives. Interest groups may of course resist
regulatory initiatives altogether. There may be a difference in, on the one hand, a conceptual
conflict between proposed regulatory initiatives and the interests of affected constituents and,
on the other hand, conflicts between specific regulatory measures and key premises of
existing corporate governance systems. The Takeover Directive, for example, facilitated
change of control and transferred some decision making authority from management and
labor in this regard – triggering conceptual (political) concerns among those constituencies197.
On the other hand, takeovers as such may be unproblematic for other constituencies, such as
controlling shareholders, while the proposed break-through rule as a mechanism challenged
their decision rights that can be seen as an elementary precondition for maintaining control
blocks. It may be difficult to alleviate the concerns of management or labor with technical
solutions, and political strategies may need to be considered instead. However, with regard to
the break-through rule, alternative functionally equivalent mechanisms could have been
considered instead. Instead of a break-through rule challenging the control implications of
different share classes, the Commission might have pushed for caps on the differences on the
consideration payable for shares of different classes, for example. It is not clear that the break-
through rule is a workable regulatory tool altogether, but in its current form the rule certainly
may have had counterintuitive effects in further entrenchment of control in environments with
concentrated ownership198. This study does not propose that regulators did not consider such
alternatives, but suggests that work should be continued not only to develop better awareness
of these differences in regulatory processes, but also towards qualitative models for
addressing these types of situations in EU legislative processes. Such models would include
analysis of institutional environments and different legal strategies and regulatory tools for
pursuing regulatory policies in these environments.
In many cases it is possible to pursue regulatory goals through different regulatory measures
and mechanisms. Thus it may be possible to adapt the choice of legal strategy to take into
account the political environment to some extent. The functional equivalency of alternative
regulatory avenues can be considered and regulatory mechanisms chosen that are less
controversial in light of the applicable institutional environment – as long as regulatory goals
can be satisfactorily met.
The above highlights the importance of identifying the constituencies affected by proposed
legal intervention and the political alliances that can be formed to allow intervention to pass
the political process. The constituencies that may be supportive of intervention may not be the
same in different jurisdictions. It may also be important to seek regulatory solutions that
balance policy requirements with the key concerns of politically influential constituencies. If
possible, regulation should be designed to achieve intended policy goals while taking these
concerns into account.
197 Horn (2011), supra note 113, at 115 and 118.
198 See John C. Coates IV (2003), supra note 35.
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C. REGULATORYMECHANISMS IN THE EUENVIRONMENT
The EU has a limited range of options for pursuing its regulatory goals in the field of
corporate governance. These vary from enforcing EU treaty freedoms through the European
Courts to introducing legal instruments and even to non-legal measures, such as
recommendations or studies.
A key question in considering the preconditions for regulatory intervention is whether the
matter at hand requires a regulatory response at the EU level, or whether the appropriate
avenue from the perspective of EU policy is negative harmonization through the courts and
leaving the matter to be regulated at the national level. With respect to corporate governance
regulation the assessment links to the harmonization-competition debate. The assumption
underlying positive harmonization is that “(c)entralized regulation, or positive integration,
furthers market integration by establishing a framework of common rules in all Member
States”199. Integration can be pursued through the courts, of course, by enforcing the EU
treaty freedoms. The precedents of the ECJ in the field of corporate law have provided an
important basis for interpreting EU treaty freedoms, and have had a considerable effect on the
development of EU corporate law. In fact, negative integration and regulatory competition
have been associated with a market oriented or laissez-faire approach to corporate
regulation200. Generally negative integration limited to enforcing treaty freedoms would result
in deregulation at the national level as incompatible national rules would be trumped by treaty
freedoms. Also, this approach relies less on political decision making and more on an
increased role of the ECJ. Positive integration through harmonization initiatives, on the other
hand, always requires sufficient political support, whereas the effects of such harmonization
initiative can vary depending on the policies pursued at the supranational level201. In this
sense different regulatory approaches to developing corporate governance regulation in the
EU – harmonization and regulatory competition –have significant political implications. The
different approaches are linked to expected regulatory outcomes and reflect underlying
political preferences. However, negative integration may not be sufficiently effective for the
purposes of the Commission’s regulatory goals. Considerable national lock-ins remain with
respect to companies, which are subject to a plethora of regulation varying from labor
regulation to taxation. Moreover, while the benefits of harmonization can certainly be
debated, some criticism of EU harmonization of corporate law is also self-serving and
originates from interested constituencies who have been able to dominate domestic regulatory
policy to serve their self-interest, but find the political dynamic at the EU level more
challenging in this regard202. Regulatory competition in the EU is still incomplete, and cannot
be relied on to provide a mechanism for EU wide regulatory development. Thus,
harmonization remains a relevant avenue for pursuing EU policies in the field of company
law.
Regulatory Instruments
To the extent that positive harmonization is pursued, there is a limited portfolio of alternatives
available at the EU level. For the purposes of corporate governance regulation, relevant
regulatory instruments mainly include directives, regulations and recommendations203.
199 Johnston (2009), supra note 9, at 115 - 116.
200 Id.
201 Id. at 115-116.
202 See Ferrarini & Miller (2009), supra note 8, at 15.
203 Article 288, Treaty of the Functioning of the European Union, 2007.
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Directives are binding “as to the result to be achieved”, but require implementation at the
national level. This can result in differences in how EU level regulation is interpreted across
the EU. With respect to directives related to corporate governance, the EU Commission has
conducted regular reviews of how directives have been implemented, and considered whether
further action has been warranted if interpretations vary, or if implementation has been
unsatisfactory. EU Regulations are directly applicable and no national measures are required
in this regard. The EU Commission has also introduced recommendations on management
remuneration, for example, focusing on shareholder participation in the approval of
remuneration204.
Adapting Regulatory Initiatives
There are several mechanisms that can be used to adapt regulatory intervention to existing
circumstances, or to find appropriate compromises. With respect to directives, optionality has
been used to allow the regulatory instrument to be adapted to local systems –as a result of
political compromise, for example. In the case of the Takeover Directive, implementation of
the break-through rule was optional, but member states had to provide means for individual
firms to adopt the rule. “Grandfathering” is also a mechanism often advocated when
introducing new regulation that may challenge existing prevalent structures. This would entail
that existing structures can be maintained, but new ones must comply with the new regulatory
initiative. Recommendations on best practices can be used to bring increased transparency on
phenomena and thereby allow market or political interests to address possible concerns. In
this regard comparative studies conducted at the EU level can also bring national differences
to light and allow interest groups to react to possible concerns.
Allowing for regulatory solutions in relation to EU corporate governance regulation that are
adapted to specific governance systems has been associated with the concept of reflexive
governance. The view taken is that allowing diversity among member states can be a resource
when combined with more open methods of coordination205. The concept of reflexive
governance is based on the notion that regulatory intervention are likely to be more successful
when they induce group representation and participation by social actors and “encourage
autonomous processes of adjustment…rather than to intervene by imposing particular
distributive outcomes”206. In this model, regulation should focus on establishing processes for
developing regulation through group participation207. In the context of supranational
regulation, including EU harmonization, “transnational standards would seek to promote
diverse, local-level approaches to regulatory problems by creating a space for autonomous
solutions to emerge”208. Different ways have been identified in which EU law can be deemed
204 Recommendation 2009/384 EC and Recommendation 2009/385/EC.
205 Simon Deakin, Reflexive Governance and European Company Law (Centre for Business Research,
University of Cambridge, Working Paper No. 346, 2007, available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1002678.
206 Simon Deakin, Regulatory Competition versus Harmonisation in European Company Law (Centre for
Business Research, University of Cambridge, Working Paper No. 163, 2000), available at
http://www.cbr.cam.ac.uk/pdf/wp163.pdf.
207 For a typology of reflexive regulation see J. Lenoble & M. Maesschalck, Beyond Neo-Institutionalist and
Pragmatist Approaches to Governance (Reflexive Governance in the Public Interest Working Paper Series
REFGOV-SGI/TNU-1), 2006, available at http://iap6.cpdr.ucl.ac.be/docs/TNU/WP-PAI.VI.06-TNU-1.EN.pdf.
208 See Simon Deakin (2000), supra note 206.
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to have adopted a reflexive approach to regulating national legal systems209. For example,
allowing member states the option to apply certain provisions of EU level regulation steers
the regulatory capacity at the national level by limiting the choice of optionality and yet
allowing member states to retain central national structures. Minimum harmonization where
member states can impose national requirements beyond harmonized levels but within the
framework of the EU treaties can be seen in the same light. Soft law regulation based on
recommendation and standards also provide a model for coordination. In the field of corporate
governance, for example, such an approach has been emerging at the EU level in the form of
recommendations issued by the EU Commission on independent directors210 and on the
remuneration of directors211. Other forms aligned with the concept of “reflexive regulation”
include the adoption of harmonized procedural rules setting out the framework for how social
actors shall interact, and harmonized disclosure rules, which allow for the information to be
incorporated in market prices, for example212.
The challenge of reflexive governance is that this approach may, in fact, allow for entrenched
national structures to thrive, and does not necessarily facilitate the development of
supranational regulatory policies. To the extent that reflexive governance promotes processes
for the engagement of social actors it is possible that this would serve to support existing
national regulatory dynamics among affected interest groups. This would allow politically
dominant groups to maintain entrenched positions and status quo. It has been noted, in this
regard, that the implementation of the Takeover Directive, for example, may have resulted in
a less takeover-friendly environment than earlier in some jurisdictions213. A reflexive
governance –approach may provide avenues to explore regulatory alternatives in areas with
considerable institutional differences among affected jurisdictions. It does not, however, seem
to provide adequate tools for efficiently pursuing specific EU level policies at the national
level.
The study now turns to considering the design of legal strategies at the EU level with respect
to dealing with control transactions and concentrated ownership. I will consider the kind of
legal strategies that address the relevant agency concerns, but will also take into consideration
the special characteristics of EU regulation discussed above.
D. DEVELOPING ENHANCED STRATEGIES FOR EUCORPORATE GOVERNANCE REGULATION
The adoption of supranational regulation will pose challenges in cases where the relevant
institutional environment differs across the affected jurisdictions. As EU level regulation in
many respects relies on national enforcement mechanisms, there is also a risk that regulation
will be both interpreted and enforced in different ways across the EU. These characteristics,
among other, need to be taken into account when choosing legal strategies at the EU level.
209 SeeMichael Dougan, Vive la Différence: Exploring the Legal Framework for Reflexive Harmonization within
the Single European Market, in ANNUAL REVIEW OF GERMAN AND EUROPEAN LAWVOLUME 1, 113- 165
(Russell Miller & Peer Zumbansen, eds., 2003).
210 Commission Recommendation of 15 February 2005 on the Role of Non-executive or Supervisory Directors of
Listed Companies and on the Committees of the (Supervisory) Board (2005/162/EC), O.J. L 52/51.
211 Commission Recommendation of 14 December 2004 Fostering an Appropriate Regime for the Remuneration
of Directors of Listed Companies (2004/913/EC), O.J. L 385/55.
212 Johnston (2009), supra note 9, at 240-242.
213 Armour & Ringe (2011), supra note 1, at 39; see also Paul Davies, Edmund-Philippe Schuster & Emilie Van
de Walle de Ghelcke, The Takeover Directive as a Protectionist Tool? (ECGI Law Working Paper 141, 2010),
available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1554616.
251
Below, we shall discuss some of the characteristics of a supranational environment in the
context of choosing legal strategies for supranational regulatory intervention.
Regulatory Initiatives and Institutional Path Dependence
It has been noted that it has been easier to introduce EU regulation in areas where national
level institutions have not developed. There is less resistance in introducing new regulation
when there are no national level structures or interest groups that are immediately challenged.
It has been argued that there has been less resistance to the introduction of EU level financial
services regulation, for example, as many EU member states did not have developed or active
markets and have few national structures to defend214. However, distinct company law and
corporate governance systems have developed at the national level in the EU member states,
and introducing change will meet political resistance. Legal responses to such resistance
include the opt-in and opt-out systems, as has been discussed. However, other corresponding
measures include grandfathering and dual regulatory systems, for example. These allow
existing structures to be retained, while preventing such structures to be created after the
adoption of the new regulation.
Enforcement - the Effects of Regulation
There has been concern that the implementation of EU corporate regulation has not been
uniform and that the enforcement of EU regulations has varied significantly among the
member states215. These concerns also need to be taken into account in the design of
regulatory mechanisms. Enforcement issues are not unique to supranational regulation, but
need to be considered in the design of legal strategies in general. However, the variation of
enforcement at the local level does add to the complexity of EU level regulation. In this
respect, the EU cannot readily rely of the efficiency of national enforcement mechanisms for
the purposes of harmonization. The EU does provide a framework for monitoring
enforcement in the form of its own court system. The precedents of the ECJ in the field of
corporate law have provided an important basis for interpreting EU level corporate regulation,
and have had a considerable effect on the development of EU corporate law. However,
corporate matters are still dealt with by national court systems with varying expertise through
the European Union. In fact, Gilson and Schwartz have argued that matters relating to the
relationship between majority and minority shareholders, for example, be directly taken up
with a European level corporate court216. The initiative may well be applauded, and the
English courts with experience from corporate matters (mainly in London), for example,
could well provide a basis for developing a European wide corporate court system. However,
such court systems are not currently available. Moreover, as legal processes are time
consuming and financial interests may be great and matters urgent, the court framework
leaves much to be desired. Also, reliance on courts may require that aggrieved parties are
appropriately incentivized to use the courts (or at least that there are no significant
disincentives to do so). Typically potential plaintiff minority shareholders, for example, will
face coordination problems in having only a limited financial interest proportional to their
level of shareholding while carrying the full risk of legal costs for the dispute at hand.
214 Armour & Ringe (2011), supra note 1, at 27.
215 See Enriques & Gatti (2009), supra note 4.
216 See Ronald Gilson & Alan Schwartz, Constraints on Private Benefits of Control: Ex Ante Control
Mechanisms versus Ex Post Transaction Review, 169 JITE 160 (2012).
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Enhanced Legal Strategies
The discussion above suggests that there are several factors to consider in designing new EU
level corporate governance regulation. Below, this chapter provides a brief summary of these
factors.
The legislative design process should start with the analysis of the appropriate legal strategy
based on the ability of different constituencies to overcome coordination problems. To the
extent that regulation is introduced to enhance the interests of minority shareholders, for
example, regulatory strategies should be applied (instead of governance strategies). The
analysis would then turn to whether instruments applied ex ante (rules) or ex post (standards)
would be more appropriate. The choice would depend on, among other, how the regulation
can be enforced. At this point the special characteristics of EU level regulation must be taken
into account. Ex ante legal strategies that target a specific form of ownership or governance
may be counterproductive especially in the EU context. Gilson & Schwartz argue, for
example, that an efficient ex post legal strategy is superior to ex ante regulatory strategies that
would impede the use of legal solutions that may be efficient in different markets217.
However, at the EU level it needs to be taken into account that the nature and quality of legal
systems and institutions varies across the jurisdictions. The EU legislators have to consider
that corporate governance matters will be subject to adjudication in very different legal
systems by very different legal institutions. Moreover, as discussed, minority shareholders
may lack sufficient incentives to enforce their rights independently. However, even in these
circumstances it may be possible to increase the effectiveness of legal standards by regulating
the premises for legal adjudication. The enforcement of standards could be enhanced by
setting special criteria, such as an “entire fairness” standard or by using rebuttable
assumptions with regard to related party transactions. Changing the burden of proof in this
way may affect how standards can be enforced. The use of certain governance strategies could
be facilitated in the same way.
The next step of the design process would incorporate considerations related to institutional
differences and differences in the political economy. The background for issuing principles-
based directives at the EU level has been to allow member states to implement the directives
in ways that fit the characteristics of the national legal system, for example. In the Takeover
Directive, member states were allowed to elect whether to implement some of the more
controversial provisions – the neutrality rule and the break-through rule (opt-in/opt-out). The
directive also allowed member states latitude as to the relevant threshold for triggering
squeeze out rights and obligations. The optionality provided for in the Takeover Directive was
an ad hoc compromise to resolve a political gridlock, but may not be a failed mechanism as
such. However, the optionality provided in the Takeover Directive may not have been
sufficiently detailed. The case can be made for introducing functionally equivalent rules
where policy goals are set and pursued through a variety of legal strategies and regulatory
mechanisms tailored for different environments and governance systems. In designing EU
level regulation it may be important to look to the underlying regulatory concerns rather than
formal corporate governance structures and to find legal strategies that best address the
relevant regulatory concern in the given institutional context. Instead of opt-in and opt-out
mechanisms it could be contemplated that EU directives provide for a limited menu of
regulatory choices, or the directives can provide for different rules to be applied in different
217 Id.
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contexts, for example. Also, the standards based strategies discussed above allow for an ex
post assessment of agent behavior and may provide an instrument that is not dependent on
formal governance structures. In this way, similar policy goals can be pursued through the EU
while allowing for solutions adapted to specific governance models to be applied at the
national level. It has also been proposed that optionality would be introduced at the level of
individual companies with respect to takeover regulation, for example218.
As discussed, regulation must not only be better adapted to the institutional environment; it
must also be politically feasible to introduce the relevant regulation. An important aspect in
this regard is how the regulation affects the interests of politically dominant constituencies.
These constituencies are likely to be less opposed to new initiatives that do not directly
challenge their position. A factor that affects the choice of legal strategies and regulatory
design is how regulation can avoid challenging the key parameters of existing governance
systems. Concentrated ownership systems may rely on monitoring by controlling
shareholders, who also seek to defend their control positions. This also suggests that ex ante
rulemaking restricting specific forms of governance might face significant political
opposition. Instead, for example, general standards addressing the potential abuse of agency
relationships within a given governance system might be more appropriate. Controlling
shareholders are likely to be more opposed to regulation directly challenging their control
than they would be to standards restricting abuse of that control.
In addition to regulatory design, the legislator may consider alternative regulatory measures
(i.e. grandfathering, regulatory dualism or other soft law measures). Also, instead of allowing
for national level opt-outs, the EU legislator could introduce limited menus of regulatory
alternatives. These alternatives could be applied either at the national level or even at the level
of individual companies.
Finally, there is only a limited scope of regulatory instruments available at the EU level,
including regulations, directives and recommendations. However, the EU can also use less
formal measures, including green papers or studies, to analyse and increase transparency with
respect to corporate governance in the EU member states. Such initiatives can increase the
salience of the concerns raised by the EU Commission and allow market participants to
compare practices in the member states.
The chart below presents a summary of considerations related to choice of legal strategies and
regulatory mechanisms.
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V. DESIGNING EUCORPORATE GOVERNANCE REGULATION
Recent EU corporate governance initiatives have originated, in part, from the reactions to the
global financial crisis. They have been preceded by experts’ reports and hearings, which have
then resulted in green papers allowing for interested parties to comment on different
alternatives for regulatory intervention. However, on many occasions EU level regulatory
proposals are based on experiences and regulatory solutions in specific jurisdictions219.
Sufficient attention has not always been given to how those mechanisms are adapted to the
varied environments throughout the EU member states. Political opposition to such proposals
has also strengthened to the extent that the proposals have challenged key parameters of the
relevant corporate governance systems.
In preparing policy and in introducing regulation to implement such policy it is important to
understand the overall policy environment and the conditions and the institutional
arrangements affecting the policy area220. It is also important to identify the relevant actors
and interest groups and the situations where policies will be applied. Finally, the patterns of
interaction and the information available to relevant actors should be fully understood. These
preconditions have been recognized in institutional analysis and, in fact, efforts have been
made to develop qualitative models for the design of policy, where the above factors have
219 See, inter alia, Johnston (2009), supra note 9, at 247 and 266.
220 ELINOR OSTROM, UNDERSTANDING INSTITUTIONAL DIVERSITY, 7-15 (2005).
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been identified as the basic elements for analysis221. The framework allows for policy design
that recognizes the institutional environment and may help in adapting regulatory intervention
to this environment. From this perspective, this chapter seeks to summarize matters related to
the policy environment to be considered in choosing legal strategies and regulatory designs
with respect to EU level corporate governance regulation. For the purposes of this study, it is
particularly interesting and important to consider the factors that are characteristic to the
dynamics of policy in the context of the EU. Identifying and analyzing these factors are also
essential in work towards developing a qualitative model of EU policy design.
The Policy Environment
As discussed, the corporate governance policy area in the EU remains varied with different
corporate ownership structures and corporate governance systems (with complimentary
institutions). Industrial structures and the dynamics among corporate constituencies differ, as
do the political and legal institutions whereby constituencies coordinate the interests and
enforce their rights. Corporate governance systems have developed over time and reflect local
circumstances and political dynamics; they may also be entrenched.
With respect to EU policy this entails, among other, that EU wide regulation can have
different and unintended effects in different regions. The chosen legal strategies can conflict
with or challenge complementary institutions that have developed in a given corporate
governance system. The legitimacy of a variety of corporate governance models should be
recognized at the EU level. Legal strategies should be adapted to institutional environment to
have desired effects, and that a functional approach to regulatory initiatives should be
emphasized. Different corporate governance models should not be disenfranchised by EU-
wide regulatory mechanisms. The policy goals of regulatory initiatives should be considered
and different regulatory mechanisms should be applied that address the relevant concerns in
different environments. Regulatory designs that challenge or contradict the functions of
complementary institutions that have evolved should be avoided. For example, instead of
directly challenging the position of controlling shareholders (through break-through rules, for
example, or extensive veto rights for minority shareholders), increased transparency or legal
standards can be considered instead. The chosen mechanism should address the potential for
abuse in the relevant corporate environment.
The competitiveness of EU listed companies remains a concern with increased globalization
and alternative means of corporate financing (including private equity). As economic
interaction and cross-border investment among member states increases, the need for
coordination is ever more important. An important aspect with respect to corporate
governance regulation is the adaptability of corporate enterprise to changing circumstances.
Corporate governance is easily entrenched and regulatory means may be required to address
this concern.
Actors and Interest Groups
The key actors in the policy area include the core corporate constituencies; i.e. shareholders,
management and employees. Other providers of corporate financing, mainly banks and other
lending institutions, are also likely to participate in the “market for regulation” with regard to
corporate governance regulation. Key actors also include politically elected officials, who
221 Id.; see also Elinor Ostrom, Background on the Institutional Analysis and Development Framework, 39
POLICY STUDIES J. 7 (2011).
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may need to promote corporate governance agendas that have a high political salience. The
relevant interest groups are not homogenous, however. For example, controlling shareholders
(i.e. corporate “insiders”) are often seen to represent clearly different policy agendas than do
institutional investors and retail investors (i.e. corporate “outsiders”). The interests of labor
are also diverged in a varied political economy such as the EU with different industrial
structures and different pension systems. The dynamic is also affected by regional differences
in corporate governance systems. To the extent that proposals challenge regionally prevalent
corporate governance models this will likely result in regional alliances trying to block the
proposal in the legislative process (both in the Council and in the EU Parliament). These
factors can create further cleavages among interest groups.
For the purposes of policy-making it is important to understand the type of politics involved
with respect to the regulatory initiatives at hand – i.e. whether they are driven by small
interest groups against each other (management vs. controlling shareholders), whether interest
groups are seeking to promote their own interests (client politics) or prevent initiatives to
promote the interests of dispersed groups such as minority shareholders (entrepreneurial
politics). Interest group influence can be considerable, and in many cases their concerns have
been legitimate as initiatives have had even confiscatory elements. In developing policy and
regulation the key concerns of key constituents should be identified and regulatory designs
should be chosen that promote the regulatory goals but that do not undermine the basis of
different governance systems thereby decreasing political resistance. If necessary, alternative
regulatory measures should be considered, such as grandfathering, soft law, partial
harmonization, recommendations, or increased transparency. Issues driven by political
salience should be identified as such; the effects of high salience policies on the premises for
business enterprise should be evaluated, and appropriate regulatory measures used that do not
impact competitiveness, such as enhanced transparency. In fact, high-salience matters have
been addressed mainly through increased transparency requirements (such as say-on-pay and
board diversity issues).
The dynamics among key corporate constituencies can be seen to result in both interest group
politics and client politics affecting the dynamics of policy making222. However, corporate
insiders have been argued to have a relatively stronger position with regard to national level
corporate governance regulation, while supranational regulation may provide economies of
scale allowing corporate outsiders (investors) to coordinate actions at the EU level223.
However, the multilevel governance model of the EU is likely to result in no single interest
group being able to monopolize policy and in entrepreneurial policy-making by the EU
Commission remaining important224. For legal strategies this dynamic means that the role of
the Commission as a policy entrepreneur remains important.
Patterns of Interaction
Corporate governance reflects the patterns of interaction among corporate constituencies. As
discussed, corporate governance can be seen as a framework for bargaining among corporate
constituencies with respect to terms and conditions of participation in corporate enterprise.
The patterns of financial contracting are path dependent, and the dynamics of bargaining vary,
resulting in a variety of corporate governance outcomes.
222 Giandomenico Majone, The European Commission as Regulator, in REGULATING EUROPE, supra note 111, at
76-77, and Young (2010), supra note 36, at 51.
223 See Ferrarini & Miller (2009), supra note 8; see also Young (2007), supra note 119, at 384.
224 Majone (1996), supra note 222, at 74-75, and Hix & Hoyland (2011), supra note 12, at 212.
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Understood in the terms above, the field of corporate governance is broad. However, the focal
points of corporate governance regulation relate to decision and cash-flow rights related to
corporate enterprise – mainly in relation to the organization of and actions of the board of
directors, general meetings of shareholders, as well as with respect to different types of
related party transactions and transparency requirements of investors. The dynamics of
decision making in corporations vary depending on the relevant corporate environment. As
discussed, one of the key issues in this regard is related to the structure of corporate
ownership. The relevant patterns of interaction among the corporate constituencies vary
accordingly. For the purposes of choosing appropriate legal strategies, this means that it is
vital to understand the relevant dynamic. Clearly, then, a prerequisite of successful EU level
corporate governance regulation is a thorough understanding of patterns of interaction in
different corporate governance systems in the EU.
EU Institutional Factors
The role and structure of the EU by itself includes factors that affect the dynamic of policy
making and the effectiveness of EU regulation. As discussed the EU has resulted in a
multilevel system of governance, where the authority of the EU and the regulatory dynamic
vary depending on the policy area in question. This dynamic evolves and has not reached any
equilibrium225.
The legal system of the EU does give EU level regulations a strong position vis-à-vis the EU
member states. However, the EU largely relies on member states for enforcing its rules and
the quality of the relevant legal institutions may vary considerably through the EU. Therefore,
it may not always be advantageous to introduce legal strategies reliant on enforcement
through the courts, for example (i.e. standards-based strategies, for example).
The institutional structures of the EU have considerable impact on policy-making. The ability
to set policy agendas and to introduce regulation provides for entrepreneurial authority for the
EU Commission, albeit within institutional limitations defined by the dynamics of the EU
Council and the EU Parliament. Regulatory initiatives must be politically feasible and so
identifying potential political alliances is vital in order to pursue regulatory initiatives
successfully. Alliances can be based on regional cleavages or on traditional political cleavages
and can vary depending on the proposed regulatory actions. These are ordinary workings of
politics. The Commission can use its agenda setting authority to form regulatory packages
designed to maximize political support and to minimize resistance. However, it is not clear
that regulatory design is sufficiently used as an element in working through these political
dynamics. In this context regulatory initiatives can be adapted based on the political dynamic
by choosing regulatory mechanisms that do not unnecessarily confront key concerns of
interest groups. This should decrease political resistance and allow for the pursuit of policy
goals.
A related aspect is the variety of regulatory mechanisms available at the EU level, i.e.
directives, regulations and recommendations, as well as adaptive measures including
optionality, grandfathering, dual-regimes, and soft-law approaches.




The policy environment and the interactions therein can be evaluated from different
perspectives, both internal and external, including economic efficiency, redistributive effects
and accountability, for example226. Importantly, the framework approach allows an analysis of
how these different aspects are affected in relative terms by the different elements described
above. This results in more transparency in legislative processes.
The summary above is mainly intended to demonstrate some of the underlying elements of
the dynamics of EU corporate governance regulation. However, in this regard the summary
also represents basic elements of a qualitative model for policy making and regulatory design
with respect to EU corporate governance regulation – with an emphasis on regulatory design.
The study recognizes that corporate governance regulation may not be directly comparable to
many other policy programs. The assets subject to regulation include decision making rights
to corporate enterprise rather than public goods. Nevertheless, the political and legislative
dynamic has similar aspects. Developing such a model may provide better tools for both
understanding EU regulation and for developing legal strategies at the EU level. The different
elements are summarized in the annex hereto.
VI. CONCLUSIONS
As economic interaction across the EU has increased, so has the significance of EU level
corporate governance regulation227. In fact, European corporate law has faced a revival228 and
the EU will likely continue be a significant source of corporate regulation, as the corporate
environment becomes increasingly international. Understanding the dynamics of EU
regulation and developing the EU approach to corporate governance regulation thus remain
important ventures.
It is clear that supranational regulatory intervention is far more challenging than regulation at
the national level. The variety and scale of economic and political environments increases
significantly, raising the complexity of designing, introducing and executing policy. Also, the
shift from established national governance systems to regulation through new supranational
institutions with an evolving political dynamic will naturally raise complex challenges in
itself. The institutions of the EU, for example, are relatively young compared to those at the
national level, and the political dynamics of the EU is evolving. Much work is required to
develop policy-making and regulation in this environment.
In these circumstances it is important to develop tools for analysing and improving EU
policy-making. A precondition for this is a better understanding of the underlying political
dynamics. This study has emphasised the notion that law and politics cannot be studied
independently of each other if the goal is to properly understand the dynamics of legislation
and legislative processes229. The dynamics of supranational regulation, and the effects of the
institutional structure of the EU, must also be taken into account when considering the
development of EU corporate governance regulation and appropriate legal strategies. The
study has outlined the sphere of bargaining with respect to corporate governance regulation at
226 Ostrom (2011), supra note 221, at 15-17.
227 See Hopt (2015), supra note 1.
228 Id. at 55.
229 ANNAHYVÄRINEN, SUOMENMAHDOLLISUUDET VAIKUTTAA EUROOPAN UNIONIN
LAINSÄÄDÄNTÖMENETTELYYN [FINLAND’S POSSIBILITIES TO EXERT INFLUENCE IN EU-LAWMAKING] 7 (2015).
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the EU level, and then analysed how the “market for regulation” functions at the EU level
with respect to corporate governance regulation. The study has also made a contribution
towards the development of a qualitative framework for analysing and developing EU
corporate governance policy and regulation.
The qualitative model recognizes the importance of adapting legal strategies and the design of
regulatory instruments to the relevant institutional environment. The model emphasizes the
need to recognize the requirements of the variety of environments through the EU in EU level
policy design. Importantly, however, the model also emphasizes the political aspects of
policy-making. The dynamics of the legislative processes must also be brought into the model
of policy-making so that the effects of institutional structures and politics are more
transparent. It is also possible to design regulatory instruments and to choose legal strategies
to decrease political resistance. If strategies and designs are developed so that they are better
adapted to institutional differences it is possible to decrease, to some extent, unnecessary
political resistance without compromising policy goals.
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ANNEX
AQUALITATIVE FRAMEWORK FOR DEVELOPING EUCORPORATE GOVERNANCE REGULATION
EU Corporate Governance Regulation
Framework Elements Considerations for Legal Strategies
Policy Environment
- Varied corporate environment (structure of
ownership, type of prevalent shareholders)
- Varied institutional environment (including industrial
structures, dynamic among key actors, quality of legal
institutions)
- Organizational matters may have considerable
economic consequences (adaptability to change,
competitiveness)
- Increasing economic interaction among different
systems
- Legal strategies to be adapted to institutional
environment for desired effect
Actors
- Shareholders (controlling shareholders/entrepreneurs,
institutional investors, retail investors),
management/entrepreneurs, employees (with political
cleavages among employee interest groups),
politicians
- Identify key concerns of different actors in the policy
arena
- Identify cleavages within interest groups
Interaction and Main regulatory avenues
- Interaction through the corporate governance
framework (defined by the terns of financial
contracting in a given institutional environment)
- Focal points include board of directors, general
meetings, related party transactions, transparency, tax
laws, insolvency laws, external governance regulation
(in high salience matters including board diversity,
social responsibility, environmental issues)
- Corporate governance must be understood broadly
and relevant avenues used for regulatory intervention
(including insolvency and tax laws)
- Identify drivers for regulatory initiatives (i.e. interest
group politics, entrepreneurial politics, high-salience
matters)
Institutional aspects
- Multilevel governance model defines policy
environment
- Limited scope of available regulatory instruments
and enforcement mechanisms
- EU institutional dynamic (Commission, Council,
Parliament)
- Identify expected political alliances in advance
- Reflect key concerns in regulatory design
- Apply alternative mechanisms, and enhanced legal
strategies where needed
Resulting evaluative criteria




- Clarify regulatory goals
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CHAPTER 7
THE EUTAKEOVER DIRECTIVE UNDER REVIEW: DEVELOPING LEGAL STRATEGIES FOR
CONCENTRATED OWNERSHIP
The EU Takeover Directive was introduced after a particularly long and convoluted
legislative process. The controversies surrounding the directive reflected the significant
differences in the ownership and governance systems of listed companies in the EU member
states. The directive and the underlying legislative process provide insights into the dynamics
of EU corporate governance regulation.
While the Takeover Directive has contributed to the harmonization of processes related to
takeover bids across the EU, the directive has been criticized for inadequately addressing
regulatory concerns related to concentrated ownership, and for not contributing to the
development of a European market for corporate control. It has been argued that instead of
facilitating takeovers, the mechanisms introduced in the directive may, in fact, have resulted
in further shareholder entrenchment. The EU Commission has also reported that certain
provisions of the directive addressing corporate control, such as mandatory bids and acting
in concert, still raise some regulatory concerns. It may therefore be relevant to revisit the
regulatory mechanisms used in the Takeover Directive.
This chapter argues that key provisions of the Takeover Directive were not adapted to an
environment of concentrated ownership and introduces alternative regulatory proposals in
this regard. The chapter also analyses legal strategies appropriate for EU level corporate
governance regulation more generally. In this regard the chapter serves as a case study for
the application of qualitative models for developing legal strategies at the EU level.
I. INTRODUCTION
Initiatives to harmonize corporate governance regulation at the level of the European Union1
have been subject to much criticism over the years.2 It has proved challenging to introduce
EU-level regulatory models that take into account national differences in corporate
governance systems. The effects of EU-level regulatory intervention may differ significantly
among the member states, depending on the institutional environment. One of the key factors
1 Regulation issued by the organs of the European Union is referred to hereinafter as EU regulation.
2 See John Armour, Who Should Make Corporate Law? EC Legislation versus Regulatory Competition (ECGI -
Law Working Paper No. 54, 2005), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=860444 or
http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.860444; John Armour & Wolf-Georg Ringe, European Company Law 1999-2010:
Renaissance and Crisis (ECGI – Law Working Paper No. 175/2011, Oxford Legal Studies Research Paper No.
63/2010), available at ttp://ssrn.com/abstract=1691688 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1691688; Luca
Enriques, Company Law Harmonization Reconsidered: What Role for the EC (ECGI Law Working Paper No
53/2005), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=850005; Luca Enriques & Matteo Gatti, The Uneasy Case for
Top-down Company Law Harmonization in the European Union, 27:4 U. PA. J. INT’L ECON. L., 939-998 (2006),
Gerard Hertig & Joseph A. McCahery, Company and Takeover Law Reforms in Europe: Misguided
Harmonization Efforts or Regulatory Competition? (ECGI Law Working Paper No 12/2003), available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=438431.
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in this regard has been the varying structure of corporate ownership in the EU. For example,
corporate governance solutions adapted to dispersed ownership may be ineffective in
companies with concentrated ownership, where the controlling shareholder may in effect be
able to unilaterally control the business of the corporation. This was also noted in connection
with the adoption of the EU directive on takeovers (the “Takeover Directive”).3 The Takeover
Directive was adopted in 2004 after a long legislative process subject to intense political
pressure and compromise. 4 The controversies surrounding the directive reflected the
significant differences in the ownership and governance systems of listed companies in the
EU member states. 5 The political process that preceded the adoption of the Takeover
Directive was particularly convoluted and provides insights into how interested constituencies
pursue their interests through the EU political framework.6
While the Takeover Directive has contributed to the harmonization of processes related to
takeover bids across the EU, the directive has been criticized for inadequately addressing
regulatory concerns related to concentrated ownership, and for not contributing to the
development of a European market for corporate control.7 It has been argued that instead of
facilitating takeovers, the mechanisms introduced in the directive may, in fact, result in
further shareholder entrenchment in the context of concentrated ownership.8 It may therefore
be relevant to revisit the regulatory mechanisms used in the Takeover Directive. Recently,
there has also been an emerging interest in the role of large shareholders in corporate
governance,9 making it salient to consider corporate regulation in the context of concentrated
ownership.
EU Legal Strategies
This study assesses legal strategies used in regulating takeovers at the EU level in light of the
varying structures of corporate ownership within the EU – and specifically in relation to
concentrated ownership. The form and design of legal intervention are key factors for the
efficient enforcement of policy. Strategies can vary from specific rules or standards to
3 Directive 25/2004/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 21 April 2004 on Takeover Bids, 2004
O.J. (L142) [hereinafter Takeover Directive].
4 See Report of the High Level Group of Company Law Experts on Issues Related to Takeover Bids, Brussels,
January 10, 2002, available at http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/company/docs/takeoverbids/2002-01-hlg-
report_en.pdf [hereinafter High Level Group Report]; see also Ben Clift, The Second Time as Farce? The EU
takeover Directive, the Clash of Capitalisms and the Hamstrung Harmonization of European (and French)
Corporate Governance, 47 JCMS 55, 62-266 (2009), and ANDREW JOHNSTON, EC REGULATION OF CORPORATE
GOVERNANCE, 268-280 (2009).
5 Ownership in listed companies in the UK is typically widely dispersed with a strong institutional shareholder
base. In Continental Europe, on the other hand, listed companies may have a single large shareholder or
shareholder block with a controlling position. Controlling shareholders tend to be families, other corporations or
governments rather than institutional shareholders. See Rafael La Porta, Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes & Andrei
Shleifer, Corporate Ownership Around the World, 54 J. FIN. 471, 491-93 (1999) [hereinafter La Porta et. al.
(1999)].
6 See Rolf Skog, The Takeover Directive – an Endless Saga?, 13 EUR. BUS. L REV. 301 (2002).
7 See Thomas Papadopoulos, The Mandatory Provisions of the EU Takeover Bid Directive and Their
Deficiencies, 1 LFMR 525 (2007).
8 See John C. Coates IV, Ownership, Takeovers and EU Law: How Contestable Should EU Corporations Be?
(ECGI Law Working Paper No. 11, 2003), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=424720.
9 Report of the Reflection Group on the Future of EU Company Law (April 5, 2011), available at
http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/company/docs/modern/reflectiongroup_report_en.pdf [hereinafter Reflection
Group Report (2012)], and EU Commission Green Paper, The EU Corporate Governance Framework
COM(2011) 164 final (April 5, 2011) [hereinafter Corporate Governance Green Paper].
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regulatory frameworks based on contractual arrangements. The enforcement of legal
strategies can be based on private actions (court systems) or on public authorities, such as
regulatory agencies. Different legal strategies may be required to ensure that legal
intervention has the desired effect in different institutional environments. For example, the
enforcement of certain legal strategies may depend on the quality of available court systems.
Legal strategies are also likely to vary according to the applicable institutional environment to
reflect the concerns and interests of dominant constituencies.
Legal strategies for addressing corporate governance relationships have been analysed in the
corporate governance literature from the vantage point of national systems of corporate
governance.10 Legal intervention based on prescriptive rules and standards, often combined
with disclosure obligations, is generally associated with efficient enforcement institutions,
such as independent agencies and effective court systems. This type of intervention based on
regulatory strategies may be called for when the affected constituencies are precluded from
efficiently coordinating monitoring themselves – as is the case with shareholders in markets
with a prevalence of dispersed ownership, for example. Other strategies based on the ability
of the principals to exercise monitoring functions independently may be associated with less
formal enforcement institutions. However, developing legal strategies in a supranational
framework such as the EU creates special challenges, as the institutional environment varies
across the affected jurisdictions. Where one strategy may be appropriate in some EU member
states due to the structure of corporate ownership, another strategy may be called for in
jurisdictions with a different corporate environment. The effects of EU-level regulation differ
between member states depending on the relevant market structures and the broader
institutional environment. In some cases the effects of EU regulation have been contradictory
to its stated goals. This highlights the importance of the design of EU regulation and the
choice of regulatory mechanisms, which may need to be tailored to different institutional
environments.
Moreover, the EU’s political institutions and the legislative processes for introducing EU
regulation pose their own challenges for pursuing regulatory change at the EU level.
Regulatory responses are the result of political processes and the efforts of affected
constituencies pursuing their interest through the regulatory framework. In this respect, the
study recognizes that corporate law is likely to reflect the institutional power of dominant
corporate constituencies.11 However, the EU framework has added considerable complexity to
the political dynamic of regulatory development. The EU legislative process has its own
characteristics with respect to interest group input and the political dynamics of the legislative
process.12 The EU’s political institutions provide an alternative and additional framework to
national institutions with respect to interest group input and the market for regulation, as
understood in economic theories of regulation. The agendas and alliances of affected
constituencies and interest groups may differ across the EU, creating a challenging political
dynamic which must be taken into account when considering feasible strategies for EU-level
regulatory intervention.
10 John Armour, Henry Hansmann & Reinier Kraakman, Agency Problems and Legal Strategies, in REINIER
KRAAKMAN ET AL., THE ANATOMY OF CORPORATE LAW 35, 52 (2ND ED., 2009).
11John Armour, Henry Hansmann & Reinier Kraakman, What is Corporate Law?, in Kraakman et al. (2009),
supra note 10, at 32.
12 See Helen Callaghan, How Multilevel Governance Affects the Clash of Capitalisms (MPIfG Discussion Paper
08/5), available at http://www.mpifg.de/pu/mpifg_dp/dp08-5.pdf.
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In summary, at the EU level it is not sufficient to address specific policy concerns within a
given institutional setting. In fact, developing EU-level legal strategies poses at least two
challenges missing from regulatory intervention at the national level. First, the effects of EU-
level regulation vary depending on the institutional environment in different member states
and, second, the political processes related to the enactment of EU regulation create a
multilevel governance framework that affects how interest groups can best promote their
agendas through regulatory intervention. These factors must also be taken into account when
considering the development of EU corporate governance regulation and different
mechanisms for regulating control transactions.
Concentrated Ownership and Takeover Regulation in the EU
Below, this study discusses the different factors affecting EU legal strategies for regulating
control transactions. It considers the effect of the varying institutional landscape of corporate
ownership, and specifically how concentrated ownership is a key characteristic to be taken
into account when considering the choice of legal strategy and the effects of possible
regulatory intervention.
Concentrated ownership and control enhancing mechanisms remain important features among
publicly traded corporations in the EU.13 These features raise specific regulatory concerns
regarding the relationship between controlling and minority shareholders as well as the
efficiency of corporate monitoring mechanisms.14 However, while concentrated ownership
and control enhancing mechanisms remain common features in the EU, after years of market
integration it is still unclear whether they have been sufficiently taken into account in EU
corporate governance and takeover regulation15. At the EU level there has also been concern
that concentrated ownership and control enhancing mechanisms are, in themselves, an
impediment to the development of active capital markets in the EU16 and consequently even
to economic growth.17 The nature of EU initiatives suggests that concentrated ownership and
control enhancing mechanisms have, to some extent, been deemed problematic per se, and
that these structures are thus to be discouraged through regulatory intervention.18 However,
empirical studies have not established that concentrated ownership is by nature an inefficient
13 See Mara Faccio & Larry H.P. Lang, The Ultimate Ownership of Western European Corporations, 65 JFE 365,
(2002) [hereinafter Faccio & Lang (2002)]; see also Shearman & Sterling, Proportionality Between Ownership
and Control in EU Listed Companies (External Study Commissioned by the European Commission, May 18,
2007, Open Call for Tender No MARKT/2006/15/F), available at
ec.europa.eu/internal_market/company/docs/shareholders/study/final_report_en.pdf [hereinafter EU
Proportionality Report].
14 See Lucian A. Bebchuk, Reinier Kraakman & George Triantis, Stock Pyramids, Cross-Ownership and Dual
Class Equity: The Creation and Agency Costs of Separating Control from Cash Flow Rights 12 (Harvard Law
School John M. Olin Center for Law, Economics and Business Discussion Paper Series 249, 1999), available at
http://lsr.nellco.org/harvard_olin/249: “The CMS [controlling minority structure] lacks the principal mechanisms
that limit agency costs in other ownership structures. Unlike the DO [dispersed ownership] structures, where
controlling management may have little equity but can be displaced, the controllers of CMS companies face
neither proxy contents nor hostile takeovers.”
15 See Gerard Hertig & Joseph McCahery, Joseph A., Company and Takeover Law Reforms in Europe:
Misguided Harmonization Efforts or Regulatory Competition? (ECGI Law Working Paper No. 12/2003),
available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=438431.
16 See High Level Group Report, supra note 4.
17 Rafael La Porta, Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes, Andrei Schleifer & Robert Vishny, Investor Protection and
Corporate Governance, 58 JSE, 3-27 (2000) [hereinafter La Porta et al. (2000)].
18 See Erik Berglöf, & Mark Burkart, European Takeover Regulation, 18 ECON. POLICY 171 (2003), available at
http://www.jstor.org/stable/1344656.
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form of corporate ownership or that control enhancing structures necessarily provide an
impediment to the development of a market for corporate control.19 In fact, empirical studies
in the EU report an association between high levels of corporate performance and ownership
concentration 20 – and there are jurisdictions in the EU that report both high levels of
concentrated ownership and active takeover markets. 21 Nor is it clear that regulatory
intervention by itself would lead to an increase in dispersed ownership22 or indeed that other
forms of corporate ownership would be superior in EU markets. Given the prevalence of
concentrated ownership and the entrenchment of control structures, it would seem more
fruitful to focus on developing regulation that recognizes these features while addressing
related regulatory concerns. Developing appropriate EU-level regulatory responses in this
regard remains a relevant topic of research.
Efforts have been made at the EU level to address issues related to concentrated ownership in
takeover and corporate governance regulation,23 but such initiatives have met with resistance
and their adoption has failed in certain key respects. 24 For instance, the Commission
introduced a break-through rule 25 to address control structures in connection with the
Takeover Directive and separately launched an initiative for a one-share-one-vote policy to be
introduced for publicly traded corporations in the EU. 26 Both initiatives were heavily
contested by affected interest groups and member states.27 Ultimately, implementation of the
break-through rule in the Takeover Directive was not mandatory, and the one-share-one-vote
initiative was shelved before any final regulatory proposals were introduced28. It could be
argued that these legal strategies were poorly chosen, as they provoked such political
resistance. An assessment should thus be made of whether the same policy goals could have
been achieved with other mechanisms of less concern to key constituencies.
It has also been argued that the regulatory mechanisms chosen by the EU Commission to
address issues arising in the context of concentrated ownership and control enhancing
structures are fundamentally flawed.29 In many respects the Takeover Directive transplanted
regulatory solutions from the United Kingdom – with largely a dispersed ownership structure
19 See Harold Demsetz & Kenneth Lehn, The Structure of Corporate Ownership: Causes and Consequences, 93
J. OF POL. ECON. 1155 (1985); Torben Pedersen & Steen Thomsen, Ownership Structure and Value of the
Largest European Firms: The Importance of Owner Identity, 7 J. OF MANAGEMENT AND GOVERNANCE, 27
(2003); Ann-Kristin Achleitner, André Betzer, Marc Goergen & Bastian Hinterramskogler, Private Equity
Acquisition of Continental European Firms - The Impact of Ownership and Control on the Likelihood on Being
Taken Private (Working paper, June 2010) available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1319836.
20 See Pedersen & Thomsen (2003), supra note 19.
21 Most notably this is the case in Sweden. See Jonas Agnblad, Erik Berglöf, Peter Högfeldt & Helena Svancar,
Ownership and Control in Sweden: Strong Owners, Weak Minorities and Social Control, in THE CONTROL OF
CORPORATE EUROPE (Fabrizio Barca & Marco Becht, eds., 2001).
22 See Magnus Henrekson & Ulf Jakobsson, The Swedish Corporate Governance Model: Convergence,
Persistence or Decline?, 20 CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: AN INT´L REV. 212 (2012).
23 See High Level Group Report, supra note 4.
24 See Skog (2002), supra note 6.
25 Takeover Directive, Art.11.
26 See Commission of the European Communities, Impact Assessment of the Proportionality Between Capital
and Control in Listed Companies, Commission Staff Working Document SEC(2007) 1705 (2007), available at
http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/company/docs/shareholders/impact_assessment_122007.pdf.
27 See Skog, supra note 6.
28 Charlie McCreevy, Commissioner, Speech at the European Parliament's Legal Affairs Committee, October 3,
2007, available at http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=SPEECH/07/592.
29 See Paul Davies, Edmund-Philipp Schuster & Emilie van der Walle de Ghelcke, The Takeover Directive as a
Protectionist Tool? (ECGI Law Working Paper No. 141/2010), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1554616.
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and active takeover markets – to EU member states largely dominated by an environment of
concentrated corporate ownership.30 In this respect, regulation has not been tailored to the
broader national institutional environment in most member states, and the effects of
regulatory intervention can thus be expected to vary considerably. It has been argued, for
example, that “similar regulatory changes may have very different effects within different
corporate governance systems. For example, while in some countries the adoption of a
specific takeover rule may lead toward more dispersed ownership, in others it may further
reinforce the blockholder system.”31 This raises considerable challenges for the development
of legal strategies for EU level regulation.
EU Takeover Regulation and Concentrated Ownership under Review
Developing EU-level regulatory approaches and mechanisms remains important, as EU
harmonization efforts continue to affect the regulatory landscape and initiatives to harmonize
EU corporate governance regulation are regularly subject to criticism.32 It has been argued
that EU efforts to provide a harmonized regulatory framework have resulted in ineffective
regulation due both to the significant differences in ownership structure and governance
systems that prevail among the member states, as well as to the characteristics of the political
processes by which EU regulation is adopted. For example, some critics have questioned
whether EU harmonization initiatives have actually been able to identify the market failures
that member states have been unable or unwilling to regulate and whether they have provided
superior uniform regulatory outcomes.33 For example, Enriques argues that the EU has rarely
been unable to correct market failures, instead producing regulation that entrenches the
position of interested constituencies.34 He also notes that in cases where EU initiatives are
justified by the need for market integration, the result more often than not is that any gains
from greater freedom of movement are lost through less flexible rules.35 Other scholars argue
that instead of adopting EU-level regulation in the field of corporate law, regulatory
competition should be encouraged and EU efforts should focus, among others, on providing
sufficient procedural protection for corporate stakeholders with respect to the competitive
process.36 However, scholars recognize that such changes in EU harmonization policy are
unlikely to be introduced for some time.37 Consequently, it remains important to identify
problems related to EU harmonization and seek to develop both the design of EU regulatory
mechanisms and the legislative processes involved in formulating and introducing EU
regulation.
In this study I address the challenges to introducing EU-level regulatory models that take into
account national differences in corporate governance systems. The effects of regulatory
intervention can vary among member states depending on the broader national institutional
environment, and harmonized regulation may not be aligned with the complementarities that
30 Johnston (2009), supra note 4, at 268.
31 Marc Goergen, Marina Martynova & Luc Renneboog, Corporate Governance Convergence: Evidence from
Takeover Regulation 29 (ECGI working paper No. 33/2005), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=709023.
32 Supra note 2.
33 See Enriques, supra note 2.
34 Id. at 8, See also Luca Enriques, EC Company Law Directives and Regulations: How Trivial Are They? (ECGI
Law Working Paper no. 39/2005) available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=730388
35 Enriques, supra note 2, at 9-16.
36 See Armour (2005), supra note 2 and Klaus Heine & Wolfgang Kerber, European Corporate Laws,
Regulatory Competition and Path Dependence, 13 EUR. J. LAW&ECON. 47 (2002).
37 See Enriques, supra note 2, at 22.
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have evolved in each state. These issues are discussed below in the context of how the
Takeover Directive addresses the implications of concentrated ownership for control
transactions. The Commission has issued a comprehensive report on the application of the
Takeover Directive in 2012, suggesting that there are still concerns with respect to certain
matters addressed by the directive38. Interestingly, these relate, in particular, to concentrated
ownership and control (mandatory bids and acting in concert, for example). Moreover,
corporate governance issues related to concentrated ownership in general are of particular
salience, as there has been an emerging interest in the role of large shareholders in corporate
governance.39 Provided regulatory concerns are satisfactorily met, concentrated ownership
may be a competitive structure of corporate ownership, as there have been worries about the
lack of shareholder engagement in publicly traded corporations with dispersed ownership.40
Finally, the role of EU-level corporate governance regulation has again been subject to much
debate and criticism after the introduction of recent regulatory initiatives,41 and consideration
of the challenges and problems specific to EU harmonization in the field of corporate
governance is now timely.
This chapter of the study first provides a brief overview of concentrated ownership and
control enhancing mechanisms in the EU and discusses current explanations for the
prevalence of concentrated ownership (Section II). The study then turns to the corporate
governance implications of concentrated ownership and discusses them in the context of
control transactions (Section III). Next, the chapter discusses the legal strategies that can be
used to address agency problems related to control transactions and concentrated ownership.
The chapter also discusses strategies for addressing path dependence in connection with
supranational regulation (Section IV). The chapter then assesses the EU-level regulatory
responses to change of control and concentrated ownership adopted in the Takeover Directive
(Section V). Building on this discussion, the chapter considers the feasibility of developing
effective corporate governance regulation at the EU level and the possible factors underlying
the current approach to corporate governance regulation in the EU (Section VI).
II. CONCENTRATED OWNERSHIP AND ITS IMPLICATIONS IN THE EU
There has been a long-running debate on the relationship between the structure of corporate
ownership and corporate performance. Traditionally, concentrated ownership has been linked
to poor economic performance and the extraction of private benefits of control by incumbent
controlling shareholders at the cost of other shareholders. In particular, there has been concern
about collusion between controlling shareholders and other corporate constituencies, such as
employees, against the interests of outside shareholders42. The effects of dispersed ownership
have been applauded, and it has been predicted that dispersed ownership with complimentary
governance models will come to dominate over concentrated ownership. Nevertheless,
38 Takeover Directive, art. 20; See Report from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the
European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions, Application of Directive
2004/25/EC on Takeover Bids (June 28, 2012), COM(2012) 347 final, available at
http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/company/docs/takeoverbids/COM2012_347_en.pdf [hereinafter EU
Commission Takeover Directive Report (2012)].
39 Supra note 9.
40 Lynn Dallas, Short-Termism, the Financial Crisis and Corporate Governance, 37 J. CORP. L. 264 (2011).
41 See Corporate Governance Green Paper, supra note 9.
42 SeeMark J. Roe, The Institutions of Corporate Governance, (Harvard Law School John M. Olin Center's
Program on Corporate Governance Discussion Paper 488, 2004), available at
http://www.law.harvard.edu/programs/olin_center/papers/pdf/Roe_488.pdf.
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concentrated ownership remains prevalent in many regions of the EU, and empirical studies
have been inconclusive as to the superiority of any specific structure of ownership. Studies
have in fact found a positive relationship between concentrated ownership and firm
performance.43 However, for the purposes of this study, the more pertinent finding discussed
below is how ownership structures and corporate control are prone to become entrenched,
leading to incumbent structures prevailing even when they have become sub-optimal. For
regulatory purposes, it seems that dealing with the entrenchment of controlling constituencies
is a paramount concern regardless of the structure of ownership.
This section first provides a brief overview of the prevalence of concentrated ownership in
Europe and a short discussion of studies related to the performance of companies with
concentrated ownership. The study then discusses explanations for the persistence of different
structures of corporate ownership, and considers the regulatory implications.
A. BACKGROUND
The prevalence of controlling shareholders
The structure of corporate ownership varies among EU member states. For example, on a
general level, certain key distinctions in ownership models exist between the UK and
continental Europe. Ownership in British listed companies is typically widely dispersed, with
a strong institutional shareholder base.44 In Continental Europe, on the other hand, listed
companies often have a single large shareholder or shareholder block with a controlling stake.
Companies often also have a minority shareholder who while not possessing an absolute
majority still controls a significant block of the shares and votes in the company.45 The level
of ownership concentration in EU member states has decreased somewhat over the past
decade but still remains high in many regions.46
Sample of Publicly Traded European Corporations (data excerpt)47










































Family 64.5% 63.2% 48.3% 76.9% 35.6% 43.5% 43.2%
43 See Pedersen & Thomsen (2003), supra note 19.
44 Faccio & Lang (2002), supra note 13.
45 Marco Becht, Reciprocity in Takeovers (ECGI – Law Working Paper No. 14/2003), available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=463003.
46 Christoph van der Elst, Shareholder Mobility in Five European Countries (ECGI - Law Working Paper
104/2008), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1123108 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1123108.
47 Roberto Barontini & Lorenzo Caprio, The Effect of Family Control on Firm Value and Performance, Evidence
from Continental Europe (ECGI – Finance Working Paper No. 88/2005) available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=675983. The sample consists of publicly listed companies with assets worth more than
EUR 300 million as of the end of 1999 (Worldscope), Financial and regulated utilities are excluded, as are
corporations where the controlling shareholder holds more than 95% of the share capital (i.e., companies only






































Types of controlling owners also differ among the EU member states, where in many
countries families tend to be the prevalent type of controlling shareholder,48 with institutional
investors in a secondary position. It has been reported that in France, Germany and Italy, for
example, close to or over 60 percent of listed firms have a family shareholder with stake of at
least 20 percent.49 State ownership is also a prominent feature in continental Europe. In the
three countries mentioned above, the state held stakes of some 20 percent in between five and
10 percent of companies. The table below demonstrates the types of controlling shareholders
in different EU member states.50
Selected data from Faccio & Lang (2003) on ultimate control of publicly traded










Austria 11.11 52.8 6 15.32 0.00 8.59
Belgium 20.00 51.54 2.31 0.77 12.69
Finland 28.68 48.84 15.76 1.55 0.65
France 14.00 64.82 5.11 3.79 11.37
Germany 10.37 64.62 6.30 3.65 9.07
Ireland 62.32 24.63 1.45 2.17 4.35
Italy 12.98 59.61 10.34 2.88 12.26
Portugal 21.84 60.34 5.75 0.57 4.60
Spain 26.42 55.79 4.11 1.64 11.51
Sweden 39.18 46.94 4.90 0.00 2.86
UK 63.08 23.68 0.08 0.76 8.94
The data presents the percentage of firms by controlling shareholders with at least 20%
stakes
48 Id. at 2.




An important feature in many regions across the EU is the use of control structures that
support the concentration of control in listed companies.51 In these structures, control is
generally separated by different means from cash-flow rights so that certain shareholders are
able to retain a higher degree of control over a company than their relative share of equity
ownership would suggest. The most common control mechanisms in use in the EU include
pyramid structures, multiple share classes, shareholder agreements, as well as voting and
ownership caps. 52
In a pyramid shareholding structure, control in a target company is based on a chain of
controlling ownership in intermediate companies. A shareholder can hold a controlling stake
in one company that, in turn, holds a controlling stake in another company. The chain could
include several companies – all in effect controlled by the same shareholder with a relatively
small initial equity stake. In general, pyramid structures have been observed in markets with
centralized ownership characterized by family controlled companies. Pyramid structures are
more common in Asian countries, but they are also found in some EU countries, such as
France.53
In a structure with multiple share classes, different voting rights are attached to different
classes of shares. By retaining shares of a class with high voting rights, a controlling
shareholder is able to retain control even if the company issues a large number of shares with
low voting rights. In some cases both share classes are traded on the stock exchange, whereas
in others the class with high voting rights remains unlisted. More often than not, the prices for
different share classes do not differ markedly if both are listed. The use of multiple share
classes with different voting rights is a central control mechanism in many EU member states.
It is seldom a dominant feature among listed companies, but it still occurs in a number of
publicly listed companies in many EU member states. For example, the structure is in use in
Germany, Italy, Sweden and other Nordic countries.
In cross-shareholding structures, companies with the same ultimate controlling shareholder
own shares in each other, entrenching the control position of the ultimate controlling
shareholder. For example, cross-shareholdings have been widely used in Germany, where
they were particularly prominent in the post war era in the largest German corporations. The
structure was previously prominent in France in connection with privatisation initiatives in the
1980s. More recently, however, companies have been unwinding their cross-shareholdings,
and they are no longer a central feature of large French companies.54
51 Jeremy Grant & Thomas Kirchmaier: Who Governs? Corporate Ownership and Control Structures in Europe,
(SSRN Working Paper, June 7, 2004), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=555877.
52 See EU Proprtionality Report (2007), supra note 13, at 25.
53 See Stijn Claessens, Simeon Djankov, Joseph P.H. Fan, & Larry H.P. Lang, The Benefits and Costs of Group
Affiliation: The Evidence from East Asia (CEPR Discussion paper 3364, 2002) available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=307426.
54 See Antoin E. Murphy, Corporate Ownership in France: The Importance of History (NBER Working Paper
Series 10716, 2004) available at http://www.nber.org/papers/w10716.pdf?new_window=1.
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The following tables demonstrate the use of different types of control enhancing mechanisms
in a number of EU member states and certain other jurisdictions 55.
Availability of Control Enhancing Mechanisms (by type of mechanism) as percentage of
a pool of sample countries
CEM Available Availability
(by type of mechanism) unclear
Multiple voting right shares 53% -
Non-voting shares 42% -
Non-voting preference shares 84% -
Pyramid structures 100% -
Priority shares 63% 5%
Depositary certificates 32% 11%
Voting right ceiling 58% 11%
Ownership ceiling 42% 16%
Supermajority provisions 89% 11%
Golden shares 42% 5%
Partnerships limited by shares 42% 5%
Cross-shareholdings 100% -
Shareholder agreements 100% -
The following table shows the overall frequency of different control enhancing mechanisms
in a pool of sample countries, and demonstrates that pyramid structures and share-class
structures are the most common mechanisms used.
Frequency of CEMs in Sample Countries
Pyramid structures 27%
Multiple voting right shares 24%
Shareholder agreements 12%
55EU Proportionality Report (2007), supra note 13, at 7, 15 and 25; surveyed states include Belgium, Denmark,
Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, The Netherlands, Poland,
Spain, Sweden, The United Kingdom, as well as non-EU states Australia, Japan and the United States.
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Voting right ceiling 11%








As the data suggest, different control enhancing mechanisms are largely available throughout
the EU member states. It has been argued that control enhancing mechanisms emerge and
develop in economies with a prevalence of concentrated ownership, as they support
governance systems based on this structure of corporate ownership.56 Where the controlling
shareholder is cash-restrained and borrowing money is not a competitive option, the
shareholder may be required to use equity financing. Under such circumstances a control
enhancing mechanism is often employed to ensure that control over key business decisions is
maintained. The variety of available mechanisms suggests that there are means to enhance
control where this is desirable and that it can be very difficult to effectively prevent the use of
such mechanisms through regulatory means alone. In fact, it can been argued that efforts to
target these governance structures in connection with the adoption of the Takeover Directive
have been counterproductive, as will be discussed in more detail below.
Concentrated Ownership and Firm Performance
An important question is whether ownership structure is related to firm performance. There
has been concern that concentrated ownership may correlate negatively with firm
performance, and an intuitive preference for promoting dispersed ownership and
complementary governance models has been noted in international policy initiatives. 57
Several empirical studies have analyzed the correlation between firm performance and
corporate ownership. The findings so far are inconclusive, but it seems that concentrated
ownership as such does not imply inferior performance as such. While concentrated
ownership does correlate with weaker firm performance in certain regions,58 a number of
studies have in fact found a positive correlation between firm performance and concentrated
ownership,59 while others have found a neutral effect.60 With regard to the United States,
56 See Bebchuk, Kraakman & Triantis (2000), supra note 14.
57 See Ronald J. Gilson, Controlling Shareholders and Corporate Governance: Complicating the Comparative
Taxonomy, 119 HARVARD L. REV. 1641 (2006).
58 See Claessens, S, Djankov, S., Fan, J.P.H. and Lang, L.H.P., Disentangling the Incentive and Entrenchment
Effects of Large Shareholdings, 57 J. OF FIN. 2741 (2002).
59 See Pedersen & Thomsen (2003), supra note 19 and Christian Weiss, The Ownership Concentration of Firms:
Three Essays on the Determinants and Effects 133 (Dissertation, European Business School, International
University Schloss Reichanthausen, 2010), available at http://hdl.handlenet/10419/30247.
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studies have failed to demonstrate that companies with concentrated ownership have inferior
performance to those with dispersed ownership;61 instead, the evidence suggests that in the
US concentrated ownership may even enhance corporate performance. Studies regarding
companies in the EU member states report similar findings.62 Empirical studies in the EU also
find that there can be differences in firm performance depending on the type of controlling
shareholder. A correspondence has been reported between companies with corporations or
financial institutions as controlling shareholders and higher firm value. However, when
controlling shareholders are families – especially second or third generation owners – the
positive effect of ownership concentration on firm value is smaller.63
It has been suggested that a key element of performance in companies with concentrated
ownership is the extent to which controlling shareholders extract private benefits of control.
Achleitner, Betzer, Goergen and Hinterramskogler have studied European takeovers through
private equity acquisition over a period of approximately 10 years.64 Their research seeks to
identify the effects of the ownership structure of target companies on acquisitions by private
equity. The assumption is that the dynamics of private-equity-driven acquisitions will turn
private equity buyers away from target companies where high levels of private benefits of
control are extracted. The study makes several hypotheses and suggests, among others, that
the probability of a firm being taken over by a private equity investor decreases when there is
an active, monitoring shareholder.65 The assumption is that a controlling shareholder will be
incentivized to monitor management, resulting in better run companies and less potential
value to be created by a takeover from private equity investors. The study finds evidence
supporting this hypothesis,66 and it makes a further hypothesis that companies with large
shareholders who enjoy private benefits of control are less attractive to private equity
investors.67 The assumption is that the controlling shareholder will require a control premium
to compensate for lost private benefits of control. Especially where such a premium must be
shared by all shareholders, the costs of the acquisition would be too high. The study again
finds support for this hypothesis.68 However, importantly, it distinguishes between different
types of controlling shareholders, finding that it is mainly the effect of family-owned
companies in the data that supports the hypothesis. 69 After adjusting for family-owned
companies, the study found no evidence of controlling shareholders extracting significant
private benefits of control. The study notes that there is no theory on which types of
shareholders are likely to monitor management and/or extract private benefits of control and
hesitates to draw distinctions in this regard.70 Nevertheless, the central finding is that not all
controlling shareholders are equal with respect to their agendas.
The same point is reported by scholars finding a negative relationship between concentrated
ownership and firm value. Cronqvist and Nilsson report on the effects of concentrated
60 See Demsetz & Lehn (1985), supra note 19 and Harold Demsetz & Belen Villalonga, Ownership Structure
and Corporate Performance, 7 J. OF CORP. FIN. 209, 210 (2001).
61 See Demsetz & Villalonga (2001), supra note 60.
62 See Pedersen & Thomsen (2003), supra note 19.
63 Id.
64 Achleitner, Betzer, Goergen & Hinterramskogler (2010), supra note 19.
65 Id. at 6.
66 Id. at 23.
67 Id. at 7.
68 Id. at 27.
69 Id. at 27-30.
70 Id. at 6.
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ownership and control enhancing mechanisms on firm value in Sweden (measured by Tobin’s
q). They find a significant negative correlation between the level of “vote ownership” by
controlling shareholders and firm value. They report that this correspondence is strong with
respect to family-controlled companies, and they also find that families are more prone to
using control enhancing mechanisms. However, Cronqvist and Nilsson suggest that the effect
is not due to expropriation by controlling shareholders. Instead, they claim that the lower
value of these companies is due to weaker returns on assets (ROA) from sub-optimal
investment decisions. This, in turn, can be the result of a large, undiversified shareholder’s
lower appetite for risk and a preference for non-pecuniary private benefits of control.
Interestingly, scholars reporting differing positive relationships between firm value and
ownership concentration also emphasize the different agendas of controlling shareholders.
Pedersen and Thomsen summarize that “[p]otential owners differ in terms of wealth
constraints, competence, preference and non-ownership ties to the firm. This affects the way
they exercise their ownership rights and therefore has important consequences for firm
behavior and performance.”71 In other words, concentrated ownership, in itself, does not
necessarily affect firm performance. Instead, what are relevant are the preferences of the
controlling shareholder. The fact that the effect of concentrated ownership on firm
performance and firm value varies depending on the type of controlling shareholder may
demonstrate that control is not transferred when a particular controlling shareholder no longer
provides efficient monitoring to maximize firm value, thus supporting the argument that
shareholder entrenchment indeed occurs in EU companies with concentrated ownership.72 If
this were not the case, transfers of control should occur when a specific type of shareholder
cannot maximize firm performance and value. This, again, suggests that transfer of control
should be encouraged when a specific controlling shareholder no longer has a positive impact
on firm performance.
B. THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE STRUCTURE OF CORPORATE OWNERSHIP
Several reasons have been given for the prevalence of concentrated ownership in the EU. For
instance, the relationship between ownership structure and the quality of corporate law has
sometimes been emphasized in this context,73 with concentrated ownership being associated
with lower levels of investor protection in corporate law and consequent rent seeking by
controlling shareholders.74 Scholars have suggested that in an environment of low levels of
investor protection, the initial owners of a company run the risk of losing control to other
investors, who may then exploit the company, if they choose to raise public capital through
the issuing of shares.75 The use of control enhancing mechanisms can be similarly explained.
In situations where an initial owner (an entrepreneur, for example) takes a company public,
the owner may retain a controlling position in order to continue to monitor management. As
71 Pedersen & Thomsen (2003), supra note 19, at 50.
72 See Gilson (2006), supra note 57.
73 La Porta et. al. (1999), supra note 5. The findings of the series of studies conducted by the authors have been
subject to some criticism. It is unclear, for example, to what extent the indexes chosen in the study are valid
proxies for investor protection in different jurisdictions. Moreover, the study measures formal compliance rather
than whether the relevant rule is effectively applied, making comparisons between countries less relevant. See
also Lucian A. Bebchuk, A Rent-Protection Theory of Corporate Ownership and Control (National Bureau of
Economic Research Working Paper 7203, July 1999) available at http://www.nber.org/papers/w7203. The
argument is made that in states with inadequate minority protection regulation, investors must seek to protect
their investment by retaining the possibility to exercise direct control.
74 La Porta et. al. (1999), supra note 5 and La Porta et. al. (2000), supra note 17.
75 See Bebchuk (1999), supra note 73.
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the company raises further capital, the owner may introduce instruments with cash flow rights
but with little or no voting rights76 to maintain this position. Typically, these mechanisms
allow a controlling shareholder to exert disproportionate control in relation to his or her
capital input. Such mechanisms have been seen to create incentives for controlling
shareholders to pursue courses of action that are detrimental to other shareholders.77 Bebchuk,
Kraakman & Triantis78 demonstrate that as the level of cash flow rights decreases in relation
to control rights, the controlling shareholder may not be incentivized to pursue opportunities
that maximize corporate wealth, instead choosing courses of action that serve his or her own
purposes.79 For example, controlling shareholders can engage all the company’s assets in a
venture while carrying only very limited financial risks themselves. This avenue of research
suggests, among others, that developing corporate governance regulation and legal institutions
will support a transformation towards dispersed ownership and facilitate the development of
active capital markets.80
In the EU the assumption that concentrated ownership is linked to low levels of investor
protection has nevertheless only proved partly true. Countries with undeveloped investor
protection have certainly been found to have concentrated ownership but so too have other
countries without this feature.81 A number of studies report, for example, that concentrated
ownership – and indeed control enhancing mechanisms – are prevalent not only in countries
such as Italy and Portugal, where private benefits of control have been reportedly high,82 but
also in countries like Sweden, where they have been found to be low. 83 Moreover, as
discussed above, it has been argued that agency problems typically related to concentrated
ownership are accentuated when control enhancing mechanisms are in use. A number of
studies support this assumption. It has been reported that family control and the use of control
enhancing mechanisms in East Asia does have a negative impact on firm performance.84
However, findings regarding the EU are not consistent in this regard, and there are indeed
studies in the EU that find no relationship between self-dealing and concentrated ownership
and control enhancing mechanisms.85
In fact, scholars have recognized that complex factors underlie the development of the
structure of corporate ownership. We observe concentrated ownership in regimes with a low
76 See Bebchuk, Kraakman & Triantis (2000), supra note 14.
77 Id.
78 Id.
79 For example, with a limited investment the controlling shareholder can in fact engage all the company’s assets
in a venture, while carrying only very limited risk.
80 See Bebchuk, Kraakman & Triantis (2000), supra note 14.
81 See Gilson (2006), supra note 57.
82 See LaPorta et. al. (1999), supra note 5.
83 Several studies report low levels of private benefits of control by controlling shareholders in Sweden, for
example. See Martin Holmén & Peter Högfeldt, 13 J. OF FIN. INTERMEDIATION 324 (2004), Martin Holmén &
Peter Högfeldt, Pyramidal Discounts, Tunneling or Overinvestment?, 2 INT. REV. OF FIN. 133 (2009), Alexander
Dyck & Luigi Zingales, Private benefits of control: An international comparison, 59 J. OF FIN. 537 (2004) and
Agnblad, Berglöf, Högfeldt & Svancar (2001), supra note 21. The studies do not report a positive relationship
between concentrated ownership and private benefits of control or a negative correlation between private
benefits of control and the level of minority protection. See also Peter Högfeldt, The History and Politics of
Corporate Ownership in Sweden in A HISTORY OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AROUND THE WORLD: FAMILY
BUSINESS GROUPS TO PROFESSIONALMANAGERS 550 (Randall K. Morck, ed., 2005).
84 See Faccio, M., Lang, Larry H.P. Lang & L. Young, Dividends and Expropriation, 91 AM. ECON. 54 (2001),
and Claessens, Fan & Lang (2002), supra note 58.
85 See Holmén and Högfeldt (2004), supra note 83.
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level of investor protection and high private benefits of control86 as well as in regimes with a
supposedly high level of investor protection and low levels of private benefits of control. The
question arises as to why concentrated ownership remains prevalent in the latter environment.
In such circumstances a large shareholder incurs costs from being undiversified and possibly
uses resources to monitor management in order to decrease managerial agency costs.
Nevertheless, he or she is insufficiently compensated for this, as private benefits of control are
unavailable.87 A number of reasons have been given to explain this. Demsetz and Lehn argue
that the structure of corporate ownership can be expected to vary in such a way that the
structure in each case is consistent with value maximization.88 Demsetz and Villalonga argue
that the “ownership structure that emerges, whether concentrated or diffuse, ought to be
influenced by the profit-maximizing interests of shareholders, so that, as a result, there should
be no systematic relation between variations in ownership structure and variations in firm
performance.”89 While Demsetz and Villalonga recognize that their argument is supported to
differing degrees by the results of empirical studies, they believe they have sufficient
empirical support for the view that “the market succeeds in bringing forth ownership
structures…that are of approximate appropriateness for the firms they serve.”90
However, markets and market participants are affected by their institutional environment. In
fact, industrial development and political institutions 91 have a significant impact on the
development of the structure of corporate ownership and corporate law. 92In this context
concentrated ownership has been seen to reflect the broader institutional environment. Roe
mentions Germany, Italy and Sweden as examples of EU member states with a political and
institutional environment that supports concentrated ownership.93 Roe argues, for example,
that in countries with strong labor institutions there is likely to be pressure for more corporate
governance institutions that favor employees and less for institutions that support the interests
of shareholders.94 For example, companies are likely to be encouraged to expand to secure
employment even at the cost of profitability and to avoid down-sizing and taking disruptive
risks.95 In this environment the institutions needed for dispersed ownership to flourish are not
present, whereas a controlling shareholder, on the other hand, would be in a relatively better
position to bargain over surplus and to resist political pressures.96 Other political economy
explanations point out that in states with concentrated ownership a political majority with
fewer financial incentives (and more labor-oriented financial interests) may oppose a market
based system related to higher risk taking.97 In this environment the political system can be
expected to favor large shareholders and labor at the cost of smaller investors and to support
complementary governance structures – much of which can be observed in EU member states
86 See La Porta et. al. (1999), supra note 5.
87 See Gilson, supra note 57, at 1649-1650.
88 See Demstez & Lehn (1985), supra note 19.
89 Demsetz & Villalonga (2001), supra note 60, at 210.
90 Id. at 231.
91 See Mark J. Roe, Political Preconditions to Separating Ownership from Corporate Control, 53 STAN. L. REV.
539 (2000) and MARK J. ROE, POLITICAL DETERMINANTS OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE (2003).
92 See Lucian A. Bebchuk and Mark J. Roe, A Theory of Path Dependence in Corporate Governance and
Ownership, 52 STAN. L. REV. 127 (1999).
93 See Roe (2004), supra note 42.
94 Id. at 18.
95 Id. at 18-19.
96 Id. at 19.
97 See Enrico C. Perotti & Ernst-Ludwig von Thadden, The Political Economy of Dominant Investors (Tinbergen
Institute Discussion Paper 2004-091/2), available at http://dare.uva.nl/document/5462.
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with concentrated ownership. The effect of incumbent industrial and financial interest groups’
interest to restrain competition on the development of financial systems has also been
emphasized. 98 Rajan and Zingales argue that it is in the incumbents’ interest to restrict
financial development and the openness of the economy in order to prevent the emergence of
competitors. Nevertheless, as a result of globalization, their impact on financial markets has
decreased, resulting in an increase in financial development and market-based corporate
governance institutions.99
C. THE REGULATORY IMPLICATIONS OF OWNERSHIP STRUCTURE
The structure of ownership has important implications for corporate governance regulation. A
key factor in this regard is how complementary institutions develop to facilitate corporate
structures. Roe identifies several relevant institutions in the United States with respect to
corporate governance, including markets (product markets, capital markets and managerial
labor markets), the board of directors, information distribution and gate-keeping, mechanisms
for coalescing shareholders, executive compensation, professionalism and norms, corporate
lawsuits, capital structure and bankruptcy.100 In different ways and with different effects, they
each address various aspects of corporate governance. The institutional environment of
business enterprises and corporate governance is complex, with regulation being just one
relevant factor. The introduction of regulatory changes may have unintended consequences, as
complementary institutions have evolved to reflect existing regulation. It is possible that
regulatory changes that are not adapted to the broader institutional environment lead to
inefficient outcomes. For example, there may be a lack of relevant institutions that support the
intended effects of the change. For regulatory goals to be achieved, many relevant factors in
the institutional environment would need to be simultaneously changed. However, these
factors can be difficult to identify. The structure of corporate ownership will have an effect on
the type of institutions that are developed to coordinate the interests of corporate
constituencies.101 Active takeover markets are typically associated with dispersed ownership,
and thus the pressure is towards the establishment and development of regulatory systems that
facilitate these markets. In the context of concentrated ownership, other coordination
mechanisms may develop instead, with different regulatory implications.
The structure of corporate ownership is reflected in how corporations are controlled.
Maintaining corporate control is a key factor in the governance of both dispersed and
concentrated ownership. In governance models reflecting dispersed ownership, control over
the use of corporate assets is mainly in the hands of the board of directors, whereas in the
context of concentrated ownership, the controlling shareholders often have de facto control
over the corporation and its business.102 Legal institutions have developed that complement
these systems. Control enhancing mechanisms can, in fact, be seen as a complementary
mechanism that can be used to leverage the monitoring function of controlling shareholders –
in the absence of alternative governance institutions. In this way, controlling shareholders can
98 See Raghuram G. Rajan & Luigi Zingales, The Great Reversals: The Politics of Financial Development in the
Twentieth Century, 69 J. OF FIN. ECON. 5 (2003).
99 Id.
100 See Roe (2004), supra note 42.
101 See Bebchuk & Roe (1999), supra note 92, at 138-140.
102 Marco Becht, Patrick Bolton & Ailsa Röell, Corporate Governance and Control 46 (ECGI Finance Working
Paper No 02/2002, updated August 2005), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=343461.
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obtain economies of scale and decrease firm specific risk.103 Nevertheless, the opposing view
must also be recognised, according to which the differentiation of cash flow and voting rights
increases the potential for the majority shareholder to pursue his or her own personal benefit.
The premise, then, that control enhancing mechanisms can serve a legitimate governance
purpose is based on the application of effective limits on the extraction of private benefits of
control.104
These differences have been reflected in the allocation of legal powers between corporate
constituencies, which in turn has affected the evolution of ownership structures. This analysis
has interesting implications for the importance of retaining corporate control. Cools has
studied the differences between the allocation of legal powers in Delaware, representing a
system with institutions oriented to dispersed ownership, and in certain EU member states
with concentrated ownership.105 She observes that under Delaware law the allocation of legal
powers favors directors and in fact grants limited opportunities to shareholders to affect
corporate matters. She argues that as a consequence, when original controllers in Delaware
companies raise further equity financing, they need not retain a majority of shares to maintain
corporate control as long as they have ensured they are appropriately represented on the board
of directors. Moreover, although outside investors are able to buy larger stakes in the
company, doing so would bring little benefit considering the limited power that even a
significant stake provides in Delaware corporations.106 On the other hand, in models where
the allocation of legal powers favors shareholders, as according to Cools is the case in many
EU Member states, the “original controllers” must ensure they have sufficient voting rights by
maintaining a sufficient majority of shareholdings or by making use of control enhancing
mechanisms.107 An important point is that in either case control remains entrenched. While in
the United States the institutional structure results in “strong managers and weak owners,”108
the institutional set up in a number of EU jurisdictions may provide for the opposite.
Institutional development, then, plays an important role in explaining the structure of
corporate ownership.
An important aspect of the interaction between ownership structure and the institutional
environment is path dependence. The institutional environment affects the initial choices of
corporate ownership structure, which tend to be path dependent, explaining why different
structures of corporate ownership and different corporate governance systems persist. Once a
given structure has been established, it is likely to be reinforced as complementary institutions
develop. 109 As discussed by Bebchuk & Roe, 110 sunk costs, externalities and
complementarities caused by initial choices of ownership structure increase the cost of
choosing alternative structures. Existing structures may also persist due to rent-seeking by
103 Ronald J. Gilson & Alan Schwartz, Constraints on Private Benefits of Control: Ex Ante Control Mechanisms
versus Ex Post Transaction Review 4 (ECGI Law Working Paper 194, 2012), available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=2129502
104 See Bebchuk, Kraakman & Triantis (2002), supra note 14.
105 Sofie Cools, The Real Difference in Corporate Law between the United States and Continental Europe:
Distribution of Powers 64 (Harvard Law School John M. Olin Center for Law, Economics and Business
Discussion Paper Series, Paper 490, 2004) available at http://lsr.nellco.org/harvard_olin/490.
106 As a significant portion of the largest US corporations are domiciled in Delaware, the laws of this jurisdiction
are used to represent the prevalent position in the United States.
107 Cools (2004) supra note 105, at 64.
108 See MARK J. ROE, STRONG MANAGERS, WEAK OWNERS, THE POLITICAL ROOTS OF AMERICAN CORPORATE
FINANCE (1996).
109 See DOUGLASS C. NORTH, INSTITUTIONS, INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE AND ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE (1990).
110 See Bebchuk & Roe (1999), supra note 92.
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parties empowered by the initial structure. The regulatory framework can be seen as a
complementary institution that recognizes and reinforces certain ownership structures due to
both efficiency and rent-seeking. It is important to recognize the self-reinforcing nature of the
structure of corporate ownership, and its relationship to the applicable regulatory framework,
in any initiatives to develop corporate governance regulation – in particular with regard to
supranational initiatives to be applied across jurisdictions with different structures of
corporate ownership.
Empirical research supports the claim that the structure of ownership tends to persist over
time. Grant and Kirchmaier compare ownership structures in the largest companies of a
number of EU member states with long term share price trends to determine whether
companies with superior performance also represent the dominant structure of ownership.
Controlling for industry, country effects, liquidity and type of controlling owners,111 they find
that ownership structures do not seem to be consistent with value maximization principles.112
In other words, even if companies with a de facto controlling shareholder might represent
superior performance, that might not be the dominant structure of corporate ownership in a
particular country. Thus, the structure of corporate ownership does not evolve towards the
most efficient model in a given economic system or jurisdiction, as suggested by Demsetz &
Lehn. Instead, Grant & Kirchmaier suggest that “current European ownership structures are a
function of the complex interaction of historic national regulation, tax codes, strength of
institutional investors and individual/family wealth preferences, constraints and psychology.
The balancing of these interests through the political process at country level has been a prime
determinant of current corporate structures.” One reason Grant & Kirchmaier give for why
ownership structures persist is that parties (the dominant shareholder, for example) are not
compensated for losing previously available private benefits. Controlling shareholders might
even face negative consequences for divesting. Moreover, where benefits are non-pecuniary,
compensation might be hard to realize.113 The authors conclude that creating incentives for
changing the structure of corporate ownership might, in fact, be as important as trying to
address concerns related to currently dominant structures of corporate ownership through
regulation.114
Entrenchment of corporate control is not a feature restricted to controlling shareholders. In
fact, Pacces suggests that the entrenchment of corporate control may be not just a distortion of
separation of ownership and control…but rather one of its distinctive features. 115 The
entrenchment of control has been widely debated in relation to dispersed ownership systems
such as that of the United States. It has been argued that the corporate governance monitoring
mechanisms believed to operate in dispersed ownership systems may not be as effective as
assumed. For example, the central role of the board of directors has long been emphasized in
the United States, and it has been argued that instead of shareholder primacy, companies with
dispersed ownership are in fact controlled by the boards – albeit in the interest of the
shareholders.116 More recently it has been argued, however, that the monitoring mechanisms
assumed to police the board and management fail to function effectively. For example, hostile
111 Grant & Kirchmaier (2004), supra note 51.
112 Id. at 4.
113 Id. at 19.
114 Id. at 20.
115 ALESSIO M. PACCES, RETHINKING CORPORATE GOVERNANCE – THE LAW AND ECONOMICS OF CONTROL
POWERS 14, 411-413 (2012).
116 See Stephen M. Bainbridge, Director Primacy: The Means and Ends of Corporate Governance, 97 NW. U. L.
REV. 547 (2002-2003).
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takeovers no longer seem to provide the management monitoring function they were once
believed to perform.117 With the development of corporate law and practice, anti-takeover
mechanisms have become sufficiently permissible to make the hostile takeover less relevant.
The extensive case law related to takeover defenses in the Delaware courts suggests that the
most stringent board requirements only apply when it has become clear that the company has
come up for sale or break up. 118 Until that stage, the board has been deemed to have broad
discretion to prevent takeover initiatives from proceeding. Researchers and regulators have
also voiced concern that shareholders are in fact relatively powerless in the United States.119
Boards of directors enjoy a considerable degree of independence in corporate decision-
making and seldom have to refer matters to shareholders, 120 and in matters where
shareholders are allowed a voice, directors have been given a right of veto.121 By way of
comparison, boards in EU member states generally require the consent of shareholders if they
wish to issue new shares (sometimes a simple majority for pre-emptive offerings and a
qualified majority for directed offerings) or pay dividends. In a number of EU member states,
shareholders have more powers that can be effectively enforced at shareholder meetings,122
and a controlling shareholder can wield considerable power at the meeting based on his
holdings. In this way, control is entrenched with controlling shareholders in the EU, while in
the United States it is entrenched with directors.
The above findings suggest that the entrenchment of control is pervasive, and that addressing
this issue through regulatory intervention might be challenging regardless of the structure of
ownership. The findings also suggest that it remains important to seek to facilitate the transfer
of control and to develop the regulation of control transactions. The EU may well have a
legitimate role in this process, as national governance systems have shown signs of further
consolidating existing control structures.
D. CONCLUSIONS: PREREQUISITES FOR REGULATORY DEVELOPMENT
Above, the study has described the structure of corporate ownership and the prevalence of
concentrated ownership in EU member states. Importantly, the study provides evidence that
neither concentrated ownership nor even control enhancing mechanisms as such are
necessarily detrimental to firm performance. More important are the preferences and courses
of action pursued by those controlling the company. For the purposes of this study, the
implications of these findings are that it may be advantageous to seek to effect a transfer of
control by appropriate means when the current ownership situation is no longer efficient,
rather than design regulation that challenges existing structures of ownership or control. The
question is what legal strategies are suitable for such purposes in each particular institutional
environment and in light of the relevant regulatory processes. Theoretical explanations
provided in the legal and political economy literature for the development of the structure of
corporate ownership have been discussed in brief. While these different explanations have
117 See Lucian A. Bebchuk & Allen Ferrell, A New Approach to Takeover Law and Regulatory Competition
(NBER Working Paper No. w8148, 2001), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=262103.
118 Revlon Inc. v. Macanderws and Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 173 (Del. 1986); Paramount
Communications, Inc. v. Time, Inc., 571 A 2d 1140 (Del 1989).
119 Lucian A. Bebchuk, The Case for Increasing Shareholder Power, 118 HARV.L.REV. 833 (2005) and Lucian
A. Bebchuk, The Case for Shareholder Access to the Ballot, 59 BUS.LAW. 43 (2003).
120 DGCL §170, See Cools (2004), supra note 104, at 46-47.
121 DGCL § 242 (b)(1); for example, under Delaware law proposals for charter amendments can only be made by
a proposal of the board at a shareholder meeting.
122 For a discussion on Belgium and France, see Cools, supra note 105.
281
been subject to criticism, and some may even contradict each other, they do emphasize the
fact that the structure of corporate ownership is affected by, and interacts with, the relevant
institutional environment. It is no great feat to conclude that legal, economic and political
institutions affect how companies are owned and governed. However, it is further argued that
these institutions are persistent and only change slowly over time. The persistence of
governance arrangements – and the entrenchment of dominant corporate constituencies – is a
major consideration when planning regulatory intervention. For the purposes of this study, the
relevant question is how this interaction should be reflected in the design of EU-level
corporate governance regulation.123
The study now turns to a discussion of corporate governance in the context of concentrated
ownership, with the aim of identifying key regulatory concerns. After that, there follows a
discussion of the EU-level regulatory responses to these concerns (and to concentrated
ownership in general), and an assessment of the legal strategies chosen by the EU
Commission for addressing issues related to concentrated ownership. The study will then
provide alternative strategies or regulatory designs and assess the EU-level response to
developing EU takeover regulation.
III. CONCENTRATED OWNERSHIP AND CORPORATE GOVERNANCE
This section first discusses corporate governance issues that arise in companies with
concentrated ownership. The study then turns to the effects of concentrated ownership on the
dynamic of change of control transactions.
A. CORPORATE GOVERNANCE RELATIONSHIPS AND CONCENTRATED OWNERSHIP
In corporate governance literature, agency problems have been seen to arise whenever a
representative or agent acts for the benefit of another party.124 For instance, the agent may
primarily seek to act in his own interests rather than in the best interests of the principal.125
Typically, in situations where such problems arise, the agent may be better informed about the
circumstances affecting his or her interests and those of the principal, and monitoring the
agent’s actions may be difficult. Attempts are typically made to create structures which align
the interests of the agent with those of the principal. The main agency relationships typically
identified in the context of corporate governance are the relationship between management
and shareholders, the relationship between controlling shareholders and other shareholders
and the relationship between shareholders and employees, creditors or other third party
stakeholders in the corporation.126
In companies with concentrated ownership, the key agency problem is the risk of a controlling
shareholder seeking to use his or her controlling position in the company to extract private
benefits of control that are not available to other shareholders. This can happen where a
shareholder is able to execute transactions with a target company under terms and conditions
that benefit the shareholder. This diversion of corporate assets and opportunities has been
123 See Gerard Hertig & Joseph McCahery, Joseph A., Company and Takeover Law Reforms in Europe:
Misguided Harmonization Efforts or Regulatory Competition? (ECGI Law Working Paper No. 12/2003),
available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=438431.
124 SeeMichael Jensen & William Meckling, Theory of the Firm - Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs and
Ownership Structure, 3 J. OF FIN. ECON. 305 (1976).
125 Id.
126 Armour, Hansmann & Kraakman (2009), supra note 10, at 35-37.
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labelled “diversionary private benefits of control”127 or simply “stealing.”128 Agency problems
also occur when a controlling shareholder uses his or her controlling position to have the
corporation pursue goals that are not aligned with the interests of the other shareholders
(pursuing the personal agendas of the controlling shareholders rather than value maximizing,
for example). A comparable situation is when a controlling shareholder fails to use his or her
controlling position to monitor management but still retains that controlling position. These
situations have been labelled “distortionary private benefits of control” 129 or simply
“shirking.”130
If a controlling shareholder only retains limited private benefits of control while providing an
efficient monitoring service for the other shareholders, the agency costs may be comparable to
a system with dispersed shareholdings, or even lower.131 Indeed, it has been recognized that
concentrated ownership can provide an efficient mechanism for monitoring management. A
large, undiversified controlling shareholder may be able to provide more effective monitoring
of management than the market-based mechanisms available in a dispersed ownership
environment.132 Ultimately, investments in a company with concentrated ownership can be
expected to be based on a trade-off between the costs associated with the possibility of
extraction of private benefits of control by the controlling shareholder and the benefit of the
monitoring performed by an undiversified and consequently incentivized shareholder. 133
Based on this trade-off, there may well be situations where concentrated ownership is an
efficient ownership structure from the outset.134 It has been recognized that even allowing
some private benefits of control to be extracted by a controlling shareholder as compensation
for an undiversified position and for performing the monitoring function can be in the
interests of other shareholders.135 Controlling shareholders carry costs related to concentrated
ownership, such as liquidity and non-diversification costs, 136 as well as costs related to
performing the monitoring function. The controlling shareholder may require at least some
compensation for these costs in the form of private benefits of control, without this actually
being detrimental to the other shareholders compared to other structures of corporate
ownership.137
Gilson & Gordon raise an important point with regard to private benefits of control and
controlling shareholders.138 They identify three alternative ways in which such benefits may
be extracted. A controlling shareholder may take a disproportionate share of the company’s
127 Alessio M. Pacces, Control Matters: Law and Economics of Private Benefits of Control 14 (Rotterdam
Institute of Law and Economics, Working Paper 2009/04, 2009), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1448164.
128 Mark J. Roe, Corporate Law's Limits 16-17 (Columbia Law School Center for Law and Economic Studies,
Working Paper 186, 2002), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/abstract=260582.
129 Pacces, supra note 127, at 14.
130 Roe (2002), supra note 128.
131 Gilson (2006), supra note 57, at 1650-1652.
132 See Ronald J. Gilson & Jeffrey N. Gordon, Controlling Controlling Shareholders, 152 U. PA. L. REV. 785
(2003).
133 Typically, the controlling shareholder is not burdened by the free-rider problem affecting diversified
shareholders; it is not e in the interests of a shareholder to perform monitoring and incur the full costs of this
while the benefits are shared by all shareholders alike.
134 See Gilson (2006), supra note 57; but see also Mike Burkart, Denis Gromb & Fausto Panunzi, Large
Shareholders, Monitoring and the Value of the Firm, 112 Q´LY J. OF ECON. 693 (1997).
135 See Bebchuk & Roe (1999), supra note 92; and Gilson & Gordon (2003) supra note 132, at 786.
136 Gilson (2006), supra note 57, at 1652.
137 Id.
138 See Gilson & Gordon (2003), supra note 132.
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current earnings, freeze out the minority or sell his or her controlling block at a premium.
Gilson & Gordon point out that these methods of extraction are substitutes and must be
addressed with symmetric responses. It seems futile to seek to limit extraction of control
premiums in takeovers if controlling shareholders have the opportunity to extract private
benefits of control through related-party transactions – and vice versa. In fact, Gilson &
Gordon argue that on balance regulation favouring the sale of control may create the potential
for greater efficiency gains than regulation favouring freeze outs. To the extent that there are
effective limits on the extraction of private benefits of control from ongoing operations, an
acquirer of a controlling block will have to increase efficiency to obtain benefits from the
transaction – which then come to benefit the minority shareholders as well.139 This suggests,
among others, that takeovers and the transfer of control cannot be analysed or regulated in
isolation from other aspects of corporate governance. To develop takeover regulation and a
market for corporate control it is important to ensure that other situations where private
benefits of control could be extracted are also properly regulated, as will be argued below.
B. THE IMPLICATIONS OF CONCENTRATED OWNERSHIP FOR THE REGULATION OF CHANGE
OF CONTROL
The exercise and transfer of corporate control lie at the heart of corporate governance. In
change of control situations, the potential for conflicts of interest among corporate
stakeholders may be particularly accentuated. Managers may seek to avoid change of control,
as they could well be replaced as a result, while shareholders may wish to sell their shares at a
premium. A controlling shareholder may have interests that are different from the other
shareholders and may seek to freeze out the minority or obtain a premium not offered to other
shareholders for the controlling stake.140 The controlling shareholder may also retain control
even when no longer performing an effective management function. Moreover, if the
controlling shareholder can extract private benefits of control, it may not be in a controlling
shareholder’s interest to relinquish control unless future potential private benefits are
compensated for, which creates a disincentive for controlling shareholders to agree to some
value-increasing takeovers. 141 These problems are further accentuated when control
enhancing mechanisms are used to separate cash flow and voting rights.
The dynamic of takeovers and the effects of takeover regulation differ significantly depending
on the structure of corporate ownership. In companies with dispersed ownership, takeover
regulation is typically intended to address the relationship between management and
shareholders. Takeovers, or the possibility thereof, can be seen to perform a management
monitoring function. In companies with concentrated ownership, the controlling shareholder
will often hold, in effect, the key to control of the company, and takeovers as such do not
perform the same governance function as in companies with dispersed ownership. In fact,
concentrated ownership has been seen as an alternative monitoring mechanism to takeovers to
restrain management. 142 The dynamic of takeovers is consequently quite different in an
environment of concentrated ownership. Takeover regulation may be of significant
importance, however, in protecting minority shareholders from the possible self-interested
behaviour of the controlling shareholder. In this context, regulation could be expected to
address the possibility of controlling shareholders extracting private benefits of control in the
139 Id. at 21-22.
140 Paul Davies & Klaus Hopt, Control Transactions, in Kraakman et. al (2009), supra note 10, at 257.
141 See Lucian A. Bebchuk, Efficient and Inefficient Sales of Corporate Control, 109 Q. J. of Econ., 957, (1994).
142 See Becht, Bolton & Röell (2002), supra note 102, at 1.
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form of unwarranted control premiums, or it would seek to compensate minority shareholders
for unfair terms. Regulation could also address the possibility of a controlling shareholder
deciding not to transfer control even when he or she no longer performs an effective
monitoring function. Developing adequate regulatory responses to these issues is complex, as
will be discussed in more detail below.
One of the key questions for regulating control transactions (or the sale of control blocks) in
the context of concentrated ownership is whether the opportunity to sell is also extended to
other shareholders and if so, what the sale price should be. Two regulatory models have
generally been distinguished in this regard: the “market rule” and the “equal opportunity
rule.”143 Pursuant to the market rule, a controlling shareholder is free to sell his shares without
the opportunity having to be extended to other shareholders. In the United States, Delaware
corporate law generally allows for such sales, with certain limitations.144 The application of
the rule is predicated on the controlling shareholders not being able to extract significant
private benefits of control in related-party transactions.145 Gilson & Gordon explain that with
this precondition (private benefits capped by legal rules), minority shareholders will also
benefit from the transaction, as long as the premium extends only to the net present value of
private benefits of control from operating the company, because a “buyer would not wish to
acquire the controlled corporation at a price that reflects the capitalized value of private
benefits unless it thought it could increase the value of its purchased interest.” 146
Consequently, assuming that the extraction of private benefits of control is restricted, the
market rule should be unproblematic from an investor protection perspective.
The equal opportunity rule provides that in a change of control situation, all shareholders are
given the opportunity to sell their shares on the same terms. The equal opportunity rule can be
implemented through a mandatory bid obligation,147 whereby the acquirer of the controlling
block is obliged to extend the offer to all other shareholders on the same terms. The reasons
given for such a rule have been based on fairness-related arguments. The rule also serves to
prevent value-decreasing transactions from occurring, as the premium payable must cover the
capitalized value of the future private benefits of the original holder of the controlling block
for the holder to agree to the transaction. However, this also raises the issue of value-
increasing transactions becoming unfeasible,,148 unless the level of premium obtained by the
original holder of the controlling block exceeds the capitalized value of future private benefits
of control (note that the same premium shall be offered to all other shareholders as well).149 If
the controlling shareholder cannot be paid a control premium, the shareholder may not be
prepared to sell, preferring instead to continue extracting private benefits of control where
available, which leads to inefficiency. 150 This increases the cost of change of control
143 See Bebchuk (1994), supra note 141.
144 In re Sea-Land Corp. Shareholders Litigation, 1987 WL 11283, 5 (Del.Ch.1987); Harris v. Carter, 582 A.2d.
222, 235 (Del.Ch. 1990).
145 See Bebchuk (1994), supra note 141 and Gilson & Gordon (2003), supra note 132; see also TIMO
KAISANLAHTI: SIDOSRYHMÄT JA RISKI PÖRSSIYHTIÖSSÄ [Interest Groups and Risk in a Listed Company] 71-72
(1998).
146 See Gilson & Gordon (2003), supra note 132.
147 Mike Burkart & F. Panunzi, Mandatory Bids, Squeeze-out, Sell-out and the Dynamics of the Takeover
Process (ECGI Law Working paper No. 10/2003) available at
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transactions and consequently may discourage bidders from making bids that would be value-
increasing. The mandatory bid rule also has negative implications for corporate restructuring,
as it can reduce trade in control positions. Berglöf & Burkart conclude that the mandatory bid
rule “may or may not be good for minority protection: the rule increases the compensation to
minority shareholders in case of a successful takeover, but it decreases the likelihood of a
takeover. Which effect dominates is an empirical issue.”151
In jurisdictions where private benefits of control are low, it does not seem necessary to apply
a strict equal opportunity rule for the purposes of avoiding the abuse of the minority. However,
modified exit rights might still be contemplated in the case of transfers of control leading to
considerable changes in corporate strategy or corporate structure, and they could be equated
with transactions requiring corporate decisions with a minority veto right. Nevertheless, in
these circumstances there may be more room to adjust exit rights to meet the policy goal of
facilitating control transfers. In other words, as long as there is robust corporate governance
regulation to limit the extraction of private benefits of control from current earnings through
related party transactions, there may be room for flexibility when setting detailed minority
exit rights in connection with takeovers.
The next section will provide an overview of how these issues can be addressed through
different legal strategies. The study then turns to what legal strategies have been used in EU
corporate governance regulation, and in the Takeover Directive in particular, to address
concerns over concentrated ownership. The study then considers alternative regulatory
approaches in the light of the regulatory challenges described above.
IV. LEGAL STRATEGIES FOR EUCORPORATE GOVERNANCE REGULATION
Legal intervention in the markets and economic activity can take many forms, varying from
the enforcement of set standards of behaviour (such as the fiduciary duties of the board) to
empowering economic actors to pursue their rights independently through legal and
contractual structures (shareholders’ meetings, for example). To be effective, the type of legal
intervention may need to be adjusted to the particular circumstances. For example,
intervention cannot rely on aggrieved parties pursuing their rights independently if they lack
the incentive or means to do so. Legal intervention might also be too detailed or too rigidly
defined to respond to changes in the activity that was intended to be regulated. Another factor
to consider in planning legal intervention and designing regulations is how they will be
received by the affected constituencies and whether it is likely that the initiatives will
successfully pass into law.
Below, I discuss legal strategies for corporate governance regulation, the factors affecting the
choice of legal strategies for supranational (EU) legal intervention, as well as the political
aspects of the choice of legal strategy.
A. LEGAL STRATEGIES FOR CORPORATE GOVERNANCE REGULATION
Several factors must be taken into account when considering the appropriate regulatory
responses to policy concerns. Naturally, a basic question is whether a regulatory response is
required at all, or whether the matter should be left to market mechanisms. The regulatory
concerns that arise in the context of corporate governance can be addressed by different
substantive legal mechanisms according to the nature of the agency situation (shareholders
151 Berglöf & Burkart (2003), supra note 18, at 175.
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and the board of directors, minority and majority shareholders) and the characteristics of the
relevant institutional environment (such as the effectiveness of the court system or the
structure of corporate ownership). Kraakman et al. have drawn up a typology of legal
strategies with respect to principal-agent problems in the context of corporate governance. In
this typology, legal strategies are divided into regulatory strategies and governance strategies,
where regulatory strategies are prescriptive and provide substantive terms for the principal-
agent relationship and governance strategies provide different mechanisms for the principal to
control the agent’s behavior.152
Regulatory strategies that may be used to constrain the activities of the agent include rules (ex
ante) and standards (ex post). Many corporate governance matters may require more complex
assessments that cannot be readily provided for through specific rules and are instead better
suited to ex post assessments of propriety (standards such as the fiduciary duties of
management, for example). Further regulatory strategies identified by Kraakman et al. include
the terms of entry and exit for principals.153 Terms of entry include disclosure obligations for
agents (managers) regarding the provision of information to outside investors prior to their
becoming shareholders. Exit terms include appraisal rights and the transferability of shares.
Governance strategies include appointment rights, i.e., the right to select and remove agents.
Selection rights apply both to the agency relationship between shareholders and managers and
the relationship between majority and minority shareholders (i.e., granting board selection
rights to minority holders as well).154 Other governance rights include decision rights and
agent incentives. Decision rights can take the form of the right to initiate or ratify
management decisions, i.e., which corporate decisions are subject to shareholder approval.
For example, significant differences can be identified in this regard between jurisdictions with
a tradition of concentrated ownership and others with dispersed ownership. 155 Agent
incentives are generally based on mechanisms whereby agents are rewarded on the basis of
their performance. Legal rules may provide frameworks for relevant management
compensation schemes in this regard. With respect to the relationship between majority and
minority shareholders, loyalty is based on a sharing rule whereby the agent’s returns are tied
to those of the principal (the principle of equal treatment, for example).
Kraakman et al. consider how the choice of legal strategies differs across jurisdictions
depending on, among others, the prevalent structure of corporate ownership and the quality of
enforcement. The authors suggest that the choice of legal strategies is likely to complement
key characteristics of the relevant institutional environment. For example, the authors
hypothesize that governance strategies are likely to evolve in jurisdictions where corporate
ownership is concentrated, with a smaller group of owners benefiting from lower coordination
costs. In contrast, where ownership is diffuse, there is more need for regulatory strategies.156
Their analysis resembles the established view on the impact of interest groups on regulation
developed by Mancur Olson.157 To the extent that a small, homogenous group has similar
interests, they are likely to be able to coordinate their efforts to affect political and regulatory
152 Armour, Hansmann & Kraakman in Kraakman et.al. (2009), supra note 10, at 39.
153 Id., referred to as “Affiliation Terms”.
154 Armour, Hansmann & Kraakman in Kraakman et.al. (2009), supra note 10, at 42.
155 See Cools (2004), supra note 105.
156 Armour, Hansmann & Kraakman in Kraakman et.al. (2009), supra note 10, at 52.
157 See MANCUR OLSON, THE LOGIC OF COLLECTIVE ACTION: PUBLIC GOODS AND THE THEORY OF GROUPS (prtg.
1971).
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outcomes. On the other hand, heterogeneous groups with similar interests have considerable
coordination problems, and may need protection by regulatory intervention.
Applied to corporate governance regulation in an environment with concentrated ownership,
the above would suggest that controlling shareholders should be able to pursue their interests
independently. Consequently, governance strategies are likely to be used with respect to the
agency relationship between shareholders and managers. It is probable, for example, that the
right to appoint and remove directors can be used effectively in an environment with large
shareholders. Minority shareholders, however, lack a similar ability to defend their interests,
and with respect to the relationship between controlling shareholders and minority
shareholders, regulatory strategies are likely to be observed. Thus, standards for director
behavior are important in such a context. Standards may also be needed to protect minority
shareholders from potential abuse by controlling shareholders. Entry and exit rights are also
important for minority shareholders and are reflected in such things as mandatory bid rules.
Similarly, large shareholders might be able to enforce their rights through private means,
whereas minority shareholders would need to rely on public enforcement. An interesting
question is whether some governance strategies might also be suitable for regulating the
relationship between controlling shareholders and minority shareholders. For example, instead
of to attempting to provide mechanisms that challenge the control of large shareholders,
regulation might seek to incentivize controlling shareholders to transfer control when a
change of ownership structure is called for.
B. FACTORS AFFECTING EU-LEVEL SUPRANATIONAL LEGAL STRATEGIES
Which legal strategies might thus be expected to be applied in the EU context? As was
mentioned earlier, the adoption of supranational regulation poses challenges in cases where
the relevant institutional environment differs across affected jurisdictions – a case in point
being the EU-level regulation of takeovers in an environment where the structure of
ownership differs considerably from member state to member state. Moreover, the
introduction of EU regulation has created a multi-tier framework of both national and
supranational regulation, providing different avenues for interested constituencies to affect
regulatory initiatives. As EU-level regulation in many respects relies on national enforcement
mechanisms, there is also a risk that regulation will be both interpreted and enforced in
different ways across the EU. These characteristics, among others, need to be taken into
account when choosing EU-level legal strategies. Below, I discuss some of the characteristics
of a supranational environment in the context of regulatory initiatives – i.e., what factors
should be considered when contemplating supranational regulatory intervention and choosing
appropriate legal strategies. As will be demonstrated, these factors add to the complexity of
designing regulation, and even to the typology of regulatory mechanisms.
Harmonization or Competition
A key question in considering the preconditions for regulatory intervention is whether the
matter at hand requires an EU-level regulatory response or whether the appropriate avenue is
negative harmonization through the courts and leaving the matter for regulation at the national
level. With respect to corporate governance regulation, such an assessment is linked to the
harmonization-competition debate. The assumption underlying positive harmonization is that
“(c)entralized regulation, or positive integration, furthers market integration by establishing a
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framework of common rules in all Member States”158. However, supranational regulatory
intervention is not always needed to promote integration. The national courts or the ECJ can
also intervene in national measures that contravene basic freedoms in the EU treaties. The
choice of appropriate rules is left to member states, but they must still be compatible with
treaty freedoms, including the freedom of establishment. In the context of corporate law, the
Centros case159 and several subsequent landmark cases on the freedom of establishment have
slowly paved the way for regulatory competition within the EU. The underlying assumption is
that companies and business will seek to migrate to jurisdictions that offer the best regulatory
environment within the EU, which will lead to regulatory competition and to the development
and adoption of competitive solutions with respect to national corporate governance
regulation. However, considerable national lock-ins remain, as companies are subject to a
plethora of regulation, varying from labor regulation to taxation. Moreover, while the benefits
of harmonization are certainly open to debate, some criticism of EU harmonization of
corporate law is also self-serving, originating from interested constituencies who have been
able to dominate domestic regulatory policy but find the EU-level political dynamic more
challenging in this regard.160 Regulatory competition in the EU is still far from effective and
cannot be relied on to provide a mechanism for EU-wide regulatory development. Thus,
harmonization remains a relevant avenue for pursuing EU policies in the field of company
law.
Regulatory Initiatives and Institutional Path Dependence
As discussed earlier in this chapter, it is important to recognize both the effects of the
interaction between regulation and the institutional environment and the implications this has
for regulation. In their recent study on the development of the Swedish corporate governance
model and international corporate governance convergence, Henrekson & Jakobsson highlight
the importance of the institutional framework for the outcome of regulatory intervention
targeting corporate ownership and corporate governance. 161 They find that even if there has
been pressure on the traditional models of exercising control in Sweden (i.e., the use of
different classes of shares or pyramid structures), the result has not been a corresponding
increase in dispersed ownership. Instead, concentrated ownership has been retained through
ownership arrangements outside the stock markets – i.e., by increasing private equity
ownership and by Swedish companies becoming subsidiaries of foreign corporations.
Henrekson & Jakobsson explain this with reference to the distribution of corporate authority.
In Sweden, as in certain other EU jurisdictions, the division of powers between managers and
shareholders favors shareholders. Controlling shareholders, then, can effectively use the
shareholders’ meeting to control the company. This, again, can be seen as a result of a history
of concentrated ownership where controlling shareholders have maintained control of
corporations and have been able to use legal means to do so. Henrekson & Jakobsson claim
that Swedish companies with dispersed ownership continue to have weak managers and that
this ownership structure remains unstable. This suggests that merely changing certain
elements related to the structure of corporate ownership – such as regulatory mechanisms or
market acceptance of control mechanisms – does not lead to actual changes in that structure.
158 Johnston (2009), supra note 4, at 115.
159 Case C-212/97, Centros Ltd v Erhvervs- og Selskabsstyrelsen [1999] ECR I-1459.
160 See Guido Ferrarini & Geoffrey P. Miller, A Simple Theory of Takeover Regulation in the United States and
Europe 15 (New York University Law and Economics Working Paper 197, 2009), available at
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161 See Henrekson & Jakobsson, supra note 22.
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This has important implications for supranational (EU) regulation. The effects of regulation
will depend on the applicable market structure and the broader institutional environment,
including the effectiveness of legal systems and the political environment.162 With respect to
supranational regulation, it is important to recognize that the effects of the same EU-level rule
or regulation can vary from one member state to another depending on these factors and may
favour actors in one jurisdiction over those in another. The introduction of regulation not
tailored to the relevant institutional environment can, in fact, be counterproductive. For
example, with regard to takeover regulation in the EU, regulatory initiatives have been based,
in part, on UK regulation. As has been discussed, however, in companies with concentrated
ownership the effect can be the reverse of that experienced by companies with dispersed
ownership. As the stock markets in many EU member states are based on concentrated
ownership and a blockholder system, instruments seeking to undermine blockholding may
undermine the whole system rather than result in dispersed ownership and the market systems
that dominate the United Kingdom and the United States. Henrekson & Jakobsson argue that
this could result in “an erosion of stock markets in Europe” and find evidence that such a
development is already underway in Sweden.163
As has been stated, EU rules need to be better tailored to the each state’s institutional
environment to have similar functions and effects throughout the EU. Consequently, the
current regulatory approach in the Takeover Directive may be flawed.
Political Aspects of EU Corporate Governance Regulation
As described above, the EU Takeover Directive was adopted after a political and legislative
process that lasted some two decades. Proposals for a directives failed to pass the EU
Parliament, and the version ultimately approved was a compromise described by the then
Commissioner for the Internal Market as not worth the paper it was printed on.164 In particular,
the optional nature of the board neutrality rule and the break-through rule were deemed
problematic in this respect. The EU-level political process involved intense lobbying by key
industry groups pursuing their self-interest and by governments protecting their industrial
structure. However, the political challenges of the Takeover Directive were well known at
time of drafting. First, a salient question is which political alliances might have been
developed to allow the directive to pass without the same degree of compromise. A further
question is whether the provisions of the directive could have been structured or designed to
better meet the main concerns of key constituencies while still addressing EU-level policy
concerns.
The scope of this study does not allow for a comprehensive review of the politics of the
Takeover Directive. However, this chapter will briefly consider the political effects of the EU
framework with respect to the regulatory dynamics of corporate governance regulation in
general. Some scholars believe that as of EU-level regulation develops, traditional industry
groups will be able to coordinate their actions on an international level and focus their efforts
to lobby for favourable EU level regulation. However, others argue that the EU framework
creates a multilevel framework of regulation, with the features of each level favouring or
162 See Johnston (2009), supra note 4, at 151 and 181.
163 See Henrekson & Jakobsson, supra note 22.
164 See Vanessa Edwards, The Directive on Takeover Bids – Not Worth the Paper It’s Written On?, 1 EUR.
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disadvantaging various constituencies in the pursuit of their interests.165 For example, key
industry groups may have considerable political leverage at the national level but may be
unable to affect EU-level regulation in the same way. Moreover, Ferrarini & Miller argue that
national-level takeover regulation is more likely to favour target companies and their
management, while the relative position of institutional investors may be better at the EU
level.166 Callaghan points out that the EU contributes to the development of a multilevel
governance framework – also with respect to corporate governance regulation. Callaghan
argues that this creates new strategic opportunities for interest groups,167 and claims that the
EU institutional set-up allows for competing political coalitions to simultaneously advance
different reforms, thus limiting the possibility of interest groups monopolizing policy.
It has been noted that EU regulation has been introduced with greater ease in areas where
national-level institutions have failed to develop. There is less resistance to the introduction of
new regulation when there are no national level structures or interest groups that are
immediately challenged. For example, there has been less resistance to the introduction of
EU-level financial services regulation as many EU member states have lacked developed or
active markets and there have been few national structures to defend.168 Thus, introducing a
system largely based on models from the United Kingdom has met with relatively little
resistance. Moreover, with regard to the Takeover Directive, it should be noted that the break-
through rule was adopted only in the Baltic States, which had little or no experience of public
takeovers and thus no immediate concerns over the introduction of the rule. However, distinct
company law and corporate governance systems have developed at the national level in the
older EU member states, and change will be met with political resistance. Two legal
responses to such resistance, opt-in and opt-out systems, have already been discussed.
However, other legal strategies include grandfathering and dual regulatory systems. These
strategies allow the retention of existing structures, while preventing the creation of such
structures after the adoption of the new regulation. A dual regulatory system would allow
existing structures to prevail but would restrict their use. For example, companies with control
enhancing mechanisms could be restricted from taking advantage of new EU-wide freedoms.
For instance, new market places have been opened that are only available to companies that
apply new regulatory requirements.
The conclusions to be drawn from the discussion above include the importance of identifying
the constituencies affected by proposed legal intervention and the political alliances that can
be formed to allow intervention to pass the political process. The constituencies that are
supportive of intervention may not be the same in different jurisdictions. It is also important
to seek regulatory solutions that balance policy requirements with the key concerns of
politically influential constituencies. If possible, regulation should be designed to achieve the
intended policy goals while taking these concerns into account. Below, this study will seek to
identify the key concerns that large shareholders are likely to have in an environment of
concentrated ownership and explore whether any legitimate concerns can be catered for by
developing the structure or design of EU-level takeover regulation while still pursuing the
policies underlying the adoption of the directive.
165 See Helen Callaghan, How Multilevel Governance Affects the Clash of Capitalisms (MPIfG Discussion Paper
08/5), available at www.mpifg.de (publications, discussion papers).
166 Ferrarini & Miller (2009), supra note 160, at 15.
167 Callaghan, supra note 165, at 10.
168 Armour & Ringe (2011), supra note 2, at 27.
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Enforcement - the Effects of Regulation
There has been concern that the implementation of EU corporate regulation has not been
uniform and that the enforcement of EU regulations has varied significantly among the
member states. 169 These concerns also need to be taken into account in the design of
regulatory mechanisms. Enforcement issues are not unique to supranational regulation; rather,
they are a general consideration in the design of legal strategies. However, the variation of
local-level enforcement certainly adds to the complexity of EU-level regulation. Consequently,
when it comes to harmonization, the EU cannot rely of the efficiency of national enforcement
mechanisms. However, the EU does provide a framework for monitoring enforcement in the
form of its own court system. The precedents of the ECJ in the field of corporate law have
provided an important basis for interpreting EU-level corporate regulation and have had a
considerable effect on the development of EU corporate law. However, throughout the
European Union corporate matters are still dealt with by national court systems with varying
expertise. For example, this is why Gilson & Schwartz have argued that matters relating to the
relationship between majority and minority shareholders should be directly taken up with a
European-level corporate court.170 Such an initiative is to be be applauded, and English courts
with experience of corporate matters (mainly in London) could well provide the basis for
developing a European-wide corporate court system. However, such court systems are
currently unavailable. Moreover, as legal processes are time-consuming and financial interests
may be great and matters urgent, the court framework leaves much to be desired. Furthermore,
reliance on courts may require the appropriate incentivization of aggrieved parties to use the
courts (or at least that there are no significant disincentives to do so). Typically, potential
plaintiff minority shareholders will face coordination problems caused by their having only a
limited financial interest proportional to their level of shareholding while carrying the full risk
of legal costs for the dispute at hand.
C. DESIGNING EU LEGAL STRATEGIES FOR CONTROL TRANSACTIONS WITH
CONCENTRATED OWNERSHIP
The previous discussion assessed certain factors to be considered in the choice of legal
strategies for EU-level corporate governance regulation. The choice of strategies is first
affected by the characteristics of the relevant relationships and consideration of the ability (or
lack thereof) of “principals” to monitor “agents”. It should be recognized that different
corporate governance forms and mechanisms can be equally effective at addressing problems
related to agency relationships. Thus, EU-level regulation targeting specific mechanisms will
have different, even counterproductive, effects in different jurisdictions. EU-level legal
strategies should not disenfranchise specific forms of ownership or governance but, instead,
should seek to address the potential for abuse within existing governance structures. It is
important to identify the relationships vulnerable to abuse and then apply appropriate legal
strategies tailored to the institutional environment. In this respect it was suggested that
regulatory strategies might offer the best protection for minority shareholders, who may face
coordinating challenges in the context of concentrated ownership. However, in the context of
EU regulation, it may be necessary to consider the special characteristics of supranational
regulation when assessing which combination of legal strategies to apply.
169 See Enriques & Gatti (2009), supra note 2.
170 See Gilson & Schwartz (2012), supra note 103.
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Enhanced Legal Strategies
For the reasons stated above, ex ante legal strategies that target a specific form of ownership
or governance may be particularly counterproductive in the EU context. Gilson & Schwartz
argue, for example, that an efficient ex post legal strategy is superior to ex ante regulatory
strategies that impede the use of legal solutions that may be efficient in different markets.171
However, at the EU level it should also be recognized that the nature and quality of legal
systems and institutions varies across jurisdictions. Moreover, as discussed, minority
shareholders may lack sufficient incentives to turn to the courts. However, even in these
circumstances it may be possible to increase the effectiveness of legal standards by regulating
the premises for legal adjudication. The enforcement of standards could be enhanced by
setting special criteria, such as an “entire fairness” standard or by using rebuttable
assumptions with regard to related-party transactions. Changing the burden of proof in this
way could affect the enforcement of standards. The use of certain governance strategies could
be facilitated in the same way.
EU-level principles-based directives have generally been issued on the premise that member
states can implement them in ways that fit the characteristics of their national legal system. In
the Takeover Directive, member states were allowed to choose whether to implement some of
the more controversial provisions – the neutrality rule and the break-through rule (opt-in/opt-
out). The directive also allowed member states latitude as to the relevant threshold for
triggering squeeze out rights and obligations. The optionality provided for in the Takeover
Directive was an ad hoc compromise to resolve a political deadlock, but as such it may not be
the failed mechanism that critics suggest. Instead, the problem might simply be that the
optionality provided in the Takeover Directive is not sufficiently detailed. A case can be made
for introducing functionally equivalent rules, where policy goals are set and pursued through a
variety of legal strategies and regulatory mechanisms tailored to different environments and
governance systems. In designing EU-level regulation, it may be important to examine the
underlying problems rather than formal corporate governance structures and then to find legal
strategies that best address the relevant problem in the given institutional context. Instead of
opt-in and opt-out mechanisms, EU directives could provide for a limited menu of regulatory
choices, or the directives could provide for different rules to be applied in different corporate
environments, or allow optionality at the company level 172 . Indeed, Enriques, Gilson &
Pacces propose a regime, whereby default rules are introduced at the EU level, but individual
companies can opt for more restrictive takeover regimes – allowing for market-based
company-specific solutions173 . Such a regime would provide one solution for regulating
varied environments, such as the EU. The standards-based strategies discussed above also
allow for an ex post assessment of agent behavior and may provide an instrument that is not
dependent on formal governance structures. In this way, similar policy goals can be pursued
throughout the EU while allowing solutions adapted to specific governance models to be
applied at the national level or even at the level of individual companies.
A related question regarding the choice of legal strategies is how regulation can avoid
challenging the key parameters of existing governance systems. Concentrated ownership
systems may rely on monitoring by controlling shareholders, who also seek to defend their
171 Id.
172 See Luca Enriques, Ronald J. Gilson & Alessio M. Pacces, The Case for an Unbiased Takeover Law (With an
Application to the European Union), 4 HARVARD BUS. L.R. 85 (2014).
173 Id.
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control positions. This also suggests that ex ante rulemaking that restricts specific forms of
governance might face significant political opposition. Instead, for example, general standards
addressing the potential abuse within a given governance system might be more appropriate.
Controlling shareholders are likely to be more opposed to regulation directly challenging their
control than to standards restricting abuse of that control. Other methods to address such
political opposition include “grandfathering” – i.e. allowing existing structures that predate
new regulatory initiatives, even if they are not aligned with the regulatory requirements. Other
approaches include regulatory dualism, whereby regulatory requirements are applied only in
certain contexts, such as for companies listed on regulated exchanges, while allowing
companies listed on other market places to deviate from the requirements. The EU takeover
regime, for example, is required to be applied to companies listed on regulated exchanges, and
mandatory bid requirements are not necessarily applied to companies traded on other types of
market places.
Finally, with respect to the regulation of control transactions, it is unclear whether takeovers
in themselves are the best mechanism for transferring control throughout the EU; similarly,
there is doubt as to whether takeover regulation should be the key mechanism for addressing
corporate governance problems related to the transfer of control. Based on the reported
differences in the levels of private benefits of control in different EU member states, it is
important to focus more generally on developing corporate governance regulation that limits
private benefits of control thus encouraging value-increasing control transfers.
V. ASSESSING THE EUREGULATORY APPROACH TOCONCENTRATED OWNERSHIP AND
CHANGE OF CONTROL
In the previous section I discussed the relationship between concentrated ownership and
corporate governance on a general level and examined regulatory approaches for dealing with
governance problems related to concentrated ownership. The study will now turn to a
discussion of how the EU has dealt with concentrated ownership in connection with EU
takeover regulation, assessing the legal strategy chosen by the EU Commission in this regard.
The goal of the discussion is to clarify the extent to which the characteristics of concentrated
ownership are reflected in EU regulation. The discussion will also address the political
dynamic of takeover regulation at the EU level in terms of how regulation might reflect the
concerns of key interest groups. The study will then provide alternative strategies or
regulatory designs and assess the EU-level response.
A. SETTING THE PREMISES FOR CONTROL TRANSFERS
Addressing Self-Dealing
As discussed above, a key problem in the context of concentrated ownership is self-dealing,
i.e., when a controlling shareholder enters into transactions with the company on other than
arm’s-length terms and conditions. Alternatively, the controlling shareholder might choose to
prevent opportunities otherwise available to the company. As was stated earlier, concentrated
ownership can be a competitive form of corporate ownership provided that private benefits of
control are restricted. Moreover, the assertion was made that controlling shareholders are
more inclined to transfer control if private benefits are unavailable. It seems then that a
prerequisite for developing a market for corporate control in an environment with a
prevalence of concentrated ownership is the restriction of private benefits of control.
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In the context of concentrated ownership, the key issues in the extraction of private benefits of
control through related party transactions concern the relationship between the controlling
shareholder and the minority or outside shareholders. As earlier noted, Kraakman et al.
suggest that regulatory strategies may be called for to overcome the coordination problems of
minority shareholders. For example, “Standards” can be used to subject related-party
transactions with controlling shareholders to an ex post assessment of fairness. “Rules”-based
strategies may be less suited to related-party transactions, as preventing such transactions
altogether may not serve the interests of the corporation and would also challenge a
traditionally basic element of control. “Affiliation terms,” such as mandatory disclosure, may
also be appropriate. Other mechanisms that may be considered include relying on independent
and disinterested board members to act as trustees, and “decision rights” such as subjecting
related-party transactions to shareholder votes if minority shareholders are deemed to be able
to overcome coordination problems. Kraakman et al. also suggest that enforcement
mechanisms should typically be based on public intervention, as minority shareholders would
otherwise be hindered by coordination problems. 174 Disclosure can be related to public
enforcement, whereby inadequate or false disclosure could lead to censure by public
authorities. On the other hand, the “standards”-approach applied in many jurisdictions relies
on enforcement by courts, which requires legal action by minority shareholders. In many
cases, the right to challenge related-party transactions in court may require a minimum level
of share ownership, further raising the bar for enforcement.
At the EU level, certain steps have been taken to restrict self-dealing. With respect to publicly
listed companies, the EU Commission has also issued recommendations on disclosure
requirements for related-party transactions and has introduced annual disclosure obligations in
this regard.175 Under IFRS reporting, as implemented in the EU, disclosure of related-party
transactions are included in annual financial statements.176 The EU Commission has given
further attention to these issues. In its 2011 Corporate Governance Green Paper,177the EU
Commission calls for opinions on the need to increase minority protection mechanisms,
among others. In the Corporate Governance Green Paper, the EU Commission questions the
sufficiency of existing investor protection mechanisms to protect minority shareholders in
companies with controlling shareholders. In particular, the Commission poses the question of
whether national corporate governance mechanisms based on the “comply or explain”
principle are effective in this environment. The Commission refers to mechanisms that would
subject significant related-party transactions to a statement by an external, independent expert
or a decision by the meeting of shareholders.178 The Corporate Governance Green Paper also
refers to suggestions of precluding controlling shareholders from voting in such situations.179
However, such proposals include the risk of the minority using this right in an opportunistic
174 Armour, Hansmann & Kraakman in Kraakman et. al. (2009), supra note 10, at 52.
175 See Directive 2013/34/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 June 2013 on the Annual
Financial Statements, Consolidated Financial Statements and Related Reports of Certain Types of Undertakings,
Amending Directive 2006/43/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council and Repealing Council
Directives 78/660/EEC and 83/349/EEC, OJ 29.6.2013, L182/19.
176 See EU Transparency Directive ([2004] OJ L 390/38), Art 5(4).
177 See Corporate Governance Green Paper, supra note 9.
178 Corporate Governance Green Paper, supra note 9 at 17. The increased transparency of the shareholders’
meeting may prevent opportunistic behaviour. It is also suggested that the party to the transaction in question be
banned from voting at the shareholders’ meeting.
179 Corporate Governance Green Paper, supra note 9.
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manner, in effect even extracting rents from the controlling shareholder,180 thus directly
challenging existing control structures.
Rather than challenging the control of large shareholders or allowing opportunistic behavior
by minority shareholders, supranational legal strategies adapted to concentrated ownership
might seek to ensure that private benefits of control are appropriately restricted. In this respect,
disclosure requirements seem to form an appropriate basis for addressing the problems at
hand. To the extent that disclosure is deemed insufficient, other steps might also be
considered. One proposal that may increase the threshold for controlling shareholders to enter
into abusive self-dealing is the introduction of an “entire fairness” standard in related-party
transactions – i.e., to shift the burden of proof with respect to the fairness of such transactions,
with minority shareholders given the right to sue on behalf of the company. While it may be
argued that a controlling shareholder has no fiduciary or similar duty towards other
shareholders based on ownership of shares alone, such duties could be introduced for
circumstances where a controlling shareholder chooses to enter into business transactions with
the company and thus has a conflict of interest. Even if the enforcement of an entire fairness
standard requires enforcement through the courts by minority shareholders, the shifted burden
of proof might support the position of the minority. A minimum level of shareholding could
be introduced to prevent opportunistic lawsuits.
An additional regulatory step could be the introduction of independent directors elected by
minority shareholders. Independent directors have sometimes been deemed a relatively weak
instrument for monitoring controlling shareholders, as the controlling shareholder often has a
de facto veto on board elections in countries where boards are elected by majority vote and/or
nominated by board committees or even committees representing the largest shareholders.
Italy has introduced a mechanism whereby board members are elected by a relative vote and
where minority shareholders consequently have an impact on nominating and electing
independent board members.181 The election system could be designed to allow a controlling
shareholder to maintain control of the board while also adding balance to the board by
including members who have a mandate from outsider shareholders. This would not challenge
the control of the controlling shareholder, and would consequently not challenge the basis of
governance systems based on concentrated ownership. However, it would introduce an
increased degree of legitimacy for independent board members.
Facilitating Control Transfers
If controlling shareholders can only extract very limited private benefits of control, they may
be more inclined to transfer control when they can no longer provide an efficient monitoring
function. If the level of private benefits of control is no higher than the costs of monitoring
and the costs of maintaining an undiversified investment position, the controlling shareholder
may be inclined to agree to value increasing transfers of control. However, as suggested by
Kirchmaier & Grant, there may be disincentives for a controlling shareholder to transfer
control even in such circumstances. In jurisdictions where concentrated ownership is
prevalent the institutional environment is likely to facilitate maintaining control positions. The
180 Luca Enriques, Gerard Hertig & Hideki Kanda, Related-Party Transactions, in Kraakman et al. (2009), supra
note 10, at 180.
181 See Legislative Decree No. 58 of 24 February 1998 Consolidated Law on Finance pursuant to Art. 8 and 21 of
Law No. 52 of 6 February 1996, available at
http://www.consob.it/mainen/documenti/english/laws/fr_decree58_1998.pdf?.
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question arises as to what the appropriate legal strategy should be for regulating change of
control transactions in these circumstances.
Controlling shareholders generally have an effective veto right over control transactions, and
control is likely to be heavily entrenched in existing regulatory frameworks. As discussed
earlier, the ability to control the corporation and to decide whether to relinquish that control is
a key element of concentrated ownership. Thus, controlling shareholders are likely to resist
regulatory initiatives that challenge their control rights. Instead, regulatory initiatives could
seek to encourage controlling shareholders to transfer control voluntarily when they no longer
perform an effective monitoring function and provide sufficient protection for minority
shareholders in the form of exit rights.
Regulation may also seek to discourage the maintenance of control when it has become
ineffective. In this respect, the EU has tended to favor market-based mechanisms. For
example, it has been proposed that external financiers could provide financing in the form of
convertible debt instruments to monitor firm performance.182 If financial targets were not met,
the instruments would be convertible in a way that would dilute the holdings of the
controlling shareholder. Such instruments would typically be introduced as the performance
of the controlling shareholder deteriorates – i.e., the convertibles would be introduced as a
condition for further financing. Such monitoring mechanisms could also be agreed upon ex
ante when expanding corporate ownership to control for shirking. Nevertheless, market-based
mechanisms may be insufficient to deal with these issues, requiring other regulatory
approaches with a similar effect to raise the opportunity costs of maintaining control.
However, the introduction of such regimes is likely to be heavily contested by interested
constituencies and may be particularly difficult to introduce at the EU level.
B. CONCENTRATED OWNERSHIP AND THE FUNCTION OF TAKEOVERS IN THE EU
Before turning to the mechanisms adopted in the Takeover Directive, this section will provide
a brief overview of the arguments underlying EU-level regulatory intervention in relation to
takeovers.
The EU Commission emphasizes the role of takeovers as a tool for corporate restructuring
and for monitoring management. According to its preamble, the Takeover Directive sets out
to “establish minimum guidelines for the conduct of takeover bids and ensure an adequate
level of protection for holders of securities throughout the Community”183 As a matter of
policy, the EU Commission has argued extensively that takeovers are an important
mechanism for corporate restructuring and a key element for integrating the European capital
markets. An EU Commission staff report on the implementation of the Takeover Directive
stated the matter as follows:
The Commission’s proposal was based on the assumption that takeovers offer a
number of benefits for companies, investors and ultimately for the European economy
as a whole. Takeovers may be efficient drivers of value creation. They facilitate
corporate restructuring and consolidation and provide a means for companies to
182 Gilson (2006), supra note 57, at 1677-1678. Gilson reports that such instruments have been used in Italy,
where Fiat was required to take on debt convertible to equity if financial targets were not met when it was raising
USD 3 billion for restructuring. If conversion had occurred due to bad performance, the controlling stake of the
Agnelli family would have been diluted, leading to the financing banks becoming the largest shareholder.
183 Directive 2004/25/EC, Preambles (25).
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achieve an optimal scale, a precondition for competing effectively on an integrated
European market as well as on the global market. They help in disseminating good
management practices and technology, and thus improve the quality of management
and corporate performance. Furthermore, takeovers discipline management and
stimulate competition. Such transactions are also beneficial for investors, allowing
them to obtain a better return on their investments.
The aim of the Commission's proposal was to help exploit such benefits at European
level and to promote integration of European capital markets by creating favourable
conditions for the emergence of a European market for corporate control: efficient
takeover mechanisms, a common regulatory framework and strong rights for
shareholders, including minority shareholders.184
Takeovers and takeover regulation have a different function depending on the structure of
ownership. Naturally, takeover regulation is generally seen to provide rules for facilitating
efficient restructuring of public corporations.185 Thus, rules should be designed to facilitate
the transfer of control as efficiently as possible. However, regulation can also address
conflicts of interest among the key corporate constituencies such as management and large
and small shareholders, as well as other stakeholders, in change of control situations. In this
context, takeover regulation also has a general corporate governance function. As earlier
stated, in companies with dispersed ownership, takeovers and takeover regulation provide a
monitoring mechanism for controlling management. The threat of a hostile takeover will
provide an incentive for management to perform effectively and focus on shareholder
interests. With regard to companies with concentrated ownership, takeover regulation can
provide mechanisms for protecting minority shareholders’ interests in the form of appraisal
rights and equal treatment requirements.
In the EU, the question arises as to whether takeovers in fact provide the tool for facilitating
the market for corporate control in the first place. The use of takeovers in the EU member
states varies, due to the variety of ownership structures and regulation.186 It has been observed
that “just as there are diverse national varieties of capitalism within the EU, so there are
varieties of takeover markets, underpinned by different institutions, corporate governance
norms and ownership patterns.”187 In the United Kingdom, with a fairly dispersed ownership
structure, takeovers are common, and an advanced regulatory framework has developed over
the years.188 In some other EU markets, most notably in Sweden, takeovers are also fairly
common, despite relatively concentrated ownership,189 while in other member states takeovers,
especially of the hostile kind, remain rare.190 In many member states, takeovers have been
controversial and subject to political debate and criticism by labour representatives and the
184 EU Commission Staff Working Document: Report on the implementation of the Directive on Takeover Bids,
Brussels, 21.02.2007, SEC(2007) 26 [hereinafter EU Staff Working Document (2007)].
185 See Mike Burkart, The Economics of Takeover Regulation (SITE Working Paper 99/06, Stockholm School of
Economics), available at http://www2.hhs.se/personal/MikeBurkart/papers/w_p5.pdf.
186 See Marina Martynova & Luc Renneboog, Mergers and Acquisitions in Europe (ECGI Finance Working
Paper 114, 2006), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract_id=880379.
187 Clift (2009), supra note 4, at 55-56.
188 See John Armour & David Skeel, Who Writes the Rules for Hostile Takeovers, and Why? – The Peculiar
Divergence of U.S. and U.K. Takeover Regulation, 95 GEO.L.J. 1727 (2007).
189 Ulf Bernitz, Mechanisms of Ownership Control and the Issue of Disproportionate Distribution of Power, in
COMPANY LAW AND ECONOMIC PROTECTIONISM (Ulf Bernitz & Wolf-Georg Ringe, eds., 2010); see also THE
NORDIC CORPORATE GOVERNANCE MODEL 57 (Per Lekvall, ed., 2014).
190 Martynova & Renneboog (2006), supra note 186, at 6.
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media. Protectionist tendencies have been observed in many significant member states, with
governments uncomfortable with foreign buyers.
As the significance of takeovers as a method of transferring control varies between EU
member states, in terms of the EU Commission’s goal of facilitating the market for corporate
control, a pertinent question is whether the choice to focus on takeovers as the key mechanism
for change of control was correct or sufficient.. Perhaps other means commonly used to
transfer control should also have been identified and the appropriate regulatory responses
developed. For example, prior to the introduction of the Takeover Directive, control transfers
occurred through sales of controlling blocks.191
C. THE TAKEOVER DIRECTIVE
The Takeover Directive sought to address certain agency problems related to concentrated
ownership in the context of control transfers. As will be discussed in more detail below, the
directive sought to limit the ability of controlling shareholders to extract private benefits of
control in the form of control premiums. The directive also sought to address shirking and the
entrenchment of control. The EU Commission identified the problems addressed in the
directive as follows:
The purpose of the directive in facilitating takeover activity through efficient
takeover mechanisms required the removal of some of the main company-related
obstacles permitted under national company law; these obstacles meant that
takeovers could not be undertaken on equal conditions in the different Member
States.
Two key provisions of the Directive — board neutrality and breakthrough — were
considered to be particularly important in this respect. These rules restrict the use or
availability of two different types of instruments which can be exploited by
companies to thwart hostile bids (takeover defences). To take account of the
differences in the takeover defences applied throughout the EU, the Commission's
proposal covered both types of defences in order to ensure a level playing field
between Member States.192
The protection of minority shareholders was a central theme in the Takeover Directive. One
of the mechanisms introduced in this regard was the mandatory bid as outlined in the
following:
Minority shareholders are protected in a number of ways under the Directive. The
mandatory bid rule provides that if a person acquires control over a company, he/she
is obliged to make a full takeover bid for all the remaining voting securities of this
company at an equitable price. This rule protects minority shareholders by granting
them a right to sell their shares in the event of a change of control as well as the
benefit of the premium paid for the controlling stake. The introduction of the
mandatory bid obligation and/or the equitable price rule in those Member States
where such a rule did not apply before transposition and the setting of a threshold
191 See Jens Köke, Control Transfers in Corporate Germany: Their Frequency, Causes, and Consequences
(ZEW Discussion Paper No. 00-67, 2001), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=256967.
192 EU Staff Working Document (2007), supra note 184, at 3.
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lower than the one applied before transposition will increase minority shareholders'
rights in some Member States.”193
The mechanisms in the directive that address concentrated ownership and control enhancing
mechanisms are the break through rule and the mandatory bid rule, which will be discussed in
more detail below. The effects of these mechanisms in an environment of concentrated
ownership have been analyzed in great detail, and concerns have been raised about the
mechanisms’ adequacy in promoting the goals of the Takeover Directive. Next the study will
describe these views and consider whether the problems the mechanisms are designed to
address are, in fact, the real problems preventing the development of the market for corporate
control in the EUand if they are, whether the instruments chosen are appropriate for this task.
The study will not discuss board neutrality, regardless of the significant controversy
surrounding it at the time of the directive’s adoption, the reason being that in the presence of a
controlling shareholder, the role of the board is of lesser significance with regard to change of
control, as the consent of the shareholder is generally necessary for a transfer of control to be
successful.
The Break-through Rule
The EU Commission had voiced concern about the effect of control enhancing mechanisms
on change of control transactions. The High Level Working Group identified different types
of takeover barriers based on how they addressed the change of control process. First, there
may be regulatory or practical barriers to a potential buyer purchasing shares. The relevant
mechanisms include ownership caps, restrictions on the transferability of shares, lack of
access to underlying shares where depositary receipts are subject to trading, and different
mechanisms reducing the possibility of acquiring sufficient shares to obtain control (cross-
shareholding, pyramids). A second set of barriers limit the exertion of control by a potential
buyer. Here, the mechanisms typically include vote cutters and share classes with different
voting rights. Barriers can also be established with regard to exertion of control at the board
level. The mechanisms identified by the High Level Working Group included co-
determination requirements, special rights to appoint directors and staggered boards. The
large number of these barriers, and in particular the structures related to the use of control,
demonstrate how prevalent the separation of cash flow rights and control is in EU corporate
governance and what a central characteristic it is of European ownership models, so much so,
in fact, that it may be inappropriate to approach these mechanisms as phenomena that can be
“regulated away.” They should instead be seen as a part of the institutional environment.
In the Takeover Directive, the idea of the break-through rule is to provide a framework in
takeover situations for disregarding mechanisms that are obstacles to the execution of the
transaction. The break-through rule removes restrictions related to the transfer of securities or
to voting rights with respect to the offer and the offeror in connection with the execution of a
tender offer. Shareholders should be able to tender their shares regardless of transfer
restrictions in articles of association or contracts, and restrictions on voting rights should not
apply to the shares of the offeror at shareholders’ meetings where any decisions regarding
defensive measures are taken. The other key provision of the break-through rules is that when
a buyer has acquired a certain majority of the shares (“75 % or more of the capital carrying
voting rights”194), he or she is no longer subject to restrictions on the transfer of shares or on
193 Id. at 9.
194 Takeover Directive, art. 11, para. 4.
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voting rights related to the target shares. Furthermore, super voting shares would carry only a
single vote per share at the meeting of shareholders called by the buyer following the closure
of the bid to amend the articles of association or remove or appoint board members. In the
Takeover Directive, the break through rule provides for equitable compensation to be paid to
shareholders whose rights have been negatively affected by the application of the rule.195 In
itself, the Takeover Directive does not provide for a mechanism for the determination of the
loss, nor does it suggest who should be obligated to compensate such loss.196 This raised
concerns in many member states about the constitutional issues arising from situations where
the directive proposes to intervene in ownership interests.197
In an environment of concentrated ownership where control enhancing structures are used, it
has been argued that the break-through rule facilitates takeovers and corporate
restructuring,198 as it eliminates the effects of the structural takeover defences set up by
controlling shareholders. The break-through rule is deemed to allow change of control
transactions which would otherwise be prevented by a controlling shareholder with a
sufficient share of the votes in the target company. It has also argued that the break-through
rule redistributes the takeover gains from the controlling shareholder to the bidder.199 As the
controlling shareholder can be circumvented by the application of the break-through rule, he
is unable to extract a control premium. In this regard, a comparison has been made between
mandatory bid provisions and break-through rules.200 With the mandatory bid rule, a bidder
would agree to purchase the control block at a price that includes the control premium and
would be forced to offer the same price to all other shareholders. Applying the break-through
rule, however, the bidder would be able to proceed with a lower price, as the controlling
shareholder would lose his “lock” on the company. The controlling shareholder would not be
separately compensated for private benefits of control, and this, so it is argued, should
increase dispersed ownership. 201
Ultimately, the implementation of the board neutrality rule and the break-through rule was
optional for the member states, as there was insufficient political support for the adoption of
these provisions on a binding basis. As a result, most member states elected not to implement
the break through rule. It should be noted that the Takeover Directive provides that states
choosing not to implement the provisions in Article 11must provide the means for individual
companies to apply these provisions on a company specific basis. Nevertheless, to date very
few companies seem to have adopted a break through provision.202 Some commentators have
supported the regulatory approach taken by the Commission with regard to the break-through
rule and have been disappointed with the EU Commission’s failure to push through its
regulatory agenda in the face of opposition from a number of member states.203 However, a
pertinent question is whether this approach was well advised in the first place, given that it
195 Takeover Directive, art. 11, para. 5.
196 See Joseph A. McCahery & Luc Renneboog, with Peer Ritter & Sascha Haller, The Economics of the
Proposed European Takeover Directive (CEPS Research Report, Finance and Banking, No. 32, April 2003, p.58
ff.).
197 Marco Becht, Reciprocity in Takeovers 3 (ECGI Law Working Paper 14/2003), available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=463003.
198 Goergen, Martynova & Renneboog (2005), supra note 31, at 16.
199 Id.
200 See Berglöf & Burkart (2003), supra note 18.
201 Goergen, Martynova & Renneboog (2005), supra note 31, at 17.
202 EU Staff Working Document (2007), supra note 184, at 7.
203 See Papadopolous (2007), supra note 7.
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triggered opposition sufficient to prevent the full adoption of the proposal. Moreover, a
further question is whether the break-through rule per se is an effective instrument to facilitate
takeovers in companies with concentrated ownership. In fact, a regulatory approach more
focused on developing wider governance structures and better tailored to the differences in
control structures among member states may have better contributed to the development of
the market for corporate control.
In the Takeover Directive, the break-through rule only effectively addresses multiple share-
class structures. For example, pyramids and cross-shareholdings remain outside the reach of
the directive, a fact recognized by the High level Working Group, which initially introduced
the rule.204 The High Level Group recommended that pyramid structures be addressed by
prohibiting stock exchange listings for holding companies whose sole activity is the holding
of other listed companies.205 Nevertheless, the proposal was not adopted in the Takeover
Directive. Moreover, even certain multiple-voting arrangements remain outside the scope of
the rule. For instance, the directive explicitly prohibits the application of the break-through
rule to a system where shares of the same class are given additional voting rights when held
by the same holder for a sufficient period of time. Multiple share classes are generally in use
in Sweden and the other Nordic member states, while the latter mechanism is in use in France.
Consequently, the break-through rule was criticized for its uneven and unfair effect among
member states.206 The Nordic countries opposed the break-through clause207 specifically on
the grounds that it failed to promote a level playing field.
Despite the controversy, research from the years immediately preceding the adoption of the
Takeover Directive suggested that the break-through rule would directly affect only a small
number of companies. 208 First, as discussed above, the break-through rule only affects
companies with a multiple-class share structure. Moreover, for the proposed 75 percent break-
through threshold to be effective, ownership must be sufficiently dispersed. Empirical
research suggested that, given these limitations, less than 3–4 percent of companies listed in
the EU would have been affected by the introduction of the break-through rule.209 It has also
been observed that if the break-through rule had been introduced, rather than remaining
passive it is likely that companies and shareholders would have taken steps to ensure the
maintenance of their control positions by adopting alternative control structures. 210
Furthermore, new companies would have been able to adopt a control structure not covered
by the break-through rules. In the current regulatory framework, such structures would
204 See High Level Group Report, supra note 4.
205 Jaap Winter, The Good, the Bad and Ugly of the European Takeover Directive in European Takeovers: The
Art of Acquisition 27 (J. Grant, ed., 2005).
206 See Ulf Bernitz (2010), supra note 189. While the merits of “level playing field” or “fairness” arguments do
not seem wholly convincing, it is interesting, and indicative of EU regulatory processes, that the proposal
targeted structures prevalent in smaller EU member states while not addressing functionally similar structures in
larger EU states.
207 The position of the Nordic countries may, of course, have been affected by strong lobbying from shareholder
groups as much as by concerns over a level playing field. For example, in Sweden the Wallenbergs ,rely largely
on multiple-class share structures to maintain control in listed companies.
208 See Morten Bennedsen & Kaspar Nielsen, The Impact of the Break-Through Rule on European Firms, 17
EUROP. J. OF LAW AND ECON. 259 (2004).
209 John C. Coates IV, Ownership, Takeovers and EU Law: How Contestable Should EU Corporations Be? 6-8
(ECGI Law Working Paper 11/2003), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=424720.
210 Id. at 12.
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include pyramids or cross shareholdings.211 Even if a more extensive break-through rule were
introduced, it is possible that other control structures would be developed over time – there is
a wide array of available instruments whereby control can be cemented.
The break-through rule can also be seen as a political outcome reflecting the relative power of
member states. The rule, as discussed above, mainly targets the control structures used in
smaller member states, including the Nordic countries, while ignoring structures with similar
effects in larger member states such as Germany and France. Moreover, it is worth noting that
the vote on the directive largely followed national boundaries rather than political divisions in
the EU parliament.212
Considering the failure of member states to adopt the break-through rule, it is salient to ask
whether a less controversial design with the same effects sought by break-through rule might
have been available. In fact, instead of seeking to “break-through” existing structures of
ownership, regulation could have been introduced to induce the controlling shareholder to
transfer control voluntarily where maintaining control was no longer efficient (when the
controlling shareholder was no longer performing effective monitoring, for example), and to
provide adequate protection for minority shareholders in connection with the control transfer.
A regulatory solution with the same potential effect as a break-through rule vis-a-vis
concentrated ownership and controlling shareholders would consist of more intrusive rules on
self-dealing, rules that raised the cost of maintaining controlling stakes in unprofitable
enterprises and rules that decreased the threshold for transferring control. It has been noted
that in many EU member states, maintaining control positions is relatively cheap, due to the
use of control enhancing mechanisms and favorable tax regimes.213 Other instruments that
could be effective in preventing such things as shirking through over-investment include
minimum dividend rules, whereby minority shareholders can require that a portion of the
profits be distributed as dividends. This limits the possibility of the controlling shareholder
diverting profits into sub-optimal investments. As the enforcement of minority rights varies
among member states, specific minority rights could be strengthened by an “entire fairness”
standard with respect to related party transactions.
The provisions described above might have been better suited to governance systems based on
concentrated ownership and might also have been less controversial politically. As discussed,
controlling shareholders may well have been prepared to accept regulation that limited private
benefits as long as they retained control.
The Mandatory Bid Rule
In the Takeover Directive, the mandatory bid rule provides that all shareholders shall be
provided an exit opportunity in connection with a transfer or accumulation of control at a fair
price. The rule requires a shareholder to make a tender offer for all shares and other securities
pertaining to such shares upon acquiring a stake large enough to secure “control” of a
211 Goergen, Martynova & Renneboog (2005), supra note 31, at 17; see also Bebchuk, Kraakman & Triantis
(2000), supra note 14.
212 See Helen Callaghan & Martin Höpner, European Integration and the Clash of Capitalisms: Political
Cleavages over Takeover Liberalization, COMPARATIVE EUR. POL. 307 (2005).
213 See Randall Morck, How to Eliminate Pyramidal Business Groups: The Double taxation of Intercorporate
Dividends and Other Incisive Uses of Tax Policy 136 in TAX POLICY AND THE ECONOMY, VOL. 19 (James M.
Poterba, ed., 2005).
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company.214 The relevant thresholds are subject to national laws, but are generally set at a 30
percent stake in the target company. The directive also requires that an “equitable price”215 be
offered in the tender offer. This price is linked to the highest price paid by the shareholder
during a certain period (between six and twelve months, at the discretion of the member state)
prior to the mandatory bid obligation being triggered. One justification given for the rule is
that a party obtaining a controlling position may also be in a position to exploit private
benefits of control at the expense of other shareholders.216 Consequently, the mandatory bid
rule seeks to prevent inefficient transactions where the value sought by the bidder would be
extracted from the target company at the cost of other shareholders rather than from increased
efficiency or synergies. In any respect, such a party may be in a position to alter the
company’s strategy and business so that they no longer reflect the original basis of the
investment of the other shareholders. In such circumstances it has been deemed appropriate to
grant a viable exit opportunity to minority shareholders. Through the pricing mechanism, the
rule also limits the possibility of paying control premiums to controlling shareholders in
change of control transactions.
As discussed above, the mandatory bid rule has faced some criticism. The mandatory bid rule
may protect minority shareholders, but it can also increase the price of takeovers and
discourage bidders from attempting takeovers – even if they were value-creating.217 Therefore,
the mandatory bid rule can have negative implications in an environment with concentrated
ownership, as it reduces trade in control positions. Nevertheless, it has been argued that the
efficacy of the mandatory bid rule depends more on the specific circumstances.218 Where a
buyer can extract significant private benefits of control at the cost of minority shareholders, a
mandatory bid rule may be called for. One explanation for the introduction of the mandatory
bid rule in the EU is that the EU Commission recognized that that the preconditions for the
application of the market rule – i.e., that private benefits from self-dealing were limited or
capped, and that efficient enforcement mechanisms were in place – were not fully present
throughout the EU . Nevertheless, the question arises as to whether the EU’s focus should
have been the limitation of private benefits of control from operating a corporation and the
development of both standards and enforcement mechanisms in this regard, rather than the
introduction of a regulatory instrument that in fact entrenched concentrated ownership and
increased the threshold for launching takeover bids. If private benefits of control can be
decreased in the EU, the need for the mandatory bid rule should be reconsidered. Indeed,
when discussing the market rule and the equal opportunity rule earlier in this study, an
214 The text of the directive reads as follows: “Where a natural or legal person, as a result of his/her own
acquisition or the acquisition by persons acting in concert with him/her, holds securities of a company as referred
to in Article 1(1) which, added to any existing holdings of those securities of his/hers and the holdings of those
securities of persons acting in concert with him/her, directly or indirectly give him/her a specified percentage of
voting rights in that company, giving him/her control of that company, Member States shall ensure that such a
person is required to make a bid as a means of protecting the minority shareholders of that company. Such a bid
shall be addressed at the earliest opportunity to all the holders of those securities for all their holdings at the
equitable price as defined in paragraph 4.”
215 The text of the directive reads as follows: “The highest price paid for the same securities by the offeror, or by
persons acting in concert with him/her, over a period, to be determined by Member States, of not less than six
months and not more than 12 before the bid referred to in paragraph 1 shall be regarded as the equitable price. If,
after the bid has been made public and before the offer closes for acceptance, the offeror or any person acting in
concert with him/her purchases securities at a price higher than the offer price, the offeror shall increase his/her
offer so that it is not less than the highest price paid for the securities so acquired.”
216 Goergen, Martynova & Renneboog (2005), supra note 31, at 11.
217 Id.
218 Berglöf & Burkart (2003), supra note 18, at 175.
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important observation was that the need for a mandatory bid rule was directly related to the
ability of a new buyer to extract private benefits of control. If this ability were sufficiently
restricted (by a good corporate governance regime, for example), there would be no need for
the rule.219 This suggests that the application of the mandatory bid rule could be selective and
based on such things as the level of minority protection.
A further question is whether the negative implications of the mandatory bid rule could have
been mitigated in some way, or whether the application of the mandatory bid rule could have
been limited to situations involving potential value-decreasing transactions. If the mandatory
bid rule is retained, however, it may be possible to amend it to better facilitate control
transfers. For example, the directive already allows for the threshold triggering a mandatory
bid to be adjusted nationally, with the understanding that a higher threshold will allow the
transfer of larger minority blocks.220 Furthermore, the pricing rules in mandatory bids can be
adjusted.221 As earlier stated, the directive links the price to the highest price offered in the
past six to twelve months (allowing for national discretion with regard to the time period).
However, one option could be to set the minimum price paid at a certain percentage of this
level – i.e., allowing some difference to be paid to compensate a controlling shareholder for
monitoring costs. Again, the directive allows for exemptions from the pricing rule and even
from the mandatory bid obligation altogether.222 These exemptions could be developed further.
The application of the exemptions is currently based on national discretion, allowing for the
application of solutions that reflect and possibly entrench national-level governance structures.
Instead of allowing exemptions to be based on national discretion, the mandatory bid rule
could be modified so that exemption would apply when other mechanisms were available that
sufficiently restricted private benefits of control or otherwise provided protection for minority
shareholders. In some countries, exemptions from mandatory bid rules could be applied on
the basis of a white wash procedure allowing minority shareholders to decide whether the
transaction is approved.
The mandatory bid rule is an exit rule, and as such a regulatory strategy. However, strict
application of the rule seems counterproductive vis-a-vis concentrated ownership. The
introduction of the mandatory bid rule may reflect the reality that private benefits of control
are still available in many EU member states. At the same time, the rule allows for national
discretion with respect to the level of shareholding that triggers the bid obligation and pricing
requirements. Thus, as the rule can be tailored to specific circumstances in the member states,
as such it is well suited to the EU environment. However, what should be contemplated – at
the very least – is the development of the exemption regimes from mandatory bid obligations
allowed under the rule, both with regard to triggering bid obligations and the price
requirement.
Squeeze-Out and Sell-Out
A takeover does not represent a corporate decision binding on all shareholders. Consequently,
a buyer may be unable to obtain full ownership of the target company, as minority
shareholders may choose to reject an offer in the hope of being able to negotiate better terms,
or may merely fail to respond to the offer. Many jurisdictions provide for a squeeze out
219 See Gilson & Gordon (2003), supra note 132.
220 Id.
221 Id.
222 Takeover Directive, art. 5 para. 4.
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mechanism that gives a shareholder the right to redeem the shares of remaining shareholders
when he or she has obtained a significant majority of the shares of the target company. The
squeeze out right eliminates the free-rider incentives of shareholders in the target company.223
Typically, the thresholds have been set at 90 percent or higher of the shares and votes in a
limited liability company. Squeeze-outs differ markedly from the mandatory bid requirement
in that they allow a shareholder to redeem shares from minority shareholders. In this sense the
squeeze-out right can be seen as a form of expropriation, and thus relatively high thresholds
of ownership have been set for triggering this right. Minority shareholders are often granted a
sell out right, entitling them to transfer their shares to a majority shareholder. Sell-out rights
protect minority shareholders from the potential extraction of private benefits of control by
the controlling shareholders by allowing an exit at a set price. The right also protects
shareholders from being effectively locked-in due to the decreased liquidity of the holding, as
in effect there may be no market for the minority shares.
The Takeover Directive introduced both squeeze-out and sell-out rules that allow member
states to set the triggering level of share ownership (not to exceed 95 per cent, however). The
directive requires that the majority shareholder pay a “fair price” for the shares. In cases
where the squeeze-out threshold is reached after a tender offer, the price offered in the tender
offer shall generally be deemed fair for the purposes of the squeeze-out.
Squeeze-out rules are another instrument that could be used to facilitate takeovers while
improving protection for minority shareholders. In many cases, bidders give a high priority to
certainty of execution. Even the risk of not acquiring the minimum level to allow a squeeze-
out is often deemed detrimental to the launch of a transaction. Lowering the level triggering
squeeze-out rights could be considered as a matter of policy. At the point where a majority
shareholder holds a sufficient portion of shares to effectively control most aspects of
corporate decision-making, a portfolio theory of share ownership would suggest that minority
shareholders have few other relevant interests to be protected than the economic value of their
investment. In takeover bids, it should be recognized, however, that the lower the level of
acceptance, the higher the proportion of shareholders who deem the price offered insufficient.
Nevertheless, considering the level of ownership concentration in many EU member states,
the minimum threshold for squeeze-outs in the Takeover Directive could well be lowered
from the current 90 percent.
This chapter has provided an assessment of certain key mechanisms introduced in the
Takeover Directive with respect to addressing the agency relationship between controlling
shareholders and other shareholders, and the suggestion was made that these mechanisms may
not be best suited to concentrated ownership. The purpose of the discussion was primarily to
demonstrate the range of regulatory alternatives available for addressing agency problems and
the factors that should be considered when designing regulatory instruments. While it is clear
that regulatory intervention is subject to political constraints, there is room to introduce a
variety of regulatory designs, and further efforts should be made to develop the proposed
regulatory instruments further.
223 Paul Davies & Klaus Hopt, Control Transactions, in Kraakman et. al (2009), supra note 10, at 264.
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VI. DISCUSSION: CONCENTRATED OWNERSHIP AND THE TAKEOVER DIRECTIVE
This study is concerned with how EU-level regulation takes into account differences in
institutional structures within EU member states and the challenges they present to the
harmonization of corporate governance regulation in the EU. More specifically, this chapter
has discussed how the EU Takeover Directive has addressed the implications of concentrated
ownership on change of control transactions. The study now turns to a summary and
assessment of the directive in this regard.
This study has asserted that the structure of corporate ownership is related to the broader
institutional environment, which varies among EU member states.224 Moreover, the study has
presented the findings of several studies which suggest that concentrated ownership reflects
the particular institutional environment in certain EU member states, in turn affecting whether
rents are extracted by controlling shareholders.225 Empirical studies of EU listed companies
have supported the view that concentrated ownership can benefit corporate performance
through the monitoring function performed by a large undiversified shareholder, and that
concentrated ownership or the use of control enhancing mechanisms need not necessarily be
related to the extraction of private benefits of control. However, the structure of corporate
ownership and corporate governance regulation is path dependent, and existing structures can
be self-enforcing. Consequently, from a regulatory perspective, it seems that the main concern
should be to address entrenchment of control (with concentrated shareholders) when the
incumbent shareholder is no longer providing an effective monitoring function.226 As with all
institutional developments, the structure of ownership and corporate control can be
entrenched and prevail even when it is no longer efficient. Moreover, corporate control is
likely to be entrenched regardless of whether ownership is dispersed or concentrated, and it is
rarely in the hands of minority shareholders. Certain corporate governance mechanisms may
be ineffective in the context of concentrated ownership, but their effects have also been
questioned in dispersed ownership environments. These observations have implications for
the EU’s choice of approach to regulating change of control in companies with concentrated
ownership. The study argues that the Takeover Directive failed to adequately take into
account the implications of entrenchment of control and the institutional complementarities of
concentrated ownership. The mechanisms used in the directive may in fact have been
counterproductive.
A. ASSESSING THEMERITS OF THE EUTAKEOVER DIRECTIVE
The regulatory solutions adopted by the EU reveal some important characteristics of EU
corporate governance regulation. At the beginning of the study, reference was made to the
arguments of Enriques on EU harmonization, 227 i.e., that in terms of regulatory intervention,
the EU is no more adept than national regulators (probably less so) at properly identifying
market failures, that the EU legislative process is vulnerable to the influence of interest groups
and that EU-level regulatory outcomes often fail to increase social welfare.
First, when it comes to the Takeover Directive’s identification of market failures, it is unclear
that takeovers were ever a key monitoring instrument or avenue for the transfer of control in
224 See Johnston (2009), supra note 4, at 181.
225 A number of studies report controlling shareholders in Sweden extracting low or no private benefits of control.
See supra note 83.
226 See Gilson (2006), supra note 57.
227 Enriques (2005), supra note 2.
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many EU member states. Moreover, the market failure, to the extent there was one, was not
necessarily related to concentrated ownership or control enhancing mechanisms but rather to
the entrenchment of control due to “stealing” or “shirking” by controlling shareholders. In this
sense the Takeover Directive should of course be analyzed as just one element of the
regulation of change of control, other key elements being general corporate governance rules
regarding minority protection and related party transactions. However, the EU’s narrow focus
on the takeover process may fail to sufficiently address the underlying policy concerns.
Second, for the reasons presented by Enriques, the final regulatory solution runs the risk of
further increasing concentrated ownership and entrenchment by controlling shareholders. It
seems that finding EU-level solutions for corporate governance matters is particularly difficult
when established structures exist in the member states. Any change will of course affect the
interest groups prominent in the current environment, and it is likely that regulatory solutions
that challenge existing and entrenched property rights will be heavily contested. In the case of
the Takeover Directive, the break-through rule and the board-neutrality rule were subject to
particular criticism. Ultimately, adoption of the provisions was optional for the member states.
While many states adopted the board-neutrality rule, most already had a similar rule. However,
the break-through rule was only adopted by some of the Baltic States, which prior to the
implementation of the Takeover Directive had neither specific takeover regulation nor an
active takeover market. Indeed, they also lacked most of the structures addressed by the
break-through rule.228 It should also be noted that the break-through mechanism did not target
control enhancing mechanisms in a consistent manner throughout the EU. The mechanism
targeted the dual class shares used primarily in the Nordic region, while ignoring, for example,
the pyramid structures, cross-shareholdings and super voting rights used predominantly in
larger member states.
Third, it is unclear that a uniform, one-size-fits-all regulatory solution is appropriate for
pursuing EU-wide regulatory policies. As discussed earlier, corporate governance regulation
can have different effects in different jurisdictions depending on the structure of corporate
ownership and the relevant legal and institutional environments. In the Takeover Directive,
certain regulatory solutions were “legal transplants” from the United Kingdom. This was due,
in part, to the assumption that as the UK had the EU’s most active takeover markets and
extensive and detailed takeover regulation, UK regulatory solutions could be used as a model
for EU-level regulation.229 However, as earlier mentioned, the institutional environment varies
widely within the EU, with most member states having ownership structures very different
from those in the UK. As a result, the effect of uniform takeover rules can be very different
from that in the UK.
Analysis of the impact of the Takeover Directive suggests that EU harmonization initiatives in
the field of corporate governance still leave much to be desired. Nonetheless, this does not
necessarily mean that regulatory intervention should be left to the national authorities. While
regulatory competition may produce efficient solutions, it is possible that a level of
harmonized regulation is required to provide the regulatory framework with sufficient
legitimacy.230 Moreover, as regulatory competition in the field of corporate governance has
not yet fully evolved in the EU, EU-level regulation remains important. Finally, as was
pointed out, the EU institutions have their own regulatory agenda, and it is unlikely that
228 See EU Commission Takeover Directive Report (2012), supra note 38.
229 Johnston (2009), supra note 4, at 268.
230 Id. at 127-128.
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harmonization initiatives will decrease. Therefore it remains important to develop and
improve EU-level regulatory approaches.
B. DEVELOPING THE EUAPPROACH TO TAKEOVER REGULATION
The study now turns to an assessment of how the design and structure of EU-level takeover
regulation might be developed and what the preconditions for such developments might be.
As such, EU-level regulatory intervention may well be warranted with respect to takeover
regulation, as policies reflecting the entrenched interests of dominant corporate constituencies
are likely to persist at the national level. However, it is important to develop EU corporate
governance regulation that addresses both the relevant governance relationships and the
challenges of entrenchment. Nevertheless, the special characteristics of EU regulation place
restrictions on the kind of legal strategies that can effectively be used.
First, the study has argued that ex ante strategies may be problematic in the EU context and
that the current approach of challenging the control exercised by controlling shareholders and
seeking to “break-through” control enhancing mechanisms is flawed. The current regulation
prevents value-increasing transactions and fails to provide incentives for controlling
shareholders to transfer control, even when the current ownership model is no longer efficient.
Although the break-through rule allows bidders to avoid paying control premiums provided
they obtain a significantly large portion of shares, if the institutional environment supports
concentrated ownership, shareholders are likely to change the structure of ownership to avoid
the influence of the rule while still maintaining control.
Different governance structures and different structures of corporate ownership should be
allowed to develop; however, efforts should be made to ensure that control can be transferred
when incumbent structures are no longer efficient. The regulatory framework should be
developed to better suit an environment of concentrated ownership by introducing regulation
that – on the one hand – decreases private benefits of control (in the form of “stealing”) and –
on the other hand – encourages controlling shareholders to transfer control when they are no
longer effective monitors (to overcome “shirking”). Private benefits of control can be
regulated, for example, by adopting a standards-based approach to regulating related-party
transactions. These standards can be enhanced by including mechanisms that facilitate
enforcement, such as entire fairness standards and fiduciary duties, or by changing the burden
of proof in situations where the risk of the extraction of private benefits of control is high.
Enhanced governance strategies could also be introduced to support the position of minority
shareholders. For example, mechanisms for electing board members could be developed to
enhance the position of independent board members, as discussed above. Controlling
shareholders are less likely to seek to prevent the introduction of mechanisms that increase the
protection of minority shareholders (i.e., regulation focusing on private benefits of control), if
those mechanisms do not challenge the essential elements of control over the use of corporate
assets.
In connection with control transactions, it is important that controlling shareholders have an
incentive to transfer control and that the minority protection mechanisms introduced do not
create unwarranted disincentives for control transactions. In the context of concentrated
ownership, it has become clear that break-through rules are unlikely to be an appropriate
instrument for these purposes. Moreover, mandatory bid provisions can also be problematic
and possibly unwarranted where private benefits of control are already restricted. In fact, legal
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strategies can be developed to provide sufficient minority protection in control transactions
while facilitating deal security. For example, mandatory bid requirements could be modified
with appropriate exemptions and pricing rules, while the threshold triggering squeeze-out
rules could be lowered to increase deal security, while still providing sufficient exit rights for
minority shareholders.
In the light of the analysis above, I now turn to a brief discussion of the political dynamic for
developing EU takeover regulation. As mentioned earlier, the introduction of the Takeover
Directive was heavily contested, and the final directive was a compromise that upheld the
status quo in many respects. It also reflected the interests of strong interested parties,
including controlling shareholders, corporate management and national governments. The
question thus arises as to whether there were less controversial regulatory mechanisms
available for the pursuit of the relevant policies. In designing supranational legal strategies at
the EU level, it is important to recognize the main concerns of the key affected constituencies
and on this basis build the necessary political alliances to obtain support for regulatory
initiatives. Thus, it may have been disadvantageous to introduce a break-through rule that
challenged the interests of dominant constituencies in a number of EU jurisdictions. Similar
policy goals and broader support could have been achieved through regulatory solutions that
restricted private benefits of control and created incentives to transfer control when the
existing ownership structure was sub-optimal. For example, the introduction of enhanced
standards for controlling shareholders and related-party transactions may have better
addressed the regulatory concerns underlying the Takeover Directive.
In conclusion, a strong case can be made that in order to regulate change of control
transactions and takeovers in Europe it is insufficient to focus on EU-level takeover regulation
alone. In fact, it is equally important, if not more so, to continue to develop corporate
governance regulation to facilitate change of control transactions where incumbent ownership
structures have become inefficient. The Takeover Directive seems to have been a bold attempt
to short-circuit entrenched governance structures. The lesson may be that in developing EU
regulation there are no short cuts.
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CHAPTER 8
CONCLUSIONS: NORDIC PERSPECTIVES ON EUCORPORATE GOVERNANCE REGULATION
I. CHALLENGES OF EU CORPORATE GOVERNANCE REGULATION
This study has originated from observations regarding the relationship between EU corporate
law and the Nordic corporate environment. EU corporate regulation has at times been ill-
adapted to the Nordic corporate environment and, in particular, to governance structures
based on concentrated ownership1. Mechanisms introduced at the EU level have been seen to
challenge premises on which Nordic models of corporate governance have been based2. From
a Nordic perspective, the break-through rule in the Takeover Directive3 and the One-Share-
One-Vote initiative4 were deemed controversial initiatives5, while the regulation of related
party transactions in the proposal to amend the Shareholders’ Rights Directive6 has raised
concern more recently7. These initiatives have been seen to undermine regionally prevalent
corporate governance systems8. The effects of EU regulatory initiatives have varied
depending on the relevant corporate environment9. Insufficient attention seems to be given to
the choice of legal strategies and regulatory design for regulatory initiatives to be adapted to
different corporate environments. These EU regulatory initiatives have also met with
significant resistance and have been subject to considerable political compromise or have
failed altogether10. Political resistance – to some considerable extent – has been based on
regional differences in corporate governance systems11. The political dynamic was not
sufficiently considered or taken into account in the design of regulatory mechanisms when
new EU instruments have been introduced.
1 See Jesper Lau Hansen, The Nordic Corporate Governance Model – a European Model?, in PERSPECTIVES IN
COMPANY LAW AND FINANCIAL REGULATION 145 (Michel Tison, Hans de Wulf, Christoph van der Elst &
Reinhard Steennot, eds. 2009).
2 Id.
3 Directive 25/2004/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 21 April 2004 on Takeover Bids, 2004
O.J. (L142) [hereinafter Takeover Directive].
4 See Commission of the European Communities, Impact Assessment of the Proportionality Between Capital and
Control in Listed Companies, Commission Staff Working Document SEC(2007) 1705 (2007), available at
http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/company/docs/shareholders/impact_assessment_122007.pdf.
5 See Rolf Skog, The Takeover Directive – an Endless Saga?, 13 EUROPEAN BUSINESS L. REV. 301 (2002).
6 Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council Amending Directive 2007/36/EC as
Regards the Encouragement of Long-term Shareholder Engagement and Directive 2013/34/EU as Regards
Certain Elements of the Corporate Governance Statement, 9.4.2014, COM(2014) 213 final, 2014/0121 (COD),
[hereinafter SHRD II].
7 See Klaus Hopt, Corporate Governance in Europe – A Critical Review of the European Commission’s
Initiatives on Corporate Law and Corporate Governance, 12 N.Y.U. J.L. & BUS. 139 (2015).
8 Id. at 144.
9 Marc Goergen, Martina Martynova & Luc Renneboog, Corporate Governance Convergence: Evidence from
Takeover Regulation, 29 (ECGI Working Paper 33, 2005), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=709023.
10 See Luca Enriques, Company Law Harmonization Reconsidered: What Role for the EC (ECGI Law Working
Paper No 53/2005), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=850005.
11 See Helen Callaghan & Martin Höpner, European Integration and the Clash of Capitalisms: Political
Cleavages over Takeover Liberalization, 3 COMPARATIVE EUROPEAN POLITICS 307 (2005), and SIMON HIX &
BJÖRN HOYLAND, THE POLITICAL SYSTEM OF THE EUROPEAN UNION, 3RD ED., 214-216 (2011).
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At the same time the importance of EU regulation is increasing and the scope for national
corporate regulation for listed companies has narrowed as regulatory initiatives have been
concentrating to supranational forums12. In fact, EU corporate law has been said to have faced
a revival13, being a key field for legal harmonization and Europeanization. It is thus important
to focus on developing the quality of these regulatory initiatives. Moreover, with ever-
increasing internationalization it is no longer feasible to limit corporate governance and
corporate regulation to the national level. Finally, the case for regulatory competition in the
field of corporate governance regulation may not be as strong as assumed14, and national level
regulation may be vulnerable to entrenched interests15. It is thus certainly warranted to seek to
develop EU corporate governance regulation. It has become apparent that it is important to
develop a broader understanding of the premises of how EU regulation is designed and
structured. It has also become apparent that the political aspects of corporate governance
should not be underestimated and must better be taken into account in regulatory design.
II. ANSWERS TO THE RESEARCHQUESTIONS
The study set out to provide a basis for developing legal strategies for EU corporate
governance regulation considering the (i) varied regulatory requirements of different
corporate environments in the EU and (ii) the political dynamics of supranational corporate
governance regulation.
The study first posed the question what institutional factors are relevant with respect to the
effects of corporate governance regulation and how these can be taken into account in legal
strategies at the supranational level. The Nordic perspective was used as a tool to identify
institutional differences in the EU. The study has first incorporated a political perspective on
corporate governance into the framework for analyzing the relationships between key
corporate constituencies. Corporate governance indices have then been analyzed in the
context of the Nordic environment and the study has established a framework for an index
that incorporates elements related to the political economy and thus enhances the relevance of
the index. The study has highlighted the need to understand corporate governance in the
context of the relevant institutional environment. Corporate governance mechanisms cannot
be analysed or compared in isolation from the broader corporate environment, including (i)
the type of ownership model that is prevalent (dispersed or concentrated), (ii) the
development of complementary institutions for addressing corporate governance concerns in
each type of ownership system, (iii) the quality and availability of legal institutions (such as
courts and agencies) and (iv) the relevant industrial, economic and political structures. These
factors provide significant challenges for introducing supranational regulation. However, this
does not necessarily mean that supranational solutions are sub-optimal per se, but that more
work is needed to analyse the effects of different legal strategies at the supranational level.
The EU framework provides for mechanisms that can be used to alleviate these challenges,
12 See FINANCIAL REGULATION AND SUPERVISION, A POST-CRISIS ANALYSIS (Guido Ferrarini, Klaus Hopt &
Eddy Wymeersch, eds., 2012), THE REGULATORY AFTERMATH OF THE GLOBAL FINANCIAL CRISIS (Elis Ferran,
Jane Hill & John Coffee, eds., 2012), UNCTAD, Corporate Governance in the Wake of the Financial Crisis,
Selected international Views (UNCTAD/DIAE/ED/2010/2), 2010.
13 See John Armour & Wolf-Georg Ringe, European Company Law 1999-2010: Renaissance and Crisis, 48
COMM. MKT. L. REV. 125 (2011), Hopt (2015), supra note 7, at 144.
14 ANDREW JOHNSTON, EC REGULATION OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE, 177, 182 and 212-213 (2009).
15 See Guido Ferrarini & Geoffrey P. Miller, A Simple Theory of Takeover Regulation in the United States and
Europe 15 (New York University Law and Economics Working Paper 197, 2009), available at
http://lsr.nellco.org/nyu_lewp/197.
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but further efforts are needed to develop legal strategies at the EU level that are more
effective and better adapted to the EU environment.
The study has also discussed the dynamics of corporate governance regulation at the EU
level. The study has sought to identify the prerequisites for developing legal strategies at the
EU level that would better take into consideration the differing institutional landscape and the
relevant political framework in the EU. First, the study argues that the framework for the
“market for regulation” includes both national and supranational levels with both private and
public actors, including corporate interest groups (representatives of controlling shareholders,
management, investors and labor), as well as political agendas not directly related to policies
on corporations and enterprise (i.e. political salience)16. In this policy area the EU can
certainly be seen as a multilevel system of governance17. Second, the study has also
emphasized the impact of the institutional structures of the EU, which may affect the
bargaining powers of affected constituencies and favour market-based outcomes18. However,
as a political system the EU remains vulnerable to high-salience issues especially in the
aftermath of financial crisis.The study finds that the institutional structures at the EU level are
evolving, as is the role of the EU19, with regard to pursuing regulatory policies in relation to
corporate governance.
The study focuses on what the implications of these findings are for the development of legal
strategies at the EU level, and what the prerequisites are for the characteristics and the
challenges of this environment to be taken into account in the development and design of
relevant legal strategies. The study finds that the choice of legal strategies and the design of
regulatory instruments at the EU level has not been satisfactory. The unwarranted effects of
EU regulation and the considerable political resistance to a number of initiatives supports
these conclusions. The institutional and political dimensions of corporate governance have not
sufficiently been taken into account in the choice of legal strategies and in the design of
regulatory mechanisms at the EU level. Moreover, the theoretical basis for developing EU
corporate governance regulation has been insufficient in this regard – and is based in part on
the lack of combining different approaches to corporate governance (including combining
legal and political approaches). This has resulted in (i) an incomplete understanding of the
basis for corporate governance regulation, (ii) increased political resistance to regulatory
initiatives due to poor choice of legal strategies, and (iii) unintended consequences of EU
regulatory intervention.
The study argues that it would be possible to introduce EU level regulation that is better
adapted to the varied corporate environments, and that would reflect the (political) concerns
16 See POLICY-MAKING IN THE EUROPEAN UNION, 6TH ED. (Helen Wallace, Mark A. Pollack & Alasdair R.
Young, eds., 2010).
17 See LIESBET HOOGHE &GARYMARKS, MULTI-LEVEL GOVERNANCE AND EUROPEAN INTEGRATION (2000);
Mark A. Pollack, Theorizing EU Policy-Making, inWallace, Pollack & Young, eds. (2010), supra note 16, at
36-37.
18 See Bastiaan van Apeldoorn & Laura Horn, The Transformation of Corporate Governance Regulation in the
EU – From Harmonization to Marketization, in THE TRANSNATIONAL POLITICS OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE
REGULATION (Henk Overbeek, Bastiaan van Apeldoorn & Andreas Nölke, eds., 2007), and LAURAHORN,
REGULATING CORPORATE GOVERNANCE IN THE EU: TOWARDS AMARKETIZATION OF CORPORATE CONTROL
(2011).
19 See Giandomenico Majone, The Future of Regulation in Europe, in REGULATING EUROPE, 265 (Giandomenico
Majone, ed., 1996), Knud Erik Jorgensen, Overview: The European Union and the World, in HANDBOOK OF
EUROPEAN UNION POLITICS 507 (Knud Erik Jorgensen, Mark A. Pollack & Ben Rosamond, eds., 2007, and
NEILL NUGENT, THE GOVERNMENT AND POLITICS OF THE EUROPEAN UNION, 7TH ED. 445 (2010).
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of key constituencies while still in line with relevant corporate governance policies. In
connection with legislative initiatives more analysis is needed on the policy environment and
its characteristics, as well as on the interactions between actors in the relevant policy area.
The EU toolbox provides for a variety of legal strategies and regulatory mechanisms that can
be used to adapt to different institutional landscapes. Analysis and research to be conducted in
connection with EU regulatory initiatives and in connection with corporate governance
regulation more generally can be developed further. Formal qualitative models20 can be
developed to incorporate the institutional and political dimensions of corporate governance in
the process of developing EU corporate governance regulation.
III. CONCENTRATED OWNERSHIP AND DEFINING CORPORATE GOVERNANCE
The study has focused on corporate governance in the context of concentrated ownership.
This has proved to be an interesting and somewhat neglected field of research. Concentrated
ownership has provided a competitive basis for the pursuit of business enterprise21. Indeed,
concentrated ownership has allowed for significant entrepreneurial endeavours and can be
seen in some of the most successful corporations in the world. Concentrated ownership cannot
be seen as an anomaly – but as a governance outcome reflecting the requirements of the
corporate environment22. The purpose of control is not necessarily to extract private benefits
of control but to provide a stable structure of corporate ownership in a given institutional
environment23.
Approaching corporate governance from this perspective has been useful for emphasizing the
entrepreneurial aspects of business enterprise and the dynamics of agency relationships
among corporate constituencies24. Entrepreneurs bargain with investors over the terms of
corporate finance25. The basic elements of bargaining are different bundles of economic
instruments allowing for different cash-flow and control rights. The financial structure of the
firm represents the outcome of the bargain. Concentrated ownership can be seen as one such
outcome. This perspective has also emphasized the characteristics of control of the
corporation. Control rights are one element of bargaining and can be balanced against cash-
flow rights, for example. Control rights may be a vital element for an entrepreneur to be able
to pursue the business enterprise, and in a given institutional environment the outcome is
concentrated ownership. Further development of corporate governance mechanisms that are
better adapted to this environment provides for interesting research opportunities in further
developing functional approaches to regulation26.
20 ELINOR OSTROM, UNDERSTANDING INSTITUTIONAL DIVERSITY, 7-15 (2005); see also Elinor Ostrom,
Background on the Institutional Analysis and Development Framework, 39 Policy Studies J. 7 (2011).
21 See Ronald J. Gilson, Controlling Shareholders and Corporate Governance: Complicating the Comparative
Taxonomy, 119 HARVARD L. R. 1641 (2006).
22 See Zohar Goshen & Assaf Hamdani, Corporate Control and Idiosyncratic Vision, 125 YALE L.J. 560 (2013).
23 Id.
24 Id. at 6; see also Oliver Hart & John Moore, Property Rights and the Nature of the Firm, 98 J. OF POL. ECON.
1119 (1990).
25 See Oliver Hart, Financial Contracting (NBER Working Paper 8285, 2001) available at
http://www.nber.org/papers/w8285.
26 See Ronald Gilson, Globalizing Corporate Governance: Convergence of Form or Function, in CONVERGENCE
AND PERSISTENCE IN CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 128 (Jeffrey N. Gordon & Mark J. Roe, eds., 2004).
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IV. THE NORDIC PERSPECTIVE
Based on experiences from applying EU based corporate governance initiatives in the Nordic
environment, it is relevant to ask what policies should be pursued with regard to EU corporate
governance regulation from a Nordic perspective.
There has been some concern that the quality of the Nordic model of corporate governance
has not been sufficiently recognised in established international corporate governance indices
and in the international corporate governance debate27. The corporate governance frameworks
in the Nordics have, in fact, provided a competitive base for corporate enterprise28. Empirical
research supports the notion that Nordic corporate governance systems have not supported the
extraction of significant private benefits of control, for example29. Yet, as economies become
increasingly international and cross-border integration continues these frameworks cannot be
developed in isolation from the broader environment. It can also be recognized that corporate
governance outcomes in the Nordic region are not the result of unique insights, but instead
remain subject to the general laws and dynamics related to the political economy30.
Governance systems, including national systems of corporate governance, are vulnerable to
capture and entrenchment – so also in the Nordics – and the premises for effective regulatory
competition with regard to corporate governance may not be available in the EU31.
The EU has become, and is likely to remain, an important source of corporate governance
regulation. With the evolution of the EU “regulatory state”32 and the internationalization of
legislative initiatives it is legitimate to expect the EU to continue to have a central role in
developing corporate law. Positive integration is likely to continue and to interact with
negative integration measures. In fact, regardless of what position one takes on the
desirability of further EU initiatives on corporate governance, it is important to analyse and
develop EU legal strategies in this field. It is important to seek to develop EU regulation, and
related Nordic policies, to promote EU regulation that does not challenge the basic premises
of the Nordic corporate governance models. In fact, for the Nordic countries, as small export
driven economies, the EU can provide an avenue to circumvent potential nationally
entrenched structures. However, at the same time, there is an inherent risk of EU solutions not
being adapted to the Nordic corporate environment.
Based on these premises, one can assess the need for further development of EU corporate
governance regulation from a Nordic perspective.
First, based on comparative institutional analysis, the prerequisites for diverse corporate
governance solutions should be maintained in the EU. Corporate governance regulation
27 See Evis Sinani, Anna Stafsudd, Steen Thomsen, Christopher Edling & Trond Randoy, Corporate Governance
in Scandinavia: Comparing Networks and Formal Institutions, 5 EUROPEAN MANAGEMENT REV. 27 (2008).
28 See Ronald J. Gilson, Controlling Shareholders and Corporate Governance: Complicating the Comparative
Taxonomy, 119 HARVARD L. R. 1641 (2006).
29 Tatiana Nenova, The value of corporate voting rights and control: A cross-country analysis, 68 J. OF FIN.
ECON. 325, 327 and 340 (2003).
30 PETER GOUREVITCH & JAMES SHINN, POLITICAL POWER AND CORPORATE CONTROL 140-148 (2005), and
Enrico Perotti & Ernst-Ludwig von Thadden, The Political Economy of Dominant Investors 1 (Tinbergen
Institute Discussion Paper TI 2004-091/2, 2004), available at
http://www.haas.berkeley.edu/groups/finance/June041.pdf.
31 Supra note 14.
32 See Helen Wallace, An Institutional Anatomy and Five Policy Modes, in POLICY-MAKING IN THE EUROPEAN
UNION, 6TH ED., supra note 16, at 69.
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introduced at the EU level should not undermine the premises of different corporate
governance models, including the complementary institutions that support these models. For
example, where control rights are a key element for corporate governance, regulatory
mechanisms that do not challenge these rights should be prioritized (i.e. transparency,
fiduciary duties or reversed burden of proof instead of minority veto-rights).
At the same time, the potential for abuse should be addressed with mechanisms that are
relevant and effective in the context of the applicable institutional environment. Legal
strategies may need to be enhanced to be effective – especially at the EU level where only a
limited selection of regulatory instruments is available and where enforcement relies heavily
of national institutions, the characteristics and quality of which can vary greatly among the
member states33. For example, to be effective, the protection of minority protection
mechanisms may require the availability of qualified supervisory authorities or special legal
institutions (class actions or special tribunals, for example)34. In this regard, the Nordic
corporate governance models can still be developed further, and EU initiatives focusing on
efficient enforcement may be warranted.
The corporate environment will continue to change and corporations should be able to
effectively adapt to these changes35. Corporate governance regulation should facilitate this
process by providing mechanisms that allow corporate constituencies to negotiate the terms of
these changes without the risk of significant abuse. With regard to concentrated ownership
environments this relates to exit rights and cash-flow rights in the context of change of
control, for example. There is need for a more comprehensive analysis of corporate
environments and relevant regulation affecting corporate constituencies – beyond traditional
corporate governance regulation.
The dynamics of EU policy-making must be paid attention to when considering EU corporate
governance policy. It can be noted that certain EU initiatives have directly challenged Nordic
models of corporate governance while models used in other, perhaps more dominant EU
regions, have been exempted. The one-share-one-vote initiative, for example, would have
directly challenged the dual class system used in the Nordics36. Also, the break-through rule
in the Takeover Directive, targeted control enhancing mechanisms used in the Nordics while
explicitly exempting the French system of vesting more voting rights in shares held by the
same shareholder for a longer duration37. An emphasis on a functional perspective and a focus
on regulatory goals rather than specific mechanisms would allow for the introduction of
regulatory mechanisms better adapted to the applicable institutional environment.
The proposed amendments to the Shareholders’ Rights Directive can be considered from the
same perspective. To the extent that transparency is increased with respect to related party
transactions, for example, the EU initiatives can be deemed to promote investor protection in
33 See EU Commission, Study on Monitoring and Enforcement Practices in Corporate Governance in the
Member States, 23 September 2009, available at
http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/company/docs/ecgforum/studies/comply-or-explain-090923_en.pdf.
34 See Roland Gilson, The Nordic Model in an International Perspective, in THE NORDIC CORPORATE
GOVERNANCE MODEL 94, 103 (Per Lekvall, ed., 2014).
35 Ronald Gilson, The Political Ecology of Takeovers: Thoughts On Harmonizing the European Corporate
Governance Environment, 61 FORDHAM L. REV. 161, 174-175 (1992).
36 See Skog (2003), supra note 5.
37 Ulf Bernitz, Mechanisms of Ownership Control and the Issue of Disproportionate Distribution of Power in
COMPANY LAW AND ECONOMIC PROTECTIONISM 191, 194 (Ulf Bernitz & Wolf-Georg Ringe, eds., 2010).
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the Nordic environment, where disclosure of related party transactions has not been as
detailed as now proposed. However, requirements on shareholder approval of related party
transactions would clearly undermine concentrated ownership interests and allow for
opportunistic behaviour by minority shareholders with diversified holdings and different risk
profiles. In the context of concentrated ownership, different regulatory mechanisms, such as
disclosure, enhanced liability, or third party trusteeship arrangements would be better suited
for these purposes.
Overall, the current regulatory goals at the EU level, as such, may be less problematic from a
Nordic perspective. The goals identified in the 2012 Company Law Action Plan, for example,
included ways of (i) enhancing transparency, (ii) engaging shareholders and (iii) supporting
companies’ growth and competitiveness especially with regard to enhancing cross-border
business38. While these goals are general in nature they would not, as such, conflict with
Nordic corporate governance. However, from a Nordic perspective, some further goals for EU
corporate governance regulation could be added, including (i) applying a functional approach
to EU regulation that does not disenfranchise or undermine different forms of corporate
governance, and (ii) facilitating the ability of businesses to adapt to a changing business
environment.
V. FURTHER RESEARCH
Much work is needed to develop regulatory approaches to meet the requirements of an ever
more internationalized environment. Defining regulation and legal systems in purely national
terms is certainly outdated, while the basis for regional political and regulatory systems is still
very much in the developing phase. Challenges related to the development of regulation that
is applied to huge and diverse regions and issued through fairly new political systems, such as
the EU, will of course be more profound than at the national level, which has largely served
as an institutional basis for regulation for the past centuries. Further research on EU
legislative processes and on the effects of EU regulation is certainly called for.
This study has focused on creating a framework for understanding the interaction among
regulation, politics and institutional structures. This framework can be tested and built on by
empirical and analytical means to gain more insight into the dynamics of EU corporate
governance regulation as well as the dynamics of regulation in multilevel environments more
generally. The individual chapters in this study can form a basis for further empirical and
analytical studies.
Corporate Governance Indices
Empirical studies can be used to develop the framework for a Nordic corporate governance
index established in the chapter “Towards a Nordic Corporate Governance Index – Metrics
for Concentrated Ownership”. The framework can be tested and further developed with
respect to the relative weight of different mechanisms in different corporate environments.
Further jurisdictions can be added to test the framework and its robustness. The results can
then be compared with other corporate governance indexes and it can be analysed whether the
framework provides for more accurate metrics.
38 Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and
Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions, Action Plan: European Company Law and Corporate
Governance – a Modern Legal Framework for More Engaged Shareholders and Sustainable Companies,
COM(2012) 740/2.
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Qualitative Models for EU Policy-Making
The approaches developed in the chapters on the law and politics of the EU company law
action plan (“The Law and Politics of the EU Company Law Action Plan – Towards a federal
System of Corporate Governance Regulation in the EU?”) and on the law and politics of
supranational regulation (“Law and Politics of Supranational Regulation: Dynamics of EU
Corporate Governance Regulation”) can be used to analyse pending or very recent corporate
governance initiatives – specifically the proposed amendments to the Shareholders’ Rights
Directive. The amendments provide a potentially interesting reflection on the dynamics
among relevant corporate interest groups in the framework of EU corporate governance
regulation in the current political climate with an active Commission. The approaches
developed in the chapters can be built on through qualitative methods, including interviews,
in relation to the legislative process underlying the proposed amendments.
Comparative Institutional Analysis in the EU
The EU has launched projects with the aim of better regulation39. The EU efforts for better
regulation may have been driven by populist policy, as sentiment among electorates has been
negative towards EU regulation that has been deemed overly burdensome and technically
complex40. Yet serious efforts to develop EU regulation are clearly warranted.
A key factor in developing EU level regulation is increasing knowledge of regulatory
environments and solutions adopted in the EU member states. This study suggests that further
comparative analysis of different corporate governance models in the EU is important and
useful for developing appropriate regulation. In this analysis corporate governance must be
understood broadly. The factors affecting corporate enterprise and the relative positions of
key corporate constituencies are not limited to the relevant provisions of national company
law, but includes the broader regulatory and institutional environment. Relevant factors
include the prevalent industrial structures and the prevalent structures of corporate ownership,
effects of taxation, the quality of legal institutions (courts and agencies), the structure of the
political system, and the dynamics of political coordination.
Projects to outline and compare corporate law systems in the EU in a more comprehensive
manner would be called for in order to gain insights for developing EU level legal strategies.
An important effort to develop corporate regulation at the EU level has been the EU model
company law project41. This initiative is useful and could be broadened to include more
comprehensive analysis of the background of different regulatory solutions (in their
respective institutional environments). However, the goal of the project does not have to be
the introduction of a uniform company law or even a model code. In fact, it has been
proposed that such comprehensive uniform rules may be counterproductive42. However, this
exercise provides the framework for a comprehensive comparative discussion and analysis of
national company laws in the EU, and increases our understanding of the variety of the
39 Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and
Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions, Better Regulation for Better Results - An EU Agenda,
COM(2015) 215 final, Strasbourg, 19.5.2015.
40 Id.
41 See Theodor Baums & Paul Kruger Andersen, The European Model Company Act Project in PERSPECTIVES IN
COMPANY LAW AND FINANCIAL REGULATION, supra note 1, at 5; see also Introduction to the Final European
Model Company Act, September 2015, available at http://law.au.dk/en/research/projects/european-model-
company-act-emca/.
42 Hopt (2015), supra note 7, at 211-212.
318
institutional environments affecting corporate enterprise. Indeed, the scope of the comparative
exercise should be broadened so as to provide a more comprehensive analysis of the
relationship between corporate governance environments and corporate law in the EU
member states. This would provide a better basis for EU policy-making in the field of
corporate governance and company law in general.
Corporate Theories – from Agency Theory to Financial Contracting and Game Theory
Finally, it seems that further research is also warranted with respect to general corporate
theory. Corporate governance theories may well have been influenced by existing industrial
and political structures, and have proved insufficient when these structures evolve. An
emphasis on the institutional context of corporate governance and on the incomplete nature of
contracting provide the basis for pursuing more general premises for corporate governance.
Theories on corporate governance related to the application of game theoretical approaches in
institutional settings can provide a more nuanced basis for understanding the relationships
among corporate constituencies43. Importantly, these approaches provide a basis that also
takes corporate performance and efficiency into consideration, while allowing for the
inclusion of political realities and dynamics into the realm of corporate governance. In this
respect, the application of comparative institutional analysis to specific corporate governance
environments in the EU has provided a promising field of comparative corporate governance
research44.
43 See MASAHIKO AOKI, THE CO-OPERATIVE GAME THEORY OF THE FIRM (1984).
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